(eng. FAS, Free Alongside Sheep - Free along the ship) FAS

one of the basic conditions that determine the procedure for the supply and payment of goods in international trade. According to this condition, the seller is obliged to deliver the goods to the board of the vessel, and the recipient carries the cost of loading goods to the vessel.

Dictionary of Financial Terms

FAS.

commercial conditions defining the procedure for the supply and payment of goods in international trade. The term is formed from the initial letters english words "FREE ALONG SHIP" (free along the vessel). Buying and selling goods on FAS terms means the responsibility of the Seller at the expense of its forces and means to deliver the goods to the board of the vessel. The buyer is obliged to charter the ship in a timely manner, he carries all the costs of loading goods on board. The risk of random death or damage passes from the seller to the buyer at the time of the actual delivery of goods along the boards of the vessel. When delivering the goods on the FAS terms, the price of the product is included directly price the product, as well as transport and other expenses.

Explanatory dictionary of the living Great Russian, Dal Vladimir

Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language. D.N. Ushakov

fAS.

faca, m. (Fr. Face - face).

Facial side of what (Book.). FAS of our housing ... went to the Neva. Leskov.

Straight section of a fortress fence or field fortification with a certain direction of fire (military.).

Explanatory dictionary of the Russian language. S.I. IGOV, N.Yu.Shvedova.

fAS.

A, m. (Spec.) Front view, from Linden, Fear. Take a picture in F.V. Profile. Turn the faces.

arr. faithful ,y ,y.

A new intelligent-word-formational dictionary of the Russian language, T. F. Efremova.

Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1998

fAS.

FAS (FRANZ. FACE - face) in fortification is a straight line of trenches, a passing of messages, unspoken anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers.

fAS.

FAS (English FAS, Socre. From Free Alongside Ship - freely along the boards of the vessel) Type of a foreign trade agreement associated with the delivery of goods by water, when the cost of delivering it to the vessel is included in the price of goods.

Big Law Dictionary

fAS.

an international trade term, one of the Franco-Terms of delivery in commercial operations (remained unchanged in the publication "Incoterms" 1990). Literally means "freely along the boards of the ship". According to this condition, the seller is considered to have fulfilled its duties when the goods are placed along the boards of the vessel on the pier or on lighter. From this point on, all the costs and risks of death or damage to the goods must bear the buyer. As under the condition of the Franco Plant, the buyer carries out the cleaning of goods from export duties and customs formalities - in contrast to the Condition of FOB, where this operation is assigned to the seller. The FAS condition applies only to shipping by marine or river transport.

FAS (face)

FAS. - Side of anything facing the viewer (see Fear). In a military business: FAS - the fortification side facing the enemy.

The facas are also called straight areas of wire obstacles, trenches and anti-tank pvs.

FAS (values)

• FAS. - front side.
• FAS. - Command with dog training.

FAS.

FAS (football club)

FAS - Salvador football club from Santa Ana. Speakers in the premiere of Salvador, the strongest division of El Salvador. The club was founded on February 16, 1947, homemade matches spend on the arena "Estadio Oscar Kuiteno", which accommodates 15,000 spectators. " FAS."The most titled club of El Salvador, and one of the most titled clubs in Concacaph.

Examples of the use of the word FAS in the literature.

Having so large forces in front of the southern fAS. Barvenkovskoye bridgehead, the German fascist command intended them for applying two blows - on Barvenkovo \u200b\u200band in the direction of the long, where the supporting office of the 9th Army is located.

The most important thing - Bayazet was taken, the Russian flag was waving over facami. Ancient fortress.

The height and width of the nose, the length of the nose backrest, the depth of the nose, the nose speech, the contour of the back in the profile, width and form of the back in fAS., Nose base position in profile, position and shape of the tip of the nose and the shape of the wings of the nose.

Let's try to deploy a mysterious phenomenon - Domestication, but not in fAS., and in the profile.

Going to the right home house fAS. On the street, Turkevich winks to his companions cheerfully, threw the Kartus upwards and announced loudly that he lives here not the boss, but his native, Turkevich, father and benefactor.

Cygaranty to the edge, upstairs, Osnari faca And send two crags to kom kill.

From high faca It was seen like rediffs trained by British instructors, riff testers: The ground took off with their shovel high above the bars, and the fitting fire threatened to become particularly dense and dangerous.

First of all, it is the root side of the large canvas shown on the left, rather, not even a turnover, and the front side, since it shows fAS. What is hidden by the position of this canvase.

It was South fAS. Kursk protrusion, where the defense was headed by the Field Office of the Voronezh Front.

Meanwhile, within 12 and 13 November, the front commander in accordance with the notes put the troops on the defense of the southern faca Bridgehead at the front Zhytomyr, Fastov, Tripolie.

She occupied part of the Western faca Kursk protrusion - to a junction with the troops of the central front.

By this time, we moved our headquarters on the northern outskirts of the Obovoi, in the depths of the southern faca arcs.

On the same day, he went to Peterhof in the evening, to the other day the same to accurately congratulate the three faca Midmiarines with production in Michmans.

This is confirmed by the fact that in southern fACE Kursk arc opponent on the first day struck the forces of five buildings, and in the northern - three.

Suddenly, the girl turned her head to the window, and Sergey at the same time saw her profile and fAS. Already from the depths of the dark running wagon glass, and her face now looked at Sergey from there carefully and sad.

To establish the exact time of the beginning of the German offensive, at the entire central front, the actions of intelligence groups were strengthened, however, despite the efforts made, to seize the "language" only in the night immediately before the start of the "Citadel" operation. In a short battle on the neutral strip, the Sapper of the 6th Infantry Division of Bruno Formel was captured, who had shown at the interrogation at the headquarters of the 13th Army, that his group had a task to clear the passages in the Soviet booms at the forefront and that the German offensive should begin at 3 am 5'th of July.

According to the memoirs of Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky, when this data was obtained at the headquarters of the front, the time for discussion of possible solutions had almost no time. After a short consultation with a representative of the Marshal rate of G. K. Zhukov at 2 o'clock 20 minutes was given an order about the start of counterpropitation. However, having achieved a certain surprise, the Soviet side, nevertheless, failed to disrupt the plans of the enemy. Darkness not only limited the possibility of observing and adjusting artillery fire, but also eliminated the expected actions of aviation.

Meanwhile, at 2:30 pm, the headquarters of the 18th air army sent a directive in the corps and divisions that determined the actions of aviators for the coming hours. The order of the commander of the 16th air army of Lieutenant General S. I. Rudenko was reading on July 5: "One third fighter can be prepared with the dawn to reflect possible opponent aviation raids. The rest of the fighters be in thirty-minute readiness to fulfill the combat order No. 0048 - a special order. One third attack aircraft and bombers to be prepared from 6:00, and the rest in thirty-minute readiness for the fulfillment of combat order No. 0048 - a special order " . For the first departure to the front line, it was envisaged to use three groups of the 6th IAC with a total number of 40 fighters.

To understand the logic of the events that occurred in the first half of July 5, it is necessary to stop at the consideration of the decision of General S. I. Rudenko several more. The order mentioned above determines the actions of aviation in the event of an opponent's transition to the offensive, contained a schedule of aircraft-departures of fighter and assault aviation. Entering it to action was especially relevant for the command of the 6th IAC and the 1st GW. Jad, whose main task was to conquer domination in the air. According to Order No. 0048, the headquarters of these compounds were to provide continuous patrols from at least 30 fighters from the first hours of battle. However, the commander of the 16th air army considered the premature commissioning of the intense pattern of patrolling, limiting himself by the expulsion to the front line of strong groups of fighters. This decision was justified, based on the uncertainty of the situation established by the time, but in the future, when the actions of German aviation acquired a lot of scope, it was largely disorganized to the work of fighter compounds.

We now turn to the description of the start of the air battle. The first groups of German aircraft were marked by Soviet observers at 4 am. At about 4:40, with the beginning of the German artillery training, the actions of the 1st Aircondvisa bombers received an additional impetus - the objects of their attacks were the position of the Soviet troops and artillery in the Mahalogengelsk district. In response to the increased activity of the enemy, fighters of the 6th IAK were raised by the command of the 16th air army.

The first to the front line approached 18 "Yakov", which were led by the commander of the 157th Japa Major V. F. Volkov (hero Soviet Union from 1.7.44). Among other parts of the 6th IAP, the regiment was distinguished by a chilling and well-prepared flight. While still as part of the 3rd air army, it was equipped with the best fighters of the Kalininsky front fighters. Approaching the Patrol District, the pails of "Yakov" deployed along the front of the front, the pilots of Yakov found in the Maharkhangelsk area - the upper pine is about 25 JU-88, which bombed the location of the Soviet troops. The entire area of \u200b\u200bthe action of enemy bombers was blocked by numerous "Fockey Wulfs" from the composition III / JG51, which acted at altitudes from 2000 to 7000 meters.

The impact eight commander of the squadron of the Hero of the Soviet Union of Captain V. N. Zalevsky tried to break through the FW-190 barrier to bombers. It was possible to be done only by four "yaks", attacked "Junkers" from behind below, whereas the rest of the group was connected by air fighting with German fighters. According to the reports of pilots, the captain of V. N. Zalevsky was shot down two bombers. Two more "Junkers" were set fire to lieutenant Anufriev and Sergeant G. Kh. Kargayev. However, at the exit from the attack, the aircraft V. N. Zalevsky and Anufrian themselves became victims of the "Fockey-Wolfs" attacks. Both pilots, having injured, jumped out of burning cars on parachutes. Captain V.N. Zalevsky, who received wounded in his leg, later died in the hospital.

At this time, ten "yaks" Major V. F. Volkov led a busy air combat with a whole pack of Fokke-Wolf. According to the data recorded by the headquarters, the regiment, the price of damage to four of their cars managed to knock down 9 FW-190. In battle, the future heroes of the Soviet Union A. E. Borovy and I. V. Maslov. However, the command of the 6th IAK otherwise estimated the results of the fight by counting the victory pilots over 3 JU-88 and 2 FW-190. The air battle caused a great inspiration of land forces observing him. Documents of the 6th JAK show that the infantry and tankers met the appearance and attack of the red fighters of the shouts of "Hurray!", And at the end of the fight Commander of the 2nd Tank Army, Lieutenant-General A. G. Rodin sent an avtomator.

From the German side, fighter fighters from the composition of III / JG51 declared five shot down Soviet aircraft identified by German pilots as MiG-3 and Lagg. The first two victories with a two-minute interval (at 4:45 and 4:50) won Feldfel Hubert Strasl (Strassl Hubert) from the detachment 8./jg51. We have repeatedly mention the name of this pilot, but as long as we point out that, perhaps, it was his attack that became fatal for Captain V.N. Zalevsky and Lieutenant Anufriev. The losses of the German side amounted to 1 FW-190 of 9./jg51, who considered missing, and also, probably, the JU-88A-14 commander 8./kg1 (posthumously awarded by the Knight's Cross Hermann Michael Hermann, which, in German This data was exploded in the air. From the crew of "Junkers" managed to escape only by one aviator. Unfortunately, the absence of more detailed data on the death of the AA does not understand it unambiguously assert that he became the victim of the pilots of the 157th IAP.

In addition to the 6th, the Patrol of the Front Patrol, other fighter divisions of the 16th Air Army were also involved. Among them, in particular, there was a 286th JaM, whose main task was the accompaniment of attack aircraft 299th Shad. However, while "Ils" were forced to stand up on Earth, Lavochkina, the 286th Jaad made several departures to cover the terrestrial troops. At about 6:00, a group of 8 La-5 721th IAP, driven by the captain N. M. Tregubov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 13.4.44), attacked about 50 bombers identified as JU-88 and DO-215 (throughout Visibility, these were BF-110 from the composition I / ZG1), which covered up to 50 FW-190. Despite the inequality of forces, the pilots of the 721th JAP managed to hold an attack in which the captain N. M. Tregubov was recorded two victories over DO-215 and FW-190.

One of the victims of the attacks of the 16th air army fighters were the JU-87D-3 of the 7./stg1 detachment, the crew of which, as part of the Heil Heinz pilot, and the Radist Arrow Gerhardt Scramma (Schramm Gerhard), was Captured by Red Army in the location of the 70th army. Sharing at interrogation impressions about the power of resistance to Russian fighter aviation, German aviators showed: "We arrived at the Soviet-German Front on July 3 from Yugoslavia. On July 5, at 2 o'clock 15 minutes, our squadron received an order to bomb fortifications of Russians. We have not yet managed to reset bombs, as our bombarder "Junkers-87" was set on fire by the Soviet fighter. To confess, we expected strong counteraction from Soviet aviation and anti-aircraft artillery. However, the cruel rebuff of the Russian pilots exceeded all the expectations and stole us " . Such a flattering characteristic of the actions of Soviet fighters could not pass by the Soviet propaganda. The testimony of the shot crew was quoted in one of the issues of Sovinformbüro. Attention is drawn to the fact that in the lines of losses STG1, Hale's crew is listed as a victim of anti-aircraft artillery.

The events of the first hours of unfolding battles inspired optimism to the Soviet command. Ground attacks that impressed poorly organized were almost universally repulsed, and German aviation raids received a decisive fighter from the fighters of the 16th air army. Everything has changed at 7:30, when parts of the 47th and 46th tank buildings after powerful artwork preparation and blows from the air again switched to the offensive against the center and the left flank of the 13th Army, as well as the right flank of the 70th army. This time there was no doubt about the seriousness of the opponent's intentions. The crews of the 1st airdavisia of the 6th air fleet on the positions of Soviet infantry and artillery began to be continuous.

On the first and second defense stripes, large groups of German aircraft dropped many fugasic, as well as mini-bombs, designed primarily to knock out the calculations of artillery guns.

Unfortunately, the command of the 16th air army missed the concentration of fighter forces to combat the bombarding aviation of the enemy. Contrary to the developed plan of combat application, groups of 6-8 fighters continued to rise into the air, which were not only unable to prevent massive raids on the combat order of ground forces, but on the approach to the front line themselves became the object of fierce attacks "Fockey-Wolfs " Documents of the 6th IAC indicate: "The first battles immediately brought the news that the enemy appears by massive groups and the nature of air fighting takes a fierce form" .

The main voltage of the morning fights on July 5 was at the aviator 273rd Jad and the 1st GW. Jad. A group of 6 Yak-9 and 2 Yak-7B of the 163rd JEAP under the command of Major N. E. Morozova in the area of \u200b\u200bMaharkhangelsk was suddenly attacked at the top of the twenty FW-190. German fighters, elongated in altitudes, conducted almost continuous attacks on the "yakas". In 40 minutes the battle was shot down by five Soviet aircraft, while three pilots died. The losses of the German side made up two cars. One of the pitched pilots FW-190 jumped with a parachute and was captured.

I unsuccessfully developed 10 Yak-9 from the composition of the 2nd squadron 347th IAP. Acting next to the group of 163rd JEP, Major's fighters A. M. Baranov around 8:00 attacked large groups of HE-111 and JU-87, while the price of four and damage to one Yak-9 managed to knock down only one "Hakel" And damage the two-dimensive fighter BF-110. The second departure was even more traged - the commander of the regiment Major V. L. Carpenters was killed in the air battle. His group at attack broke into separate pairs and cars. As a result, the aircraft V. L. Plotnikov turned out to be a pair of FW-190 and did not return to his airfield.

Among the successful fighting of the morning, on July 5, it is possible to note only an attack in the ninth hour of a large group of German bombers eight Yak-1 53rd GW. JEP under the command of Senior Lieutenant P. P. Rodnikov. German bomber by that time a real "conveyor" was arranged over the front edge of the Soviet units. Approaching from different directions, they lay on a combat course, following the front line. Having found up to 70 HE-111 and JU-88, at an altitude of 3200 meters, group of 53rd GW. The JAP began to gain a height, bypassing the barrier of the enemy fighters. Hiding in the rays of the Sun, Soviet pilots soon found themselves in the tail of the opponent's columns, which in the area of \u200b\u200bPonyrai began to turn on the combat course. At this point, the Group P. P. Rodnikov, according to the team of his lead, attacked HE-111, and from the first attack it was possible to hit 2 HE-111 and 2 JU-88. These aircraft were counted as shot down. Note that most likely crews of the 53rd GW. JEP attacked the Heinkel group from the composition III / KG53, knocking down one or two bombers.

After the rapid first attack, a group of Soviet fighters was divided into two fours, one of which, led by the senior lieutenant P. P. Radnikov, continued the attacks on the "Heinkel" connection. The leading, together with his slave lieutenant, A. F. Khatkovikov managed to damage another HE-111, but the leader of the latter was also seriously damaged. After receiving burns, Lieutenant A. F. Khatkovikov made a forced landing in the location of his troops. The same fate suffered the younger lieutenant Khomich, who broke his "Yak" when landing on the fuselage.

Despite the courage and dedication of flights, the overall situation in the air remained not only difficult, but in many ways tragic. Only in the first seven hours of the battle of the Soviet side were noted over 1000 aircraft-spans of German aviation, of which about 850 accounted for bombers. Tangible losses forced the General S. I. Rudenko at 8:30 to transfer to the fighter compounds a telegram who had the chance that since 9:30 parts of the army had to act according to order No. 0048. The headquarters of the 6th IAC noted that this is the decision of the commander "Claims clarity to the arrangement and use of the fighter forces of the corps. Further, the work was reduced to the issue of graphics groups " . However, as practice has shown, the blind fulfillment of orders and the lack of initiative actually gave domination in the air in the hands of the enemy.

The sensitive losses of the first hours of the battle led to the fact that to withstand the patrol schedule according to order No. 0048 headquarters of the 6th IAC and the 1st GW. Jad was becoming harder. Documents of the 163rd IAP testify: "At the same time, there was such a number of foci of attacks on our objects, which was not possible to send them to combat them. Each of our fighter accounted for 6-8 enemy fighters. " .

Evaluating the events of the morning on July 5, it is necessary to remember that relatively small forces of fighter aviation were brought to the struggle for domination in the air. Thus, from the composition of the 6th IAK in the morning hours, only two regiments of the 273rd Jaad were actively operated, while the 157th JEAP already mentioned by us, consisting of 16 fighters, speaking mentioned by us above the battle, was in the reserve of the commander of 6- GO JAK. Dalled from the staffing number was the combat composition of the 1st GW. Jad. As part of the four regiments of the junction of Lieutenant Colonel I. V. Krushchenina, there were only 67 aircraft, of which 56 were good. Thus, the average number of the compound regiment was from 12 to 16 fighters. Only the 67th GW allocated for the better. JEP, who in its composition 27 "Aerokoba". However, this regiment was in the personal reserve of the commander of the 16th air army and participation in the defensive battle of July never accepted. However, the reasons for the undergoing heavy air situation were not exhausted by the insufficient number of sent groups of fighters. Unfortunately, the communities of parts and connections did not undertake the necessary measures to improve management and guidance from the Earth. The group of officers led by the Deputy Commander of the 16th Air Army was unable to change the provisions and constantly at the headquarters of the 13th Army.

A heavy situation that pretended in the first hours of battle, made the command of the 16th air army to attract the 279th JaM of the 6th Jame to the struggle for dominance. Unlike the next 273rd Jaad, the command of this division sent to the front line of the group of fighter numbers of 16-18 cars. However, the subordinate Colonel F. N. Dementeyeva, the first fights also brought disappointment and bitterness of losses. Only during the first three departures of the 279th, Iad lost 15 aircraft.

An indicative was one of the first fights of 16 La-5 192th JaP with the six FW-190 six, in which, with the loss of two of their cars, it was possible to knock down just one "Fokke-Wulf". In addition, another Loveochkin was struck by the fire of anti-aircraft artillery. Soon, 18 La-5 92th IAP in the area of \u200b\u200bPoni-Buzuluk attacked to 50 JU-87 and JU-88 bombers. The achieved success can be considered very relative - knocking 2 "Junkers", the group lost 5 of its aircraft. However, the battle of the 18 La-5 486th IAP, led by the commander of the regiment by Major K. A. Pelitz, was most unsuccessful. In the twelfth hour of the day, this group tried to attack in the area of \u200b\u200bPonyrays on the nine JU-88, covered 12 FW-190. Fighters of the 486th JEAP were echelonized in heights from 3,000 to 4000 meters, as prescribed a combat experience. However, the presence of cloudiness and bad chillery did not allow to use a numerical advantage. After the attack of the lavetop shock six, her lead captain A. M. Ovsienko passed up, as a result of which the group broke down. The K.A. Pelipsov, the Smead, who went with an exceedment of 500 meters, also noticed "Junkers" and tried to attack them. However, at the second occasion, the aircraft of the commander of the 486th IAP was set fire to the "Fockey Wolfs". At this time, a group of 4 La-5 Lieutenant I. G. M. Meshshova, who went on an altitude of 4,000 meters, did not see and participate in it did not take part in the cloud of combat. As a result, 6 La-5 was not returned to his airfield, and one or two enemy fighters was recorded at the expense of pilots of the group.

Apparently, the opponents of the pilots from the detachments of the detachments 8. and 9./jg51 were opponents of the pilots of the 486th EAP. According to German data, in eight minutes of air combat, 8 Soviet fighters identified as Lagg-3 and Lagg-5 were shot down. At the same time, Hubert Strasl paid his sixth and seventh victory per day. Already seven minutes after the end of the battle with the Soviet fighters, the crews "Fockey-Wolfov" attacked the bombers and attack aircraft appeared above the front line. In this battle at the expense of the Strasl, 4 more victories were recorded - 2 La-5, Il-2 and Boston.

As can be seen, fighters from the composition of III / JG51 were above the front line just at the moment when the command of the 16th air army was put into effect by shock aviation. The terrestrial situation in the center and on the left flank of the 13th Army took the turnover threatening for the Soviet side. Parts of the 47th Tank Corps by 10:30 managed to break through the defense of the 15th and 81st rifle divisions, part of which came to the environment. Lockers and Casual Polyana were captured.

Another powerful blow was applied by the 46th tank corps on the right flank of the 70th Army. German bombers, without meeting serious resistance in the air, provided very effective support for their infantry and tanks, contributing to the breakthrough of defensive frontiers in this area. So, for example, the 132nd Rifle Division of the 70th Army, entling at the turn of the Gniec - a red corner and beat up three attacks on its position, was forced to retreat after a massive strike to eighty JU-87 from STG1. The report of the Operational Department of the 70th Army on hostilities noted that German aviation "Waves of 20-25 aircraft all day bombed orders of 28 small corps." In total, on the positions of the 70th Army on the first day of the battle, about 1600 aircraft-spans of the opponent were recorded. According to the headquarters of the army, 9 enemy aircraft was destroyed with anti-aircraft fire from the ground. According to the overseas of the 70th army, 3 German aviator were captured in the disposition of the association.

During the battle, a dangerous crisis has occurred. Large groups of tanks and infantry of the 47th tank corps began to break through to settlements of Ponyry, again, Podolyan. The command of the central front was thrown at hand. At the same time at 10:30, the Commander of the 2nd Tank Army, Lieutenant General A. G. Rodin received an order about the beginning of the 3rd and 16th tank corps to the location of the breakthrough, which was to ensure the sustainability of the Defense of the 13th Army. The cover of Tankists from the air was carried out by specially dedicated groups of fighters of the 16th air army, but German frontal aviation was so busy with blows at the front edge, which the movement of large masses of armored vehicles of the 2nd tank army passed almost without affecting it.

The strong visor of the central front command in the current situation continued to be shock aviation of the 16th air army, which since the morning expected the signal to departure. The calculation of Lieutenant General S. I. Rudenko, who abandoned from doubtful raid raids on enemy airfields, was faithful. Having received a very shaped order of General K. K. Rokossovsky "Place your shoulders", the commander of the 16th air army raised into the air to localize breakthrough in the band of the 13th Army of the Group of 221st, 241th Bad, as well as the 2nd GW. And the 299th Shad. At the same time, part of the forces of the 283rd and 286th Iad was also connected to the struggle for domination in the air. The measures taken by the Soviet side did not remain unnoticed by the enemy. The headquarters of the Center for Army Center noted the strengthening of the actions of the red-based aircraft in the final reconnaissance department for July 5: "The enemy aviation after the initial confusion moved to planned actions" .

Speaking of participation in the battles on July 5 bombing aviation of the 16th air army, we note that the main burden fell out the crews of Boston bombers of the 221th Bad, which per day 89 aircraft-departures. For their accompaniment, fighters 282th JaM, which also included in the 6th Sak, rose 103 times into the air. Despite the opposition of German fighters and strong anti-aircraft fire from the Earth, the loss of the 221th Bad was relatively small - only 4 aircraft did not return to their airfields, and two more bomber committed forced landings. German data is not very different from Soviet. According to them, JG51 and JG54 fighters for the day 7 American production bombers were shot down.

Crews PE-2 241th Bad made departures with the forces of only two groups consisting of 5 and 8 PE-2, respectively.

The eight of the "pawns" was forced, due to the lack of enemy troops in the appointed area of \u200b\u200bimpact, bombard the spare goal - clusters of German tanks in a grove in 2 kilometers east of the lower Tagino. But the crews of 5 PE-2 covered the infantry battalion, 6 tanks and about 40 carts with troops and cargo in the Casual Polyana area - a new farm. As subsequently, one of the captured German soldiers of the 292nd Infantry Division, the bombs gaps covered the German positions on a plot of about two kilometers, and some fragmentation bombs fell either in the trenches or on their bars. As a result, only one battalion lost 23 people killed; And another 56 servicemen were injured.

It should be noted that the crews of the 241th BD in the course of 13 aircraft-departures 66 Fab-100, 32 AO-15, 40 AO-10, 38 AO-8 and 120 Zab-2.5 were reset. All Pe-2 returns from the combat task had many damage. On one of the "paws", the mechanics counted up to 40 fragmentation slippers. At the same time, the losses of the 241th Bad were minimal. The attacked of the dozen German fighters of the eight of PE-2 lost only one car, which made a forced landing. Another "pawn" already on the mileage there was a chassis supports - as a result, a broken bomber had to write off.

The actions of attack aircraft from the composition of the 2nd GW were very effective. And the 299th Shad. For the better, the 2nd GW of the 2nd GW was distinguished. Shad, who passed the harsh school of fighting in Stalingrad. Of the four assault regiments of the two assault regiments in the battles of the first day, three (59th, 78th and 79th GW were used in the battles of the first day. At the cost of losing 4 attack aircraft, according to the compound crew reports, 31 tanks, 30 cars, 3 armored vehicles, as well as other techniques were destroyed. Many attack aircraft were damaged, and the junior lieutenant plane Popova from the 78th GW. Shap, affected by both anti-aircraft fire and from the "Fokke-Wolf attacks", landed on its airfield on the fuselage.

It was much harder to have a personal composition of the 299th Shad, which suffered heavy losses in a number of air battles. So, eight IL-2 under the command of Lieutenant Mitusov lost in one fly of six cars. In another group of the 217th SAAP, three IL-2 were immediately shot down after the sudden attack "Fokke-Wolfs". Saved only the excellent survivability of "Ilov" - one plane made a forced landing, and the rest still retained to her airfield. But all the arrows-radio players on the aircraft were injured, and one of them later died in the hospital.

Already by 12:00, the number of aircraft-departures committed by the subordinates of General S. I. Rudenko, translated over the mark 500. We note that the assault aviation operated in the main groups of 6-8 cars, which did not allow to effectively hit the large masses of armored vehicles, as well as increased the flow rate of fighters for support. It is not surprising that, lighting the actions of the attack aircraft, German sources emphasized: "Soviet assault planes appeared above the battlefield about noon, but they could not seriously prevent the actions of our land forces" . Be that as it may, but by the second half of the day, the position in the strip of the 13th army was somewhat stabilized. Aerial blows, as well as a destructive artillery fire allowed a short time to neutralize the emergence of the enemy. German tanks stopped, turning into fixed firepoints, and the infantry was forced to heal.

The eloquent testimony about the first day of the fighting was given and the fired Ober-Efreitor of the 5th company of the 167th shelf Baumgof: "The first day of our offensive I will never forget. I did not have any hope to get out alive from the battle. Our regiment suffered very heavy losses. Other regions of the division suffered even more. Already by noon 5 july 216 Regiment, abandoned by the Russian defense breakthrough, lost two thirds of the personnel, but did not achieve any result. The pathetic remains of the regiment were assigned to the second echelon. Sanitars did not have time to endure the wounded. One sanitary university officer told me that the dressing point reminds the yard of the slaughterhouse. "

For the second half of the day, the battles at the front of the 13th and 70th armies reached its apogee. According to eyewitnesses, at this point the enemy provided simultaneous finding over the front edge of the Soviet defense to 300 bombers and about 100 fighters. In addition, observation posts located in the strip of the neighboring Bryansky front have repeatedly reported on the passage of groups consisting of up to 150 bombers.

The second half of the day also passed the dominance in the air of German aviation. Despite the fierce resistance of parts of the 13th and 70th armies, the German troops managed to move into the depths of Soviet defense approximately 4-5 kilometers. Summarizing the combat operation of the 13th Army, the Commander of the front General K. K. Rokossovsky noted in his report at the rate: "Parts of the army, reflecting the continuous attacks of tanks and infantry of the enemy, supported by large groups of aviation, held the frontiers occupied over three hours. Only after re-art. Aviation treatment, entering into battle up to 400 tanks, the opponent managed to press parts of the army " .

The command of the Center's Army Group emphasized the special role of aviation of the 1st air traffic in achieving this success, noting that large forces of bombarding, assault and fighter aviation were supported by sequential waves supported the offensive operation of the ground forces. Numerous direct contacts in artillery batteries, field positions and transport columns were noted.

Air combat boots remained almost to the sweetest. During the day, a slightly improved from the ground, but even it did not guarantee the breakdown of enemy bombing. So, a large group of 19 La-5 92th JaP, going to perform the task at 12:30, was enthusiastically in the station Bthk-2 in the Podolyn area - Tagino on a mixed group of bombers consisting of 15 JU-87, 7 JU-88 and 6 HE-111, covered dozen "Fokke-Wolfs". Encatarating into two groups of 12 and 7 aircraft, Soviet pilots attacked bombers and fighters of the enemy. The analysis conducted by employees of the headquarters of the 6th JAK on the basis of the last fight showed that the actions of the pilots of both groups led by Major D. A. Medvedev and Senior Lieutenant N. G. Butomova were scattered. As a result, although the crews were counted three shot down bomber and four fighters, with the loss of two La-5, the overall total of the battle was recognized as unsuccessful.

Note that the Group 279th Jaad continued to carry heavy losses in air battles until the very end of the day. Futing from his airfield at 15:15 A group of 16 La-5 486th IAP in air combat over the area of \u200b\u200breindeer with 30 JU-88 and BF-110, covered with a large number of fighters, lost 4 cars, knocking only one JU-88. Even more tragically there was a departure of a group of neighboring 192nd JEAP in the period 19: 15-20: 40. Leaded by the commander of the regiment by Major Kizylov 15 La-5 in the Majarkhangelsk district - Ponyari attacked the JU-88 bombers, covered by FW-190 fighters. As a result of the battle, 6 La-5 was lost, plus another one of our plane made a forced landing in the field with the chassis cleaned, while only four shot down German fighters were recorded on the accounts of pilots.

It is in the evening hours, crowned bloody day on July 5, was perfect for the whole day of the ram. The pilot of the 54th GW differs. Jap Jr. Lieutenant V.K. Polyakov, who as part of the four Yak-1 at 18:53 flew from the airfield Fate to reflect the enemy raid in the area 2nd Ponyary - Nikolskoye. During air combat, two yaks were connected by escort fighters, and the Kalmykova group commander plane received damage and left the battle. Then the junior lieutenant V.K. Poles attacked the compound HE-111 independently. Returning with one of the bombers at a distance of about 20 meters, the Soviet pilot opened fire and achieved hits. However, the reversal fire of the air arrow was also labels. On the car V. K. Polyakova, a benzobac was broken, lowered the water, the right plane caught fire, and the pilot himself got a face burn and was injured in the right hand. Understanding that the fighter will not stretch for a long time, the brave aviator decided to Taran Heinkel. The blow of the screw and the right plane, he demolished the tail plumage of the German bomber, and himself, thrown out of the burning fragments of the fighter, bloated, with the burns of the face, but still alive, safely landed in the arrangement of his troops. The traded HE-111, apparently belonging to the KG53 squadron, fell in the area of \u200b\u200bthe chap. It was the twenty-fourth air battle and the fourth pilot victory. For the Taran over Kursk Duta Vitaly Konstantinovich Polyakov on September 2, 1943, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded.

So, the first day of battle is the most severe and rich in losses for the 16th air army - ended. Performing 1720 crashes (of which 1232 days), its crews conducted 76 air fighting, in which, according to the army headquarters, managed to knock 106 enemy aircraft. At the same time, the loss of unification of General S. I. Rudenko was truly emptying: 98 aircraft returned to their airfields.

The lion's share of the 16th air army loss, about 75%, amounted to airplanes from the compounds of fighter aircraft. It is enough to say that only the 6th Jac lost another day of 45 cars. The combat composition of his regiments was strongly powered. Some of them to the outcome of the day were at best reinforced squadrons. Thus, for example, in the 273rd mead in the 157th JEP, 16, and in the 163rd and 347th IAP, respectively, 6 and 7 of the serviceable "yaks" of different modifications were listed. The combat composition of the 279th Jiad was significantly reduced, where the number of La-5 fighters per day decreased in the 92nd JEP from 27 to 19, in the 192nd JEAP and 486th JEP from 24 to 13 each. Nine aircraft lost the battered shoulder to the shoulder with the pilots of the 6th IAK Aviators 1st GW. Jad. Despite the relatively small digit of losses, due to a large number of damaged machines, the combat capability of some regiments fell sharply. In particular, this concerned the 54th GW. IAP. The data filed at the division headquarters, apparently, before Taran, committed by the younger lieutenant V. K. Polyakov, testified - out of 13 fighters (12 serviceable), which were available to the beginning of the day, could be climbed into the air only 3 Yak-1 and 2 Yak-9, while 7 cars were recorded in repair. Also suffered greatly during the first day of the fighting 286th, the whole day is engaged in the accompaniment of attack aircraft and the struggle for domination in the air. During the fighting, she lost 14 fighters, 8 of which belonged to the 721th EAP.

The reasons for such severe losses were obvious. Describing the first day of the Kursk battle, the headquarters of the 6th IAC was noted: "It was the first combat baptism for the young flight composition of the hull, which could not hold on to the group and on combat figures" . Indeed, the basis of most compounds (not only of the 6th IAC) was young pilots that have passed accelerated training in flight schools and spare shelves. According to the 6th IAK, which arrived in the summer of 1943 to the front, the fighter pilot had only 2-3 educational air combat. A nice piloting plane individually, yesterday's cadets nevertheless hardly could act in the group, which was especially noticeable on the example of combat work of the 92nd, 192th and 163th IAP. The actions of the pilots of the 163rd IAP were recognized especially unsuccessful. The story of the part reports: "The first day in this grand battlewee was unsuccessful for the regiment, which was the reason for the publication of special order on 16 VA, accusing our pilots in indecision granted with cowardice" .

Disadvantages in flight and firing training of young pilots were aggravated by organizational troubles. When you arrive at the combat mission on the alarm of the group, it was often not gathered over the airfield, the leading did not wait for the slaves. As a result, the fighters entered into the fight fragmented, without increasing the forces. Challenges of groups in the areas of extermination in most cases were delayed. Guidance officers missed the air situation, without helping the pilots in its lighting. Noting the shortcomings in the system of guidance of fighters, the documents of the 16th air army headquarters testify: "In the first days of combat work, our fighters failed to paralyze the enemy. The fighters went to the rear, did not see the enemy, the battles with the departments sometimes were, they acted sluggishly and reluctantly, thanks to which the losses in the first days were big. It happened because the guidance radio stations were placed 4-5 km from the front edge, the observation was hampered as a result of rainy weather, smoke from fires, from artillery and bombing " .

Another major disadvantage in the actions of Soviet fighter aircraft was the desire of crews to fight over its territory, as a result of which the documents of the 6th IAC note, "The arrival of bombers became known to the command of the corps at the time of the bombing" .

The most accurately established atmosphere characterize lines from the Martial Action Report of the 486th IAP, which can be attributed to many Soviet airlines: "Air battles from the first days of the opponent's occurrence in most cases proceeded inorganized, there was no interaction of the covering and staming group. Leading groups weakly used radio for managing group air battles. The weak flushed of crews in pairs and groups has emerged. Leading steam lost their senior groups in the group air combat, and the slave pairs lost their leading, which was the result of losses from the enemy fighters of leading groups " . It should be noted that only in the 6th day during the first day of battles killed three commander of groups, including commanders of the 347th and 486th IAP, which was largely due to the lack of flushing and mutual execution.

In contrast to the Soviet side, the German command of all levels gave a high assessment of the actions of its aviator. During the day, 2088 aircraft-departures were committed during which "The 1st Aviation Division brilliantly supported the troops of the 9th Army turned into the offensive. Total 9 and supported 1909 bombers and fighters (Meaning aircraft-departures. - Approx. Auto), who had a decisive effect on the success of the offensive " .

The greatest activity was developed by the crews "pieces" and two-dimensional bombers who committed 647 and 582 aircraft-departures, respectively. The fighters JG51 and JG54 squador destroyed from them, destroying 158 Soviet aircraft during 533. Another 11 wins were assigned to the anti-aircraft artillery. As can be seen, the success of the German side was overestimated by approximately 1.5 times. Among the fighters of the greatest success, the pilots I / JG54 were achieved, who had at least 59 victories on its account. In second place with 45 victories there was a group III / JG51.

Already mentioned by us by the Pilot 8./jg51 Hubert Strasl reached the end of the day of the phenomenal result, bringing his victories to 15 shot down aircraft, 9 of which were fighters. The second air fleet among the pilots of the 6th Air Fleet became Gunter Shell (Scheel Gunther) from the 2./jg54 detachment, shot down 8 Soviet cars. At 7, the victories were recorded on Rudolf Radaemacher Rudolf (Rudolf) and Hermann Lucke (Lucke Hermann) from 1./jg54 and 9./jg51. All his victories overthrew in the course of 3 departures. At least three pilots won 5 victories. Among them, we will note the Ober-Feldwebel Anton Anton, by July 11 she won its 50th victory. Hafner, who reached at the time of his death, October 17, 1944, 204 wins, became the most effective pilot of the JG51 squadron.

It is important to emphasize that the actions of German fighters were aimed primarily on the destruction of Soviet aviation. Repeatedly per day, there were cases when large groups of "Fockey-Wolfov", a number of 30-40 cars, attacked the Soviet patrols on the approach to the front line, thereby providing their bombers the opportunity to work almost freely for terrestrial purposes. It is not surprising that, describing the events of the tragic day on July 5 in his memoirs, the former commander of the 16th air army S. I. Rudenko was forced to notice diplomatic: "The first day did not bring us satisfaction" . The statements of German military leaders regarding the actions of Soviet aviation are much more definite. Thus, the former head of the headquarters of the 6th Air Fleet Friedrich Klesess, summing up July 5, noted: "Undoubtedly, on July 5, the owner of the battlefield was Luftwaffe. The breakthrough occurred without any significant intervention from the Air Force " .

What were the losses of German aviations during the first day of fighting? According to the reports of the 6th air fleet headquarters, the loss of the combination of the general of the grain grain made up only 7 cars (1 JU-88, 2 JU-87, 1 BF-110 and 2 FW-190). Note that the same figures were duplicated later in the diary of the EMB hostilities. Meanwhile, the list of losses of the 6th air fleet, compiled on the basis of the reports of the General-Farmaster, gives us a slightly different picture. According to him, it was lost and damaged at least 33 aircraft. At the same time, with those percentage of damage to which exceeded or was equal to 40%, we will get that the irrevocable loss of the 1st Airciff Division for July 5 amounted to 21 aircraft (3 JU-88, 8 JU-87, 1 HE-111 , 7 FW-190, 1 BF-110, 1 BF-109). Thus, the losses of the Red Army Air Force slightly less than 5 times exceeded the losses of the 6th air fleet, and Soviet pilots at least in the same 5 times overwhelmed their successes. For the sake of objectivity it should be noted that part of the German aircraft became a victim of anti-aircraft artillery, and were also divided into accidents and disasters.

According to the author, the ratio of losses 1: 5 is an adequate expression of the level of combat training, used tactics and the quantitative relationship of the opposing parties. Interesting fact It is also the fact that in his report at the rate of fighting on July 5, the commander of the central front reported only about 45 enemy aircraft shot down in air battles. Probably, General K. K. Rokossovsky operated on the preliminary data of the headquarters of the 16th air army. However, it can not be surprising that as a result of the subsequent "clarification", the number of shot down airplanes increased more than twice.

So, the first day of battle in the Northern Face Kursk Arc ended. The action of the crews of the 6th Air Fleet made it possible to apply heavy losses of Soviet aviation in air battles, as well as to provide effective support for ground troops. At the same time, parts of the 9th Army General Model failed to develop an initial success. Loss of the element of suddenness, lack of infantry compounds, as well as persistent resistance of parts of the 13th and 70th armies and massive blows of Soviet aviation made very uncertain prospects for further attack on Kursk from the north. There could be a speech about the rapid breakthrough in the style of the "tank raid". Anxiety for the command of the 9th Army was also intelligence data, according to which: "6.7 You should expect, first of all, the west of the Railway Eagle - Kursk, as well as the North-west of Lieavargelagelsk, the counterattack of enemy tank connections" . And indeed, at the dawn of the next day, the reserves of the 13th Army, with the support of the tanks of the army of General A. G. Motherland, inflicted powerful counterdads on advanced German parts.

2.2. Unstable equilibrium

The results of the first day of the battle in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kursk arc were the subject of close attention of the rates. According to the memories of S. I. Rudenko, during the evening report K. K. Rokossovsky Stalin was particularly interested in the question of conquering domination in the air. It can be assumed that heavy losses incurred by the parts of the 16th air army, the supremes were alarmed. The report commander of the front, which referred to the fierce of battles and mutual heavy losses, the leader clearly did not satisfy. Of the very streamlined lines of memories of the former commander of the 16th air army, it can be concluded that Stalin expressed its discontent with the fact that aviation did not have a noticeable influence on the course of events. In addition, he also inquired, whether the commander of the 16th air army is able to correct the situation. All the same, K. K. Rokossovsky managed to convince the Supreme in the fact that the next day the question with the domination in the air will be "resolved positively." Despite the assurances of the commander, the bid was made their own measures to strengthen aviation management. The first deputy commander of the Red Army commander of the Red Army, G. A. Vorozheikin, who received the categorical order of Stalin, was urgently flew to the central front: "To ensure that tomorrow, the domination in the air has been conquered!"

In the current difficult situation, the command of the 16th Air Army was necessary to urgently make decisive measures to eliminate failures in the organization of hostilities that led to Fiasco on the first day of the defensive battle. Priority attention was required to improve the guidance of fighters from the Earth, for which additional officers from the headquarters left the troops. The second most important task was the aviation support for the counterdad of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, as well as parts of the 2nd Tank Army, designed to restore the position in the center and on the left flank of the 13th Army.

Obviously, to make any significant changes to the organization of combat work in a short summer night it was impossible. Planning aviation support for the counterdard of the 17th Guards Corps, the Armed Forces Commander decided to divide the echelons of the actions of attack aircraft and bombers of the 221st Bad heights of 1000 and 2000 meters, respectively. As can be seen, the forces of bombarding aircraft involved in this operation were presented with only one division, while the most powerful bombing compound of the 16th air army - the 3rd tank (as well as several fighter and assault airlines) remained in the reserve of General S. and . Rudenko. To create an opponent, impressions of the larger number of machines participating in the rope of the drum aircraft should have made several goals on target from different directions and heights.

At about 4:00, after a short artillery training, as well as the impact of assault aviation, part of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps moved to the offensive together with three divisions, which were coming from the Liearhangelsk district. Applying the enemy's troops, the part of the Soviet infantry was already in the sixth hour, the 1st Ponyary was published - Bobrik's friendship. It should be noted that from Memoirov S. I. Rudenko follows that support for the occurrence of infantry rendered simultaneously in the air of the group IL-2 and Boston bombers. However, according to archival documents, part 221rd Bad flew to the fulfillment of the first combat task after 6 am, that is, when the rifle parts have already achieved their success. So, only at 6:08 am, the Boston groups began to rise in the air, and after another 12 minutes, the neighboring 8th GW was also sent to the task. and 745th BAP. Most likely, the action of crews of bombers preceded the offensive in the direction of the Steppe team of the 16th Tank Corps, which, despite his hopes, did not have success. The head 107th tank brigade, which was moving on the boty, got into an ambush organized by an opponent and was almost all destroyed by fire of heavy tanks and sau, losing almost 70 T-34 and T-70. No more successful success and other parts of the hull have not achieved.

Crews 221rd Bad continued to make departures up to the second half of the day, the bombing of the live strength and equipment of the enemy in the areas of Senkovo, the new farm, Ozerki, Clear Polyana, Podolyan, Top Tagino. On July 6, it was for the division of Colonel S. F. Buzyleva most tense and rich in losses in the afternoon for the whole time of the defensive battle. 16 "Bostonov" did not return to their airfields, and most of the losses fell on the 8th GW. and the 745th BAP, perhaps, respectively, 7 and 6 cars. The losses of the accompanying bombers of the crews of the 282th JaM amounted to only 5 yak-1.

It should be noted that the greatest losses of the 221st Bad suffered from the fire by the enemy anti-aircraft artillery that hit 10 aircraft, while the share of German fighters had only 6 "Boston". These data almost completely coincide with the German, according to which the first three bomber were shot down by the 1./JG51 commander of the Ober-Lieutenant Joachim, as well as Pilot 9./jg51 by Hermann Luchel, and the Kuken Wilhelm. By the end of the day, German fighters from III and IV / JG51 managed to bring down three more bomber from the composition of the 221th BD.

Consturdar of the Central Front, applied at dawn on July 6, despite the heavy losses incurred by tankers, nevertheless had a very noticeable effect on the folding setting. The initiative, even if for a short time, was spilled out of the hands of the enemy. Parts of the 9th Army had to be from noon, to take attacks at the position of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps to restore the lost position. The ground offensive was supported by massive aircraft raids, which were played, perhaps, a decisive role in the expanded battles. Around 15:30 from 50 to 70 JU-87 and Ju-88 aircraft, the location of the Soviet troops was subjected to a fierce bombing, and the attack that followed after this was discarded parts of the 17th Guards Corps with in the morning of positions. Describing the actions of German aviation over combat orders of the 13th Army, the commander of the central front in his evening reporting in the bid noted that the opponent's aviation by groups of 20-30 and 60-100 aircraft continuously affected the combat order of the army's troops.

High activity crews of German bombers showed in other areas of the front. So, the headquarters of the 132nd Rifle Division, comparing the actions of German aviation with the previous day, noted: "On this day (July 6th. - Approx. Auto) the actions of the opponent's aviation were even stronger and massive. By producing 80-100 aircraft with groups, the enemy used the tactics of the continuous movement of these groups. So all the days in the air were continuously at least 100 aircraft. " .

Note that in the second half of the day, the priorities of the command of the 6th air fleet were shifted to the 41th tank corps, which launched the offensive in the general direction on the reindeer. At the same time, crises appeared on the sites of the neighboring 46th and 47th tank buildings forced the German command to redirect the significant forces of aviation. Thus, the blow of the 46th tank corps at the height of South Gniec, scheduled for 19:00, did not take place, since the positions made to the onset of the 31st Infantry Division were suddenly subjected to a powerful attack of the 19th tank corps. It is not known how events would develop for the German infantry, if there were not a very surgical intervention of aviation of the 6th air fleet, which allowed to beat off the Soviet tank attack. As a result, part of the 46th tank corps every day had a promotion just a little more than a kilometer.

Speaking about the activity of German aviation on the second day of the battle, it should be noted that it fell almost twice as compared to July 5. During the day, 1023 aircraft-departures were made, 546 of which accounted for drum machines JU-87, JU-88, HE-111 and BF-110. At the same time, the crews of the 16th air army 1326 times raised their cars into the air. It should be noted that the decline in the activity of aviation of the opposing parties occurred not only because of the large number of cars damaged on the eve, but also due to the dramatically deteriorating during the day weather conditions. Despite this, the heat of air fighting, as equal to their content, was practically no difference from the events of the previous day.

The most unsuccessful for Soviet pilots was the air battle, which occurred at about 9:40 in the area of \u200b\u200bOlkhovka, 2nd reindeer. The patrolling group of 17 La-5 92th IAP 279th Iad (Master Major D. A. Medvedev) was divided into two drums (5 and 6 aircraft, respectively) and the syllable (6 aircraft) of the group. After relatively clear predestal clocks, a powerful heap cloud appeared in the sky. The above-tavering group received an order from the ground to gain altitude, losing visual contact with shock groups, which, in turn, also tried to break the clouds. Suddenly, 3,500 meters, Soviet pilots found 6 JU-88, who were under the cover of the same number "Fockey-Wolfs". From the very first attack, Major D. A. Medvedev managed to hit one "eighty-eighth", which was recorded by the pilot as a victory. However, soon a group of the 92nd JaPs broke into separate pairs and cars, which, wandering in the clouds, the fights with appearing here, then there are German aircraft. The total number of enemy machines on the return on the airfield was estimated at 40 JU-88 and 16 FW-190. According to the reports of pilots, 5 bombers and 5 fighters were shot down. However, even these figures could not justify the hardest losses incurred by Aviators of the 92nd JaP in this fly: 8 La-5 was not returned to their airfields, almost half of the group flying to the combat task! Among the dead were not only young pilots, but also an experienced commander of the squadron Hero of the Soviet Union I. D. Sidorov. During the air combat with Fokke-Wulfami, the AU did not notice the opponent who came to him and was shot down.

On July 6, the level of loss of fighter aviation has slightly decreased in absolute terms, constituting as on the eve of a significant relative value. So, for example, the 6th IAC lost 24 aircraft during air battles. Sensitive damage was also caused by the 1st GW. Jad, whose shelves missed the day of 13 fighters. A significant amount of damaged aircraft in battles has even more influenced the combat capability of the compound. By evening, July 6, as part of the 1st GW. Jaad (excluding the 67th GW. JEP, continuing to be in reserve) there were 26 serviceable aircraft and 17 requiring repair. The sad spectacle was the 30th GW. and 54th GW. JaP, who had the outcome of the second day of the battle of only four and two serviceable fighters, respectively. Due to the large losses in the fighters, the command of the 16th Air Army had to actually combine a group of different regiments to patrol. So, for example, fighters of the 163rd JAP acted in combat orders with the neighboring 347th IAP. The composition of the Unified Groups flew on the tasks "Yaki" of the 53rd GW. and "Cobra" of the 30th GW. IAP, and several Yak-9t fighters from the composition of the 54th GW. The EAP strengthened the groups of other division regiments.

July 6, except for the 1st GW. The Jiad and the 6th Jacman, in the struggle for dominance in the air, also participated in the pilots of the 286th and 283rd Iad. Crews The latter was especially well shown themselves during air battles. Division documents are noted by the actions of Lieutenant S. K. Kolesnichenko from the 519th IAP, who, heading the four Yaks, attacked the JU-88 bombers three times in the Olkhovka region. After the first attack on bombers, one of the JU-88, set fire to S. Kolenichenko, went to the ground with a big roll. Junior Lieutenant N. V. Chistyakov attacked and set up another German bomber. After that, S. K. Kolesnichenko with his slave lieutenant V. M. County entered into battle with the four pursuing them "Fockey-Wolfs", knocking down one of them. After the end of this fight, S. K. Kolesnichenko noticed another group of an opponent aircraft consisting of 6 JU-88, and attacked her forehead. However, Soon "Yaki" turned out to be again connected by the fight with German fighters, during which the younger lieutenant I. F. Mucenko managed to knock the S. K. Kolesnichenko, which went into the tail of the aircraft FW-190. However, at the same time, the young pilot himself fell into a corkscrew, as a result, with difficulty, he broke away from the enemy fighters pursued. During this fight, Lieutenant S. K. Kolesnichenko won his third victory.

The pilots from the Group of 10 Yak-1 neighboring 176th IAP under the command of Captain V. G. Lyalinsky were actively actively operated. Hooking at the end of the day the terrestrial troops in the area of \u200b\u200bPonyry - Olkhovka, where the situation after the breakthrough of German tanks sharply aggravated, they joined the air combat with three groups of bombers, each of which had to 40 JU-88 and HE-111 cars. According to the results of the battle, two bombers were recorded at the expense of the leading group. One "Junkers" replenished the account of the younger lieutenant D. S. Kabanova, who, having damaged one German aircraft, was able to break away from the opponent's fighters pursuing his fighters, and then having overtook the connection of the bombers, made another attack.

Interesting example The effective work of the fighters of the 16th air army was recorded by the military personnel of the 1st progress of the 13th Army. At about 5:00 pm, they observed how the West of the Ponya pair La-5 of the 6th Jame was calmly attached from the bottom to the group of 30 HE-111 and one of the bombers knocked down without interference. It is possible that the "Heinkel" was the victim of the Yak-1 pair of the same group V. G. Lyalinsky. During the battle, a couple of fighters led by the junior lieutenant S. Z. Shevchenko, which was hit by HE-111 around 17:00 in the Ponyrai area.

Despite the examples of the heroism and self-sacrifice of the pilots, the air situation towards the outcome of the second day of the battle continued to remain hard. The level of losses of the unification of General S. I. Rudenko exceeded any reasonable limits. During the battle on July 6, the 16th air army suffered 91 aircraft. Compared to the previous day, when the greatest losses fell on fighter aircraft, on the second day of the fighting, the significant share of lost cars was the IL-2 attack aircraft. For example, in the 2nd GW. Shads were missing 17 "Ilov", 9 of which were lost irretrievably, and 8 made forced landings, having received damage to varying severity. Even more sensitive losses accompanied the combat work of the 299th Shad, in which 4 attack aircraft were victims of fighter and anti-aircraft artillery, and 25 did not return with combat missions.

Reports of the 6th Air Fleet, according to which 118 Soviet aircraft were destroyed in air battles, and another 12 shot down by fire of anti-aircraft artillery, relatively exactly correspond to the digits of Soviet losses. Among the most distinguished pilots, it is possible to meet the names of Hermann Luke from 9./jg51 and Hubert Strasl from 8./jg51, who won 4 and 6 victories, respectively. On the account of the commander 9./jg51 Ober Lieutenant Maximilian (Mayer Maximilian) for July 6, there are also 4 shot down aircraft, which brought the military account of the pilot to 50 victories. In the discharge of the achievements of the crews of shock aircraft, primarily dive bombers from the composition of STG1 and III / STG3, 29 destroyed and 12 damaged Soviet tanks are listed. The command of the Center's Army Group noted the role of the crews of bombarding aviation, which highly thickened the initial positions of tanks and sometimes gave sensitive facilitations to ground parts.

Documents of the 2nd Tank Army note that throughout the day the opponent's aviation by groups of 60-80 aircraft continuously hung in the air and processed every hundred square meters Square, laying the road tanks and infantry. At the same time, according to Soviet data, the effectiveness of enemy raids affected the combat capability of tank units and connections. So, the 2nd tank army for the entire period of the defensive battle lost only 9 tanks from the actions of German aviation. For comparison, we indicate that in the same period, the total losses of the army amounted to 214 tanks, of which 138 were lost irretrievably.

The loss of the 6th air fleet, according to the Association Monitoring Diary, was only 6 aircraft (3 JU-88, 1 JU-87, 1 BF-110 and 1 FW-190), although the reports of the General-Administrative System contain a mention of 13 Machines, 8 of which were lost forever. One of the three lost "Fokke-Wolfs" piloted the commander of the I / JG54 group Major Reinhard Zayler (Seiler Reinhard), who opened the impressive list of Luftwaffe aviation commanders during the Kursk battle. Veteran fights in Spain, where they were shot down by 9 republican aircraft, Zayler commanded the 1st group of famous "Green Hearts" from mid-April, replacing the legendary Gansa Philipp (Philipp Hans) in this position. On July 5, at the expense of the group commander, 5 victories were recorded (4 fighters and attack aircraft), the next day two more victories. However, in the air battle of the AS, which made a mark of 109 victories, was seriously injured, jumped out of the aircraft on a parachute and no longer participated in air battles.

The results of the two-day air battle over the northern faces of the Kursk arc could not help but cause anxiety both at the central front leadership and in the bet. In two days, the fighting of the 16th air army decreased by almost 190 aircraft. Especially sensitive losses fell on fighter aircraft. So, in the 6th IAK, which lost 81 plane and 58 pilots in two days, for the outcome of July 6, there were only 48 serviceable cars. The same picture was in the 1st GW. Iad, where there were 28 serviceable "yaks" and "Aerokoba". The crisis of fighter aviation of the 16th Air Army was so obvious that after a conversation with General S. I. Rudenko Marshal G. K. Zhukov ordered the transfer from the 15th air army of the Bryansky front of the 234th Id Colonel E. Z. Tatanashvili . This division, despite the staffing of the young flight, according to the results of the June audit, was in a good account at the command of the Red Army Air Force. Unfortunately, the path of the 234th mead on the central front was somewhat delayed. The order of Marshal A. A. Novikova followed on July 7, the next day the regiment of the division flew to the airfields of the 16th Air Army, incorporated into combat work only on July 9.

According to Soviet historiography, July 7, it became a turning point during the battle in the Northern Fac of Kursk Arc. In the morning, the 9th Army launched an offensive at the height of the north of Olkhovka and in the Poniye district, sending their main efforts along the Eagle Railway - Kursk. Part 4 of the 4th Tank Division was introduced into battle. The 41st Tank Corps after the initial success associated with the seizure of the settlement of the 1st of May and the exit to the northern outskirts of Poniyur, spent several unsuccessful attacks during the day in the position of the 307th Rifle Division. Significant support for the infantrymen in these battles were the crews of the 16th air army, the actions of which became more and more massive and purposeful.

For the first time since the beginning of the battle in battles, all three bombing divisions of General S. I. Rudenko took part in full, which in his order especially drew the attention of the crews to the accuracy of bombing. "Requires bombardment not just a given area, but finding the most important goals in a given area, especially follow the signals of your troops ..." - wrote the commander in his order on July 7th.

The actions of the bombers began with dawn, when about 45 PE-2 3rd tank bombarded the accumulation of German troops before the 3rd Army front. Over the purpose of the crews, the German anti-aircraft artillery activity was observed. Simultaneously in the air burst from 30 to 50 anti-aircraft shells. The same "hot welcome" the enemy also rendered in the afternoon. However, despite this, Major General Aviators A. Z. Karavitsky as part of 30 PE-2, supported by attack aircraft, achieved impressive success. By this time, the rifle parts have already shot down two fierce attacks at the reindeer. By organizing a new attack, the opponent focused to 150 units of armored vehicles in the Rusta area - friendship, as well as large infantry forces. This accumulation of technology was soon discovered by aerial intelligence. Up to 120 drum aircraft was raised into the air. According to the commander of the Central Front, the German parts suffered serious losses, and their attack was thorough.

The difficulties with which the German Tankists had to face the hacking of the Soviet defense, told at the interrogation of the 3rd tank regiment of the 4th Tank Division of the 3rd Tank Region of the 4th Tank Division: "On the night of July 5, we read the order of Hitler. The order said that tomorrow the German army will begin a new offensive, which is destined to solve the outcome of war. In front of the 35th regiment was tasked with the defense of Russians. Up to 100 tanks, the regiment went to the original positions. At this time, we were attacked by Russian aviation and disabled several cars. At 5 o'clock, our battalion unfolded wedge along the road and went to the attack. Having achieved a ridge of height, we fell under the cross-fire of anti-tank guns and anti-tank rugs of Russians. The system immediately broke, the movement slowed down. Neighboring tank shot. The front tank of the company commander stopped, and then drove back. All that we were taught, lost meaning. Actions have been deployed not as they painted at school. Tactics of a tank breakthrough, which we were taught, turned out to be unsuitable. Soon, my tank was bent, and a fire arose inside the car. I hurried to jump out of the burning tank. At the battlefield stood at least 40 baked tanks, many of whom were burning. "

IL-2 289th Shads played a special role in the application of strikes on German tanks, which actively used the cumulative bombs of Ptab 2.5-1.5. Only at the time of focusing about two hundred tanks for the attack of the reindium, the pilots of the attack aircraft made about 120 flights, achieving excellent results. Group of 431st Senior Lieutenant D. I. Smirnov (Hero of the Soviet Union from 4.2.44.) Destroyed and damaged in the area of \u200b\u200bBuzuluk, twelve enemy tanks, for which he received gratitude to the command of the 13th Army. Eight of Captain K. E. Terrhean for one side destroyed and damaged eleven tanks of the enemy. Pilots of the 874th SAAP, operating in the Maharkhangelsk area, spent 980 cumulative bombs for July 7 and 8, stating the defeat of over forty-German tanks with the loss of six crews.

It is important to note that the massive actions of the impact aircraft of the 18th air army "confused cards" by German fighters who could not disrupt these raids. So, the 2nd guv. The step lost only 1 IL-2 for the day, and another 5 aircraft made forced landings. Losses of bombers were also relatively small. From the composition of the 3rd tank to its airfields for the whole day 4 PE-2 was not returned, two of which were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, and one PE-2 of the 24th BAP was damaged and finished by German fighters. Another plane made a forced landing. A similar picture was in the 221th Bad, whose bombers made 125 aircraft-departures in the Steppe, Sootpecker, Podolyan and Bobrik, having lost only 3 aircraft from the composition of the 745th BAP. It should be noted that on July 7, Victory over Bostoni was recorded by such asams like Joachim Brendel from I./JG51, Gunther Shelle (Schnorrer Karl) and Hans-Joachim Happatshi (Happatsch Hans-Joachim) from I / Jg54.

Escort fighters 282th Jad showed themselves in these battles with best sideI successfully interacting with the covered crews of the 221th BD. This largely contributed to the consolidation of fighter regiments behind the same bombing parts. So, the 127th IAP accompanied mainly 8th GW. BAP, 517th JaP - 57th BAP, and 774th IAP - 745th BAP. In the course of the unfolding battle, the 282nd Jaad had to reflect the attacks of Fockey-Wolf groups with a number from 6 to 20 cars. Already in the morning fly eight Yak-1 127th EAP Captain I. I. Petrenko, who covered the actions of 6 A-20B in the Podolyn area - the Council, counterattacking 10 FW-190, who tried to enter the attack on bombers from the bottom. Another majority withstand the pilots of the 127th IAP in the afternoon, when 12 bombers of the 8th GW. The BAP when leaving the goal was attacked from above because of the clouds with two dozen "one hundred and nineties". Despite the suddenness of the attack, the losses among Bostonov was not, while Soviet pilots stated several shot down FW-190. In these battles, many aviators 282nd Jad distinguished themselves, including the future heroes of the Soviet Union of Captains KM Treshchev and A. P. Savchenko (127th IAP, the title was assigned 2.8.44 and 4.2.44) and senior lieutenant I. I. Romanenko ( 774th IAP, the title is assigned 4.2.44).

The death of the hero was killed by the commander of the squadron of the 517th EAP Senior Lieutenant M. I. Viwow. The accompaniment group, which he headed, entered into battle over the location of the 13th Army with the FW-190 group. Having consumed the ammunition of his Yak-1 and trying to prevent German fighters to bomber, Virudowan Taranized one of the "Fokke-Wolfs" plane, the splicing on the German aircraft at an angle of 90 degrees. Probably, the victim of Taran was one of the two FW-190 from the composition of IV / JG51, which disappeared on July 7 without anything.

Again, the fighters of the 283rd mead showed themselves from the best side. In the area of \u200b\u200bPonyry - Thychi 12 Yak-7B of the 519th IAP under the command of Lieutenant P. I. Trubnikov attacked four bombers groups with a total of 22 JU-88. The busy air battle lasted about 25-30 minutes. As a result of its price, the loss of one "yak" was shot down 2 JU-88, apparently belonging to the group III / KG51. Another "Junkers" was damaged. In addition, Soviet pilots claimed the destruction of five German fighters.

Despite the fierce resistance of the Soviet infantry, in the evening of July 7, the German parts managed to achieve some success - after a stubborn battle, the northern outskirts of the reindeer was occupied. On the Olkhovaat direction of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, after a massive strike of German bombers, were forced to move 2-4 kilometers to a height of 257.0. The headquarters of the 16th air army especially noted the organization of the Aviation Aviation of the enemy in this tax. Three groups of German bombers appeared above the front line around 19:00. The first two, consisting of 25-30 JU-87 and the JU-88, bombarded the front edge of the 16th Army defense in the Ponyry area, again, self-mass, shock. The bombardment was carried out both from dive and from a horizontal flight, while the German crews were built their maneuver in such a way that the attack would go to its territory. The third group of bombers, under a stronger escort of 20 fighters, produced 3-4 goal. While the "Junkers" were engaged in the processing of the front edge, four pairs of "hunters" delighted the Soviet territory to a depth of 10-12 kilometers, not allowing the bombing area of \u200b\u200bthe 16th air army to the bombing area.

According to the headquarters of the 13th Army, the third day of the battle was most tense throughout the defensive operation. During the day of the army of General N. P. Pukhov, put a kind of record, spending almost 3,000 tons of ammunition. Despite some tactical adversary successes, the results of the fighting on July 7 caused optimism from K. K. Rokossovsky and his headquarters. In Soviet historiography, dedicated to the Aviation Action Research, July 7, is also considered a day of fracture for domination in the air. This is how it says about the events of this day in the study M. N. Kozhevnikova: "On July 7, 1943, the main efforts of the enemy were focused against the troops of the central front. Here the enemy acted in groups of 80-120 aircraft, but he could not achieve domination in the air. The 16th air army with the assistance of the 15th air army produced 1370 aircraft-departures, and the opponent is somewhat more than 1000. Starting from this day, Soviet fighters firmly mastered the initiative in the air. Most of the enemy bombers were intercepted and destroyed by our fighters on the approach to the covered objects " . A similar assessment can be found in a book dedicated to the combat path of the 16th air army. Speaking about the events of the third day of the battle, its authors report: "Starting on July 7, a fracture has come to the struggle for domination in the air - Soviet fighters captured the initiative. If in the first two days of air fighting, our losses were slightly less than the enemy's loss (the ratio of losses was 1 to 1.2), then for July 7 and 8, the army pilots shot down 185 opponent aircraft, losing 89 at the same time. .

German sources do not confirm a significant drop in the activity of the unification of General Background Grahima. According to the military operations diary of the 6th Air Fleet, July 7 compared with the previous day, the number of flights not only did not decrease, but also increased significantly, reaching the figure 1687. Of this, 1159 aircraft-departures were committed by the crews of shock aviation - "pieces", Heavy fighters and bombers. Attention is drawn to the fact that on July 7, not only the crews of the "Junkers" and "Heinkers" were attracted to the attacks on the positions of Soviet troops, but intelligence officers who anticipate the bombing reserve in 120 and 18 departures, respectively. According to the reports of German aviators, the day was able to destroy 14 and damage 22 tanks, as well as burn 63 cars. The loss of the 6th Air Fleet on July 7 was small, reaching 13 aircraft, of which 8 was written off.

Despite the fact that the German bombarding aircraft on the third day of battle continued to dominate in the air, its fierce raids on well-fortified defense of the Soviet troops did not always bring the result. So, for example, during heavy battles for the locality, the warm 11th Guards Tank Brigade lost only one tank from the actions of German aviation, although its combat order was bombed all day by the JU-87 and JU-88 bombers. In addition, the effectiveness of the actions of German fighter aviation fell more than twice. On the one hand, it was associated with devastating losses incurred by the 16th air army during the first two days of battle, with the other - massive actions of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, which did not succeed in the German pilots. Note that the tactics of the Soviet fighter actions were gradually changed, whose failures on initial stages The battles caused an acute response both at the rate and in the headquarters of the Red Army Air Force.

Already on July 7, I saw the light of Marshal Aviation Directive A. A. Novikova. Noting in short, positive changes that occurred in the structure of the significantly fermented and grown numerical Army Air Force, the commander analyzed the large miscalculations in more detail, which were used in the use of aviation. Disadvantages, according to A. A. Novikov, took place at the stage of the combat missions. Often it was not determined, without specifying the necessary results, which it was necessary to achieve, which led to a decrease in the sense of responsibility from commander. Aviators, according to the protrusion, they strive more "Run flight, and not solve the task". Operation planning was also distant from the ideal. The staff workers often had no creative approach to their work, the flights were planned to be template, without changing the height and flight routes, as well as without changing the method of attacks. Immediately before departures, the exposure to the object of impact and its air defense system was carried out. All this led to the cases of the nebid to goal. In addition, meetings with large groups of enemy fighters and powerful fire of anti-aircraft artillery often became a surprise for flight composition, among which, according to A. A. Novikov, a broad initiative and military trick were sufficiently cultivated.

Two points of their directive commander of the Air Force devoted to the management and use of fighters. Radio control, although actively used in all air armies, according to Marshal, has not yet satisfied the requirements of the modern situation, and in some units, they inflicted other means of communication. The network of radio stations not everywhere was still quite wide, and the serving staff often did not have the necessary qualifications. At the same time, in the fighter parts, a free search on the territory of the enemy and the destruction of enemy aviation on the approach to the front line was still rarely practiced. The tough binding of patrolling fighters to a particular object or district deprived of our pilots to lead an active offensive battle.

Commands of the parts were suggested to pay close attention to the location of couples and their interaction during air combat. Couples should have been able to have a permanent composition, which was drawn up by order on the shelf. All this, on the thought of the commander, increased the responsibility of the pilots of the couple, especially those led, for ensuring the actions of their partners. In air battles it was necessary to create a numerical advantage to the skillful increase in forces, which was achieved by using tactics, very similar to the enemy applied. Patroling couples were to collect on the team from Earth to a single group for the attack of the detected opponent aircraft.

Another important innovation was the allocation of the total mass of the best pilots and the development of the "free hunting" tactics behind the front line. The commander of the Air Force emphasized: "The workshop free flight of the best fighter pilots (ASOs) is mainly in those directions of the front, where the main forces of aviation are valid, without connecting them to perform any specific tasks. Aces are always everywhere and everywhere have only one task - to destroy the opponent aircraft in the air, using favorable air conditioning conditions. " .

In relation to the commandile, the requirements of the Directive were reduced to the need to develop the initiative from the commanders of the Aviadvisias and regiments, providing them with maximum freedom when planning combat operations. The operations themselves should be carried out not impromptu, but on the basis of a detailed plan. A special role in the current situation was acquired by the use of compact combat orders, increasing the level of defense of drum aircraft groups and their interaction with cover fighters, as well as with their anti-aircraft artillery.

As can be seen from the foregoing, for the command of the Air Force of the Red Army, major flaws in the combat work of aviation were not a secret. In fact, they were rather "growth diseases" than serious "chronic diseases". Figuratively speaking, by the summer of 1943, the Skeleton of the Air Force was assembled, muscle mass Used in muscles, which nevertheless still demanded patient "pumping". In addition, a new fighter was needed creative spirit, a quick response and independence. But to eliminate all the shortcomings and the acquisition of high professionalism required time. It is important to understand that the Kursk battle only highlighted the shortcomings of the new structure, allowing you to schedule ways to solve them. In the meantime, the combat experience was acquired in heavy battles and generously paid by the blood of the flight composition.

The course of the battle on July 8 confirmed the correctness of the conclusions made on the eve of the commander of the Central Front of K. K. Rokossovsky, who, according to the results of the fighting, on July 7, in a conversation with the commanders of the armies, stated that the defensive battle was almost wondered. In the morning I managed to restore the position in the Ponyrai area - the 307th Rifle division by the rapid attack returned the northern part of this settlement. However, heavy battles continued here throughout the day.

Failure to failure in the Ponyrai district, the command of the 9th Army focused its efforts in the afternoon at attacks in the height of 257.0, which is north of Olkhovka. To capture heights in areas again, the subdocumentary and the councils were concentrated, according to Soviet estimates, up to 400 tanks and up to two infantry divisions. The airfolding of the 16th air army marked the solid movement of cars and tanks from Zmievka through the glazing on the bottom and from Zmievka through the glazing to the lower tagino, as well as the movement of groups of cars on field roads from the Lozhanovka line, Bogoroditsky to the south. Fights in the height of 257.0, several times moved from hand to hand, boiled all day. Only by 17:00 on July 8, it was captured by German units as a result of a number of attacks from different directions with the participation of approximately 60 tanks.

On July 8, the Soviet Aviation Command has tried to make the necessary changes to the tactics of the actions of the fighter aircraft, bypassing large groups for clearing airspace before the lapse of bomber and attack aircraft. The first method was tested by the pilots of the 1st GW. Jad. 15 Yak-1 under the command of the hero of the Soviet Union of Captain V. N. Makarov, who are visited from the ground by the commander of the division by Lieutenant Colonel I. V. Brichenina, held two large air combat over the army of the 13th Army. In the first of them, the combat order of group 40 BF-110 was upset from the composition I / ZG1, after which the group V. N. Makarov was overstated to the area of \u200b\u200bOlkhovatka, to which up to 50 JU-88 and JU-87 aircraft were approached.

As a result of air combat, pilots reported on the destruction of 5 JU-87, 2 JU-88 and FW-190. Although German sources and do not confirm the numbers of Soviet applications for victory, the experience in managing fighters from the ground clearly succeeded.

At the same time, the level of losses of the 16th air army on July 8 rose again compared with the previous day, having increased from 37 to 47 not returned to the airfields of cars. Refined data suggest that in two days of battles on July 7-8, the union of S. I. Rudenko lost 89 aircraft. The bulk of losses on the fourth day of battle again fell on fighter aircraft. Especially suffered by the 739th IAP 286th Id, who was before that day in reserve. During the day of fierce battles, thirteen aircraft did not return to the airfields, and eight of them were lost during one departure to the area of \u200b\u200bPoniy. Having accepted the air battle with 14 FW-190, apparently belonging to III and IV / JG51, group of the 739th IAP under the air combat of six aircraft. Two more "lavecie" were shot down by the fire of anti-aircraft artillery.

As a result of severe losses, the numerical composition of many fighter connections fell to a critical mark. So, for example, only in the 1st GW. Jad at the end of day July 8 was noted the presence of four regiments of only 19 serviceable and 14 repaired aircraft. Despite the established serious situation, the command of the 16th air army nevertheless retained the reserve of two regiments (56th and 67th GW. IAP). According to the memories of S. I. Rudenko, who learned about it. K. Zhukov expressed its extreme displeasure, however, a little cool, approved the actions of commander-16.

Meanwhile, the question of covering ground troops on the fourth day of battle was so acute that it was forced to attract the crew of the 3rd GW to fulfill this task. Jad from the 15th air army. The pilots of this compound made departures in the 3rd Army strip starting from the first day of the Kursk battle. So, July 5, 10 La-5 63rd GW. Japa conducted a air battle from 20 FW-190. According to the Openers, one "Fockey-Wulf" was shot down, but 5 La-5 was not returned to his airfields. The next day, the airliners of the 15th air army made 72 aircraft-departures in the central front strip. During the three air fighting in the Sherbatovo area, Mahamargelsk and the Red Slobodka were shot down 6 BF-109 and 1 FW-190. However, their losses were also significant - 2 La-5 was shot down, 2 IL-2 committed forced landings, and 6 La-5 considered missing. Among the incredible commander of the 32st GW. Jame Major B. P. Lyubimov and his deputy in political part Major N. D. Tarasov.

On July 8, out of 113 aircraft-departures committed by the pilots of the unification of General N. F. Naumenko, only 14 were implemented to support the troops of the central front. 8 La-5 63rd GW. JEAP under the command of Captain P. E. Bundeva about 8:46 discovered and attacked in the Ponyry area - Buzuluk 16 JU-87, who were under the cover of 16 fighters. According to the results of the battle, the price of the two incredible and one damaged fighter crews were shot down 3 JU-87, 2 FW-190 and 1 BF-109. On this involvement of aviators of the 15th air army in the defensive phase of the battle on the Kursk arc ended.

The fourth day of the defensive operation was also characterized by a decrease in the activity of assault and bombardment aviation of the 16th air army. So, for example, the crews of the 3rd tank only rose in the air. However, even from this number of 18 bombers were forced to return due to the lack of cover fighters. With a combat job, one PE-2 was not returned. Several big losses suffered a part of the 221st Bad, who missed six crews.

According to German data, fighters of the 1st Aircondvisia claimed the destruction of 5 "Boston", one of which was the 27th victory of Hubert Strasls out of 30 by him during the four-day fights near Kursk. Strasl fought as part of III / JG51 since the end of 1941. After knocking down his first aircraft in July 1942, the 24-year-old pilot was not particularly highlighted among his colleagues, having a bill of July 37 victories. Nevertheless, in the combat biography of Asa there were often cases of destroying for a day 2-3 aircraft. The most efficient was June 8, when the battle account of the Strasl was replenished with 6 victories. With the beginning of the "Citadel" operation, the pilot immediately fell into the focus of universal attention, but Military Fortune turned out to be changed. By in the evening of July 8, his account up to 67 victories, Strasl died in battle with a group of La-5 fighters (in some sources, Lagg-3 or Lagg-5 are mentioned). The Fockey-Wolf Group in the Eagle - Kursk Highway has undergone an unexpected attack of a group of Soviet fighters who managed to damage the Strasl plane. Leaving on its territory, its black "four" FW-190A-4 (head. Number 2351) received several more hits with the pursuing Soviet fighter. The dome of the parachute that sued at an altitude of about 300 meters of the German pilot did not have time to fill the air, causing his death. On November 12, 1943, the pilot was posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross.

It is interesting to note that the Strasl plane was just one of the two official losses officially recognized on July 8 (the second was JU-87 from the composition III / STG3). According to the General-Farmaster of 4 FW-190, 1 HE-111, 1 JU-87 was damaged in battles, and JU-88 from the composition III / KG1 exploded in the air with all the crew. In addition, the wound in the air combat was received by the commander of the detachment 3./jg54 Franz Eisenach (Eisenach Franz), which is nevertheless landing at the aerodrome Panino.

By July 9, the command of the 6th Air Fleet began to experience an anxiety for the fate of such a successfully started operation. This is what the head of the unification of General Friedrich Chase writes about this: "Invertible air battles, tightened for a long time, reduced the efficiency of our aircraft, temporary domination in the air superior in the number of Soviet air forces was inevitable, the enemy could act directly against our troops in the breaks between the Luftwaffe departures. Due to the fact that the land forces of the 9th Army participated in an extremely important offensive, inevitable tactical successes of the Soviet Air Force were extremely unpleasant for us. " . Until the complete cessation of the operation "Citadel" in the Northern Fac of Kursk Arc remained three days. For the German side, they passed the final chord of the former power both on earth and in heaven.

2.3. Over heights of Olkhovka

It will not be an exaggeration to say that by July 9, the onset of the army of the model went to a dead end. I stumbled upon the fierce resistance of the troops of the 13th and 70th armies, parts of the 41st and 47th tank buildings on the fifth day of the offensive could be achieved only by minor tactical success, expressed in the next breakthrough to the northern outskirts of the reindeer, as well as in a slight promotion in Height area 257.0. Speaking about the progress of the battle, Stephen Newton did not make sure that his "It is difficult to describe otherwise as a repetition of the battle at the vertene with big noise from tanks" . Despite the created difficult situation and continued to receive intelligence data on the concentration of the largest forces of the Red Army north and east of the eagle, the command of the 9th Army and the Army Center, the Center did not lose hope for the successful outcome of the "Citadel". To a large extent, this optimism was determined by the Regulations on southern Face Kursk Arc, where the 4th Goth's tank army came out to the rear defensive line of the Voronezh Front. General model did not leave plans for the renewal of the offensive. Having achieved the permission of Feldmarshal-General Trevity to transfer to the 9th Army from the reserve of the 12th Tank and the 36th Infantry Division, he planned to regroup his forces and, shifting the direction of impact in the south-west direction, on July 12, complete a breakthrough of Soviet defense .

The plans of the central front command at this stage of the battle were determined by the need to keep the established status quo until the moment when the troops of the Bryansky front, as well as the left wing of the Western Front, will not begin the surroundings of the Orytics Orlovsk Group. In addition to the powerful anti-tank defense and rapid counterattack, the most important factor that ensured the stability of the situation was massive raids of bombers and attack aircraft of the 16th air army. Such a tactic in the current situation showed itself the most effective, allowing at first attempts to focus the enemy to attack sensitive blows. At the same time, their own losses significantly decreased, and the use of escort fighters was optimized. The documents of the 16th air army headquarters are especially emphasized: "The use of massive blows was caused by the fact that the enemy focused on the narrow section of the front large forces of tanks, artillery and infantry to continue the offensive. For such purposes and used massive blows " .

Like the previous three days of the battle, on July 9, it began with powerful raids of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft on the cluster of German tanks and infantry in the area of \u200b\u200bKashara, Svobrovka, the Council. About 5: 30-6: 00 The air rose six groups of PE-2 241st and 301th Bad, four of which had an effective bombarding blow to the arrangement of the enemy, dropping a total of 366 Fab-100, 7 Fab-50, 685 AO-10, 42 AO-25. According to crew estimates, it was possible to destroy 12 tanks and suppress fire 2 artillery batteries. Two more groups of 18 aircraft each were forced to return to their airfields due to the lack of escort fighters.

It should be noted that the air clearing groups were used to ensure the action of impact aircraft for the first time. After making sure the effectiveness of the tactics applied by the enemy, the command of the 16th air army decided to introduce this experience in own parts. In order parts of the 3rd tank on combat operations on July 9, it was said: "In addition to direct accompaniment 5 minutes before hitting the target, 30 fighters 273 JaM (6 ion) will be patrolled. Over the opposite route of the group of bomber organized a clip of eightec yak-1 273 Iad " .

Behind the strike of the bombers and attack aircraft, the commander of the 16th air army, who announced the gratitude to all aviators participating in the departure. Nevertheless, this departure can hardly be attributed to the category of "light walks" for members of the crews "pawns" and "Ilov". Fully neutralize the activity of enemy fighters failed. Directly above the target of the group of the 3rd tank were attacked by airplanes from the composition IV / JG51, as well as BF-110 from I / ZG1. As a result of the battle, 4 PE-2 was shot down, one bombarder became a victim of anti-aircraft artillery, and two more received significant damage and made forced landings.

The main damage fell on the 301th Bad, who has lost a total of six aircraft. Indicating the cause of losses, the crews of the bombers "traditionally" laid the guilt on escort fighters from the 279th Jaad, who were distracted by a group of German fighters, imitating air battle in the area of \u200b\u200bthe target. This allowed the pilots of another group "Fokke-Wulfov" to produce an unexpected attack on the "pawns", as a result of which the regimental columns lost two cars. When attacks, the crews of bombers noted the bold action of German Asov, who, ignoring the fire of shooters and navigations, repeatedly tried to break through the group of bombers in order to split it. The Fokke-Wolf Pilot Fire was mainly concentrated on PE-2 wing pots. Despite the attacks, the "Yagdfly Geramp" could not disrupt the massive bombing of their troops - the large masses of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, which followed a powerful escort, were a strong nutrition for them.

On the effectiveness of the infused strike, only the fact that, if in previous days, after applying bomb strikes, German troops with some delay, but nevertheless moved to the offensive, then after hitting July 9, the enemy did not show activity on the Olkhowat direction all day. For the breakdown of the tank attack, the command of the 2nd Tank Army sent gratitude to pilots. On July 9, the 16th air army caused two more massive impacts in the Council of the Council, Buzuluk, Swards, reindeer. This time, the Boston groups were operating here by the 221th Bad, which were 69 crawls by the end of the day. Losing only one plane of the 8th GW from the anti-aircraft fire. BAP, bombers successfully completed a combat challenge.

Heavy trials on July 9 fell out of pilots of assault aviation pilots, whose groups were repeatedly subjected to fierce attacks of the enemy fighters. According to German data, the pilots of the JG51 and JG54 destroyer and JG54 per day managed to knock about 30 attack aircraft. Especially hard accounted for 11 Il-2 299th Shads, which, when applying a strike in the area, wide swamp attacks in the forehead of the eight of German fighters. Crews Il-2 managed to still reset the bombing cargo to the target, destroying and damaging up to 15 tanks and about 20 cars. As a result, the attack was torn in the position of the 3rd tank corps. However, the tests for pilot-attack aircraft were just beginning.

Beyond the fight with Fokke-Wulfami, La-5 from the accompaniment group was left "ily" without cover, which did not slow down to take advantage of other "one hundred and nineties". The first attack of the FW-190 result did not give, since the attack aircraft stood in a defensive circle, supporting each other with fire. German pilots had to imitate the way out of battle. However, as soon as the attack aircraft began to rebuild to a large wedge, "Fockey-Wolfs" immediately attacked them again, having filled four "il" at once. The remaining seven managed to get up again in a circle, exposed to even more fierce attacks of the enemy. During the ten-minute fight, German fighters produced more than thirty attacks. To avoid lesions from the bottom, the pilots "Ilov" were forced to decline to 15-20 meters, sowing as a result to break away from the enemy.

Much no longer lucky to pilots six Il-2 of the same 299th SHD followed. All cars included in it were either shot down, or made forced landings. The accompanying attack aircraft "Yaki" of the 896th EAP were cut off from their wards an unexpected attack "Fockey-Wolfs". As a result, each IL-2 attacked three or four FW-190, and the pilot plane attacked the whole seven fighters.

The next day, on July 10, the assault and bombardment aviation of the 16th air army acted with the former scope and with even greater efficiency. From the morning, the opponent resumed his attacks at the junction of the 13th and 70th armies. Compared to the previous day, German aviation slightly increased its activity, making 1136 aircraft-departures before sunset. It should be noted that the increase in departures was obtained mainly due to the crews of "pieces" and two-door bombers who, supporting their ground troops, made almost 280 outlets more than the day before.

Ground battles were mainly unfolded before the front of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. Personal composition of the connection from 8:30 to 16:00 reflected three powerful attacks of the enemy, the forces of which were estimated more than one infantry division and up to 250 tanks. In the unfolded heavy battle, the Aviation of the 16th Air Army was also managed to say his testing word. Around noon, a large cluster of tanks and adversary infantry in the Kashara region, which, apparently, was prepared for the next attack. A powerful aviation compound, consisting of 171 bombers (108 PE-2 and 63 "Boston") and 37 attack aircraft, was promptly in the air. All these cars belonged to the 3rd tank, 6th sak and the 2nd GW. Shad.

Within three minutes from 12:47 am to 12:50, eight groups of 17-18 PE-2, together with Boston and IL-2, caused a concentrated blow to the accumulation of the enemy's technique. Over the purpose of Soviet aircraft were met with powerful anti-aircraft fire - at the same time in the air, there were from 80 to 100 breaks. Despite the active opposition of the enemy, the results of the bombardment exceeded all expectations. As noted in the operational summary of the General Staff of the Red Army: "Infantry and artillery observation establishes that as a result of the aircraft, in this area 14 was burned and 30 tanks of the enemy, and his infantry suffered great losses" . From the 2nd tank army, they were reported that as a result of air raids, on July 10, 8 tanks were burned in the area of \u200b\u200bKutyraki, in the region of the height of 238.1-6 tanks and up to 40 tanks scattered in the Swards area. The preparing major attack of the enemy was torn with a big damage for him. The losses of the Soviet side amounted to 1 "Boston" and 5 IL-2.

The command of the 16th air army emphasized successful actions on July 10th crews of the 221th BD. According to the reports of land forces, only after the "Boston" strikes of the 745th BAP in the height of 250.0, fourteen tanks were burned, the rest, apparently made for the offensive, turned into the rear. This success was all the more significant that the combat work of the connection from the beginning of the Kursk battle was not always at the height. Three times its crews mistakenly hit their troops. There were also cases of discharge of bombs in the field and the care of the goal of the gossip. And here, after a week of harsh tests, yesterday's "green" pilots demonstrated themselves with mature fighters. The opponent gave them a high assessment. The general of Friedrich Cles mentioned by us, speaking about the actions of the crews of Boston bombers (which he mistakenly calls "Bristol"), marked them "Excellent discipline and exceptional aggressiveness" .

They did not praise on the praise of aviators and ground commanders. So, in particular, the headquarters of the 2nd tank army sent a letter of graceful telegram to the commander of the 16th air army, which said: "During the day, 10.7.43 aviation caused a massive blow to the accumulation of tanks and infantry of the enemy north of the 1st reindeer and height of 238.1. Tankers with admiration looked at the work of Stalin Sokolov and bring you a big tanker thank you. We are confident that our combat community will further strengthen the strikes on the enemy and accelerate our final victory over the enemy. Recall the enemy again Stalingrad " .

Note that the next day, on July 11, the bombardment and assault aviation of the 16th air army of massive strikes did not. The command of the 9th Army clearly refused to try to break through the Soviet defense. In some areas of the front, the Soviet observers noted that the enemy began working on strengthening the defense of his front edge.

From consideration of the actions of shock aviation, we turn to the struggle for the domination of the air in the last three days of the battle. We have repeatedly noted that severe damage, which suffered a fighter aircraft of the 16th air army during the first four days of a defensive operation. Among the compounds were especially injured by the 273rd, 279th and 1st GW. The JaM, which, to the end of July 8, has 14, 25 and 19 cars, respectively. These forces to combat bombarding and fighter aviation of the enemy, as well as the escorting of the 3rd tank aircraft by July 9, was obviously not enough.

The main hopes for the stabilization of the situation, the command of the 16th air army associated with the commissioning of the 234th JaM of Lieutenant Colonel E. Z. Tatanashvili with the introduction into battle. This connection, which consisted of 87 Yak-7B fighters, focused on the airfields of the 273rd Jaad on July 8, taking the airfields of the Kolpna, Red, Limovoye. The division entered the prompt subordination of the 6th IAK, having received a combat challenge from his commander for July 9 to cover the combat orders of ground troops in the Council of the Council, the Swards, Ponyry.

Despite the bad weather, the groups of the 233rd and 248th IAP were raised in the air in the morning, while the 133rd JEAP was abandoned by the command in the reserve. Of the 79 aircraft-departures committed by the pilots of the compound July 9, 22 was spent on the flight line of the front and 57 for patrol. Oddly enough, but there were no meetings with opponent aircraft. At the same time, as a result of group loss of orientation, the dealers of the division made 8 forced landings in which five cars were broken. Two pilots did not return to their airfields. Note that, according to German data, the commander of 1./jg51 Joachim Brendel, which shot down during 4 minutes of air battle, was achieved on 9 July. One of the killed fighters was the 50th victory of ACA and the 400th victory of his squad.

The next day, acting in full force, the crews of the 234th JaM not only provided patroling north of Olkhovka and in the Poniye district, but also flew to the interception of the enemy on call from the command paragraph of the 6th JAK. During the day, 11 air battles were held, in which, according to the reports of pilots, it was possible to knock down 22 FW-190, BF-109, as well as to beat another "Fockey-Wulf". Division's loss in the same day of battles amounted to fifteen aircraft, of which eleven were considered not returned to their airfield, one was shot down in air combat, two were chosen by anti-aircraft artillery and another plane, hit in battle, failed a catastrophe at the landing.

Despite the fact that the German bombarding aircraft continued to perform departures, inflicting strikes at the front edge of the 13th army, the overwhelming majority of the bouts were carried out with German fighters. The most heavy air battle occurred at about 13:50. Eight Yak-7B of the 233rd JaP, led by senior lieutenant A. K. Vinogradov, met 8 FW-190. Noticing our aircraft, German pilots went to the clouds. However, literally after a minute, Soviet fighters were attacked from above because of clouds already 18 "Fokke-Wolfs". There is a fight on verticals between the fighters. From the command item of the 6th Jac, the Six of Yak-7B was called from the composition of the 133rd JEAP, which soon also entered into battle, which was extremely unsuccessful for Soviet pilots. The losses of the two groups of the 234th JaM made up nine aircraft, of which one was broken on a forced landing. In fact, only 3 aircraft returned to his airfield from 8 Yak-7B of the 233rd, and from six fighters of the 133rd JaP, which took place, survived only two. According to the results of the battle, 9 shot down FW-190 were recorded on the battle accounts of the pilots. In addition, one of the baked "Fokke-Wolfs" made a forced landing of the south of the settlement of the wet.

With a large probability, it can be argued that the Soviet pilots in this battle opposed Fockey-Wolfs from the composition of IV / JG51, which shot down eight Soviet fighters identified as MiG-1 and Lagg-3. The own losses of the group per day amounted to 2 FW-190, belonging to the detachment 12./jg51. Among the missing, Hans Pfahler Hans was listed - a 29-year-old pilot, who defeated the 10th victory from the beginning of the Kursk battle and brought to 30 shot down aircraft. Perhaps his forced landing was observed by Soviet pilots. It is possible that Pfaler was shot down by the pilot of the 248th IAP lieutenant A. C. Ivanov, after the queues of which the pilot of one of the "Fockey-Wolfs" jumped with a parachute.

The next day, on July 11, the number of departures committed by the Pilot 234th JaM decreased almost half. During the seven group departures (60 aircraft-departures), only three air combat was held. Balance of victories and losses recorded by the department of division practically converged. Nine fighters were lost, despite the fact that, at the request of the pilots of the connection, in air battles managed to knock 2 JU-87 and 9 FW-190.

The main load on July 11 fell on the shoulders of the crews of the 133rd JEAP. After spending two air combat, the regiment was missing by the end of the day eight aircraft. The first air battle was especially unsuccessful when about 5:20 10 Yak-7B under the command of Major T. F. Amelchenko, immediately before leaving his airfield, met a group of 24 JU-87, which was accompanied from 30 to 40 FW-190 from I / JG54. Percussion of Captain A. I. Eschenko attacked the diving bomber, but was counterattacked by Fokke-Wulfs. With a combat task, all the unit has not returned in full. Another "Yak" became a victim of the fire of anti-aircraft artillery. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, the German N. Ya. Ilyina managed to still attack the dive bombers, knocking 2 JU-87. According to German data, in this battle, two victories won Gunter Shell (Scheel Gunther) from the 2./jg54 detachment, and two more Soviet aircraft were shot down by pilots 3./jg54.

In the second half of the day, pilots from the eight of the same 133rd JEAP led the air battle in the Ponyrai area from 14 FW-190. With a loss of 3 Yak-7B, it was announced on the destruction of the five "Fockey-Wolfs". However, as in many other cases, German sources do not confirm these applications for victory. According to the host diary of the 6th Air Fleet, only 2 aircraft are lost - FW-190 and JU-87. Reports of the General-Starmerster reports indicate that five aircraft were lost in the day (2 FW-190, 2 JU-87 and 1 JU-88), and four more damaged. It should be noted that in all over the period from July 9 to July 11, the 6th air fleet in the area of \u200b\u200bthe operation "Citadel" irrevocably lost 20 aircraft, and another 11 cars were damaged.

A severe loss for the German side was the loss of July 11 commander IV / JG51, a veteran of battles in Spain and the cavalier of the Knight's Cross Major Rudolf Rudolf (Resch Rudolf). Having won its last, 94th victory over IL-2, the German speaker was shot down in air battle and died. Unfortunately, to establish the authorship of this victory from the Soviet side is not possible.

It should be noted - despite the fact that the battle over the Northern Fasu Kursk Arc has lasted for a whole week, the fighters of the 6th air fleet continued to demonstrate high performance in air battles at a relatively low level of losses. In addition to well-established interaction and control in battle, the actions of the German crews were characterized by the use of various elements of military tricks. Thus, according to the report of the commander of the 273rd Iad of Colonel I. E. Fedorov about the combat work of the division for the period from 5 to July 8, for the exit of the unsuccessful fear of Fokke-Wulfov, the imitation of the disorderly fall and breakdown into the corkscrew was often practiced. Often it created the illusion of the destruction of the enemy car in young and inexperienced Soviet pilots, contributing to the unrestrained growth of applications for victory.

We have repeatedly become witnesses that the figures are victories and losses contained in the documents of the opposing parties, when compared, often dramatically diverge. Considering this very scrupulous and painful question about the effectiveness of fighter aircraft actions, it should be noted that, recognizing many shortcomings in its work, the documents of the 16th air army at the same time practically do not contain materials that critically evaluate the number of applications for air victories. Thus, the report on the actions of the army in the defensive operation of the central front contains numbers whose analysis cannot but cause surprise. According to him, the number of German aviation grouping to the beginning of the operation, according to the army headquarters, was about 900 aircraft, among which there were 525 bombers and about 300 fighters. As can be seen, the number of German fighter aviation was exaggerated by the Soviet side almost twice, nevertheless as a result of a week of combat work from July 5 to July 11, according to the same report, the air battles managed to bring down 425 fighters, 88 bombers and 5 opponent's scouts. Thus, the number of destroyed "Fokke-Wolfs" and "Messerschmitt" even compared to the overestimated discharges of the month amounted to 140%!

Analysis of German sources allows you to draw the following conclusions. According to the 6th Air Fleet Diary, from July 5 to July 11, only 33 aircraft were lost (10 FW-190, 1 BF-109, 4 BF-110, 8 JU-87, 6 JU-88, 3 HE-111 and 1 AR-66). Analysis of the reports of the General-Starmaster's report allows us to talk about great losses to the unification of General Background Grahima. According to them, the number of written off airplanes is 64 cars (24 FW-190, 2 BF-109, 5 BF-110, 15 JU-87, 11 JU-88, 5 HE-111, 1 AR-66 and 1 FI-156) . Another 45 aircraft were damaged. Perhaps this data is also not quite complete. So, according to the Russian historian D. B. Khazanov, by the morning of July 9, a 37 "Fockey-Wulfov" was missing for the morning of JG51. Nevertheless, expect that the order of the German side loss when clarified the loss figures will change at least an order of magnitude.

Analysis of Soviet archival documents allows us to conclude that failures in the work of fighters were associated not only with the level of preparation of flights and disadvantages in the management of compounds. A significant proportion of clarity in this issue is made by telegrams to the commanders of the fighter compounds, which are contained in the "Correspondence on Combat Work" of the Foundation of the 486th IAP. To begin with, we present the full text of the order of the head of the headquarters of the 6th Iac N. P. Zhiltsov, aimed at the results of combat work on July 10:

"For 10.7.43, the following flaws in the work of fighters of your parts are established.

1. Not a single group of fighters flewing into the appointed area to reflect the enemy bombers was not, and all went 8-9 kilometers south that, that is, the age of 6, with the exception of the group 6 of the IAC, which was eaten about 20-00. The enemy fighters in pairs and fours patrol in the area, associate our fighters, and bombers without covering calmly bombard the front edge of 50-70 Yu-88 and Yu-87.

2. Fighters in the air conduct unnecessary conversations, they simply chat, so they do not hear the guidance station and do not speak their call signs even when requesting.

3. The enemy fighters go in pairs, counterpart fours.

Order:

1. To bring me the names of all the leading groups to bring to justice for non-compliance with my order. I demand from all the leading groups and all the pilots to learn over the front line and warn that for the failure to fulfill this order, I will attract the strictest responsibility - to send to the penalty battalions and even shoot in front of the building for cowardice.

2. Install the discipline in the air. Stop chatter, but look after the air, to report the opponent, command one or two words and listen to my OUB-1 radio station, which is 3 kilometers from the front edge, and the radio station "Body". To pass through Olkhovatka and call the call sign, fight bombers, and fighter fighters. Division commanders report me the names of the leading each group and departure time. "

The sharp and concrete in his message was General S. I. Rudenko, who in the telegram of July 10 wrote: "So cover your troops - a crime and failure to fulfill my order is also a crime. For all the days of battles, a meager number of bombers, and fighters on the report of the pilots "wrote down" as much as they did not have the opponent, while the bombers go even without covering hundreds " . It is threatening to send themselves to the penalty battalions and even shoot in front of the building for cowardice, the commandar nevertheless addressed to the sense of dedication of pilots: "It's time to stop, comrades pilots, disgrace our fighters so that the infantry in one voice stating that the fighters do not protect it, do not fight with bombers, and hide into the rear, while the same infantry admires the courage and courage of our attack aircraft and bombers" .

Despite the terrible warnings of commander, the actions of fighters the next day, July 11, left much to be desired. Let us turn again to the instructions of the commander of the 16th air army, which, characterizing the combat work of fighters, especially noted:

"The team on the radio is not performed, so it was 11.7, when the" OUB-1 "radio ordered TOV. Vinogradov, Mishchenko, Silayev and Babenko to go to bombers. The latter accepted the team, but did not go. The ether during the flight of our fighters is clogged by unnecessary empty conversations and other "mat", do not perform accurate commands.

Order:

1. All fighters accurately perform previously data numbers of the instructions on patrolling in the zone, counting the front line by the main area.

2. When departing on call with the bombers of the enemy, do not fly directly to the place of the bombing site, and to bypass the area of \u200b\u200binterception of the enemy fighters is significantly east of the northeastern city of Maharkhangelsk, to enter the enemy's territory from the rear and attack his bombers.

3. The commander of 6 IAK [instead of] sent over the past days to combat enemy aircraft 20 aircraft from 12.7.43 to send a group of 40 aircraft and accurately execute the item of this indication.

4. Bomber and attack aircraft when flying towards goal and back to take into account the enemy zones in the air and also bypass them.

5. Commands 6 IAK and 1 HAD investigate the failure of the order of the OUB-1 and the bayonet ... ".

The destroying characteristic of the actions of the fighter aircraft of the front proceeded not only from the mouth of the commander, but also from other aviation commanders. So, for example, the commander of the 279th Iad Colonel Dementiev noted that "All our fighters patrol 10 kilometers behind the front line, they don't care about the front edge, fear of anti-aircraft fire, and give enemy bombers for the whole hour to stay over the goal." Summary of the commander of the division is impregnated by bitterness: "I'm ashamed to look at it" .

The author believes that the documents given very convex characterize not only the actual situation in the struggle for domination in the air, but also the attitude towards this issue of the command of the 16th air army and commander of the compounds of fighter aircraft. As can be seen, even the input in the battle of the Fresh 234th Iad has not changed the established situation. For three days of hostilities as part of the Association S. I. Rudenko, Pilot Pilot E. Z. Tatanashvili shot down 36 German aircraft, 34 of which were identified as FW-190, and only 2 JU-87 bombers. At the same time, the own losses amounted to 27 Yak-7B and 23 pilots. Is it worth saying that most of the stated victories are not confirmed by German sources.

We have already indicated those changes in the combat operation of fighters of the 16th air army, which occurred in the course of the defensive operation of the central front. The Command of the Red Army Air Force considered it necessary to strengthen and the governing composition of the compounds. Already on July 10, 85 aircraft and 54 pilots and 54 pilots were appointed for the position of commander of the 6th Jac and 54 pilots, Major General E. E. Yerlykin was appointed, urgently recalled from Leningrad. Until June 29, the Major General A. B. Yumashev was located at the head of the corps, after which only eleven days the connection was embossed in battles received a new commander. Thus, in the most tense moment of the Kursk battle, the corps did not have the commander officially appointed to this position, and his duties, judging by the documents, performed the head of the headquarters Colonel N. P. Zhiltsov.

After reviewing the place with the established situation, General E. E. Yrelykin has already presented the next day to the commander of the 16th Air Army, a report in which suggested aimed at improving the efficiency of fighter aircraft, aged mainly in the spirit of the Marshal AA Novikov directive dated July 7. The most interesting thing was the proposal to use in the interests of front-line aviations in the Kursk air defense system and the RLS Shchigrats "Reduce". The system of terrestrial observation of air surveillance posts did not allow the approach to the front line of groups of enemy bombers, not to mention the seed of lifting aircraft from the airfields of Orlovsky and Bryansky aerials. The introduction system, which was available to the beginning of a defensive operation of the central front, did not justify himself. At best, she made it possible to throw the opponent bombers at the time of their approach to the front line, while it was not necessary to talk about serfs of the rise of German aircraft from the airfields of Orlovsky and Bryansk nodes. According to the proposal of Yerlykin, in the work on the guidance of fighters it was necessary to use the two settings "Reduce", placing them near the front line and providing communication with the command lead points. Running a little ahead, it is worth noting that the introduction of RLS to ensure the combat work of fighters began on the central front only after the completion of the Kursk battle.

Another proposal, which was submitted to the commander of the 16th air army, the commander of the 6th Jac was the camouflage painting of domestic aircraft. By stating that all types of fighters are produced by the Soviet industry with a bright black and green camouflage, which came to masking on Earth, but not for air combat, E. E. Yerlykin, noted: "In the air combat, not knowing the type of aircraft, it is easy to determine our plane from the opponent's aircraft according to it too bright coloring of the planes and fuselage, i.e. the main battle figures." According to the general, the camouflage of the Allied and German cars was adapted just for air combat, making it difficult to keep the sighting fire. Summary Komkora was as follows: "It is necessary to put the question of the industry about the further release of combat vehicles with camouflage not dark color, but light gray (bluish-steel). This dramatically cuts endless sudden attacks of the Germans to our aircraft; Sharply reduce the loss and defeat in battles and will disappear for the annual repainting for winter " .

Let's go back to the events of July 11. The obvious hopelessness of the German offensive in the center of the central front by this time has not yet caused doubts. Despite the maximum progress in the depths of Soviet defense to 10-12 kilometers, it was not possible to achieve any noticeable operational success of general model. Starting from July 6, the promotion of the 9th Army was becoming more modest. Bloody battles on the Olkhowat direction with the parts of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps and the 2nd Tank Army, three-day fierce battles in the Ponyrai area, not giving a decisive success parts of the 41st Tank Corps, and, finally, attenuation of the offensive in the region of heights north of Olchovka - Such are the main stages of the "Citadel" operation in the Northern Face of the Kursk Arc. Not received the development and plans for the command of the 9th Army, associated with the displacement of the main blows already mentioned above.

On July 11, in the Bryansk and Western fronts, reconnaissance was conducted, and the next day, artillery salts are east and north of Eagle unequivocally announced the completion of the operation "Citadel" north of Kursk. Now the command of the Army Group "Center" had to solve the task of preventing the environment of their own troops, locked in the arc - but no longer kursk, and Orlovskaya.

We have left to summarize the air battle. Having at the beginning of the German offensive 1151 aircraft (1084 serviceable), the 16th air army during the week of fierce fighting suffered heavy losses - the army headquarters wrote off 439 aircraft, or almost 38% of the aircraft fleet. From this number of 391, the aircraft was lost on combat and not combat reasons, and the rest are written off, as not to be recovered. The unification of General S. I. Rudenko for a week of battles lost 55% of fighters, 37% of attack aircraft, 8% of bombers. The number of flights to one loss in assault and fighter aviation was almost the same, equal to 13 and 15 aircraft-departures, respectively, whereas the bombers make up 62 aircraft-departures.

Note that some of the damaged aircraft was sent to the repair authorities. So, according to the report of the 6th IAK, about 50 aircraft were evacuated for all July month from the places of forced landings, of which 30, on parts and in the cutting kits 6, and one fighter, as indicated in the report, were sent. It was undermined at the landing site.

Sensitive losses The 16th air army suffered in the flight composition - 2 commander of the regiments, 2 navigators, 55 squadron commanders and their deputies, 20 link commanders and 279 pilots died in the battles.

Comparing these figures with the data of the German side, we note that for the same one, the period according to the host diary of the 6th air fleet, 586 aircraft were destroyed in air battles, and another 52 cars became victims of anti-aircraft artillery. As can be seen, German pilots and anti-aircraft users have been overcome by 1.5 times their successes, which, given the scale of the unfolding battle, can be recognized by quite acceptable magnitude.

It is more difficult to estimate the real number of victories for the 16th air army due to the lack of accurate data on the loss of the 6th air fleet. As already mentioned, according to the reports of General-Starmaster, the unification of the general von Grahima lost over a week of battles for all reasons irrevocably 64 aircraft. Damage received another 45 aircraft. At the same time, according to the report of the 16th Air Army, its pilots during 380 air combat was shot down by 518 aircraft, of which 425 were fighters, 88 - bombers and 5 - scouts. As can be seen, our aviator has been overwhelmed at least 5-8 times.

During the operation, 7548 aircraft-departures were made by parts of the 16th air army, and almost 98% had to be at the Olkhovatse direction. Comparing these data with the indicators of the 6th air fleet, whose pilots performed 8917 aircraft-flights during the same time, and taking into account the total quantitative superiority of the Soviet parties, it is possible to obtain a visual understanding of the load that fell to the share of pilots of both opposing parties. For compounds of Soviet aviation, these values \u200b\u200bare relatively small. So, on average, one bombarder made 0.9, the attack aircraft 0.6, a fighter of 1.1 aircraft-departures per day. Unfortunately, these figures do not reflect the dynamics of the load of the aircraft in different periods battles. For example, on July 5, on average, one bombarder performed 3.1, a stormmaker 2.2, and the fighter is 4.1 aircraft-departures.

According to the experience of a defensive battle in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk, the pilots of the existing parts were given to some types of aircraft. For example, those experiencing in the 1st GW. Maide 10 Yak-9t fighters with a 37-mm gun (2 in the 53rd GW., 8 in the 54th GW. IAP) made 136 aircraft-departures, spending 15 air fighting. With the loss of three aircraft of this type (one was shot down by the fire of German bombers) the pilots were announced, about the destruction of 5 enemy aircraft (2 FW-190, 1 BF-110, 1 JU-88 and 1 HE-111). A high efficiency of 37-mm guns of OKB-16 11P-37 was noted when working in both ground and air targets. At the same time, among the disadvantages, the considerable weight of the guns were indicated, a large range of shell breakdown (4000 meters, whereas it was required 1000-1200 meters), the ineffectiveness of the ring sight, as well as a slow pace of shooting. For air combat, the new "Yak" was heavy, badly "feeling" himself vertically. For this reason, the pilots recommended to use mixed groups of Yak-1 and Yak-9T fighters in battle in proportion 2: 1. It will not be superfluous to notice that after the end of the Kursk battle of the 1st GW. The Jaad was never armed with the new fighter A. S. Yakovlev, returned in the fall on a well-proven "aerosobra".

Well shifted themselves and bombers PE-2, demonstrating in some cases excellent vitality. So, some "pawns" returned to the airfield, having from 40 to 70 fragmentation spacing, without losing controllability in damage to the ailers and the height steering wheel. In the documents of the 3rd tank, a well-designed location and a successful design of roller guides were noted, which ensures control of the aircraft rugs during damage to the rods of steering with projectiles and fragments. Especially liked the crews double chassis management system - electric motors and emergency. In the process of combat work, there were cases of coming on their aircraft airfield with damaged controls by profile to 70%.

However, the remarks to the "pawns" at the pilots and the navigations were also grabbed. The main ones were weakness of weapons and aircraft protection. The rifle armament of the bombarder, according to Aviators, was not enough for the summer of 1943. The front firepoint was criticized, which consisted of everything from one machine gun. In addition, unsuccessful and close turret provided only small corners of the shelling of 50-65 degrees. The filling system of gas tanks inert gas did not provide sufficient protection of the aircraft from the fire. Called complaints and M-105 engines that had a low vitality.

Finishing a description of the fights in the Northern Fac of Kursk Arc, I would like to say a few words about the struggle for the domination of the air. The question of whom the sky remains over the rays and an class, despite the obvious outcome of the battle, does not imply, oddly enough, an unequivocal answer. In the future, we will simply see that the results and the course of ground fighting cannot be automatically transferred to the situation that develops in the confrontation of aviation.

With a total higher preparation of flight composition, more perfect and, the main thing, the worked tactics of the mood application of Luftwaffe was managed in the first two days of the battle to preliminarily dominate in the air, which was expressed not only in the suppression of Soviet fighter aircraft, but also in a practically unhindered inflicting bombers of shocks by positions of ground troops. The lack of proper flight and combat training in most of the young flight composition of the 16th air army, weak particleness inside squadron and regiments, as well as ineffective, poorly well-established aviation management system - all this largely predetermined the tragic to the Soviet side the beginning of the battle. Disadvantages in fighter aircraft, where the pilot first needed increased independence in decision-making and the initiative, as well as good flight and fire training, could not be liquidated in full not only in the course of the battle, but during the entire summer campaign of 1943 .

The newly created connections thrown into the battles once at once carried in the first battles heavy losses, which we witnessed on the example of the 6th Iac and the 234th JaM and more than once again collide in the narration when describing events in other areas of Soviet-German Front. Unfortunately, the introduction of the experience of combat use was the process of long and painful, associated with large losses and bitter lessons in air battles. It was not always possible to "pull from above" in the form of an order or directive.

However, it would be unreasonable to see only one side of the coin. The command of the 16th Air Army convincingly demonstrated the ability to "hold a strike" in an unfavorable setting, as well as an understanding and rapid perception of new realities of air war. Starting from the third day of the battle, it fell on the way of organizing massive blows on the clusters of armored vehicles and the living force of the enemy. As it turned out, in reserve, the command of the 6th air fleet did not find effective tools Countering these races of bombers and attack aircraft of the 16th air army, which in most cases achieved their goal. Since July 7, they began to provide a direct impact on the course of ground events, which was especially manifested during the fighting on July 9 and 10, and finally buried the hopes of the Command of the 9th Army on the success of the "Citadel" operation.

TsAMO RF. Fp. 486th IAP. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 131.

TsAMO RF. Fp. 486th IAP. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 130.

TsAMO RF. Fp. 486th IAP. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 127.

TsAMO RF. F. 368. OP. 6476. D. 56. L. 194.

TsAMO RF. F. 368. OP. 6476. D. 54. L. 9, 10.

TsAMO RF. F. 1st GW. Jad. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 10.

Losses Defensive phase:

Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation "Kutuzov": Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
Common in the battle for the Kursk protrusion:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Kursk battle as a whole
~ 254 470 killed, prisoners missing
608 833 wounded, sick crude
153 thousand Small arms units
6064 Tanks and saau
5245 guns and mortars
1626 Battle aircraft

In German sources 103 600 Killed and missing on the whole Eastern Front. 433 933 wounded. According to Soviet sources 500 thousand common losses On the Kursk ledge.

1000 tanks in German data, 1500 - according to Soviet
less 1696 airplanes

The Great Patriotic War

Invasion in the USSR Karelia Opolyary Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozova Kharkov Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad. Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Great Luki. Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastorno Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belorussia Lviv Sandomir Yasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltic Kurland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians Eastern Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, to urge the troops of the enemy and cause them defeat, applying counterdasters in the coming. For this purpose, deeply echelonized defense was created on both faces of the Kursk protrusion. In total, 8 defensive frontiers were created. The average mining density in the direction of the expected strikes of the enemy was 1,500 anti-tank and 1700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

In assessing the forces of the parties in the sources, strong discrepancies are observed associated with different definitions of the battle of various historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and the classification of military equipment. When evaluating the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exception from the reserve-step front calculations (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some ratings:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Kursk battle on various sources

A source	Personal composition (thousand)		Tanks and (sometimes) sau		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany
MO RF	1336	over 900.	3444	2733	19100	about 10,000	2172 2900 (including PO-2 and long)	2050
Krivosheev 2001.	1272
Glanz, House	1910	780	5040	2696 or 2928.
Muller Gill.				2540 or 2758.
Zett., Frankson	1910	777	5128 +2688 "Rate reserve" just over 8000.	2451	31415	7417	3549	1830
Kosave.	1337	900	3306	2700	20220	10000	2650	2500

The role of intelligence

However, it should be noted that another 8 April 1943 G. K. Zhukov relying on these intelligence bodies of the Fronts of the Kursk Direction very accurately predicted the power and direction of German strikes on the Kursk arc:

... I believe that the main offensive enemy operations will unfold against these three fronts, in order to, defeat our troops in this direction, get the freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow through the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, collecting the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aviation will strike with its Oryol-Krobyan group bypassing Kursk from the North-East and Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypass Kursk from the southeast.

Thus, although the exact text of the "Citadel" led on Stalin's table three days before Hitler signed it, but four days before the German plan became obvious to the Higher Soviet military command.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began in the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command was exactly known the time of the operation, at 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought on Berlin time - translated to Moscow 5 o'clock in the morning), 30-40 minutes before it began artillery and aviation counterpropitation.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning in our time, the Germans also inflicted a bomb and artillery strike according to Soviet defensive turns. Running tanks immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow to the Northern Face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovka. Without having succeeded, the Germans suffered a blow towards the reindeer, but they could not break through Soviet defense. Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which he had already lost up to two thirds of tanks from July 10, the 9th German army moved to defense. In the South Face, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of the rooks and roar.

July 5, 1943 Day first. Defense Cherkasy.

To perform the task of parts of 48 TC on the first day of the offensive (the day "x") was required to hack 6 GW defense. A (Lieutenant-General I. M. Chistyakov) on the section of the joint of 71 GW.SD (Colonel I. P. Sivakov) and 67 GV.SD (Colonel A. I. bucks), seize the largest village Cherkasy and carry out a breakthrough with armored parts in The direction of the village of Yakovlevo. The plan of the onset of 48 TC was determined that the village of Cherkasski should have been captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 TC. should have been achieved by the city of Oboyany.

However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet parts and compounds, the courage and resilience, as well as the preparation of defensive lines in advance, in this direction, the Wehrmacht plans were "significantly adjusted" - 48 TCs did not reach the Obovoi at all.

The factors that defined the non-disaberebly slow pace of promotion 48 TC on the first day of the offensive were good engineering training Soviet parts (ranging from anti-tank pvs almost all over defense and ending with radio-controlled mine-field fields), fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and assault aviation actions on the enemy tanks accumulated before engineering barriers, the competent location of anti-tank reference points (No. 6 South Korovin in the Strip 71 GW.SD, No. 7 south-west Cherkasy and No. 8 southeast of Cherkasy in the 67 GV.SD), the rapid rebuilding of battalionic orders of 196 gv.p.p. (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the main blow of the enemy south of Cherkassky , timely maneuver Division (245 OTP, 1440 SAP) and army (493 ITTAP, as well as 27 OPTABR Colonel N. D. Chevola) by the anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks in the flank of the inclined parts of 3 TD and 11 TD with the attraction of the forces 245 OTP (Lieutenant Colonel M. K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 SAP (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 Su-76 and 12 Su-122), and not to the end of the depressed Rump The hyperial of the remnants of combat efforts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199 Gw.p, Captain V. L. Vahidov) and in the area of \u200b\u200bthe workers of the Barakov south-west with. Korovino, which were the initial positions for the occurrence of 48 TC (capturing these source positions were planned to produce specially dedicated forces of 11 TD and 332 PD until the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of combat care was not completely Depressed to dawn July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of partitioning in the initial positions in front of the main attack and their promotion during the onset itself.

Machine gunment leads fire on the upcoming German parts

Also, at the rate of the housing, the lack of discharge of the German command was affected when planning the operation and poorly spent interaction of tank and infantry parts. In particular, the division "Great Germany" (V. Heerlyn, 129 tanks (of these 15 pz.vi tanks), 73 SAU) and she has given 10 TBR (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 commander tanks pz.v) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be attense and unbalanced connections. As a result, the first half of the day the main mass of tanks was bored in narrow "corridors" in front of the engineering booms (especially big difficulties caused the overcoming of the wetlands of the South Cherkasy wetlands), fell under the combined blow of Soviet aviation (2nd BA) and artillery - from ptop number 6 and No. 7, 138 GW.AAP (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 Otpabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer composition), and could not turn around in accordance with the schedule of the offensive on the tanquish terrain at the turn on the turn Korovino - Cherkasy for further strike towards the northern pains of Cherkasy. At the same time, by overcoming the anti-tank barriers to infantry parts in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own fires. For example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusille Regiment was at the time of the first attack, which was at the time of the first attack, was at all without tank support and suffered sensitive losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the Division "BG" for a long time actually could not introduce them into battle.

The result of the resulting congestion on the routes of nomination was also a non-time consumption of the artillery parts of the 48 tank corps on firing positions, which affected the results of art preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of 48 TC became a hostage of a number of erroneous solutions to the higher authority. Especially negatively, the lack of an operational reserve in Knobelsdorf - all corps divisions were entered into battle almost simultaneously in the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active fighting for a long time.

On July 5, the development of the occurrence of 48 TC on July 5 was most promoted: active actions of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 flights-departures) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It should also be noted the initiative actions of the parts of 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 separates. Division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering barriers and access to the eastern outskirts of the Cherkasy mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank parts was the high-quality jump in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles. Already during the first day of the defensive operation, the Kursk arc showed an insufficient capacity of anti-tank funds in service with the Soviet parts, in combating both new German tanks pz.v and pz.vi, and with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet ITTAP It was armed with 45-mm tools, the capacity of 76 mm Soviet field and American tank guns allowed to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks on distances twice and three times the most efficient range of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled parts at that time were practically absent not only in the general 6 GW. A, but also in her two border of defense of 1 tank army M. E. Katukov).

Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barrage south of Cherkassky, reflecting a number of counterattacks of the Soviet parts, the division of the Division "Vg" and 11th TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the battles moved to the street phase. Around 21:00, Comdaiv A. I. Bucks gave an order about the withdrawal of parts 196 GW.p. to the new positions north and northeast from Cherkasky, as well as to the center of the village. During the departure of 196 GW.p.P. The installation of mine fields was made. Around 21:20, the combat group of Grenadlers Division "Vg" with the support of Panther 10 TBR burst into the farm Bright (north of Cherkasy). A little later, 3 TD Wehrmacht managed to capture the farm red mines (north korotino). Thus, the result of a day for 48 TC of the Wehrmacht was inclined in the first defense strip of 6 GW. And 6 km, which in fact can be recognized by failure, especially against the background of the results of the SS 2 troop casing (acting east parallel to 48 TC), less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of 6 GW. BUT.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasy was suppressed around midnight on July 5th. However, to establish full control over the village, German parts were able only to the morning on July 6, that is, when the hull should already be approached by the offensive plan.

Thus, 71 GV.SD and 67 GW.SD, not possessing large tank compounds (at their disposal there were only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 SAU from the composition of 245 OTP and 1440 SAP) about a day held in the village of Korovino and Cherkasy five Divisions of the enemy (three of them are tank). In the battle on July 5, the fighters and commanders of 196 and 199 GW were especially distinguished in the district of Cherkassi. Rifle regiments 67 gv. Division. Competent and truly, the heroic actions of fighters and commanders of 71 GV.SD and 67 GV.SD, allowed the command of 6 GW. And in a timely manner, tighten the army reserves to the place of inclusion of parts of 48 TC at the junction of 71 GW.SD and 67 GV.SD and prevent the general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this section in the following days of defensive operation.

As a result of the above-described hostilities, Cherkasski village actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness testimonies: "represented a lunar landscape").

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasy on July 5 is one of the most successful moments of the Kursk battle for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day second. The first counterdads.

By the end of the first day of the offensive 4, she wedged into defenses of 6 GW. And to a depth of 5-6 km at the site of the onset of 48 TC (in the area of \u200b\u200bCherkasskoye) and 12-13 km at a plot of 2 TK SS (in the area of \u200b\u200bBykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka). At the same time, the division of the 2 Tank Corps of the SS (Obergroupenfüren P. Hauser) managed to break through the first turn of the defense of the Soviet troops on the whole depth, pushing part 52 of the State Unitary Enterprise (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second The Criminal Procedure occupied by 51 GV.SD (Major General N. T. Tavvarkladze), having entered into battle with its advanced parts.

However, the right neighbor 2 of the SS Tank Corps - AG "Cempf" (V. Kerpf) - did not fulfill the task of the day, faced with the resistance resistance of parts 7 GW. And, thereby exposing the right flank advanced 4 tank army advanced. As a result, the Hawsser was forced to use a third forces of his corps from July 6 to July 8, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against 375 SD (Colonel P. D. Tovornenko), the divisions of which brilliantly showed themselves in battles on July 5 .

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Lybstandard Divisions and, especially the "Das Reich", forced the command of the Voronezh Front in the conditions of not complete clarity of the situation to take pushing response measures to plug a breakthrough formed in the second border of the Front defense. After the report of the commander of 6 GW. And Ready about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin gives its order 5 GW. Stalingrad TK (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 - T-34 and 21 - MK.IV "Churchill") and 2 GW. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 - T-34 and 17 - MK.IV "Churchill") in submission of the commander of 6 GW. And and approves his proposal to apply Contrudarov on the breakdowns through the positions of 51 GW.SD Tanks of the Germans forces of 5 GW. STK and under the base of the entire coming wedge 2 TC ss by 2 GW forces. TTK (directly through combat order 375 sd). In particular, July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of 5 GW. Major General A. G. Kravchenko The task of the conclusion from the defensive area held by him (in which the building was already ready to meet the enemy, using the Tactics of ambushes and anti-tank reference points) of the main part of the case (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and applying the forces of Kontrudar to the flank MD Lakebstandart. Having received the order, commander and headquarters of 5 gv. STK, already knowing about capturing with. The onion of the division tanks "Das Reich", and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the fulfillment of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and executions were forced to proceed to its implementation. Attack Brigades Corps was started at 15:10.

Sufficient our own artillery agents of 5 gv. The STK did not have time, but the order did not leave the time to fading the actions of the hull with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was produced without artillery training, without supporting aviation, on an equal terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell right in the Lob MD "Das Reich", which was rearranged by putting tanks as an anti-tank assault, and, having caused aircraft, caused a significant fire defeat by the teams of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and move them to defense. After that, having tightening the PTO artillery and organizing the flank maneuvers, parts of MD Das Reich between 17 and 19 hours were able to reach communications for the defendants of the Tank Brigades in the Kalinin area, which was defended by 1696 Zenap (Major Savchenko) and left 464 GW.Art from the village .Divizion and 460 gv. mortar battalion 6 GV.MSBR. By 19:00, parts of MD "Das Reich" was actually solved to surround most of the 5 GW. STK between p. Archery and Farm Kalinin, after which, developing success, command of the German division part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Bellenicino crossing. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and the combators, the 20 TBR surroundings remaining outside the ring (Lieutenant Colonel P. F. Okhrimenko) 5 GW. STK, who managed to quickly create a rigid defense from various parts of the box, and the onset of MD Das Reich managed to stop, and even make the German parts go back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the case, on the night of July 7, surrounded parts of 5 GW. The STK organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the environment and connected with parts of 20 TBR. During July 6, the units of 5 GW. Stark on combat reasons was irretrievably lost 119 tanks, another 9 tanks were lost on technical or not clarified reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Such significant losses in one day did not have any tank corps during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk arc (loss of 5 gv. STK July 6 exceeded even the loss of 29 TC during the attack on July 12 in St.x. Oktyabrsky).

After the surroundings of 5 gv. STK, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another squad of the Tank Regiment of MD "Das Reich", using confusion during the waste of the Soviet parts, managed to go to the third (rear) border of the army defense occupied by parts of 69a (Lieutenant-General V. D. Kryuchenkin) , near the farrevino farming, and in a short time, the 285 SP 183 SD was wedged into defense, but due to the explicit deficiency of forces, having lost a few tanks, was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third border of the defense of the Voronezh Front is already on the second day of the offensive, was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Battle under Prokhorovka

The belfry in memory of those killed on the Prokhorov field

Resort of defensive battle phase

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, the loss of 33,897 people, of which 15 336 were irrevocable, his opponent - the 9th army of the model - lost 20,720 people in the same period, What gives the ratio of loss in 1.64: 1. Voronezh and the Steppe Fronts who participated in the battle on the South Face Arc lost for July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irretrievably. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 common losses. However, the Chief of Staff of the Voronezh Front, the Headquarters of the Ivanov, headquarters and the head of the operative department of the headquarters of the Front, General Major Tetshkin, were thought of the headquarters: loss of his front, they believed at 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to the Soviet documents of the period of war, consider the official numbers faithful, then, taking into account the German losses in the South Face at 29,102 people, the ratio of losses by the Soviet and German side is 4.95: 1.

During the period from 5 to 12 July 1943, 1079 ammunition cars were spent by the central front, and Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh front so sharply exceeded the losses of the central - in the smaller massage of forces and means in the direction of the German strike, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough in the South Face Kursk Arc. Although the breakthrough was able to close the power front forces, but it allowed the advancing to achieve favorable tactical conditions for his troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank connections did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it into depth.

In the South Face, counteroffensive forces of Voronezh and Steppe began on August 3. On August 5, about 18-00 Belgorod was released, August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing an offensive, Soviet troops on August 11 cut the railway Kharkov -Poltava, August 23, were mastered by Kharkov. Contrudars of Germans did not have success.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk arc, the German command has fallen the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensions, such as the "Watch on the Rhine" () or the Operation on Balaton () also did not have success.

Kursk battle has become a turning point in World War II. Soviet troops defeated the Hitler's army and switched to the offensive. The fascists planned to strike at Kursk from Kharkov and Eagle, defeat the Soviet troops and rushed to the south. But, fortunately for all of us, the plans were not destined to come true. From July 5 to July 12, 1943, the struggle for each block of Soviet land continued. After the victory under the Kursk troops, the USSR switched to the offensive, and so continued until the end of the war.

In gratitude to Soviet soldiers for the victory of the seventh of May 2015, a monument "Teplovskaya heights" was opened in the Kursk district.

Description

The monument is made in the form of a monument represents a three-level viewing platform. The top level is located on the height of bird flight (17 meters). It overlooks the ages of hostilities. Thermal heights were for the fascists the key from Kursk, but it was not possible to get this key to the Nazis.

The USSR flag flies over the monument, and the dates of each day of the Kursk battle are located on the railings of the observation deck. The soldiers and officers stood to death, but did not let the enemy in the city.

The monument "Teplovskaya heights" is installed on the northern faces of the arc. Until recently, this area was not immortalized, although it was of great importance in determining the outcome of the war.

Holiday opening monument

At the opening ceremony of the monument, representatives of United Russia, Governor of the Kursk Region Alexander Mikhailov, Senator of the Federation Council Valery Ryazansky, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia Alexander Belflov, Head of the Ponirovsky district Vladimir Torubarov, War Veterans, members of public organizations, not indifferent citizens.

Speaking to the audience, A. Belflov noted that the construction of the monument "Thermal heights" is a tribute to the memory of the Fatherland defenders who fell on the battlefield. Also, the pollipration stressed the importance of northern faces during hostilities and praised the officials of the region for decent preparation for the Victory Day.

After the speech of the plenipotentiary representative, veterans rose to the observation platform. A resident of the village of Olkhovatka Ponyrsky district I. G. Bogdanov thanked the leadership of the area for the preservation of historical memory and wished that young people follow the traditions of the ancestors. "Thermal heights" - a memorial who was created taking into account the wishes of the defenders of the Fatherland.

The spectacular part of the event included a parachute jumping and a festive concert. The best athletes of Russia and the Kursk region dressed in the military form of soldiers of the Great Patriotic War. Parachutists from landed on the North Fast at the same time, when veterans rose to the observation platform. Warriors heard words of gratitude for peace.

"Teplovskaya Heights": Memorial

The monument erected in the Northern Face is part of the same together with the monument "For our Soviet Motherland", the eternal fire, a brotherly grave, in which 2 thousand soldiers, colonnade, nominal plates of the heroes of the Soviet Union - the winners of the battle on the Kursk arc. Also on the plates are carved the names of military units who participated in hostilities. This is the "Teplovsky heights" memorial.

Ponya

The district center of Ponyry is known for the fact that the fate of the peoples of the Soviet Union was solved here, and maybe all of humanity. According to the German plan "Citadel", the enemies were going to close the Kursk arc to gain access to Moscow. Thanks to the intelligence, it became known that the fascists chose the point of the offensive precisely. Here the battle began, during which the German tanks stopped living Soviet people ... In memory of the soldiers, a museum was open in the memory of the soldiers.

The village is famous and memorial in honor of the defenders of the Motherland. Near the monument burns an important strategic importance and also the railway station on which reinforcement arrived and tanks were delivered. Also in reindayments, monuments of the Warrior liberator, heroes-sapellars, military warriors and heroes of artillery are erected.

Thermal heights (Kursk region) are the place of historical memory of the people about the war.

The Angel

In the Fatest in the village of Hamolt, on May 7, the sculpture of the "Angel of the World" was opened. On a 27-meter pedestal, an 8-meter angel towers. The total length of the monument is 35 meters. Caurizer holds a wreath in his hands with a dove of the world.

The composition is equipped with backlight, so at dusk, an illusion of an angel was created above the earth. The "Angel of the World" perpetuates the feat of Soviet soldiers who gave their lives for the victory.

In honor of the seventieth anniversary of the victory in the Fatar Earth, a memory alley was laid and a geoglyph of pine seedlings was created. The tree has become a material and to create giant stars with Kursk Antonovka in the center. The compositions are visible from the height of a bird'scape and on cosmic pictures.

The results of the battle under Kurk allowed to debunk the myth about the superiority of the Aryan race. The fascists were abused psychologically, and therefore could not continue the offensive further. And invincible once again proved to the world that the genuine force is not in aggression, but in love. To homeland, relatives and friends.

Little German heavy self-propelled installation Panzerjäger Tiger (P), more known asFerdInand., left a noticeable trace in historical memory and in the Soviet tank building. In itself, the word "Ferdinand" became nominable: these self-propelled installations of the Red Army team "noticed" in a variety of sections of the Soviet-German front, and at all until the end of the war. In practice, only 91 such a car was built, and truly massivelyFerdInand. used only in the summer of 1943 during the "Citadel" operation on the Kursk arc. In this battle, the Germans lost more than a third of all machines of this type.

Despite the fact that SAUFerdInand. (later known asElefant.) It was used quite limited, they showed themselves a very effective anti-tank agent. Command of the Red Army to the DefensePorsche. K.. G.. andAlkett. receded very seriously. AppearanceFerdInand. at the front, it was directly reflected on the development of Soviet tanks, tank guns and anti-tank artillery.

Impact force in the Northern Fac

The fact that the German industry has created such an impressive battle car, in the main armored control of the Red Army (GBTA), until its appearance at the front did not even guess. They did not know about it and allies on the antihytler coalition. It is simply explained: the fact is that Panzerjäger Tiger (P) was built in the spring of 1943, and went to battle in early July. For a short time, the preparation for the "Citadel" operation went, information about Ferdinand through the front line did not have time to leak. At the same time, even about the "Panther", for which the battle on the Kursk arc also became a combat debut, the allies were obtained at least some information, albeit inaccurate.

The study of the German novelty began on July 15, that is, even during the Kursk battle. The Central Front arrived a group of NIBT police officers in the Colonel Engineer Kalidov, Senior Lieutenant Technician Kzhak and Lieutenant Technician Serov. By that time, the fights in the area of \u200b\u200bthe station Ponyry and the Sovkhodogo 1st of May were raised. In addition to the immediate inspection of German cars, German prisoners of war were interrogated by specialists. Also, the information was shared by Soviet soldiers and officers who took part in the battles against German combat vehicles. Finally, the German instructions for Ferdinanda fell into the hands of Soviet military.

The poll of prisoners allowed to obtain a large amount of information, including on the organization of anti-tank divisions, which were in service were self-propelled installations Ferdinand. Additionally, NIBT Polygon specialists received information and other parts that participated in battles together with the 653rd and 654th divisions that have been in service with heavy tank fighters.

Ferdinand with onboard number 501, which in September 1943 was delivered to NIBT polygon

The information obtained allowed to restore the picture of the combat use of divisions with Ferdinands and their neighbors who used STUH 42 and SturMpanzer IV self-propelled installation. Ferdinanda, who possessed a thick armor, performed in the role of Taran, moving at the head of the battle orders of the shock group. According to the collected information, the cars went, lined up the line. Thanks to powerful armediation, able to hit Soviet tanks on distant distances, the crews of Ferdinands could open fire to a range of up to 3 kilometers. If necessary, the German cars of the firing turn back, leaving a thick frontal armor under the enemy flame. So they could, retreat, continue to fire on the Soviet tanks. Shooting was carried away with short stops.

It is clearly visible by the projectile mark on the left side. This note is available on board the car in the Patriot Park

Against well-protected German self-propelled installations, Soviet tank guns were almost useless. From the Machines inspected by specialists, the ka 21 cars are only one, with side 602, had a hole in the left side. The hit had to go to the gas tank area, a fire originated, and self-propelled installation burned down. The tactics of German self-propellars could well work if it were not for one "but": they had to come to the echelonized line of defense, in which there were far from some tanks. Soviet sailors became the most terrible enemy of Ferdinand. 10 cars were undermined on laid mines and fugasas, including SAU with on-board number 501. This self-propelled installation with serial number 150072 turned out to be the car perforiterant of Hansa-Joachim Wilde, the commander of the 1st battery (5./654) of the 654th battery division Tank fighters.

5 "Ferdinand" got shells into the running part and were disabled. Another 2 cars got hit and in the running part, and to the gun. The machine with the onboard number 701 was the victim of Soviet artillery. The shell, which heard on the attached trajectory into the roof of the cutting, struck the hatch and exploded inside the combat department. Another car was pleased with the airbab, which completely destroyed the cut. Finally, the machine with the on-board number II-01 from the staff of the 654th division was destroyed by Soviet infantry. The designer getting a fire with an incendiary mixture caused a fire, the crew burned inside.

The letter n indicates that it was a car from the 654th division of heavy tank fighters, whose commander was Major Carl-Hans Naak

In fact, the loss of divisions, which were armed with Ferdinands, were even higher. In total, during the operation of the "Citadel" operation, 39 self-propelled settings of this type were irrevocably lost. The results of the battle were clearly clearly shown that the Red Army learned to fight with significantly superior enemy forces, because on the side of German tank forces in this battle was an indisputable advantage. A full-fledged response to the new generation of German tanks and self-propelled attitudes The Soviet tank industry was able to give only in the spring of 1944, when T-34-85 and IS-2 went to the troops. Nevertheless, the Kursk battle of the Germans lost. As the battles showed under the rejoices, not always the advantage in tanks turned out to be the most important factor. "Ferdinand" break through the Northern FAS Kursk Arc could not.

In Cube for experiments

The first group of NIBT Polygon specialists loss from the fighting area on August 4. On August 24, the second group arrived here in the Major Engineer Hinsky, Senior Lieutenant Technician Ilyin and Lieutenant Burlakova. The task of the group acting on the central front until September 8 was the selection of the most whole trophy German cars and their delivery to NIBT polygon. Two cars were selected. In addition to the SAU already mentioned with the on-board number 501, it was a self-propelled installation with serial number 15090. She also blew up on mine. One machine was used to directly study and firing tests, the second was fired from domestic and foreign tools.

On the right side of damage turned out to be minimal

The study of trophy machines began even before they were on NIBT polygon. The first testing of the fought "Ferdinand" was held on July 20-21, 1943. It turned out that the board of the German car makes himself a podkalibal shell of a 45-mm anti-tank gun at a distance of 200 meters. The German armor at a distance of 400 meters and a 76-mm cannon of the ZIS-3 was punched by a subcalibered projectile. For 85-mm gun 52-K and 122-mm body gun A-19 The onboard armor of German sau was also not a serious problem. It is worth noting that Ferdinand armor, especially the machines with serial numbers up to 150060, was worse than in pz.kpfw.tiger ausf.e. For this reason, in the further test, the firing machine with the serial number 150090 was somewhat different from the results.

Ferdinand with the on-board number 501 was the victim of Soviet sapiers

The trophy documents were studied. Already by July 21, the Red Army had accurate data on TTH German self-propelled installation. Moreover, it was exactly known how many Ferdinands built. The data were drawn from the consolidated instructions for the armament of the German army captured among other documents:

"In its armor and armament, an exceptionally strong instrument to combat tanks and to support the offensive under the conditions of strong opponent resistance. Large weight, a small speed on the battlefield, low passability limit the possibilities of combat use and require particularly thorough reconnaissance before entering into battle.

90 pieces were released into a heavy anti-tank regiment in two divisions of 45 guns. "

Selected NIBT Polygon Self-propelled facilities arrived in Cube in September 1943. Immediately after arrival, the study of the sample with the onboard number 501 began. On the running tests at that time speech did not go, lacked time. Instead, the tests made a brief description of the German self-propelled installation, which they called "Ferdinand (Tiger P)". Thanks to the existing materials, it was possible to accurately indicate the characteristics of the machine.

Evacuation hatch was reset. On the museum machine, he was welded to the roof, so as not to be lost

The evaluation of the German novelty was, to put it mildly, ambiguous. The obvious pluses of the machine were armor protection, as well as powerful weapons. At the same time, even the weapon of the tank caused questions. The study of 88-mm guns PAK 43 showed that the rate of guidance with its rotary mechanism is small. The leading of the sighting fire was possible only from the place or with short stops. Machine visibility Soviet experts recognized bad. These findings indirectly confirmed German constructors. During the modernization of Ferdinand, which began in the fall of 1943 (about the same time, the car changed the designation on Elefant), the machines received a commander turret. True, it lait down the situation.

Another significant disadvantage of the German SAU was a small ammunition consisting of only 38 rounds. Crews independently corrected the situation: in self-propelled installations found wooden styling, hoody structures in the field.

Uncomplicated installation during the shelling. NIBT Polygon, December 1943

The description of the description, however, was not the most important task for NIBT Polygon specialists. Where more important was to determine where and the German novelty can be hit. After the battle, under the rejoices, the threat emanating from Ferdinand, perceived very seriously. The car made an indelible impression on Soviet infantry and tankers. Steel Makhina, which is almost impossible to break through the frontal projection, has been having experienced in different parts of the front. For this reason, it was necessary to know exactly which systems and at what distance are able to hit a heavy german fighter tanks.

For a subcalibered projectile of a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the german self-propelled installation turned out to be quite punishable

The Ferdinanda Case Test Program was signed on September 29, 1943. But the tests themselves managed to proceed only on December 1. During this time, the armament nomenclature was expanded, which was planned to install a trophy. In addition to domestic, German artillery systems and allied cannons, the anti-tank grenade of the NII-6 was used, later adopted as RPG-6. As the tests showed, the cumulative grenade confidently struck the side of the self-propelled installation, after which the jet struck the panel from inch boards installed inside the case.

The next list was 45-mm gun installed in the T-70 tank. Her armor-piercing projectile did not break through the German car at a distance of 100 meters, which turned out to be quite expected. But the sub-caliber projectile at the same distance coped with the board of the housing, and with a side of the cut. At a distance of 200 meters, a podkalibar shell managed to break down the board, the cutting turned out to be stronger.

The results of the shelling of a 6-pound tank gun

Punch the side of the German self-propelled installation was forces and a 57 mm tank gun installed in the Churchill tank. With a distance of 500 meters, the armor 80 (85) mm pierced confidently. The fire was from the 43-caliber version of the gun, the Valentine XI / X and Churchill III / IV supplies of 1943 had longer-tire guns.

For tank guns caliber 75 and 76 mm board of the German car turned out to be a complex obstacle

Worse, there were decoration of the German self-propelled installation of a 75-mm M3 gun installed in the American middle tank M4A2. The armor-piercing projectile M61 could not break through the side of the cutting even from the distance of 100 meters. True, two ingress on the welded seam, which connects the frontal and left side sheet of cutting, led to its cracking. However, the same shell pierced the side of the Ferdinand building already at a distance of 500 meters. Even worse, the armor-piercing projectile of the Soviet 76-mm tank gun F-34 was behaved, which, however, was not news.

D-5C Ferdinand sides struck almost a kilometer at a distance

The results of firing on board the German self-propelled installation from the D-5C cannon, installed in the Su-85, were not surprised. At a distance of 900 meters, it was confidently punched and board the hull, and the side of the cutting. If the shell's inner hit, armored armor took place, the fragments did not leave the calculation of the combat branch of the chance of survival. However, by the time of the appearance at the front of the SU-85, and then other Soviet combat vehicles equipped with 85-mm cannons, the chances of meeting with Ferdinand on the battlefield decreased noticeably.

This breakdown from d-25t was not counted. But it happens in the real situation, the calculation of Ferdinand would be anyway

All the systems listed above were not used for the shelling of self-propelled installation from the frontal part, which is understandable: the armor in 200 mm with their help would hardly be possible to break through. The first instrument that was used for firing on the windshield sheet of the housing was 122-mm gun D-25, installed in an experimental sample of the IC-2 tank. The first projectile, released from a distance of 1400 meters along the windshield sheet, struck the screen and smoked. The second projectile, released on the same distance in the cut, left a dent depth of 100 mm and the size of 210 × 200 mm. The third projectile is stuck in armor, but still partially entered it. The breakdown did not start, but in practice, such a defeat would bring the calculation of the instrument. At shorter distances, shooting this time was not carried out, but, as they showed further events, the distance at a distance of 1200 meters and less ended with a break. Testers The limit distance for the breakdown was considered to distance 1000 meters.

Panther's gun struck self-propelled installation in the housing forehead with 100 meters

Next followed the shelling of 75-mm KWK 42 L / 71 guns installed on the German tank pz.kpfw.panther ausf.d. At a distance of 100 meters of the forehead, it was possible to break through. But I could not break through the cut from 200 meters.

These results were influenced by damage from previous hits. But the meeting with ML-20 did not promise nothing good

The most terrible test was shelling from 152-mm Gaubitis-gun ML-20 installed in an experimental sample of ISU-152. The second hit in the front side of the hull led to the fact that both the screen and the sheet were broken in half. Not least such a result was obtained due to an unwitting embrasure of the course machine gun, which was re-installed on Elefant.

Visual demonstration of why another car sent to the trophy exhibition in Moscow

On this test, the firmware was decided to stop. ML-20 turned "Ferdinand" into the pile of fragments. It was assumed to send a shot at the trophy exhibition to Moscow, but later the decision was changed. Another car was taken to demonstrate, which was also fired (it was probably "Ferdinand", which was fired in the summer of 1943). In a pair, a whole self-propelled plant went to the exhibition. The machine with the onboard number 501 remained on NIBT polygon.

Catalyst for Arms Racing

To the emergence of a new German self-propelled installation on a Kursk arc in the main armored control of the Red Army (GBTA), it was very serious. In part, the start of the new developments provoked the battle debut "Panther". Of course, with the activity that began after the appearance of the "tiger", which took place not to compare. Nevertheless, already in early September 1943, a letter was gone signed by the head of the GBTU, Lieutenant General Fedorenko. In connection with the emergence of new samples of German armored vehicles, he offered to start developing promising tanks and self-propelled guns.

A direct consequence of the appearance of Ferdinand was the beginning of the development of a heavy tank object 701, the future of the IS-4. In addition, the works of 122-mm can be accelerated by the D-25T, started in May 1943. Moreover, she was supposed to release an even more powerful gun with an initial rate of projectile to 1000 m / s. Work began on creating more powerful guns of 85 and 152 mm caliber. Finally, again on the agenda, the question of the development of 100-mm guns with a sea gun ballistic appeared. So the history of D-10C, the main weapons of the SU-100 self-propelled installation began.

Cooling system scheme prepared by NIBT polygon

All this is only part of the activities that have been launched or restarted in connection with the advent of Ferdinand. Thanks to the German heavy SAU, the Soviet program for creating an electric transmission was "resurrected". It was engaged in the USSR since the beginning of the 1930s, such a transmission was assumed to be used on the KV-3. The serial German heavy machine with an electric station forced Soviet specialists to return to these works. However, our engineers did not copy German developments. The program to which the well-known science fiction writer was related (and part-time chairline of the 3rd rank and the chief engineer of the plant No. 627) developed independently.

Specification of armor sheets of the Ferdinand chassis, prepared by NII-48 in 1944

Great interest in the USSR caused the design of the German car. The housing and logging were studied in the NII-48 - the leading enterprise in the issues of armor. According to the results of the study, several reports were prepared. Engineers of the NII-48 created armor and the body of the optimal form - with good protection and relatively low weight. The result of these works has become more rational form Cases and towers, which began to be implemented from the second half of 1944, first on heavy, and later on medium tanks.

Influenced these developments and study of the gun installed on Ferdinand. In 1944, the creation of armor protection capable of withstanding this gun was a priority for Soviet designers. And they coped with her much better than German colleagues. Already by the end of 1944, the first experienced tanks appeared, the protection of which allowed to confidently confront the German tool. Tanks IS-3 and T-54 "grown" just from such developments.

Other elements of Ferdinanda were studied, for example - suspension. In the Soviet industry, this development was not found, but certain interest caused. The Porsche suspension report was compiled at the request of the British.

Ferdinand pendant diagram from the album of torsion suspensions prepared by NIBT Polygon in 1945

The most important result of the study of the German car was the appearance of funds for effective struggle with her. The heavy army was adopted by the heavy tank IP-2 and self-propelled installation of ISU-122. It is known at least two cases of the collision of the IS-2 with Elephant in the summer of 1944. In both cases, the crew of the IC-2 under the command of Lieutenant B.N. Slyunyayeva came out the winner. The most noteworthy was the fight on July 22, 1944: the column of the 71st Guards heavy tank shelf was towards Magherov, when fire was opened in heavy tanks from the ambush. Tank Slyuniyev under the cover of the second car moved to the crossroads of roads. Watching 10-15 minutes behind the ambushed, IC-2 approached it at a distance of 1000 meters and opened the response fire. As a result, "Elefant", 2 anti-tank guns and an armored personnel carrier were destroyed.

Three weeks later, the same regiment was first struggled with the latest German hard tanks pz.kpfw. Tiger Ausf.b. It was where it turned out that the measures taken by the Soviet designers were very by the way. "Royal Tiger" possessed more resistant front armor than Ferdinand, which did not prevent Soviet tankers to win a duel with the newest German tanks dry. Preparing to fight with Ferdinands, the Soviet tank industry has prepared for the emergence of a German hard tank of a new generation. As a result, such a powerful high-quality advantage in tanks, which Wehrmacht received on the eve of the Kursk battle, did not happen in the summer of 1944. And for other serious attempts to change the established balance of forces from the German tank industry, there was no time left.