The country faces a difficult choice between liberal, estate and socialist ideas

We are expecting a sluggish decline in GDP (about 3% per year), sharp fluctuations in the ruble, which provide speculators close to the Central Bank with large incomes, a fall in the living standards of the population, an increase in housing and communal services tariffs, and a reduction in small and medium-sized businesses. Administrative pressure on business will grow - both formal and informal. Social tension will grow against the background of an increase in the number of accidents and disasters, as well as due to the inevitable increase in political activity on the eve of the elections.

SEVERE SITUATION FOR PUTIN

As usual, the forecast for the future, more precisely, already begun, 2017 for Russia is preceded by an analysis of the forecast for the previous year. This forecast was traditionally published in early March, so a year has passed and it is necessary to discuss in detail what was said there.

I would like to note that the tradition of keeping all annual forecasts, the history of which is already quite long, in one section on the site, is considered by many "experts" as not very reasonable - but I indignantly reject the very idea of ​​restricting access to old forecasts. The fact is that these forecasts (and I, by the way, do not make others, everything else is publicistic or even polemical reasoning on the topic) is based on our theory of the modern capitalist economy and, as a consequence, the current crisis - and the demonstration of the history of development this theory is important factor its verification. So to everyone who is trying to explain that "all of Khazin's predictions did not come true," I strongly recommend reading these predictions.

So, the first statement of the previous forecast was that the development of the situation, both economic and political (when the forecast for 2016 was written, this was an assumption, now it has become a reality - anti-liberal elites came to power in the United States), will create a serious threat for the country's governance system. Actually, in the text this problem is called "administrative collapse". Note that things have not reached the point of disaster here (yet?), But the number of, for example, domestic accidents in housing and communal services has grown sharply. So the general problem has not gone away, and the trend is quite clear.

Note that the liberal "team" here decided the issue with the elections very simply - having ascribed to the liberal in origin and bureaucratic in essence "United Russia" 150% of the votes actually received, it dealt a severe blow to Putin, sharply limiting his possibilities for modernization (about which EP said directly immediately after the elections) and constructive work with the government. And, by the way, by significantly limiting his opportunities in foreign policy, since it will now be quite difficult to promise Trump something "anti-Clinton", taking into account the completely "pro-Cinton" direction of the government. That, in fact, was predicted in the forecast.

Separately, the forecast said a lot about the devaluation of 2014 - as a liberal attack on Russia. Everything was confirmed here - and the fact that the result of 2016 turned out to be strong better results year 2015, and the fact that the recession in the domestic economy continued. In general, the forecast said a lot about the role of the IMF as the “headquarters” of our government, whose interests have nothing to do with Russia's interests, and, in general, I cannot deny anything from it. The only thing that, today, after the first month of President Trump, there is a lot to add - but this can be read in my current texts on this site.

Quite a lot in the forecast was devoted to the complex relations of specific individuals in the government and the presidential administration, but here, as is clear, we can only talk about the coincidence of trends, and not about specifics, it depends on too much a large number accidents. Thus, the forecast did not say anything about the drop in the ratings of the government and Putin following the results of the Duma elections, about the resignation of Sergei B. Ivanov and the strange position of the patriotic forces following the elections. The fact is that private information shows that, for example, in some regions, Rodina won quite a lot of votes (and even overcame the 5% barrier at the federal level), but the topic of election fraud, as extremely dangerous for the stability of the state, continued not found. But as a result, the last illusions about "democracy" have disappeared from the society.

By the way, the forecast specifically noted a difficult situation for Putin. The fact is that in recent years he has shown himself to be an outstanding master of tactics, which cannot be said about strategy. But to the analysis of the split of the world and domestic elites based on the results recent years I have no complaints about the split, which has intensified even more after Trump's election, and Putin's refusal to make a strategic choice greatly exacerbates the problems. A lot can be said about the reasons for such a refusal, including this will be discussed below, but the fact is obvious here.

Quite a lot of space in the forecast was given to the “red” line that limits the policy of the “real” (not legendary) Putin. The events of the past year showed that he (even taking into account the need to make a strategic choice) did not cross this “virtual” line, and in this sense (and this is already some forecast) the question is very interesting: how much has Trump's election moved this line. Judging by the arrest of Ulyukaev, it has moved (although it has not been possible to put the latter in prison so far (?)), But how much is a big question.

The main achievement of the forecast was the analysis of potential relations between Putin and Trump (recall, the forecast was published at the end of February 2016, 8 months before the US elections), to which I have no complaints even now, after a year has passed. And in this sense, another achievement was his description of the fact that Trump still does not have a constructive scenario. Actually, as it follows from our theory and is written in the forecast for the world, it cannot be. Unlike us.

This is another important part of the forecast, which was realized in theory (that is, we have a serious competitive advantage), but is not used at all in practice. This is understandable - since, as explained in detail in the forecast and other texts, our economic policy is determined by "financiers" (analysis of the 2014 devaluation is an example), for whom Trump is a fierce enemy and therefore all actions aimed at strengthening "isolationism" liquidated “as a species”. And here it makes sense to move on to the actual forecast for 2017, since in the economic part, the forecast for 2016 was fully realized, that is, there was a sluggish recession, which is not going to stop at all.

WHAT IF YOU WERE OFFERED THE POSITION OF THE AUSTRALIA COMMANDANT? ..

I have already written about the "red" line of Putin's policy, which is connected both with his personal qualities (he has great difficulty parting with people who have done him something good) and with political preferences. First of all - with a fundamental refusal to exacerbate the situation, fraught with movement towards civil war... Victims of the punitive "judicial" system of Russia (quotation marks are put because the courts, in the classical sense of the word, in modern Russia not at all) may think otherwise, but in reality they are just a victim of the "privatization" elite of the 90s, which in this part realized their dream of re-creating a class society. Those who are now part of the judiciary are sincerely convinced that they have received the corresponding sphere of state life "in possession" and are acting in accordance with their ideas about optimizing this system.

Among them there are people who are more decent (someone has some residual ideas about morality, someone understands that this can all end badly) or less decent (that is, outspoken sadists), but this does not change the essence of the system. By the way, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and many established or reformed state structures have a similar idea of ​​life, for example, a new guardianship, which really wants to get rights similar to those that it has in the framework of juvenile justice in England or France. Actually, within the framework of the liberal concept, it was all quite possible to implement, but, apparently, times are changing.

This is very clearly seen in the anti-Trump rallies in the United States - there the liberal like-minded people of our government just demonstrate the class approach: their opinion is much more important than the opinion of some "rednecks" (from red neck - simple workers), even if the latter are much more. But it is clear to any "handshake" person, the opinion of an arbitrary, even the most seedy liberal, even if he is not "alternatively gifted", is worth hundreds and thousands of opinions of conservatives or even, God forgive me, Christians! With Muslims, the issue is a little more complicated, since there are “correct” Muslims, as Hillary Clinton’s policy in the Arab world showed us.

But it is absolutely obvious that this whole "alternatively gifted" team will fight for the "nishtyaks" gained in recent decades in earnest. And since it is she who controls a significant part of the Russian economy (together with the corresponding financial flows), then this fight can be both long and bloody. And I don’t know about the others, but if I were in Putin’s place, I would also think for a long time how to minimize this blood ... Someone might say that Putin only thinks about how to steal more, but how a person who understands a little how the public administration system works, I can say with confidence that Putin has other thoughts ...

And here I will make a small digression, asking the reader a completely abstract question, which I once invented in order to explain that the role and position of Stalin is much more complicated than the "handshake" democrats believe and broadcast. Imagine that you live in Germany in the 1930s and do science, somewhere in a quiet provincial town. You don't like the Nazis very much, but they have raised the industry and the standard of living of the population, and therefore you do not consider it necessary to go against the society that supports them.

But then 1939 comes and you are suddenly called by a distant relative from Berlin, who says that for you there was a very important and interesting job... That, of course, you can refuse, but then there is a possibility that a terrible villain will turn out to be in this place and this will be very bad for many people. Well, it is also good for the family that you take this position.

You sluggishly fight back, and in the end you agree, after which you find out that this position is the commandant of Auschwitz. And this is where the choice begins. You can begin to expose vice and disappear in the same Auschwitz, along with those who died there. You can - stupidly follow orders and kill, kill, kill ... Or you can - conduct an incredibly complex game and, as a result, save the lives of a couple of million people ... True, a couple more will have to be killed ... And here's the question - if you chose it is this last scenario, which of these two million survivors will understand to whom he owes his life? And with whom will you go down in history?

Of course, I deliberately exaggerated the very moment of choice (although in the case of Stalin I clearly underestimated the scale), but by itself it occurs in a person's life much more often than many people think. For example, I ran into him once - in the mid-90s, when in order to continue a career that was quite successful, I just had to close my eyes to outright theft, which I could have stopped at that time. I did not close and stopped - and it cost me and my family quite dearly. But in the case of modern Russia, this choice is really scary.

LIBERALS, MONARCHISTS, SOCIALISTS

However, let's get back to the forecast. The “alternatively gifted” team, already realizing that after Ulyukaev's arrest, what further development of the situation threatens it, will work in several main directions. The first is the continuation of attempts to introduce an estate state in Russia. At the same time, a rather specific group, which is certainly not a liberal one, has become the main “strike tool”: it is an Orthodox-monarchist group. She actively promotes the corresponding values, from the propaganda of the "white" movement to the glorification of Nicholas II. At the same time, the main feature of their propaganda is that, for example, unlike Franco, who at some point switched to a policy of national reconciliation, we are not talking about reconciliation, but about eliminating the alternative imperial direction - the socialist one. That is, in other words, in reality, the Orthodox-monarchical group in our political elite is used by liberals to destroy unity within the imperial direction in Russian politics. Well, and provocations of genocide.

For me, since my mother comes from a family of wealthy people, active participants in the "White" movement (up to participation in the Great Patriotic War on the side of the Germans), and my dad comes from a family that came out of total centuries-old poverty with industrialization, the question of reconciliation is not is empty. And that's why I am categorically not satisfied with attacks on the USSR. Moreover, to all appearances, this position does not suit Russian society either.

A typical example is the story of the transfer of St. Isaac's Cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church. It would seem - what's the difference? Moreover, in the 90s, society supported such processes, since the church was viewed as, in general, the victim (moreover, for the truth, which in reality did not always correspond to reality) and spreading the correct ideological and value position. But over time, the situation has changed. Here the not entirely decent behavior of individual (but quite numerous) hierarchs played a role, as well as a certain demonstrative distance from social problems and, as it seems to me, the main thing - the readiness to introduce an estate society.

In general, the sharp increase in positive attitudes towards the USSR and Stalin (which in the late 1980s and early 1990s were quite controversial in the eyes of the population) is most likely due to the fact that the new "privatization" elite (to which the church hierarchs treat unconditionally) for the most part ignores the Russian (and Russian) people, and ignores them cynically and publicly. This, by the way, was very clearly seen in the discussions on the Internet, when the supporters of the transfer of Isaac to the church demonstratively dismissed unchurched Russian people as having no right to vote.

As a result, the craving of Russian society for the empire is acquiring more and more socialist shades, no matter how annoying the monarchists may be. Moreover, nationalist tendencies are also strengthening, and not only in national regions, but also in purely Russian ones. The fact is that the demonstrative disregard of the population by the bureaucracy leads to the inevitable emergence of forces that explain such disregard for national discrimination (by the Russian elite for the national elites and, on the contrary, anti-Russian for the Russian population).

At the same time, the bureaucracy of Russia in this place supports the monarchists in terms of restoring the estate society, although it is afraid that the "sovereign-emperor" may demand responsibility. In general, this is the main element of modern political life- restoration of political activity on the basis of the concepts of "responsibility" - for power and "justice" - for society. This is the reason for the growth of Stalin's popularity - he is associated with the responsibility of the bureaucracy to society. And all attempts at propaganda aimed at tying repressions to Stalin (by the way, not always historically justified, since, for example, the terror of 36-38 was organized by people who aimed at the elimination of Stalin and their own coming to power) are reduced to one single thesis : “Did you shoot? Officials? These? Few!"

Let us note, by the way, that the unification of the liberal "privatization" elite and Orthodox monarchists on the topic of craving for an estate society shows what is really important for them. The failure of all right-wing liberal parties is connected, in fact, with one very simple circumstance: the leaders of these parties did not care at all about civil liberties and the need to comply with the laws, not to mention the interests of entrepreneurs (which they showed very well in the framework of the 1998 default scenario they implemented) , they thought about their personal commercial interests. And this manifested itself in real political actions, which led to well-known results. As for the monarchists, they directly speak of the need to return to the estate society, but within the framework of a number of other theses and only their willingness to cooperate with the liberal "privatization" elite suggests that the restoration of the estate society is their main goal.

Let us note, by the way, that it was the estate society that became not only the main brake on the development of the Russian Empire in the late 19th - early 20th centuries, but also led to the support of practically all educated society for the Socialist-Revolutionary terror. Simply because everyone understood that the estate elite would not give up its positions "in a good way". I would very much not want us to return to a similar situation at the beginning of the 21st century, especially since today terror will be much more dangerous, since it will be directed not against the class society, but against the entire state as a whole.

And this division within the Russian elite and Russian society is greatly intensified by the victory of the isolationists in the United States (and this year, possibly in France), since they are not liberals, but traditionalists. That is, for them "responsibility" and "justice" are basic concepts, which Trump talks about all the time. Not to mention the hatred of liberals. But as a result, we have the following wonderful picture, which fully fits into the famous Chinese "bundle of three forces." In our country, these are conditional “liberals”, which include the entire “privatization” elite, part of the bureaucracy and part of the business community (mainly related to government orders). Its task is to eliminate Putin, organizing administrative and social chaos if possible. These people do not care about the fate of Russia, they do not connect the future of themselves and their children with our country, although they are ready to swindle for some time. This group has been controlling the country's economic policy since the time of Gaidar. They, locally, are satisfied with the estate structure of the state, but only on the condition that they will determine its policy. This group is in active position.

The second group is Orthodox-monarchical. They are patriots (and in this sense they cannot agree with the "liberals"), but at the same time they want the revival of the "good old time", on the assumption that it is they who will become the basis of the privileged estates. A very important thing: the church is needed by potential nobles (read - patriotic officials) in order to bridge the gap between tsarist Russia and the present time, since the continuity of the nobility was completely destroyed. At the same time, this group is focused on purely ideological issues, since they cannot describe the economy of the estate society: in any case, it will be at the level of the beginning of the twentieth century, more complex systems of relations with such a state structure are impossible. Actually, the modern economic degradation is just a consequence of the fact that in the modern "privatization" elite, these class relations have already taken root. This group is also active.

The third group is the socialist patriots who want the revival of the empire, but on the principles of justice and equality of people. This group is today in deep liabilities, but its support from the population, as I wrote above, is growing very much. And if we recall the logic of the “bundle of three forces” (“if two forces are in liabilities, and one is in the asset, then the active one wins; and if two are in the asset, and one is in the liability, then the passive one wins”), then we can say that the political situation in Russia will be characterized by the strengthening of socialist ideology aimed at justice for all citizens.

This tendency will intensify even more due to the fact that the contradiction with Islamic fundamentalism, which, in the conditions of liberal globalization, has raised the flag of the fight against inequality, is extremely intensifying throughout the world. Yes, the equality that he offers is very, very specific, but in the conditions of a complete absence of alternatives and the gradual transition of the "middle" class to the state of the "new" poor, it will march across the planet with triumph. If he is not offered an alternative. Which today can only carry socialist shades. Actually, this is exactly what the world expects from Russia today, and this is precisely what caused the heightened interest in our country.

And the intensification of socio-political activity, which is best seen in St. Petersburg, just shows that society supports not the Orthodox-monarchist alternative to the "privatization" elite, but the socialist one. This is clearly seen in the number of rallies "for" and "against" the transfer of Isaac to the church. It should be noted that Moscow, apparently, understood this, even in the Patriarchate, in connection with which a decision was made in recent days to postpone the transfer process.

I will repeat again, since this is a matter of principle: society is not protesting against Orthodox Faith(for which almost everyone, with the exception of Muslims, of course), but against a specific institution that lives (no matter how complicated its internal structure is) within the framework of the “privatization” logic. By the way, one of the factors of protest is the behavior of the Patriarchate (as a whole), which, apparently, does not at all understand that its property interests and faith in God are not quite the same thing.

From a political point of view, the year that has begun will be a year of struggle for voter turnout. The fact is that the turnout in September 2016 (35%) was already very low, and the indicators of St. Petersburg (22%) showed that the trend is aimed at its further decline. The standard of living of the population is falling, the level of tax and non-tax (corruption) burden on citizens is growing, the insolence of officials is not decreasing, they are not going to reduce their standard of living, healthcare continues to be liquidated, the situation with education is not significantly improving. And in this situation, especially after the cynical "scam" on the part of the authorities in the Duma elections, something must be done, since the turnout at the elections is a clear demonstration of the people's attitude to the authorities. Nor can Putin afford to become president at the expense of Muslim votes.

One way to boost turnout is to create some electoral intrigue. Apparently, it was decided to repeat the option with Sobyanin's elections (the real purpose of which was to remove him from the candidates for prime minister) and introduce Navalny as a presidential candidate. The court verdict is not an indicator here: the fact is that, according to the Constitution, people who are in places of detention are not allowed to participate in elections. The law, which does not allow Navalny to be a presidential candidate today, in this place clearly contradicts the Constitution, expanding this list to those who have been convicted, but an appeal to the Constitutional Court (which is likely to take place in the fall) will correct this contradiction and Navalny's path to the elections will be open.

Yes, today he is little known to most of the population. But, taking into account the aforesaid, if he “straddles” the socialist theme and begins to propagandize a corresponding program, he will have a very serious chance to seriously shake the stability of the current Russian elite. Theoretically, there are other possibilities, in particular, this rhetoric can be picked up by some of Putin's associates who are not involved in privatization. I do not want to say that United Russia Volodin can use this line, but, theoretically, other characters may appear here.

In any case, attempts to establish "order" within the framework of the "privatization" elite, which continues to determine the "rules of the game" for the country, will not work: numerous historical examples show that against the background of the economic downturn, local games with the establishment of order do not produce an effect, on the contrary, they only strengthen confrontation within the elite itself and create alternative leaders of power. And so the transfer of power itself to a socialist track (by the way, in full accordance with the notorious "May decrees") is quite possible. Because only this path gives a chance to create a real alternative to Islamic fundamentalism. Two other formal alternatives (nationalist and Orthodox), as we can see, do not lead to justice for everyone today: the first, in conditions of a mixed population, leads to massacre and genocide (see Ukraine and other former republics of the USSR), the second actually builds an estate state ...

At the same time, the refusal to fight the "privatization" elite and the estate state nullifies the advantages that Russia could receive from Trump's coming to power in the United States. Trump himself is actively fighting the essentially estate-based establishment in his country (which, like our "privatization" elite, is largely not super-traditionalist, but liberal-financial in nature) and will not be "friends" with his outspoken enemies ... Thus, it seems to me that political success in today's Russia can be achieved by combining the socialist (in terms of building the economy) idea with the Orthodox-non-acquisitive one. Interestingly, Navalny Orthodox? And if he is publicly baptized by the Old Believers-non-possessors? I wonder what the effect will be? But the fight between the Orthodox-monarchical group and history in the form of the USSR is beneficial only to the liberal wing, which, without such a fight, would rather quickly lose power.

I deliberately do not write about the specific details of the Kremlin "showdown", about which Professor Solovey writes a lot (who, unlike me, is a political scientist), because it seems to me that there is a colossal variation in the development of events in this place. An example is the arrest of Ulyukaev: the fact that there will be a “run over” on the liberal camp, as a demonstration of its weakness, I have written repeatedly, but the choice of Ulyukaev specifically is the result of a rather complicated set of circumstances and it would be rather difficult to predict him.

FORWARD TO THE PAST

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the interaction of Russia with other countries. I have already written a lot about the fact that the tendencies of the "assembly" of the Eurasian economic space are increasing, but now we have entered a certain new stage this process. First, the economic crisis is intensifying and thus partners need to moderate their appetite somewhat. Not everyone likes this (see Lukashenka's behavior), but this is not the result of imperial aggressiveness, but an objective tendency. And therefore, I expect that the integration processes in the Eurasian direction will intensify, in spite of the individual “outbursts” of its participants and the sabotage of the Russian liberal elite.

Secondly, the eastern direction of Russian policy aimed at rapprochement with China will be strengthened. The split in the Chinese elites (the "liberal" wing led by Premier Li Keqiang and the "nationalist" wing led by Xi Jinping) forces Xi to move towards real cooperation with Russia in the logic of interaction of "non-Western" civilizations. And there are serious reasons to believe that this line will significantly manifest itself in the beginning of the year.

Third, the line of interaction between Russia and the EU will be weakened. The Brussels elites, liberal flesh and blood, will continue the (rather suicidal at the moment) policy of countering Russia. Even if Marine Le Pen comes to power in France, she can only accelerate the collapse of the EU, but not change the direction of its policy. And this situation is getting more and more tired of Russia, and this year, especially given the activity of China, this irritation is likely to move to a qualitatively new level.

I have already partially written about relations with the United States, but I will repeat once again: as long as the economic discourse in Russia is determined by the liberals, there can be no more or less intelligible interaction with the United States. Moreover, since Putin and Trump will talk about something, Putin will take some obligations on his part - and will receive outright sabotage from the government (as with any of his initiatives). As a result, all agreements and opportunities to work with Trump (taking into account his mentality as an American businessman) will go to waste.

If we talk about the economy, then the situation in 16 years will repeat itself almost completely. We are expecting a sluggish decline in GDP (about 3% per year), sharp fluctuations in the ruble, which provide speculators close to the Central Bank with large incomes, a drop in the living standards of the population, an increase in housing and communal services tariffs, and a reduction in small and medium-sized businesses. Administrative pressure on business will grow, both official (with the aim of "knocking out" taxes) and unofficial. The level of social tension will grow and it will be supported both by various growth of accidents and disasters, and by the growth of political activity on the eve of the elections.

I do not think that this activity can lead to any serious political changes, but the "anti-corruption" campaign (quotation marks are put, since its goal is not to fight corruption, but to inter-clan struggle of various power groups), the campaign will continue, most likely, it will even intensify. But a society devoid of political instruments (after the last year's Duma elections, people have lost their last illusions about the possibility of such a variant of influencing the policy of the authorities), will increasingly tend to support extremists. In this sense, the situation will be very similar to the one that has developed in the European Union, only there the “new” poor will protest against the fact that they cannot return to the “middle” class, while in our country they will protest against the coming estate society and pressure from the bureaucracy.

In this sense, the system of building Russian society will more and more resemble Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, only instead of the conservative and illiterate peasantry, we now have the urban poor, in competent managers). But the hatred of power in both cases is boundless. And if we consider that both the February Revolution and the Great October Socialist Revolution were, in fact, summit coups, then this leads to certain associations. Yes, they certainly will not show themselves in 2017, but the trend, as they say, is obvious.

This is, in fact, the end of the forecast. As in the previous year, it turned out to be very general and, as events develop and the processes become more specific, I plan to clarify it.

Mikhail Khazin
khazin.ru, 25.02.2017

Photo at the announcement: "BUSINESS Online"

Mikhail Khazin- opposition economist, one of the authors of the theory of the modern world economic crisis.

Was born in 1962 in Moscow.

Graduated from the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow State University (specialization "statistics").

He worked at the USSR Academy of Sciences, in the banking sector, in the Russian government. 1997 - 1998 - Deputy Head of the Economic Department of the President of Russia.

Since 1998 he has been a consultant.

Since 2002 - President of the expert consulting company Neokon.

Together with Oleg Grigoriev and Andrey Kobyakov developed a theory of the modern economic crisis.

Recently, he put forward a theory about the split of the global elite, the struggle within which determines the current economic and political situation in the world.

He is widely known for his rejection of liberal ideas and economic forecasts of apocalyptic nature.

The central bank said that most Russian businesses need a strong ruble. According to the regulator, only those who are focused on external demand suffer from the strengthening of the national currency. These are, for example, manufacturers of wood, rubber and plastic products. They export more than they spend on imported raw materials.

At the same time, the strong ruble is beneficial for the rest, they are sure of the Central Bank. For example, the pharmaceutical industry needs a rate of 42 rubles per dollar, because it is heavily dependent on foreign raw materials, while the food industry needs 49 rubles per dollar.

However, business representatives do not agree with analysts from the Central Bank. Some believe that even the current exchange rate is overvalued, and call the level of 65-70 rubles per dollar acceptable. A number of entrepreneurs even say that a strong ruble prevents industry from developing, namely, it reduces the forecasts for industrial growth rates by 1-1.2 percentage points.

As Pravda.Ru reported, earlier the Central Bank presented explanatory note, in which he predicted the risks of the undervaluation of the ruble. Attempts to reduce the real exchange rate through operations in the foreign exchange market often end in failure, the ministry summarizes.

As the authors of the study write, the real exchange rate is still strengthening, but under the influence of higher rates of price growth (wages - due to competition for labor from the nontradable sector). This was the situation in Russia in the 2000s.

What is actually better for the economy - a weak or a strong ruble? The questions of Pravda.Ru were answered by Mikhail Khazin, President of the Mikhail Khazin Foundation for Economic Research, economist, publicist.

What exchange rate of the ruble does the Russian economy need? Which industries benefit from the strengthening of the ruble, and who will suffer from it?

It depends on a very large number of circumstances. Export industries would benefit if they did not take out large loans. If you took out large loans, then you need to look at each specific enterprise. It all depends on the company. If the company is an export company, then it is certainly more profitable for the ruble to be weaker, but if the company has large foreign currency debts, then it will be more difficult to service these debts with the weakening ruble.

If we are talking about a domestic producer, then for him a decrease in the ruble is an increase in the potential for import substitution. But at the same time, since ruble loans are not issued, and loans can be taken in foreign currency, the strengthening of the dollar creates problems for them.

I cannot give a forecast of the Central Bank's policy as a whole. There are factors that I cannot calculate. For example, the commercial interests of the leaders of the Central Bank. I do not know what the scale of Carry trade operations is today. It depends on this whether they will keep the ruble exchange rate - or can afford to lower it.

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Late spring has finally reached Moscow, and positive macroeconomic news, as if waiting for warm days, fell like a cornucopia. First, Rosstat refreshed its estimates of the GDP dynamics by quarters of the last three years, as a result of which it became clear that the crisis recession in the Russian economy was smaller, and the way out of it was outlined earlier than previously thought.

And on Thursday, the head of the Ministry of Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin presented his first three-year economic forecast as head of the department, containing more optimistic estimates of the growth of our economy. True, this applies only to this year, and from 2018 a new braking will begin. Now let's talk about everything in order.

The statistics department brought the quarterly GDP figures for 2014-2016 in line with the annual results published in early February, which struck many with an obvious discrepancy with the previously published quarterly figures. According to the new quarterly breakdown, although the annual GDP total for 2016 is still lower than a year earlier (-0.2%), in a sequential quarterly view, the bottom of the recession was reached more than a year ago, in the last quarter of 2015. Thus, the recession in the Russian economy, which began in the third quarter of 2014, continued for six quarters, during which the cumulative decline in GDP amounted to about 4% (and not 5–6%, as follows from previous estimates). True, the average quarterly rate of recovery growth last year was extremely weak, only 0.3% on an annualized basis.

The indicators of gross fixed capital formation have also been recalculated, since the production of weapons is now considered (in accordance with the international methodology of the SNA-2008) as an investment in the economy. As a result, investment indicators received more favorable dynamics: in 2016 they decreased by only 1.4% compared to the previous year. Nevertheless, even taking this into account, the ratio of investment in fixed assets to GDP, which was (in 2011 prices) 20–20.5% in 2011–2014, decreased to 18.4–18.7% in 2015–2016. , with a continuing downward trend.

The Ministry of Economic Development improved the baseline forecast for the country's GDP growth in 2017 from 0.6%, as predicted earlier, to 2% immediately. At the same time, the forecast for GDP dynamics for 2018–2019 has been worsened: the ministry expects economic growth in these two years at the level of 1.5%. In the previous forecast of the ministry, GDP growth was foreseen by 1.7% in 2018 and by 2.1% in 2019. Where this braking comes from in the forecast is still unclear. After all, the traditional “governing parameter” for such forecasts - the oil price - not only does not decrease, but even grows above the current official medium-term target of $ 40 per barrel. The forecast for the average oil price for 2017 has been raised to $ 45.6 per barrel. In 2018, according to the forecast of the Ministry of Economic Development, a barrel will cost an average of $ 40.8, in 2019 - $ 41.6 and in 2020 - $ 42.4.

But the most intriguing were Oreshkin's statements about the ruble exchange rate. “We expect a serious weakening of the ruble in the coming months,” he said at a press conference. The head of the Ministry of Economic Development noted that the current moment for importing companies and the population, which is preparing for foreign travel, "is very profitable for the purchase of foreign currency."

According to Maxim Oreshkin, the ruble exchange rate has now significantly deviated from its "model level" towards re-strengthening, in the near future it should decline and by the end of the year will amount to 68 rubles per dollar. This rate is predicted in the baseline scenario of the Ministry of Economic Development in the event of a decline in oil prices by the end of the year to $ 40 per barrel. If oil prices remain at their current level (about $ 54 per barrel), the dollar will cost 63–64 rubles.

In conclusion, not very good news. Last week it became known that the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree on the subordination of Rosstat to the Ministry of Economic Development. In the public field, the topic was warmed up by Mr. Oreshkin, who two weeks earlier had subjected Rosstat to harsh public criticism for violating the data release schedule and ill-considered methodological reforms. The statistical community took the news of the reassignment of Rosstat with alarm, seeing in this step the risks of manipulating statistics. (See the article on this topic by one of the leading statisticians of Russia Alexei Ponomarenko "Lords of the tables", p. 26.)

"This is the most interesting thing that will happen in a presidential election year"

The beginning of the year is the traditional time for macroeconomic forecasts: what surprises - pleasant and not very pleasant - will the population expect in the coming months. We asked one of the most quoted and rated economists in Russia, Mikhail Khazin, the president of the Economic Research Foundation, a well-known publicist, consultant and analyst, to speak on this topic.

Mikhail Leonidovich is known for his consistent rejection of liberal approaches in economics and criticism of the Russian government, in his opinion, these approaches are professing. He did not change his principles in a conversation with our publication.

Mikhail Leonidovich, the economic results of the last year turned out to be contradictory. The government said that there was economic growth in the country, the ruble exchange rate stabilized, and inflation fell to a historic low of 2.5%. However, the incomes of the population continued their decline, and the citizens did not feel any positive changes when they looked into their wallets. So what do we have now: the beginning of growth or the end of the fall?

- I don’t think 2017 was a contradictory year from an economic point of view. It was an absolutely logical continuation of the previous years. The government can say whatever it wants to the population on this score, but these are just words.

The economic downturn in our country began in the fourth quarter of 2012. Somewhere by 2013–2014. the growth of incomes of the population has stopped.

The fact is that when a recession begins, income growth continues for some time by inertia. If the economic downturn is short, people may not notice it. But in Russia, the decline is long. It has reached a stable level of 2–2.5% per year.

This is primarily due to the lack of investment for the self-reproduction of the economy. Compensation for investments does not depend on us, because they are foreign. It is not possible to return capital to the homeland. The only exception is 2015, when the head of the Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, as I believe, on the orders of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) staged a landslide devaluation of the ruble. As a result, foreign capital flowed out of Russia - $ 200 billion, and the economic recession then amounted to 8-10%. In subsequent years, the situation returned to normal, by the same minus 2–2.5%, but the decline in the living standards of the population accelerated.

And what are your macroeconomic expectations for this year - especially considering the upcoming elections and promises made about this? Will the lives of ordinary people change for the better as a result?

- In 2018, the recession is likely to accelerate. Indirect evidence of this - there was no seasonal fall economic growth.

Regardless of the results of the year, there are always two recessions in the economy - summer and New Year, and two ups - autumn and spring. Judging by the fact that there was no rise in the fall, now, following the results of the New Year holidays, we will experience a rather sharp decline. It is not obvious whether there will be a spring rise. There is no reason for this.

Russia has a unique government that constantly steps on all sorts of rakes. For example, in an economic downturn, it raises taxes. Without changing the economic model, this will lead to nothing but an acceleration of the recession.

- Should we expect serious changes in the taxation system after the elections and in what way?

- If the composition of the government does not change, taxes will increase. The point is that in the understanding of a liberal government, the economic policy of the state is a balancing of the budget. Today his task is to collect taxes. And the fact that the taxpayers themselves are being liquidated does not bother them. They live one day.

The current government has no strategy. The government has a tactical body - the Ministry of Finance and a strategic one - the Ministry of Economy. The Liberals all their lives wanted to drive the Ministry of Economy under the Ministry of Finance.

Yegor Gaidar, when he came to the government at the end of 1991, created a united Ministry of Finance and Economy with the priority of the Ministry of Finance. Later, Oleg Lobov succeeded in straightening the Ministry of Economy, but in the end he was at first severely "lowered", separating from it branch departments and creating the Ministry of Industry, and now, with the appointment of a native of the Ministry of Finance Maxim Oreshkin, the Ministry of Economy was in fact turned into a department of the Ministry of Finance.

As a result of all these maneuvers, there is no systemic economic strategy in Russia. And the tactics are as follows: if in order to replenish the budget today, it is necessary to liquidate all small and medium-sized businesses, this will be done. What, in fact, is the government doing - and nothing else!

But the members of the government are appointed for us not by the International Monetary Fund, but by the Russian president. And Vladimir Putin all the years of his reign relied on liberals at the head of economic departments: Kudrin and Gref, Ulyukaev and Nabiullina, Shuvalov and Dvorkovich, Siluanov and Oreshkin ... It turns out that there are some factors and the results of their activities that force Putin over and over again to put liberals at the head of the economic bloc?

- The question presupposes that in our country the president is the absolute bearer of power. This does not happen anywhere and never. As Catherine II said, answering the question of how you manage to get along with your nobility: "I never offend them." And she had more power than Putin today.

In our elite, economic and financial policy is traditionally determined by the so-called liberal group - people oriented towards the world financial elite, who have provided economic growth in the world economy since 1944, with the adoption of the Bretton Woods agreements.

- Reveal the secret: who is included in this "liberal group"?

- We all know them. She is family. It includes Igor Shuvalov, Alexander Voloshin. The performers include the group of Yegor Gaidar - Anatoly Chubais, which includes, for example, Elvira Nabiullina, Arkady Dvorkovich, Alexei Kudrin and the entire privatization elite.

This group provided our country with relations with the IMF and the inflow of foreign investment. She was responsible for this for 25 years. The slightest attempt by other groups to get involved in this topic ended in wild scandals.

For example, when Vladimir Polevanov was appointed head of the State Property Committee of the Russian Federation in 1994 and tried to stop illegal privatization, the IMF announced to Boris Yeltsin that if Polevanov was not removed from office within two weeks, there would be no IMF loan. When the head of the Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko, in 1998 made the Central Bank's decision to register bills, which destroyed the dollar's monopoly, and accordingly, an extremely tough demand from the IMF to immediately cancel this decision followed.

But this is all - an interpretation of the events of the distant 90s. We live at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, and for 18 years now it is not Yeltsin and his "family" who have ruled us ...

In 1991, Russia adopted the IMF's rules of the game - the Bretton Woods system. After that, this group of people began to define the economic and financial system in our country. True, it has suffered a number of heavy losses over the past few years. The main blow for them was the rise to power in the United States of Donald Trump, who personifies the American regional elites, and does not represent transnational financiers.

Today's problem for the liberal group is objective. For many decades, it has provided economic growth throughout the world through emissions. Currently providing this growth this group just not able to. With regard to our country, it cannot provide a sufficient volume of foreign investment.

Representatives of this group began to ask questions: if you cannot ensure economic growth, why are you sitting here? In other words, the elite consensus that was adopted in the early 1990s and defended by Vladimir Putin as president has come to an end. I think in 2018 it will change to a different consensus, and this is the most interesting thing that will happen in a presidential election year.

However, the process of changing the elites will take place not only in our country, but throughout the world. The group that really began to strive for power back in the late 19th century made a powerful breakthrough in 1913, with the creation of the first private central bank, the US Federal Reserve, and which actually took control of the Western world in 1944 and the rest of the world. in 1991, it has exhausted its resource. This year there will be a fundamental change of the elite, and this is a very significant event.

Can you name specific people not from the liberal camp who could take key posts at the head of the government's economic bloc after the elections?

An internal elite consensus must occur first. They must decide among themselves who will now determine the economic policy. This will be decided at an elite, behind-the-scenes level. We will not know when this will happen.

- Who will decide this?

- It is not clear yet. Among the negotiators, in my opinion, there will definitely be Kudrin, Chubais, Voloshin, some security officials, some regional leaders. They will decide among themselves through long difficult negotiations who is good and who is not, and in the end they will make a choice. Having made a decision, they will start looking for performers for it.

Elite discussions take place outside the public domain. Somewhere, in some mansion or somewhere on the seashore, 4–5 people sit and decide how to do it right. Another 5 people sit in another place. Then they intersect. All this happens for months, and as a result, they have an understanding of how to act, and how not.

Let's go back from political conspiracy to economic specifics. The President promised us to quickly raise the minimum wage (minimum wage) to the subsistence level from May 1 of this year. Will there be funds for this in the budget and will this initiative help solve the problem of poverty in the country?

- Any economy produces a certain social product. The only question is how to distribute it: some to business owners, some to the budget, some officials, some retirees.

If in general the pie is shrinking, you can give someone more only due to the fact that something will be taken away from someone. Someone has to become a victim. If, for example, the government dispossessed the privatization elite of the 1990s, more money could be allocated to pensioners. If not, retirees will receive less. What will be written in the documents and how it will be formatted is unimportant and uninteresting.

All talk about the minimum wage and the cost of living is fiction. Rosstat, as it is told, will calculate it. He also considers economic growth against the backdrop of a recession, and also that pensions are growing - despite the fact that they are falling.

- That is, the population should not hope for the best?

It can hope as much as it wants, but nothing will change. There is no money in regional budgets to increase the minimum wage. The population will continue to grow poorer. You may not agree with this, but it is a fact. People need to survive - they won't be able to live.

Advice from Mikhail Khazin: how to save up for old age

There are two ways to accumulate retirement. First, while you receive your wages, you need to buy one gold coin each time. This will be your retirement savings.

Second: if you are not yet forty, you need to give birth to children. And the more the better. It will not be easy to raise and feed them in our conditions, but later, when you become retired, they will be able to support you.

In early January, the dollar fell below during trading on the Moscow Exchange 60 rubles for the first time since July 2015. In general, in 2016 the ruble appreciated against the dollar and the euro. Thus, the rate rose by more than 20% against the US currency, and about 25% against the euro. Experts already disagree about what awaits the national currency in the coming 2017. Some believe that the exchange rate will remain stable. Others see the risks of devaluation. However, experts agree that this process will be influenced by the oil price, as well as the policy of the new US president. Donald Trump in relation to Russia.

The main support for the ruble was oil. Over the past year, the cost of one barrel has risen from 27 dollars to encouraging 55 dollars... Such a price may look more favorably towards the future of the Russian economy, which is still dependent on raw materials.

Reaching an agreement to cut production in 2017 may lead to further growth in prices for black gold. In this case, the ruble may become one of the most attractive currencies for investment among all developing countries.

"Three" waves "of oil price hikes occurred exactly at the right time for the ruble: the first, in late January - early February, allowed the ruble to push off the bottom at a time when it seemed that nothing could withstand its fall. - early autumn. The third, which began in December after the decision of OPEC and Russia to cut oil production, strengthened the ruble on the eve of another seasonal peak in demand, which falls on the second decade of January, "the economist is sure Sergey Aleksashenko.

Undoubtedly, the rise in oil prices will have a positive impact on the exchange rate. But this is only one of the factors of a stable exchange rate. The situation will worsen if the new President of the United States, Donald Trump, begins to implement his campaign promises. We are talking about lifting restrictions on the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in the United States, as well as the desire to reduce oil imports, replacing them with their own resources.

In addition, most experts agree that the state will go through several years of deep recession, which, naturally, will cause the economic crisis to continue. Many experts believe that the balance of payments can play an even more decisive role than oil. As you know, imports and exports were negatively affected by sanctions, and the Russian economy switched to import substitution. Business is less in need of dollars, and this leads to the strengthening of our national currency.

As the economist writes Mikhail Khazin, economic growth is impossible in short time... The ruble will not grow in 2017. However, the country's government, headed by Dmitry Medvedev sees positive dynamics in the state of the Russian economy and hopes for the strengthening of the ruble.

The exchange rate of the national currency will also depend on geopolitical processes. As the analyst of Alpari Group of Companies is sure Anna Kokoreva, the main political event of the next year will undoubtedly be the presidency of Donald Trump and his new economic policy, with which everything is still far from clear. In particular, the issue of lifting anti-Russian sanctions.

"2017 will continue to be a tense and rather turbulent year for the foreign exchange markets. However, most likely, the main concerns will affect the euro and, to a lesser extent, the US dollar. For the Russian ruble, 2017 promises to be more favorable," she said.

So, in her opinion, the following factors will affect the dollar and euro in 2017: interest rate in the United States, the emergence of tension in relations between the United States and China, anti-Russian sanctions, elections in Germany and France, as well as a reduction in oil production by OPEC countries.

“As a result, we expect that in 2017 the dollar may strengthen against the euro at least to $ 1.02-1.05 per euro, and under more unfavorable circumstances for the European Union (the victory of Eurosceptics in Germany and a referendum in any of the eurozone countries on euro), the dollar may actually reach parity with the euro.According to our estimates, the ruble may strengthen against the dollar and the euro in 2016. We expect that the ruble may fluctuate in the corridor of 60-65 rubles per dollar and 63-68 rubles next year. . for the euro ", - the expert is sure.

Note, earlier the Minister of Finance of Russia Anton Siluanov said that in 2017, the department does not expect serious fluctuations in the exchange rate, any sharp changes in the rates of the US Federal Reserve. According to him, the Russian economy does not need additional fluctuations in the ruble exchange rate, even in the direction of its strengthening. So, in the industry, which is already accustomed to the rate of 60 rubles. per US dollar, further strengthening of the ruble will lead to a decrease in competitiveness.

"Yes, indeed, there are forecasts that a decision will be made a couple of times to raise this rate, but I do not see any serious consequences for the ruble exchange rate," the head of the Ministry of Finance added. At the same time, he allowed an increase in the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel not only due to the increase in excise taxes.