"Baltic deputy" (1936) dir. Alexander Zarkha and Joseph Heifitz, scenes. D. Dal (Lebashevsky Lebashevsky, 1892-1975) and Leonid Rakhmanov (1908-1988) with the participation of garks and heifying 298 "Darwin did not say this." "I didn't say you, but I told me." 299 * I raise this little glass with great

"Fortoraries of happiness" (1936) dir. Vladimir Korsh-Sablin, scenes. Yohan Zeltser (1905-1941) and Grigory Cobez (1898-1990) 349 Tell me, please,<…> How much can this steamer cost? 350 have a chance to kill

"We are from Kronstadt" (1936) dir. Efim Dzigan, scenes. Vsevolod Vishnevsky 430 We are Pscop. Cf. Also: "We are Kalutski, I will not reach us" - the "winged phrase of patriotism" of its hut with the edge of the "World War II". ? Zamovsky, p.

"Circus" (1936) scenes. and post. Gregory Alexandrova; The authors of the original scenario: I. Ilf, E. Petrov and the shaft. Kataev 556 Imposive, Ryka, Imposive! 557 she has<…> Black child!<…> White woman has black

The USSR Constitution (1936) 694 who does not work, he does not eat. Constitution of the USSR 1936, Art. 12 ? Kukushkin Yu. S., Chistyakov O. I. Sketch of the history of the Soviet Constitution. - M., 1987, p. 287 in the Constitution of the RSFSR 1918, Art. 18: "Not a worker yes does not eat!" ? In the same place, p. 245. Lenin: "Who does not work, he does not eat -

Kun sticks next.
There is no sharp difference between observations and theory.
Science is not cumulative (that is, it does not carry a cumulative nature).
Real science does not have a strict deductive structure.
Real scientific concepts are not very accurate.
The methodological unity of science is a lie: there are many disparate funds used for studies of various types.
By themselves, science is disconnected. They consist of a large number of only partly intersecting small disciplines, whose representatives may not even understand each other. (Ironically, Bestseller Kun appeared in the series "Encyclopedia of Single Science".)
The confirmation context cannot be separated from the context of the opening.
Science lives in time and is essentially historical.
Will the mind question?

In the second edition of the "Clean Rough Critics" (1787), the Kant says about the "intellectual revolution", which Fales did or someone else, turning the empirical methods of mathematics in strict evidence. In fact, the idea of \u200b\u200bthe revolution in the scientific sphere is almost that the sameness is the idea of \u200b\u200bthe political revolution. Both were entrenched during the French Revolution (1789) and Revolution in Chemistry (let's say, 1785). Of course, it was not the beginning. In England, there was its own "glorious (bloodless. X.) Revolution" in 1688, just at the time when it became clear that the scientific revolution could occur in the minds of people.

When Kun writes about science, it usually means not the whole huge machine of modern science, but rather small groups of scientific researchers who carry out the same line of research. He called it a disciplinary matrix consisting of interacting research groups with general problems and objectives. It can include about a hundred people on the forefront of the science, plus students and assistants. Often such a group can even determine the unfair person or sociologist, who knows nothing about science. He simply notes who is overwhelmed with who to whom someone calls on the phone, who publishes preprints who are invited to countless special scientific meetings, where they are exchanged for the most recent information over the years before it is published. A good key to identifying a disciplinary matrix is \u200b\u200breferences to the same authors at the end of articles. Requests for funding are reviewed by "reviewers' colleagues. The set of these colleagues can serve as an approximate pointer to a disciplinary matrix in one country, but such matrices are often international.

Inside such a group, there are general methods, standards and basic assumptions. They are transmitted to students, are introduced into books, are used in decision-making on how to maintain what problems are important, what decisions are allowed who should support who reviews articles who publish who fails. This is a paradigm as a set of common values.

/// perhaps, you can say so. Science is a rational activity - if we highlight a private situation from it - the rules of dialogue and evidence between few professionals. When one specialist is trying in an official setting or in writing to explain to another something. It leads rational arguments (\u003d tries to bring ...). Or - even easier - scientific articles are written as a subspecies of rational argumentation. But science as social, mass activity - is significantly more relative than the components of its elements. That is, when we explore science as an array - a change of beliefs, theories owned by the scientific community - it is necessary to speak in Maner Kuna, as an irrational incident. As about changing fashion or faith. When we talk about the arguments that are used in articles and individualized official disputes - the rational component ///
Usually, after the revolution, a large fragment of some part of chemistry or biology is forgotten and becomes available only by the historian, who is hard to get in the already forgotten worldview.

/// Is there a natural selection? As an object - no. How is the process? And what object does it applies to? There is no process. This is a mechanism. Means ... That is, a certain process takes place, we formulate the question of it, the response to the mechanism to which some kind of process property is achieved is and this aspect is the answer to the question - and there is a natural selection. And evolution is the concept of the same kind. No object "Evolution". And the process of "Evolution" is also not. You can poke in the direction of the current river forms, moving one to another - this is not evolution. This is also the answer to some question - the name of the aspect, which is allocated only by the smart questioning look, which is formulated on this river forms. Does it mean that. What is the world not real? Sure. No - the world is real, and evolution is, let's say, objective truth. But this is such an objective truth - it includes as a condition a smart look and the question, and the answer, and just such anonymous viewing. In another perspective there is no question - and there is no answer. And there is no evolution. Not at all.
And here it seems to me that a lot of things exist as "natural selection". But people used to call such things objects. Or processes. And they believe that they are seen by their eyes - or with the help of devices. But without a mind setting this particular (or the other? Maybe another it would be better ...) The question - there would be no such answer and there would be nothing that we are now confidently referred to how - for example, evolution, or selection, or mutation, or genome. And what, then the mammals would not have happened? Of course, everything would be as it should, but here is no evolution. And DNA molecules, of course, would be in any case. But be another question - there would be no genome ///

The main ideas of positivism are: (1) the emphasis is placed on verification (or such an embodiment, like "falsification"), this means that those whose truth or falsity can be established in some way are considered to be significant proposals. (2) Observations are welcome: what we can see, feel and so on, provides the best content or foundation of our low-imaging knowledge. (3) Antikuzalism: There is no causality in nature, there are only constancy, with which the events of one kind are followed by the events of another kind. (4) Understanding the role of explanations: Explanations can help organize phenomena, but can not give a deeper answer to questions "Why"; They only argue that phenomena and things regularly appear in such a way or another. (5) Anti-theoretical entity: positivists strive not to be realists not only because they limit the reality observed, but also because they are against the reasons and doubt about the explanations. They do not want to bring the existence of electrons from their causal effects because they reject the causes, adhering to existence of only constant patterns that bind phenomena. (6) Positivists summarize the content of paragraphs (1) - (5) in their desire to substantiate its anti-imitation physical orientation. Intended suggestions, unobservable objects, reasons, a deep explanation - all this, says a positivist, is the metaphysical trash that needs to be thrown.

The positivists were well managed by slogans. Here the tone asked Hum his loud phrases, completing his "study of human understanding": "Arming these principles, what kind of destruction should we produce in libraries? Take into the hands of any volume, for example, theological or scientific metaphysics, and I ask: Does it contain any abstract reasoning regarding quantities or numbers? "- No. Does it contain any experimentally confirmed reasoning relative to the essence and existence? - Not. Then I will betray his fire, for it does not contain anything but sophistic and delusions. . "

It is well known to the Yum's teaching that the reason is just a constantly implemented connection. Yum believes that to say that and the reason for this does not mean to say that and some kind of power or a feature caused V. This only means that things type and regularly accompanied by things like B. Details of the arguments of UMU are analyzed in hundreds of philosophical books . However, we can skip a lot if we consider the Huma outside its historical context.

In fact, not Yum is the author of the common philosophical idea of \u200b\u200bcausality as simply on permanent communication. This author was unnecessary to be Isaac Newton. During the time of Yum, the new triumph of the human spirit was the Newtonian theory of attraction. Newton was so careful in the question of the metaphysics of gravity, that scientists can argue to the conclusion of times about what their thoughts actually were. Directly to Newton, progressive scientists thought that the world should be understood in terms of mechanical jokes and drawing efforts. But gravity did not seem to be "mechanical" because it was an action at a distance. For this very reason, Leibniz, the only one who could compare with Newton, completely rejected Newtonian gravity: from his point of view, it was a reaction return to the inexplicable occult forces. In the case of the leibyman, the positivist spirit triumph. We learned that the laws of attraction are only regularities that describe what is happening in the world. And then we decided that all causals - just regularity! For empiricists, the postntonian approach was as follows: we should look in nature not the cause, but only patterns. We should not think about the laws of nature, as if they discover us, what should happen in nature, since in fact they only describe what is happening in nature. The naturalist is trying to find universal proposals - theories and laws that would cover all the phenomena as their own cases. To say that we have found an explanation of the event, it means to say only that the event can be adequate from the overall pattern.
This idea has many classical wording. Here is one of them taken from the book of Thomas Reed "Essay about the active forces of the human mind" (1788). Reed was the founder of what is often referred to as the Scottish school of philosophy of common sense, on borrowings from which was held by American philosophy until the beginning of the era of pragmatism at the end of the XIX century.

"The naturalists arguing cautiously possess the exact meaning of the terms they are used in science. When they say that they indicate the cause of nature, they mean the law of nature, the direct consequence of which this phenomenon acts. As definitely says Newton, all The object of natural philosophy is reduced to two main things: first, by induction from the experiment and observation to detect the laws of nature, then apply these laws to the explanation of nature phenomena. It's all that I tried to achieve this great philosopher, and everything that he considered it is achievable. " (I VII.6)

Ian Hacking

Representing and intervening

Introductory Topics In The Philosophy of Natural Science.

Cambridge University Press. 1983.

Jan hacking. Presentation and intervention.

Preface
Introduction: Rationality

Part A:

Representation
1. What kind of scientific realism?
2. Building and causing (causation)
3. Positivism
4. Pragmatism
5. Neso-size
6. Reference
7. Internal realism
8. Surrogate Truth
Turn. Real objects and views
Part B:
9. Intervention
10. Experiment
11. Observation
12. Microscopes
13. Theorization, calculation, models, approximation
14. Creating phenomenov
15. Measurements
16. Bekthonian themes
17. Experimentation and scientific realism

Literature

Publisher "Logos"

Moscow 1998.

Institute "Open Society"

The educational literature on humanitarian and social disciplines for higher education and secondary special educational institutions is prepared and published with the assistance of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation) as part of the Higher Education program.

Editorial Council: V. I. Bakhmin, Ya. M. Berger,
E. Yu. Geniyev, G. G. Dilgensky, V. D. Sadrikov

Scientific editor - d. F. n., prof. Mamchur E. A.

The translator and the editor express gratitude to the village. N, Professor S. V. Illarionov, who made a number of valuable comments on translation.

Andrei Bondarenko Decoration

Corrector - Lungina D. A.

Hacking I.

X 16 presentation and intervention. Introduction to the philosophy of natural sciences. Per. from English / Translation S. Kuznetsova, Scientific. ed. Mamchur E. A. M.: Logos 1998. - 296 p.

The book is a course of lectures on the philosophy of science of the famous philosopher, Professor of the University of Toronta, Ya. Hucking. The central theme around which the presentation concentrates is the problem of scientific realism. The first part of the book contains an overview of the views on this problem of leading foreign philosophers of science and justifies the thesis, according to which the position of scientific realism can get its reliable justification, only if the point of view of the experimenter's scientist will be taken into account, which in the course of his scientific activity actively interferes with natural processes . In this regard, in the second part of the book, the author appeals to real scientific knowledge and on a large natural science material demonstrates the role of experimental principles in science.

ISBN 5-7333-0394-8

© Cambridge University Press. 1983.

© Logos Publisher. Moscow 1998.

© Translation -Besnets with .. Editorial - Mamchur E. A.

Scientific publication

Jan haking

Presentation and intervention.

Introduction to the philosophy of natural sciences.

Translation from English - Sergey Kuznetsov

Decoration

Andrei Bondarenko

Corrector - D. Longgin

Publishing house "Logos"; LR №065364 of 08/20/1997

Moscow, Zubovsky Boulevard, 17

Signed in print 26.03.1998. Format 60x90 / 16.

Print offset. Circulation 2500 copies.

Order No..

In the book salon "Gnosis" (Moscow, Zubovsky Boulevard, 17) you can also purchase other books of Logos publishing house:

o Lacan J. Seminars. Book I: Freud's work on psychoanalyan technique (1953/54) . Translation from the French M. Titov and A. Chernogov. 27 p. L.

"To interrupt silence, a diet can anything - sarcasm or a kick kick.

That is what, according to the Jen technique, the Buddhist teacher comes in finding the meaning of the meaning of the Buddhist teacher. Search response to their questions should be discharged. Teacher does not teachex Cathedra. Already finished science, he presents the answer at the very moment when students are ready to find it.

Such training refuses every system. It opens the thought in motion - thought, however, ready for the system, since it requires a dogmatic aspect in it. Freud's thought more than any open revision. Mistakenly reduce it to beaten phrases. Every concept lives his own life. This is exactly the dialectic.

Some of these concepts turned out at some point, Freuda needed to answer the question previously in other terms, and it is possible to catch their importance only by placing them again into the appropriate context. "

(From the "entry" to Seminar)

In November 1998, the publishing house "Logos" publishes the 2nd volume Seminar – I am in Freud's theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis (Le Moi Dans La ORIE DEECHNIQUE De La Psychanalyse). Translation from French A. Chernoglazov. Total volume - 25 p. L.

o Anthology of phenomenological philosophy in Russia. Tom I.(Series "Phenomenology. Germenevics. Language philosophy"). Under the general editors to. F. n. I. Chubarova. 32 p. L.

The following books are published in the Logos publishing house:

Delz J. Fold. Leibniz and Baroque.

Translation from French B. Skuratova. General editors and afterword prof. V. A. Tortographer. Total volume - 15 p. L.

"The concept of" baroque "refers not to any entity, but rather to some operational function, to a characteristic feature. Baroque constantly produces folds. The discovery does not belong to him: there are a variety of folds who came from the east, as well as the ancient Greek, Roman, Romanesque, Gothic, classic ... But Baroque sparkles them and bends them, riding to infinity, folding, one to another. The main feature of the baroque - directed toward infinity of the fold. And, above all, the baroque their differentiates, respectively, two directions, two infinities, - as if the infinity had two floors: the folds of matter and bends in the shower. "

(From chapter 1:Mabyrinths of matter )

Blancheo M. From kafka to kafka.

Translation from French D. Mole. Total volume - 15 p. L.

"" Death is in front of us approximately as well as the picture of the Battle of Alexander on one of the walls of the cluster room. It is understood that from the very beginning of this life, we darken or even rub the image by our actions. " Creation of Kafka is like this picture, which is death, as well as the action that darkens and rubs it. But, like death, it could not dare, and on the contrary, brightly shone from this vain effort to destroy itself. That is why we understand his works only betraying them, and our reading is alarmingly wandering around the misunderstanding. "

(From chapter 2:Reading Kafki. )

Vasilyeva T. V. Path to Platon.

T. V. Vasilyeva "Path to Platon" is a compressed statement of the philosophical system of the founder of the Athenian Academy on the basis of the compositions of the Platonov Corps and the latest achievements of domestic and foreign platonism. The work contains a detailed retelling of the most important dialogues of Plato, which reveals the specifics of their logic and composition, tracing the development of the cardinal provisions of Platonism from the dialogue to the dialogue, as well as the analysis of the basic concepts that make up the philosophical system of Platonism, in line with the historical tradition, prepared by Platonic problems and those who have received the solutions proposed by Plato.

The work is focused on both those who want for the first time to get acquainted with the great thinker of antiquity and those who seek to make their own contribution to the study of Platonian heritage. Total volume - 12 p. L.

Kozhek A. The idea of \u200b\u200bdeath in the philosophy of Hegel.

Translation from French and Afterword I. Fomina. Total volume - 12 p. L.

The book includes two final reports Alexander Kozhev -Dialectics of the real and phenomenological method at Hegel andThe idea of \u200b\u200bdeath in philosophy Hegel - from his opened era of the modern French philosophy of the course "Introduction to the reading of Hegel".

Ferdinand de Sosseur. Course of general linguistics. Updated and corrected translation of 1933. Critical publication, afterword, introductory article, comments prof. N. A. Slyusareva. (Series "Phenomenology. Germenevics. Language philosophy.") Total volume - 22 p. L.

The theory of F. de Sosurira (1857-1913) played a decisive role in the development of humanitarian sciences in Europe in the middle of the XX century. The "course" was published in 1916. Sh. Balley and A. SESE on student records of his lectures in 1907-1911. He received particularly fame since the end of the 20th heads, when the principles of structuralism in linguistics and literary studies were approved (N. S. Trubetskaya, R. O. Jacobson, L. Yelmslev, etc.) in opposition to the story of the XIX century. Sosorur substantiated the doctrine of the language as a system of signs, regardless of Ch. S. Pierce allocated science about the iconic systems and called it semiology. His ideas are paradigmatic for the development of both sciences about spirit and natural sciences in the 20th century. In 1957-1974 R. Godel, and R. Enger, unknown earlier materials were published, including personal notes of the sausage, which served as a new commented edition of the "Course" in different countries (Italy, France, Japan). Although the Russian translation of the "Course" published a separate publication in 1933 and in 1977 as part of the book "F. de sausure. The works of linguistics ", the previous editions, unfortunately, no longer comply with the modern requirements of the science of language (in them, for example, the above mentioned" notes "of Sosurira are distorted, some facts of his biography and scientific activity), an understanding of its newest areas from transformational grammar to cognitive linguistics. The new critical publication of the classic work of Sosurira prof. N. A. Slyusareva is accompanied by an afterword prof. R. Eglera.

A special type of cognitive activity aimed at developing objective, systemically organized and reasonable knowledge about the world. Interacts with other types of cognitive activity: ordinary, artistic, religious, mythological ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

- (USA) (United States of America, USA). I. US total information state in North America. Area 9.4 million km2. Population of 216 million people. (1976, Evaluation). Capital of Washington. In administratively, the territory of the United States ...

SOUL - [Greek. ψυχή], together with the body, forms the composition of man (see articles Dichotomism, Anthropology), while being an independent beginning; D. Human makes the image of God (according to some fathers of the church; in the opinion of other, God's image is concluded in everything ... ... Orthodox encyclopedia

- (from Lat. Universitas Aggregate). Currently, with the concept of W. Connect an idea of \u200b\u200ba higher educational institution, which, having the purpose of free teaching and the development of all branches of science, regardless of their ... ...

Composite parts of universities (see), representing some kind of individual higher schools, in which certain cycles of science are taught. General characteristics. Traditional F. Most universities are theological, philosophical, ... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron

I Contents: A. Geographical Essay: Position and Borders Device Surface Irrigation Climate and Natural Works Space and Population Emigration Agriculture Catooting Fishing Mountain Fishing Industry Trade ... Encyclopedic Dictionary F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron

EUCHARIST. Part II. - E. In the Orthodox Church of the II millennium E. in Byzantium in the XI century. By the XI century Visant. The divine service has acquired almost the kind as it retained in Urty. Churches all the subsequent millennium; It was based on ancient to the Polish tradition, significantly ... ... Orthodox encyclopedia

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Great Soviet Encyclopedia

I Italy (ITALIA) Italian Republic (La Repubblica Italiana). I. General information I. State in the south of Europe in the central part of the Mediterranean. Berega I. is washed with seas: at Z. Ligurian and Tyrrhensky, on Yu ... ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

ANCIENT GREECE - the territory in the south of Balkansky P Oova (see also Articles Antiquity, Greece). History D. G. covers the period from the beginning. II thousand to R. X. on start. I thousand on R. Kh. Geography and ethnography of the FEST DISC. XVII century R. H. (Archaeological Museum in Heraklio, ... ... Orthodox encyclopedia

Representing and intervening

Introductory Topics In The Philosophy of Natural Science.

Cambridge University Press. 1983.

Jan hacking. Presentation and intervention.

Preface
Introduction: Rationality

Part A:

Representation
1. What kind of scientific realism?
2. Building and causing (causation)
3. Positivism
4. Pragmatism
5. Neso-size
6. Reference
7. Internal realism
8. Surrogate Truth
Turn. Real objects and views
Part B:
9. Intervention
10. Experiment
11. Observation
12. Microscopes
13. Theorization, calculation, models, approximation
14. Creating phenomenov
15. Measurements
16. Bekthonian themes
17. Experimentation and scientific realism

Literature

Publisher "Logos"

Moscow 1998.

Institute "Open Society"

The educational literature on humanitarian and social disciplines for higher education and secondary special educational institutions is prepared and published with the assistance of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation) as part of the Higher Education program.

Editorial Council: ,
,

Scientific editor - d. F. n., prof.

The translator and the editor express gratitude to the village. N, Professor, who made a number of valuable translation comments.

Andrei Bondarenko Decoration

Corrector

Hacking I.

X 16 presentation and intervention. Introduction to the philosophy of natural sciences. Per. from English / Translation S. Kuznetsova, Scientific. ed. M.: Logos 1998. - 296 p.

The book is a course of lectures on the philosophy of science of the famous philosopher, Professor of the University of Toronta, Ya. Hucking. The central theme around which the presentation concentrates is the problem of scientific realism. The first part of the book contains an overview of the views on this problem of leading foreign philosophers of science and justifies the thesis, according to which the position of scientific realism can get its reliable justification, only if the point of view of the experimenter's scientist will be taken into account, which in the course of his scientific activity actively interferes with natural processes . In this regard, in the second part of the book, the author appeals to real scientific knowledge and on a large natural science material demonstrates the role of experimental principles in science.

© Cambridge University Press. 1983.

© Logos Publisher. Moscow 1998.

© Translation -Besnets with .. Editors -

Scientific publication

Jan haking

Presentation and intervention.

Introduction to the philosophy of natural sciences.

Translation from English - Sergey Kuznetsov

Decoration

Andrei Bondarenko

Corrector - D. Longgin

Publishing house "Logos"; LR № 000 dated 01.01.2001

Moscow, Zubovsky Boulevard, 17

Analytical content

Introduction: Rationality

Rationality and realism are two main topics of modern philosophy of science. There are questions regarding the mind, facts and methods, and there are questions about what the world is that there is and what is true about him. This book is about reality, and not about rationality. The introduction is dedicated to what is not in this book. It contains an overview of some problems of rationality as a basis, which are generated by the classical book of Thomas Kuna "The structure of scientific revolutions".

Part A: View

1. What is scientific realism?

Realism relative to theories says that the target of theories is truth, and sometimes they are approaching it. Realism relative to objects suggests that objects mentioned in theory should really exist. Anti-Realism relative to objects says that objects postulated by theories are at best of useful intellectual fictions.

2. Building and causing (causation)

J. Smart and other materialists say that theoretical objects exist if they are among the construction bricks of the Universe. N. Cardtarta approves the existence of those objects whose causal properties are well known. None of these realists regarding concepts must be a realist on theories.

3. Positivism

Such positivists as O. Cont, E. Mah and B. van Fraassen are anti-thealists both relative to theories and relative to objects. In their opinion, it should be believed only to those proposals whose truth can be established by observation. Positivists suspiciously belong to such concepts as causing (causation) and an explanation. They adhere to the opinion that theories are tools for predicting phenomena and for organizations of our thoughts. The criticism of "withdrawing to the best explanation" is given.

4. Pragmatism

he said that something is real if the researchers community will eventually agree that it exists. He thought that the truth was what the scientific method will ultimately be based on, provided that the study will continue long enough. W. James and J. Dewey pay little attention to this duration, they pay more attention to what is currently considered to be more convenient to believe and what to discuss. As for modern philosophers, X. Patnam goes after Pierce, while R. Rortor prefers James and Dewi. These are two different types of anti-measurealism.

5. Neso-size

and P. Feyebend somehow said that competing theories are difficult to compare in order to determine which of them are better consistent with the facts. This idea strongly supports one of the types of anti-measurement. It contains at least three ideas. Minds of themes: Compare theories can only be partially intersect, so it is difficult to compare them by their confirmation. Dissociation: after enough long time and after changing the theory, one of the views on the world can not be completely understood for later era. The incompleteness of the values: some ideas are relative to the language imply that rival theories are always mutually comparable and mutually translated, so a reasonable comparison of theories in principle is not possible.

6. Reference

H. Patna is developing the concept of "meaning", which avoids the conclusions about the non-election of values. The successes and failures of this idea are illustrated by short stories of referents of terms such as glipticodont, electron, acid, heatborne, muon, meson.

7. Internal realism

The Panym study of importance began with some kind of realism, but gradually became becoming more pragmatic and anti-remote. A description of these shifts, which are compared with the Coon philosophy. Both Patnam and Kun came close to the fact that it is best called transcendental nominalism.

8. Surrogate Truth

I. Lakatosh has a methodology for the scientific research program, intended to be antidote the concept of Kun. This methodology looks like a description of rationality, but rather it looks like an explanation of how scientific objectivity should not depend on the theory of truth based on compliance.

Change: Real Objects and Representations

This chapter concerns the anthropological fantasy about the ideas of reality and presentation, starting with the cavemen and ending with G. Herz. It is used to show why disputes between realism and antirealism can never be solved by remaining at the level of the presentation. Consequently, we turn from the truth and representation to experimentation and manipulats.

Part B: Intervention

9. Experiment

The theory and experiment have various relationships in different sciences and at different stages of their development. There is no single correct answer to the question "What is the first: experiment, theory, invention, technology ...?" Illustrative examples of optics, thermodynamics, solid and radio astronomy physics are given.

10. Observation

suggested that all statements about the observation are charged by theory. In fact, the observation does not apply to the language, but refers to the ability. Some observations are completely designer. Works Ch. Herschel in astronomy and W. Herschel on thermal radiation are used to illustrate some observation banalities. We use the word "see" in situations when it comes far from the eyes with a naked eye, but about the use of information transmitted by theoretically postulated objects.

11. Microscopes.

Do we see with microscopes? There are many types of light microscope based on various properties of light. We believe that we see mainly due to the fact that various physical systems provide the same picture. We "see" even with an acoustic microscope that does not use light, but sound.

12. Theorization, calculation, models, approximation

There is not the only generation that can be called theorization. There are many species and levels of theory that have different attitude to the experiment. The history of the experiment and the theory of the magneto-optical effect illustrates this fact. The ideas of N. Cartrette relative to the models and approximations are the further illustration of the theoresis of the theories.

13. Creating phenomena

Many experiments create phenomena that before them in pure form in the universe did not exist. Talk about repetition of experiments is rather deceptive. Experiments are not repeated, but improve until the phenomena are systematized. Some electromagnetic phenomena illustrate the creation of phenomena.

14. Measurement

Measurements play the most diverse role in the sciences. There are measurements that serve to verify theories, but there are also pure definitions of natural constants. The works of T. Kun also contains an important description of the unexpected functional role of measurements in the growth of knowledge.

15. Bekthonian themes

Bacon created the first classification of species of the experiment. He predicted that science would be the interaction of two different types of activity - rational and experimental. Thus, he answered the question of P. Feyerabenda: "What is the Great contains a science?". Becon had a good description of the critical experts, according to which it is clear that they are not decisive. An example from chemistry shows that in practice, we cannot continue to introduce additional hypotheses in order to save theories refuted by critical experiments. The incorrect interpretation of Michelson-Morley's lacate experience is used to show how science philosophy oriented can deform the philosophy of the experiment.

16. Experimentation and scientific realism

Experimentation leads its own life, interacting with theorizing, calculation, construction of models, inventions and technologies. But while the theoretical, the calculator and the creator of models can be an antirealist, the experimenter must be a realistic. This thesis is illustrated by a detailed description of the device, which produces concentrated rays of polarized electrons used in order to demonstrate the violation of parity in weak interactions of neutral currents. Electrons become instruments whose reality is no doubt. In the end, scientific realists do not reflect on the world, but a change in it.

Preface

This book consists of two parts. The reader can start from the second part - "intervention", which concerns experiments. Philosophers of science ignored them for too long, so the conversation about them is somewhat in a novelty. Philosophers usually think about theories. The presentation concerns theories and, therefore, this part contains a partial description of the work done in this area. The last chapters of the part and may be more interested in philosophers, while some of the heads of part b will come more to the taste of scientists. See and choose: Analytical content will tell me what is contained in each chapter. Chapters are intentionally located in this way, but the reader does not need to read in the specified order.

Building books is the themes of my annual introductory course in the philosophy of science at Stanford University. Under the word "introductory" I do not mean "lightweight". Introductory topics should be quite understandable and serious enough to attract the mind for which they are new, and yet enough incendants to avail the spark for those who have been thinking about these problems for many years.

Preface to the Russian publication*

This book came out 15 years ago. The Russian reader may be interested in learn something that served as the basis for writing this book. Then I will tell you a little about the present.

You will notice that some paragraphs of the book are marked with the letter "E". This means that they are written by me together with Francis Everitt. Everitt is a physicist experimentator, which has been engaged in most of his life to the design of equipment intended for space flights. These flights were taken to verify some hypotheses, including a special relativity theory. Everitt has always emphasized that laboratory tests of the theories of space and time has never been conducted. He was also deeply interested in the history of physics. Somewhere in 1980. We wrote an article called "Theory and Experiment: What precedes?" Using a large number of examples from the history of science and overlooking various areas of physical knowledge, we argued that in many cases experimentation precedes the theory, which only after its creation is capable of considering experimental results. We sent an article into a large number of magazines of various sense, but in each case the article immediately rejected on the grounds that our main thesis is strange. For both of us, this was the only case when our article was rejected.

This anecdotic example demonstrates the spirit of Western philosophy and the history of science in 1980. In the sociology of the science of business, there were some better, because the researchers began to study the laboratory activities of the scientist. In 1979, Bruno Latur and Steve Wolgar published their brave book "Life Laboratory", half dedicated to the ethnography of the laboratory, half a one who represents a certain demonstration of strength by philosophers who argued that scientific facts are social structures. After 1983, the situation has changed very quickly. Among the really famous books, I will mention two devoted to the physics of high energies: the book Andrew Pickering "Designing quarks" (1985) and the book of Peter Galison "End of Experiment" (1987). In parallel with these books in 1985, the work was published "Leviathan and the air pump: Hobbs, Boyle and Experimental Activity" Simon Shaffer and Stephen Shapin. This is a highly philosophical story in which the main character is not Robert Boyle and not Thomas Hobbs, but the instrument, the equipment is an air pump.

These were the most interesting work. Currently, in English-language philosophy and history of science, articles, books and conferences on experimenting are full. As I said, times have changed. You can perceive the second part (part b) of this book as one of the earliest events in these changes and look at the bibliography added at the end of the book, in order to learn about later publications.

As for the part and this book, the reason for the discussion was a publication in 1980 Basa Wang Fraaspena Books "Scientific Image" served. He vigorously defended the anti-remote position, which he called constructive empiricism. He argued that scientific theories should not be perceived as true in the literal sense of the word. Most more that you can expect from them - these are their empirical adequacy. Wang Fraaspen's arguments left for their roots to the work of Pierre Duhmama - French philosopher and physicist who worked at the beginning of the twentieth century, as well as to the works of the Danish phenomenology B. Foschemans. Wang Fraassen believed that we can consider real only that we can directly observe the naked eye. Currently, everything, in addition to possessing particularly acute vision, can see the moon of Jupiter only with the help of a telescope. But in principle, we can fly to Jupiter and see the moon with the naked eye. But we can not reduce ourselves to the size of the cell. So we can consider the cell by unobservable essence and, therefore, according to Van Frasen, deny her reality. The chapter on microscopes in my book, which is now presenting independent value, was originally a reaction to such a Vú Denia.

For the former Soviet Union, my book could not have such a great value, what she had for the Western world, as this is a materialistic book. I understand it literally. Its focus is material interaction with the material world by means of equipment and tools. I am not very disagreeable with Van Fraassen about its anti-rashes in relation to theories, although my arguments rarely coincide with it. But we both share the persuasion of Pierre Ducem in the fact that abstract theories are only ideas and should not mention as literally true. The generally accepted opinion is that we use scientific theories, the system of approximations, and that these theories are true, while approximations will lead to us away from the truth. However, Nancy Cartwright especially emphasizes in his book "As the laws of physics", that if something brings us to the truth, so this is approximations, and not theory. But in the book submitted to your attention, the focus is made not on debates around theories, but on discussions on theoretical, unobservable entities.

I introduce what I call the experimental argument in favor of scientific realism about theories. It is proclaimed on the first pages of the book, where after describing the experiment, in which electrons are used to charge the ball of super-cooled fluid, called niobium, I am writing: "If you can spray them (electrons), they are real." Do not make mistakes here. I do not say: "If they are real, you can span them." I do not want to say that all those things that we can consider real can be used by us, and we can manipulate them, for example, "spray" them. I formulated a sufficient condition for the reality of some entities; But this condition is not necessary. I really have doubts about the fact that things with which we are in principle cannot interact are not real. But that is another story.

The argument in the last part of the book is built around the device in which we use polarized electrons in order to investigate something else - weak neutral currents. I describe some details of the design of the equipment created in order to make it work some entities that were previously considered as "simply theoretical". One of the moments that I emphasize is that physics engineers, designing equipment, can have completely different theoretical Vú Denia that they are electrons. All that is required for their cooperation is the consent that the electrons do.

For a time when I write this preface, the most important work on the history and philosophy of physics is the book of Peter Galison "Image and Logic: Material Culture of Microphysics." In this book, Galison is developing the concept of the "working area", which explains how scientists and engineers with completely different luggage of knowledge, qualifications and beliefs are able to work together in a fairly wide area of \u200b\u200bphysical science. Consent relative to the fundamental theory is less important than consent regarding what theoretical essences do. In the light of this knowledge, we turn out to be able to use these entities in order to explore other, significantly less well-known aspects of the Universum.

I would like to finish such a thought. When I said, "If you can spray them, then they are real," I was based on the fact that there was some point in their deposition, namely, the part of the experiment, which was intended to study something else, in this case to study There are "free quarks", fractional charges, constituting 1/3 of the electron charge. When we use some unobservable entities for the study of other aspects of nature, we have the right to argue (until we prove that we are mistaken in what we do) that these entities are real. You will make sure it is a really materialistic book.

Introduction: Rationality

"You ask me what features of philosophers cause idiosyncrazia? .. For example, the lack of historical feelings, their hatred of becoming, their Egypticism. They imagine that they do the honor of some things if they deistorize it, sUB SPECIE AETERNI.- if you make a mummy out of it. "

F. Nietzsche. "Twilight idols" *

Philosophers have long made mummy from science. When the corpse was finally melting, and the philosophers saw the remains of the historical process of formation and discovery, they came up with a crisis of rationality. It happened somewhere around 1960.

This event was a crisis because it turned the old tradition of thinking, which considered that scientific knowledge was the crown of the achievements of the human mind. Skeptics have always doubted that the serene panorama of science as collecting and accumulating knowledge is true, but now they received weapons in the form of historical details. Looking at some non-resident events in the history of science, many philosophers were worried about whether the mind plays a large role in intellectual confrontation. Mind is determined by what the theory is closer to truth and what study should be taken? It became not at all obvious that it was the mind that should determine such solutions. Some people may be those who have already believed that morality is culturally due and relative, proposed to believe that the "scientific truth" is a social product that does not claim absolute strength or even relevance.

Starting from this crisis of trust, rationality became one of two moments, which mastered the minds of philosophers of science. We ask: what do we really know? What should we assume? What is a fact? What is good foundations? Is science rational so much as people got used to thinking? Is there all this conversation about the mind just a smoke vest from technocrats? Such questions about reasonable knowledge and relief are traditionally related to logic and epistemology. This book does not concern these issues.

Scientific realism is another important issue. We ask: what is the world? What kind of things does it contain? What is true about them known? What is the truth? Are the essences postulated by theoretical physicists real, or are they only the constructs of the human mind that can organize our experience? These are questions about reality. They belong to the field of metaphysics. In this book, I chose them in order to systematize my introductory provisions on the philosophy of science.

Disputes both about mind and reality have long been polarized community of philosophers of science. These disputes are modern and now, since many philosophical debates about natural sciences rotate around the mind and reality. But none of these disputes are new. You can detect them in ancient Greece, where the philosophy of science originated. I chose realism, but rationality can be considered: these questions are intertwined. Stop on one of them, does not mean excluding the other.

Are there both of these questions important? I doubt. We really want to know what is really real, and that is genuinely rational. But you will see that I reject many questions about rationality, and is a realist only on the pragmatic basis. Such an approach does not detract from my respect to the depths of our need for reason and reality, as well as in the values \u200b\u200bof each of these ideas as starting points.

I will talk about what is real, but before you continue, we will try to see how the "rationality crisis" arose in the recent past of the philosophy of science. He could also get the name of the "error history". This is a story about how from excellent work you can get not quite reasonable conclusions.

Concerns about the mind and rationality are influenced by many aspects of modern life, but in relation to the philosophy of science, they seriously began with a famous offer, published twenty years ago:

"If we consider the story not only as a collection of jokes and chronological information, then it can make a fundamental transformation of the image of science, which currently owns our minds."

Corrected transformation - anecdote or chronology - image of science, currently owning our minds- These are the words from which the famous book of Thomas Kuna "Structure of scientific revolutions" begins. The book itself produced a fundamental transformation and caused a crisis of rationality involuntarily for its author.

Shared image of science

How could history lead to crisis? Partially due to the preceding image of mummified science. Initially, the case looks as if there was no single image. Take for example two leading philosophers. Rudolf Karnap and Karl Popper began their scientific path in Vienna, in the 1930s left from there: Karnap - in Chicago and Los Angeles, and Popper to London. From there they began their long-term disputes.

They did not agree largely, but only because they converged mainly: they believed that the natural sciences were wonderful, and the best physics. It serves as an embodiment of human rationality. It would be wonderful to have a criterion for the excellent science of such good science from bad nonsense or incorrectly constructed reasoning.

The first discrepancy appeared here: Karnap thought that it was necessary to draw a distinction in terms of the language, while Popper believed that the study of meanings had nothing to do with the understanding of science. Karnap said that the scientific discourse is comprehended, and metaphysical reasoning is not. Meaningful sentences should be verifiablein principle, otherwise they say nothing about the world. Popper thought that verification goes on the wrong path, since quite general scientific theories could never be verified. Their borders are too wide for this. However, they can be checked, and maybe their falsity will be installed. The offer is scientifically, if it falsifable. According to the popper, the dockscore metaphysics is not so bad, since non-flexible metaphysics often serves as a speculative predecessor of falsified science.

This difference issues another, deeper. Carnage verification is directed from below: Make observations and see how they confirm or verify more general approval. Falsification of the popper is directed from top to bottom: first form theoretical statement, and then display the consequence and check them for truth.

Carnap acts within the framework of the tradition, which became common from the seventeenth century and believed that science is inductive in nature. It initially said that the researcher should make accurate observations, carry out neat experiments, honestly record the results, then make generalizations and conduct analogies, gradually producing hypothesis and theory, all the time developing new concepts in order to comprehend and organize facts. If the theories are withstanding subsequent checks, then they contain some knowledge of the world. We can even come to the fundamental laws of nature. Carnap's philosophy is a form of this approach belonging to the twentieth century. Carnap thought about our observations as about the foundations of our knowledge and held his last years in trying to invent inductive logic, which would explain how the observed certificate can support various hypotheses.

There is an earlier tradition. The ancient Greek rationalist Platon admired geometry, but did not think so flattering about highly developed metallurgy, medicine or astronomy of their days. This worship before the deduction was preserved in the teachings of Aristotle: genuine knowledge, that is, science is to eliminate the consequences from the source principles through the evidence. Popper fell disgust for the idea of \u200b\u200bthe original principles, but it is often called the Deadukivist, because he believed that there is only one logic - deductive. Popper agreed with David Hume, who in 1739 put forward the thesis that our desire to summarize experience is only a psychological propensity. Such a tendency cannot serve as the basis for inductive generalization, as well as the inclination of a young man does not trust his father, is not a reason to trust the first more than the second. According to the popper, the rationality of science has nothing to do with how well our experience supports our hypotheses. Rationality, it believes, is the essence of the method, and the method is to extend the hypotheses and their refutation. We form far-reaching assumptions about the world, withdraw some of them some observable consequences. Check if they are true. If yes, we will conduct other checks. If not, we will reconsider the assumptions or, even better, come up with new ones.

According to Popper, we can say that the hypothesis that has undergone many checks is supported (Corroborated), but this does not mean that it is well supported by empirical evidence. This means only that this hypothesis has kept afloat in a stormy sea of \u200b\u200bcritical checks. Karnap, on the contrary, tried to create a confirmation theory, analyzing how compliance with empirical data makes the hypothesis more likely. Popper supporters reproach Carnage supporters for the fact that they did not create a viable confirmation theory (confirmation). The same, in retaliation, they say that popper conversations about reinforcement or empty, or are a hidden way to introduce the concept of confirmation.

Battle fields

Karnap thought that the concepts valuesand theory languageimportant for science philosophy. Popper despised these problems as scholastic. Karnap preferred verificationas a means for different science science. Popper supported falsification. Karnap tried to formulate good foundations for such distinguishing in terms of theory confirmationAnd Popper believed that rationality lies in the method. Karnap thought that knowledge had basis, and Popper believed that there was no reason, and all our knowledge subject to errors (fallible.). Karnap believed in induction, and Popper believed that there was no other logic except deduction.

All this creates the impression that to Kuna was not a standard, generally accepted "image" of science. But this is not the case: as soon as we meet two philosophers, divergent in the top ten of various items, we know that in fact they agreed almost in everything. They share the same image of science, an image rejected by kun. If two people really would not agree on the main issues, they would not find a total soil for a consistent discussion of specific differences.

Total soil

Karnap and Popper were believed that natural sciences are the best sample of rational thinking. We give other provisions for which they converged. They used these positions in different ways, but it is important that such general provisions were.

Both philosophers thought that there is a pretty clear distinction between observation and theory. Both believed that knowledge growth in general cumulative (i.e. it is cumulative). Popper attached great importance to refutations, but it believed that science develops evolutionally and strives for the true theory of the Universum. Both philosophers believed that science is quite strict deaduitable structure. Both believed that scientific terminology was or should be enough strict. Both believed in unity of science. This means that all sciences should apply the same methods, so humanitarian sciences must have the same methodology as physics. Moreover, they believed that at least the natural sciences are part of one science, and we have the right to expect from biology that it will be reduced to chemistry, as well as chemistry comes down to physics. Popper came to the idea that at least a part of the psychology and social world does not reduce the physical world, but the carnap did not have such doubts. He was the founder of the Tomov series under the general name of the Encyclopedia of Single Science.

Both agreed that there is a fundamental difference context confirmation(justification.) OT opening context. These terms belong to Hansu Reyhenbahu, the third famous philosophical emigrant of this generation. Discussing the context of discovery, historians, economists, sociologists or psychologists will define a lot of questions: who made the opening? When? Was it a happy guessed, the idea stolen from the opponent, or a remuneration for twenty-year-old hard work? Who paid the study? What religious or social environment contributed or prevented this development? All these questions arise in context discoveries.

Now consider the final intellectual product: hypothesis, a theory or opinion. Is it reasonable, is it confirmed by the facts, is it supported by the experiment, was it strictly inspected? These questions about O. confirmationor consistency. Philosophers take care of confirmation, logic, reason, consistency, methodology. From a professional point of view, the popper and carnap did not interest the historical circumstances of the discovery, psychological nuances, public interactions, economic environment. As Kun said, they used history only in chronological purposes or as a source of various examples suitable for illustrating their concepts. Since the presentation of the popper about science is more dynamically and dialectically, it is closer to the historicist KUN, which is the flat formalism of the works of Carnage on confirmation. But still, mostly philosophical systems of Karnap and Popper Aistoric: They consider science out of time, out of history.

Blur image

Before explaining why Kun away from his predecessors, we can easily compile a list of distinctions, just going on the grounds that were common to Popper and Carnap. Kun sticks next.

There is no sharp difference between observations and theory.

Science is not cumulative (that is, it does not carry a cumulative nature).

Real science does not have a strict deductive structure.

Real scientific concepts are not very accurate.

The methodological unity of science is a lie: there are many disparate funds used for studies of various types.

By themselves, science is disconnected. They consist of a large number of only partly intersecting small disciplines, whose representatives may not even understand each other. (Ironically, Bestseller Kun appeared in the series "Encyclopedia of Single Science".)