In 1933, Zinovy ​​Kolobanov was drafted into the ranks of the Red Army. In the "winter war", breaking through the positions of the White Finns, he burned three times in a tank. On March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was signed between the USSR and Finland, after which the fighters of both sides began to fraternize, for which the company commander Kolobanov was demoted to the reserve, stripped of his rank and awards. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Zinovy ​​Grigorievich was reinstated in the ranks of the Red Army.

On the night of August 8, 1941, the German Army Group North launched a swift offensive against Leningrad. On August 18, the commander of the 3rd tank company of the 1st tank regiment of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division, Senior Lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov, was summoned to the division commander, General V.I. Baranov. The division headquarters was then in Krasnogvardeysk (now Gatchina). Showing on the map three roads leading to Krasnogvardeysk from Luga, Volosovo and Kingisepp, the divisional commander ordered: “Block them and stand to the death!”

Get Started

On the same day, Kolobanov's company - five brand new KV-1 tanks built at the Kirov Plant - advanced towards the enemy. The KV-1 crew consisted of five people, the tank was armed with a 76 mm cannon and three machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber. The thickness of the turret and frontal armor of the hull was 75 mm. The 37mm German gun didn't even leave marks on his armor. Each car was loaded with two armor-piercing shells and a minimum of high-explosive fragmentation shells.
They conducted reconnaissance with the commanders of the vehicles, and it was ordered to create two shelters each: the main and the spare. Two tanks - lieutenant Sergeev and junior lieutenant Evdokimenko - Kolobanov sent to the Luga highway, two - under the command of Lieutenant Lastochkin and junior lieutenant Degtyar - to the road leading to Volosovo. Zinovy ​​Kolobanov himself set off on the road connecting the Tallinn Highway and the path to Marienburg.

In a combat position

Column of German tanks Pz.Kpfw III

The crew of the tank with tail number 864 consisted of commander senior lieutenant Kolobanov, gun commander senior sergeant Andrey Usov, senior driver foreman Nikolai Nikiforov, junior driver of the Red Army soldier Nikolai Rodenkov and gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Pavel Kiselkov. Kolobanov determined the location of his tank in such a way that the largest, well-visible section of the road was in the firing sector. He identified two landmarks: the first was two birch trees on the road to Marienburg, the second was the intersection with the road to Voiskovitsy. Around the position were haystacks and a small lake where ducks swam. There were marshy meadows on both sides of the road. It was necessary to prepare two positions: the main and the spare. On the main tank, it was necessary to bury a tower in the ground.
The crew worked all day. The ground was hard, and it was not easy to dig a caponier (a structure for flanking fire in two opposite directions) under such a colossus. By evening, both positions were ready. Everyone was terribly tired and hungry, except that the place for provisions in the tank was occupied by shells. Gunner-radio operator Pavel Kiselkov volunteered to run to the poultry farm for a goose. The brought goose was boiled in a tank bucket.
In the evening, a lieutenant approached Kolobanov and reported on the arrival of the infantry. Kolobanov ordered the outposts to be placed closer to the forest, away from the tank, so that they would not come under fire.

Judgment Day

The crew of the tank Kolobanov №864

On the morning of August 20, 1941, the crew was awakened by the roar of German bombers going to Leningrad. Calling the commander of the outpost, Kolobanov ordered him not to engage in battle until his gun spoke.
German tanks appeared in the Kolobanov sector only in the afternoon. These were Pz.Kpfw IIIs with 37mm guns from Major General Walter Kruger's 1st Panzer Division. It was hot, some of the Germans got out and sat on the armor, someone played the harmonica. They were sure that there was no ambush, but nevertheless, three reconnaissance motorcycles were launched in front of the column.
Quietly closing the hatches, the crew of the KV-1 froze. Kolobanov gave the order not to shoot at reconnaissance and prepare for battle. German motorcycles turned onto the road leading to Marienburg. Kolobanov ordered senior sergeant Kiselkov to report to the headquarters about the appearance of the German column, while he himself examined the Nazi tanks through the periscope: they walked at a reduced distance, substituting the left sides under the KV-1 gun. The disgruntled voice of the battalion commander Shpiller was heard in the headset, who asked why Kolobanov let the Germans through and did not shoot. There was no time to answer the commander. After all, the first tank in the column caught up with two birches, which were about 150 meters away. Kolobanov only managed to report that there were 22 tanks in the column.
“Landmark first, on the head, direct shot under the cross, armor-piercing - fire!” - ordered Kolobanov. The first tank was hit by an accurate hit and immediately caught fire. "On fire!" Usov shouted. The second shot knocked out the second German tank. Cars coming behind poked their noses into the stern of those in front, the column shrunk like a spring, and a traffic jam formed on the road.
To lock up the column, Kolobanov ordered to transfer fire to the rear tanks. The last car was about 800 meters away, so Usov failed to hit the target the first time: the projectile did not reach. Having corrected the sight, the senior sergeant hit the last two tanks with four shots. Since there were swampy meadows on both sides of the road, the enemy was trapped.

tank duel

From that moment on, Kolobanov began to fire at enemy tanks as if in a shooting range. The remaining 18 cars began to drive
random shooting at haystacks, mistaking them for camouflaged firing points, but then they nevertheless discovered the position of Kolobanov's tank, and then a real duel began. A flurry of armor-piercing shells hit the kaveshka. Fortunately, in addition to the standard armor, additional 25 mm screens were installed on the KV tower. The guys were suffocating from the smoke of gunpowder and deaf from the blows of the blanks on the tower.
Kolya Rodenkov at a frantic pace drove shells into the breech of the gun. Andrey Usov, not looking up from the sight, fired continuously at the Nazis. The Germans, realizing that they were in a trap, began to maneuver, but this only complicated their situation. KV-1 tirelessly continued to fire at the column. Tanks lit up like matches. Enemy shells did not cause significant harm to our car - the superiority of the KV-1 in armor affected.
German infantry units moving behind the column rolled out four PaK-38 anti-tank guns (AT guns) onto the road. And here high-explosive fragmentation shells came in handy.
"Direct under the shield, fragmentation - fire!" Kolobanov ordered. Andrei Usov managed to destroy the first calculation of the German anti-tank guns, but they managed to fire several shots, damaging Kolobanov's panoramic periscope with one. Under the cover of the combat guards that entered the battle, Nikolai Kiselkov climbed onto the armor and installed a spare periscope. After the second shot of the enemy cannon, the turret jammed, the tank lost the ability to maneuver the gun and turned into a self-propelled gun. Kolobanov ordered to leave the main position. KV-1 got out of the caponier in reverse and moved to a reserve position. Now all hope was on the driver Nikiforov, who, following Usov's orders, aimed the gun, maneuvering the hull.
All 22 tanks were on fire, ammunition was bursting inside them, the three remaining German anti-tank guns were blown into the air one after another. The column was broken. The tank duel lasted for more than an hour, and during this time Senior Sergeant Usov fired 98 shells at the enemy. Inspecting the armor of their tank, the KV-1 crew counted 156 hit marks.
Battalion commander Shpiller got in touch with Kolobanov: “Kolobanov, how are you doing there? Are they on fire? “They are on fire, comrade battalion commander. All 22 are on fire!”

Hero's feat

IN AND. Baranov, the commander of the 1st Panzer Division, which included Kolobanov's company, signed an order to present Zinovy ​​and the crew of his tank to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. From the headquarters came the answer: “What are you? He just got out of prison. He discredited our army on the Finnish front." At the headquarters of the Leningrad Front, the awards were reduced. Kolobanov received the Order of the Red Banner. Gun commander senior sergeant A.M. Usov was awarded the Order of Lenin, foreman N.I. Nikiforov - Order of the Red Banner, Senior Sergeant P.I. Kiselkov - medal "For Courage".
The feat of a simple Russian guy from the Vladimir province remained in Russian history for centuries. A year after this battle, Zinovy ​​​​Kolobanov was seriously wounded, during the war he lost contact with his family. Only after the war, thanks to a radio broadcast in which information about the missing was announced, did he find his wife and son, whose birth he did not know.

"Tiger" against the IS, the German tank school against the Soviet, these tanks were the face and pride of their powers, they were feared and therefore respected. There were legends about them. Many pages have been written about them in electronic and printed resources of different periods. However, an objective comparison of this technique is quite rare.

This was prevented by many factors, ranging from incompetence to fanaticism. Here we will try to most objectively evaluate these machines, their comparison (if possible, of course), combat use and pay attention to the most frequent and gross mistakes of the so-called "specialists".

Being consistent in historical events, let's start with the PzVI "Tiger".

The Tiger tank was created in an effort by the German command to regain the lost advantage in tank strength, taken away by the Soviet T-34 and KV-1. It was also planned to use the tank to push through the enemy's defenses.

Here it is necessary to note the difference between the German and Soviet commands in the vision of the role of tank troops in the battle and, accordingly, the tactics of their use and the requirements for their capabilities. The Soviet command considered tanks as an element of infantry support and a means of achieving superiority over the enemy in a particular area. This idea of ​​the role of tanks prevailed all over the world. As a result, the tank brigade, whose tasks were of a local nature, was the largest tank formation. The German command, represented by the ancestor of the German tank forces, Heinz Guderian, in view of the relatively small number of tanks, as well as the small number of new-design tanks in them, relied on the "tank fist". Thus, under the lightning strikes of entire tank armies concentrated in one place, France fell in a month.

Thus, the place of the Tiger tanks was in the center of the wedge advanced forward. The task is to destroy the most dangerous enemy and break through the defense thanks to excellent armor and weapons. Ensuring the safety of the relatively vulnerable sides of the tank was to be carried out by lighter vehicles of the Pz III and PzIV types. With the retreat, the "Tigers" were used in groups of up to 10 tanks and were deployed for pinpoint elimination of threats along the entire front.

Transmission location.

due to the front transmission, the tank had a spacious fighting compartment, which had a positive effect on increasing the ammunition load and reloading speed of the gun, and also provided more comfort to the driver. But, with the advent of more powerful Soviet guns, there was a risk of damaging the transmission with a shot in the forehead. However, not a single case of its ignition was recorded. Also, the latest equipment made it possible to drive a 60-ton machine without effort and skills, like an ordinary car.

Chess pendant.

The staggered arrangement of the suspension, due to the larger area of ​​​​contact with the ground, made it possible to withstand a lot of weight, and also provided a phenomenal smooth ride, which made it possible to successfully shoot on the move - only German tanks could boast of this; however, they had to pay with unreliability and rapid wear of structural elements, which was extremely destructive in battle.

Electric turret traverse.

The electrical control of the turret rotation allowed the gunner to work with pinpoint accuracy, but due to the complexity and weight of the structure, the rotation was slow.

Optical devices.

High-quality optics allowed the "Tiger" with a high probability to hit a standing target from 3200 meters, and a moving target from 1200 meters.

Tool.

The power of the gun, created on the basis of an 88 mm anti-aircraft gun, with a high rate of fire (6-8 rounds / min) allowed the tank to confidently hit the most armored enemy targets of that period from 2,500 meters, penetrating armor 132 mm thick from 1,000 meters at an angle of 90 degrees. On the move and on moving targets, the tank had a good chance to hit from 1200 meters.

Design.

The design did not imply rational angles of inclination. This was due both to the layout of the tank and the lack of need - 100-mm frontal armor at that time perfectly held the blow of any anti-tank gun from less than 200 meters. However, with the use of an inclined scheme, it would be possible to significantly reduce the weight of the tank. The problem of insufficient engine power for such a weight (700 hp), overloaded chassis of the Tiger and, as a result, its relatively low maneuverability and high wear of parts is a well-known problem.

Consider the IS tank.

The Soviet heavy tank IS was a profound modernization of the KV-1 tank in accordance with the changing conditions and, accordingly, the requirements for the capabilities of tanks and their priority. Therefore, unlike the KV, the IS, created during the years of the offensive, had better maneuverability, and its 122-mm gun, depending on the type of projectile, was designed to fight both long-term fortified points (bunkers) and enemy tanks of the "Tiger" type and "Panther". By the way, the 122-mm gun coped with the destruction of pillboxes much better than the 88-mm German gun. Again, thanks to the fact that it had a direct purpose, unlike the German anti-aircraft guns.

The design of the tank was a classic Soviet layout with a rear transmission and engine compartment. Accordingly, the tank turret was moved forward, which made it possible to have a better vertical aiming angle than the German tanks. Also, in comparison with the tanks of the beginning of the war, the IS was also distinguished by relatively higher quality optical devices. As for the gun, turret and hull of the tank, it would be advisable to divide it into early (IS-85), medium (IS-122) and late (IS-2) tanks. The IS-85 featured a staggered forehead hull similar to the KV-1, as well as a smaller turret and an 85mm gun mounted on the T-34-85. Later, based on reports on the combat use of IS tanks and the results, the armor protection of the tank and its firepower were found to be insufficient. A new, larger turret was developed for the 122-mm D-25 (IS-122) gun, created on the basis of the A-19 heavy artillery gun. However, the problem of improving the frontal armor of the tank was solved later, when a tank was created with straightened frontal armor like the T-34.

Appearing at the time of the offensive of the Soviet troops, the IS tank was used in tank formations, playing the role of a heavy breakthrough tank. Guards formations of IS tanks were created, however, these tanks were used by groups extremely rarely. Basically, the tank unit, in addition to the total mass of the T-34, T-34-85 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, had only 2-3 IS tanks to solve the most difficult tasks.

It's hard to believe, but the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht fought for 48 hours with a single Soviet tank KV-1 ("Klim Voroshilov").

This episode is described in detail in the memoirs of Colonel Erhard Raus, whose group tried to destroy a Soviet tank. A fifty-ton KV-1 shot and crushed with its caterpillars a convoy of 12 trucks with supplies, which was going to the Germans from the captured city of Raiseniai. Then, with aimed shots, he destroyed an artillery battery. The Germans, of course, returned fire, but to no avail. The shells of anti-tank guns did not even leave dents on his armor - the Germans struck by this later gave the KV-1 tanks the nickname "Ghost". Yes, guns - even 150-mm howitzers could not penetrate the KV-1 armor. True, Routh's soldiers managed to immobilize the tank by exploding a projectile under its caterpillar.

But "Klim Voroshilov" was not going to leave anywhere. He took a strategic position on the only road leading to Raiseniai and delayed the division's advance for two days (the Germans could not bypass it, because the road passed through swamps where army trucks and light tanks got stuck).

Finally, by the end of the second day of the battle, Routh managed to shoot the tank from anti-aircraft guns. But, when his soldiers cautiously approached the steel monster, the tank turret suddenly turned in their direction - apparently, the crew was still alive. Only a grenade thrown into the hatch of the tank put an end to this incredible battle...

Here is what Erhard Raus himself writes about this:
“Nothing important happened in our sector. The troops improved their positions, conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Siluva and on the east coast of Dubyssa in both directions, but mainly tried to find out what was happening on the south coast. We met only small units and individual soldiers. During this time we made contact with Kampfgruppe von Seckendorf and 1st Panzer at Lidavenai.In clearing the wooded area west of the bridgehead, our infantry encountered a larger force of Russians who were still holding out in two places on the west bank of the river. Dubissa.

In violation of accepted rules, several prisoners captured in recent battles, including one lieutenant of the Red Army, were sent to the rear on a truck guarded by only one non-commissioned officer. Halfway back to Raseinai, the driver suddenly saw an enemy tank on the road and stopped. At this moment, the Russian prisoners (and there were about 20 of them) suddenly attacked the driver and the escort. The non-commissioned officer was sitting next to the driver facing the prisoners when they tried to snatch the weapons from both of them. The Russian lieutenant had already grabbed the non-commissioned officer's machine gun, but he managed to free one hand and hit the Russian with all his might, throwing him back. The lieutenant collapsed and took a few more people with him. Before the prisoners could again rush at the non-commissioned officer, he freed his left hand, although he was held by three. Now he was completely free. With lightning speed, he tore the machine gun from his shoulder and fired a burst at the rebellious crowd. The effect was terrible. Only a few prisoners, not counting the wounded officer, managed to jump out of the car to hide in the forest. The car, in which there were no living prisoners, quickly turned around and rushed back to the bridgehead, although the tank fired at it.

This little drama was the first sign that the only road leading to our bridgehead was blocked by the KV-1 super-heavy tank. The Russian tank, in addition, managed to destroy the telephone wires connecting us with the division headquarters. Although the intentions of the enemy remained unclear, we began to fear an attack from the rear. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Wengenrot's 3rd Battery of the 41st Tank Destroyer Battalion to take up position in the rear near the flat top of a hill close to the 6th Motorized Brigade's command post, which also served as the command post for the entire battle group. In order to strengthen our anti-tank defenses, I had to turn 180 degrees to a nearby battery of 150-mm howitzers. The 3rd company of Lieutenant Gebhardt from the 57th sapper tank battalion received an order to mine the road and its surroundings. The tanks assigned to us (half of Major Shenk's 65th tank battalion) were located in the forest. They were ordered to be ready to counter-attack as soon as it was needed.

Time passed, but the enemy tank blocking the road did not move, although from time to time it fired in the direction of Raseinaya. At noon on June 24, the scouts returned, whom I sent to clarify the situation. They reported that, apart from this tank, they did not find any troops or equipment that could attack us. The officer in charge of this unit made the logical conclusion that this was a lone tank from the detachment that attacked the von Seckendorf battle group.

Although the danger of attack had dissipated, measures should have been taken to quickly destroy this dangerous obstacle, or at least drive the Russian tank away. With his fire, he has already set fire to 12 trucks with supplies that were coming towards us from Raseinaj. We could not evacuate the wounded in the battles for the bridgehead, and as a result, several people died without receiving medical care, including a young lieutenant who was wounded by a shot at point-blank range. If we could take them out, they would be saved. All attempts to bypass this tank were unsuccessful. The vehicles either got stuck in the mud or collided with scattered Russian units still wandering through the forest.
So I ordered Lieutenant Wengenrot's battery. recently received 50-mm anti-tank guns, make your way through the forest, approach the tank at an effective shooting distance and destroy it. The battery commander and his brave soldiers happily accepted this dangerous task and set to work with full confidence that it would not drag on for too long. From the command post at the top of the hill, we watched them as they carefully made their way through the trees from one hollow to another. We were not alone. Dozens of soldiers climbed onto the roofs and climbed the trees with intense attention, waiting for how the idea would end. We saw how the first gun came within 1,000 meters of a tank that was sticking out right in the middle of the road. Apparently, the Russians did not notice the threat. The second gun disappeared from view for some time, and then emerged from the ravine right in front of the tank and took up a well-camouflaged position. Another 30 minutes passed, and the last two guns also went to their original positions.

We watched what was happening from the top of the hill. Suddenly, someone suggested that the tank was damaged and abandoned by the crew, as it stood completely still on the road, representing an ideal target. (You can imagine the disappointment of our comrades, who, sweating for several hours, dragged the cannons to firing positions, if that were the case.) Suddenly, the first of our anti-tank guns rang out, a flash blinked, and the silvery track ran right into the tank. The distance did not exceed 600 meters. A ball of fire flashed, there was a jerky crack. Direct hit! Then came the second and third hits.

The officers and soldiers shouted with joy, like spectators at a merry spectacle. “Got it! Bravo! Done with the tank! The tank did not react in any way until our guns scored 8 hits. Then its turret turned around, carefully found its target and began methodically destroying our guns with single shots of 80-mm guns. Two of our 50 mm guns were blown to pieces, the other two were seriously damaged. The personnel lost several people killed and wounded. Lieutenant Wengenrot led the survivors back to avoid unnecessary losses. Only after nightfall did he manage to pull out the cannons. The Russian tank was still tightly blocking the road, so we were literally paralyzed. Deeply shocked, Lieutenant Wengenrot returned to the bridgehead with his soldiers. The newly obtained weapon, which he implicitly trusted, was completely helpless against the monstrous tank. A feeling of deep disappointment swept over our entire battle group.

It was necessary to find some new way to master the situation.
It was clear that of all our weapons, only 88 mm anti-aircraft guns with their heavy armor-piercing shells could cope with the destruction of the steel giant. In the afternoon, one such gun was withdrawn from the battle near Raseinay and began to crawl cautiously towards the tank from the south. The KV-1 was still deployed to the north, since it was from this direction that the previous attack had been carried out. The long-barreled anti-aircraft gun approached to a distance of 2000 yards, from which it was already possible to achieve satisfactory results. Unfortunately, the trucks that the monstrous tank had previously destroyed were still burning along the sides of the road, and their smoke prevented the gunners from aiming. But, on the other hand, the same smoke turned into a curtain, under the cover of which the gun could be pulled even closer to the target. Having tied a lot of branches to the gun for better camouflage, the gunners slowly rolled it forward, trying not to disturb the tank.

Finally, the crew got to the edge of the forest, from where visibility was excellent. The distance to the tank now did not exceed 500 meters. We thought that the very first shot would give a direct hit and would certainly destroy the tank that was interfering with us. The calculation began to prepare the gun for firing.
Although the tank had not moved since the battle with the anti-tank battery, it turned out that its crew and commander had iron nerves. They coolly followed the approach of the anti-aircraft gun, without interfering with it, since as long as the gun was moving, it did not pose any threat to the tank. In addition, the closer the anti-aircraft gun is, the easier it will be to destroy it. The critical moment in the duel of nerves arrived when the crew began to prepare the anti-aircraft gun for firing. It is time for the tank crew to act. While the gunners, terribly nervous, aimed and loaded the gun, the tank turned the turret and fired first! Each projectile hit the target. A heavily damaged anti-aircraft gun fell into a ditch, several crew members died, and the rest were forced to flee. The tank's machine-gun fire prevented the cannon from being taken out and the dead picked up.

The failure of this attempt, on which great hopes were placed, was very unpleasant news for us. The optimism of the soldiers died along with the 88-mm gun. Our soldiers did not have the best day, chewing canned food, since it was impossible to bring hot food.
However, the biggest fears disappeared, at least for a while. The Russian attack on Raseinai was repulsed by the von Seckendorf battle group, which managed to hold Hill 106. Now there was no longer any fear that the Soviet 2nd Panzer Division would break through to our rear and cut us off. All that remained was a painful thorn in the form of a tank blocking our only supply route. We decided that if we could not cope with him during the day, then at night we would do it. The brigade headquarters discussed various options for destroying the tank for several hours, and preparations began for several of them at once.

Our sappers proposed on the night of June 24/25 to simply blow up the tank. It should be said that the sappers, not without malicious satisfaction, followed the unsuccessful attempts of the gunners to destroy the enemy. Now it was their turn to try their luck. When Lieutenant Gebhardt called for 12 volunteers, all 12 people raised their hands in unison. In order not to offend the rest, every tenth was chosen. These 12 lucky ones were looking forward to the approach of night. Lieutenant Gebhardt, who intended to personally command the operation, familiarized all the sappers in detail with the general plan of the operation and the personal task of each of them individually. After dark, the lieutenant at the head of a small column set off. The road ran east of Hill 123, across a small sandy patch to a line of trees where the tank was found, and then through sparse woods to the old staging area.

The pale light of the stars twinkling in the sky was enough to outline the outlines of the nearby trees, the road, and the tank. Trying not to make any noise so as not to give themselves away, the soldiers, who took off their shoes, got out to the side of the road and began to examine the tank at close range in order to outline the most convenient path. The Russian giant stood in the same place, his tower froze. Silence and peace reigned everywhere, only occasionally a flash flickered in the air, followed by a dull rumble. Occasionally an enemy shell hissed past and exploded near the crossroads north of Raseinaya. These were the last echoes of the heavy fighting that had been going on in the south all day. By midnight, artillery fire from both sides finally stopped.

Suddenly, in the forest on the other side of the road, there was a crash and footsteps. Ghostlike figures rushed towards the tank, shouting something as they ran. Is it the crew? Then there were blows on the tower, with a clang the hatch was thrown back and someone got out. Judging by the muffled chime, it was food. The scouts immediately reported this to Lieutenant Gebhardt, who began to be annoyed with questions: “Maybe rush at them and capture them? They appear to be civilians." The temptation was great, because it seemed very easy to do. However, the tank crew remained in the turret and stayed awake. Such an attack would alarm the tankers and could jeopardize the success of the entire operation. Lieutenant Gebhardt reluctantly rejected the offer. As a result, the sappers had to wait another hour for the civilians (or were they partisans?) to leave.

During this time, a thorough reconnaissance of the area was carried out. At 0100, the sappers began to act, as the tank crew fell asleep in the tower, unaware of the danger. After demolition charges were installed on the caterpillar and thick side armor, the sappers set fire to the fuse and fled. A few seconds later, a booming explosion broke the silence of the night. The task was completed, and the sappers decided that they had achieved a decisive success. However, before the echo of the explosion died out among the trees, the tank machine gun came to life, and bullets whistled around. The tank itself did not move. Probably, his caterpillar was killed, but it was not possible to find out, since the machine gun fired furiously all around. Lieutenant Gebhardt and his patrol returned to the bridgehead visibly depressed. Now they were no longer sure of success, moreover, it turned out that one person was missing. Attempts to find him in the dark led nowhere.

Shortly before dawn, we heard a second, weaker explosion somewhere near the tank, for which we could not find the cause. The tank machine gun came to life again and for several minutes poured lead all around. Then there was silence again.
Soon after that it began to get light. The rays of the morning sun dyed the forests and fields with gold. Thousands of dewdrops sparkled like diamonds on the grass and flowers, the early birds sang. The soldiers began to stretch and blink sleepily as they rose to their feet. A new day began.
The sun had not yet risen high when a barefoot soldier, slung his boots over his shoulder, strode past the brigade's command post. To his misfortune, it was I, the commander of the brigade, who first noticed him, and rudely called him to me. When the frightened traveler drew himself up before me, I demanded in intelligible language an explanation of his morning walk in such a strange way. Is he a follower of Father Kneipp? If yes, then this is not the place to demonstrate your hobbies. (Papa Kneipp created a back to nature society in the 19th century and preached physical health, cold baths, outdoor sleeping, and the like.)

Very frightened, the lone wanderer began to get confused and bleat indistinctly. Every word from this silent violator had to be pulled out literally with tongs. However, with each of his answers, my face brightened. Finally I patted him on the shoulder with a smile and shook his hand gratefully. To an outside observer who did not hear what was being said, such a development of events might seem extremely strange. What could a barefoot guy say that the attitude towards him changed so rapidly? I could not satisfy this curiosity until the order was given for the brigade for the current day with the report of the young sapper.

“I listened to the sentries and lay in a ditch next to a Russian tank. When everything was ready, together with the company commander, I hung a demolition charge, which was twice as heavy as the instruction required, to the tank track and lit the fuse. Since the ditch was deep enough to provide cover from shrapnel, I awaited the results of the explosion. However, after the explosion, the tank continued to shower the edge of the forest and the ditch with bullets. More than an hour passed before the enemy calmed down. Then I got close to the tank and examined the caterpillar in the place where the charge was installed. No more than half of its width was destroyed. I didn't notice any other damage.
When I returned to the rally point of the sabotage group, it had already left. While looking for my boots, which I had left there, I discovered another forgotten demolition charge. I took it and returned to the tank, climbed on the hull and hung the charge from the muzzle of the gun in the hope of damaging it. The charge was too small to cause serious damage to the machine itself. I crawled under the tank and blew it up.
After the explosion, the tank immediately fired at the edge of the forest and the ditch with a machine gun. The shooting did not stop until dawn, only then I managed to crawl out from under the tank. I sadly discovered that my charge was still too low. When I got to the collection point, I tried to put on my boots, but found that they were too small and not my pair at all. One of my comrades put mine on by mistake. As a result, I had to return barefoot, and I was late.”

It was the true story of a brave man. However, despite his efforts, the tank continued to block the road, firing at any moving object it saw. The fourth decision, which was born on the morning of June 25, was to call in Ju-87 dive bombers to destroy the tank. However, we were refused, because planes were required literally everywhere. But even if they were found, it is unlikely that the dive bombers would be able to destroy the tank with a direct hit. We were sure that fragments of close gaps would not frighten the crew of the steel giant.
But now this damned tank had to be destroyed at all costs. The fighting power of our bridgehead garrison will be seriously undermined if the road cannot be opened. The division will not be able to fulfill the task assigned to it. Therefore, I decided to use the last means left to us, although this plan could lead to heavy losses in men, tanks and equipment, but it did not promise guaranteed success. However, my intentions were to mislead the enemy and help keep our losses to a minimum. We intended to distract the attention of the KV-1 with a feint attack from Major Shenk's tanks and bring the 88mm guns closer to destroy the terrible monster. The terrain around the Russian tank contributed to this. There it was possible to stealthily sneak up on the tank and set up observation posts in the wooded area of ​​the eastern road. Since the forest was rather sparse, our nimble PzKw-35t could move freely in all directions.

Soon the 65th tank battalion arrived and began firing at the Russian tank from three sides. The crew of the KV-1 began to noticeably get nervous. The tower spun from side to side, trying to catch the impudent German tanks on sight. The Russians fired at targets darting through the trees, but they were always late. The German tank appeared, but literally disappeared at the same moment. The crew of the KV-1 tank was confident in the strength of its armor, which resembled an elephant skin and reflected all projectiles, but the Russians wanted to destroy the enemies that vexed them, at the same time continuing to block the road.

Fortunately for us, the Russians were seized with excitement, and they stopped watching their rear, from where misfortune was approaching them. The anti-aircraft gun took up a position near the place where one of the same had already been destroyed the day before. Its formidable barrel aimed at the tank, and the first shot rang out. The wounded KV-1 tried to turn the turret back, but the anti-aircraft gunners managed to fire 2 more shots during this time. The turret stopped rotating, but the tank did not catch fire, although we expected it to. Although the enemy no longer reacted to our fire, after two days of failure we could not believe in success. 4 more shots were fired with armor-piercing shells from an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which ripped open the monster's skin. Its gun rose up helplessly, but the tank continued to stand on the road, which was no longer blocked.

Witnesses of this deadly duel wanted to get closer to check the results of their shooting. To their great amazement, they found that only 2 shells penetrated the armor, while the remaining 5 88-mm shells only made deep gouges in it. We also found 8 blue circles marking where 50mm shells hit. The result of the sappers' sortie was serious damage to the caterpillar and a shallow dent in the gun barrel. On the other hand, we did not find any traces of hits from 37-mm guns and PzKW-35t tanks. Driven by curiosity, our "Davids" climbed onto the fallen "Goliath" in a vain attempt to open the tower hatch. Despite his best efforts, his lid did not budge.

Suddenly, the barrel of the gun began to move, and our soldiers rushed away in horror. Only one of the sappers retained his composure and quickly pushed a hand grenade into the hole made by the projectile in the lower part of the tower. There was a dull explosion, and the manhole cover flew off to the side. Inside the tank lay the bodies of the brave crew, who until then had received only wounds. Deeply shocked by this heroism, we buried them with full military honors. They fought to the last breath, but it was only one small drama of the great war.
After the only heavy tank blocked the road for 2 days, it began to act. Our trucks delivered to the bridgehead the supplies needed for the subsequent offensive."

PzKw-35-t

The 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was part of the 41st Panzer Corps. Together with the 56th Panzer Corps, he was the 4th Panzer Group - the main striking force of Army Group North, whose task was to capture the Baltic states, capture Leningrad and connect with the Finns. The 6th Division was commanded by Major General Franz Landgraf. It was armed mainly with Czechoslovak-made PzKw-35t tanks - light, with thin armor, but with high maneuverability and maneuverability. There were a number of more powerful PzKw-IIIs and PzKw-IVs. Before the start of the offensive, the division was divided into two tactical groups. The more powerful was commanded by Colonel Erhard Raus, the weaker by Lieutenant Colonel Erich von Seckendorf.

In the first two days of the war, the offensive of the division was successful. By the evening of June 23, the division captured the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai and crossed the Dubyssa River. The tasks assigned to the division were completed, but the Germans, who already had experience of campaigns in the west, were unpleasantly struck by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops. One of Routh's units came under fire from snipers positioned in the fruit trees in the meadow. Snipers killed several German officers, delayed the advance of the German units for almost an hour, preventing them from quickly encircling the Soviet units. The snipers were obviously doomed because they were inside the location of the German troops. But they completed the task to the end. In the west, the Germans did not meet anything like this.

How the only KV-1 ended up in the rear of the Routh group on the morning of June 24 is not clear. It's possible that he just got lost. However, in the end, the tank blocked the only road leading from the rear to the positions of the group.

This episode was described not by full-time communist propagandists, but by Erhard Raus himself. Raus then won the entire war on the Eastern Front, passing through Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and finished it as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and with the rank of colonel general. Of the 427 pages of his memoirs, which directly describe the fighting, 12 are devoted to a two-day battle with the only Russian tank at Raseiniai. Routh was clearly shaken by this tank. Therefore, there is no reason for distrust. Soviet historiography ignored this episode. Moreover, since for the first time in the domestic press he was mentioned by Suvorov-Rezun, some "patriots" began to "expose" the feat. In the sense - this is not a feat, but so-so.

The KV, with a crew of 4, "exchanged" itself for 12 trucks, 4 anti-tank guns, 1 anti-aircraft gun, possibly for several tanks, as well as several dozen Germans killed and died from wounds. This in itself is an outstanding result, given the fact that until 1945, in the vast majority of even victorious battles, our losses were higher than German ones. But these are only direct losses of the Germans. Indirect - losses of the Seckendorf group, which, reflecting the Soviet strike, could not receive help from the Raus group.

Accordingly, for the same reason, the losses of our 2nd Panzer Division were less than if Raus had supported Seckendorf.

However, perhaps more important than the direct and indirect losses of people and equipment was the loss of time by the Germans. On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht had only 17 tank divisions on the entire Eastern Front, including 4 tank divisions in the 4th Panzer Group. One of them was held by KV alone. Moreover, on June 25, the 6th division could not advance solely because of the presence of a single tank in its rear. One day of delay for one division is a lot in conditions when the German tank groups were advancing at a high pace, tearing apart the defenses of the Red Army and setting up a lot of "boilers" for it. After all, the Wehrmacht actually completed the task set by Barbarossa, almost completely destroying the Red Army that opposed it in the summer of 1941. But due to such "incidents" as an unforeseen tank on the road, he did it much more slowly and with much greater losses than planned. And in the end he ran into the impenetrable mud of the Russian autumn, the deadly frosts of the Russian winter and the Siberian divisions near Moscow. After that, the war turned into a hopeless protracted stage for the Germans.

And yet the most surprising thing in this battle is the behavior of four tankers, whose names we do not know and will never know. They created more problems for the Germans than the entire 2nd Panzer Division, to which, apparently, the KV belonged. If the division delayed the German offensive for one day, then the only tank - for two. No wonder Raus had to take away anti-aircraft guns from Seckendorf, although, it would seem, it should have been the other way around.

It is almost impossible to assume that the tankers had a special task to block the only supply route for the Routh group. Intelligence at that moment was simply absent. So the tank ended up on the road by accident. The tank commander himself realized what an important position he had taken. And deliberately began to hold her. It is unlikely that the tank standing in one place can be interpreted as a lack of initiative, the crew acted too skillfully. On the contrary, standing was the initiative.

To sit without getting out in a cramped iron box for two days, and in the June heat, is torture in itself. If this box is also surrounded by an enemy whose goal is to destroy the tank along with the crew (in addition, the tank is not one of the enemy’s targets, as in a “normal” battle, but the only target), for the crew this is already an absolutely incredible physical and psychological stress. And almost all this time the tankers spent not in battle, but in anticipation of the battle, which is morally incomparably harder.

All five combat episodes - the destruction of a convoy of trucks, the destruction of an anti-tank battery, the destruction of anti-aircraft guns, firing at sappers, the last battle with tanks - in total they hardly even took an hour. The rest of the time, the KV crew wondered from which side and in what form they would be destroyed next time. The battle with anti-aircraft guns is especially indicative. The tankers deliberately hesitated until the Germans set up the cannon and began to prepare for firing - in order to shoot for sure and finish the job with one shell. Try to at least roughly imagine such an expectation.

Moreover, if on the first day the crew of the KV could still hope for the arrival of their own, then on the second, when their own did not come and even the noise of the battle near Raseinaya subsided, it became clearer than clear: the iron box in which they are fried for the second day will soon enough turn into their common coffin. They took it for granted and continued to fight.

The fact remains that one tank held back the advance of the Raus combat group. And if someone thinks that only containment of the tank group is a feat, no less, then is the opposition to the "Raus" group really not such a feat ??

Before answering this question, I will give you the composition of the Raus battle group:
II Panzer Regiment
I/4th Motorized Regiment
II/76th Artillery Regiment
company of the 57th tank sapper battalion
company of the 41st Tank Destroyer Battalion
Battery II / 411th Anti-Aircraft Regiment
6th motorcycle battalion.

against 4 people.

When, in the morning hours of June 22, 1941, the German army launched the Barbarossa plan - an attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet troops were taken by surprise. And although the Red Army was armed with a large number of types armored vehicles, which were completely unknown to the Germans, however, this technical superiority could not compensate for the catastrophic tactical errors of the army command. An unexpected fact for the Wehrmacht was not only the large number of Soviet tanks that the German troops had to face, but also their high fighting qualities, especially tanks of the latest designs.

Although produced in limited quantities, literally in the last months before the German attack, the new types of Soviet tanks - the T-34 and KV, were a very serious opponent. Even before the start of Operation Barbarossa, their number and combat characteristics, and in some cases even their very existence, were not discovered by the German military intelligence services.

Tank KV-2 captured by the Germans

About what's new soviet tanks, including the KV-2, turned out to be a surprise for the German command, for example, an entry in the diary of Colonel General Franz Halder, who wrote on June 24, 1941:

"New Russian heavy tanks have appeared on the front of the Army Group North, which are armed, most likely, with an 80 mm caliber gun, or even a 150 mm caliber, which, however, is unlikely."

But the very next day, when new updated reports arrived, Halder was forced to agree with reality. He wrote:

“Scattered information is being received about new Russian tanks: weight 52 tons, forehead armor 37 cm (?), sides 8 cm, armament with a 152 mm cannon and three machine guns, crew of 5 people, speed 30 km / h, cruising range 100 km. Capabilities for fighting: 50mm cannons pierce the armor under the turret, 88mm cannons probably also pierce the side armor (not known for sure)."

An excellent example of this complete ignorance is the conversation that took place in early August 1941 between Adolf Hitler and the commander of the Panzergruppe 2, General Guderian:

Hitler: "If I knew that the data on the number of Russian tanks given in your book ( Guderian "Achtung Panzer", 1937) were true, I think I (perhaps) would never have started this war."

Guderian in his book estimated the number of Soviet tanks at 10,000 pieces, which caused a sharp reaction from the German censors. However, it turned out that Guderian's estimates were even too low. On August 6, 1941, the command of the German army officially announced that the total number of destroyed Soviet tanks was 13,145. This figure seems to correspond to reality, given that between 1933 and 1941 more than 30,000 armored vehicles of all types (including armored cars) were built in the USSR. Approximately 20,000 of this number were light tanks, while the number of heavy tanks was only 1,800, including the latest types. This number seems relatively small compared to the production of tanks in the USSR (for example, T-26 light tanks), but compared to the tank fleet of other European armies, it is quite significant.

Sufficiently recent Russian sources provide the following data on the composition of the Red Army on June 1, 1941:

• personnel - 5,224,066;
• field artillery - 48,647;
• mortars - 53,117;
• anti-aircraft guns - 8,680;
• tanks and other armored vehicles - 25,932;
• trucks - 193,218;
• tractors and tractors - 42,931;
• horses - 498,493.

The German high command quickly realized the danger of the situation. The fight against the new T-34 and KB tanks required enormous efforts and led to heavy losses. Therefore, just a month after the outbreak of hostilities, an army information sheet "D 343 Merkblatt fur die Bekampfung der russischen Panzerkampfwagen" was issued to instruct German soldiers on methods of dealing with Soviet tanks. We can say that it was a symbol of the shock of the collision with the T-34 and KV. By the way, it is interesting that when faced with the KV-2 tanks, the Germans at first believed that tank KV-2 model 1939 is a later version of the machine, and accordingly assigned it the KW-IIB index, i.e. an improved version compared to the 1940 model, which received the KW-IIA index.

Despite the fact that most of the KV-2 tanks were lost not in battle, but due to mechanical failures, as a result of which they had to be abandoned due to the impossibility of repair and restoration, the German advance was significantly slowed down. Sometimes only one single KV-2, which occupied a key position on the front line and was supported by infantry, was able to stop the enemy advance. The powerful armor of this tank and the weakness of the German anti-tank weapons of that time made it possible to detain even large units for many hours or even days. Some KV-2s withstood up to 20 direct hits before they could be destroyed by 88 mm anti-aircraft guns acting as anti-tank guns or calling in Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers to attack.

Another way to fight the "Russischer Koloss" was to attack the infantry and conduct close combat, which usually involved heavy losses. Heavy field artillery could also play a role in solving the "Problem of the KV-2". However, only the 10 cm Kanone 18, lFH 10.5cm and sFH 15cm carried a limited number of direct fire anti-tank rounds. Other field guns had to rely mainly on luck in trying to achieve a direct hit when firing KV-2s along ballistic trajectories.

The main German tanks of that period, which were at the forefront of the offensive, were rarely used to combat the KV-2. They were too poorly armed to deal effectively with a Soviet heavy tank:

• PzKpfW III had a 3.7 cm KWK gun;
• PzKpfW III - 5 cm KWK L/42;
• PzKpfW IV -7.5 cm KWK L/24;
• PzKpfW 38 (t) - 3.7 cm;
• PzKpfW 35 (t) - 3.7 cm.

Despite the fact that the number of KV-2 tanks in the first months of hostilities remained relatively small and many of them were lost without effort on the part of the enemy, in a technical aspect, its influence can hardly be overestimated. The result of the "T-34, KW Shock" for the Wehrmacht was the adoption of much better armed and armored tanks PzKpfW VI "Tiger" in 1942 and PzKpfW V "Panther" in 1943.

KV-2 training models for training Wehrmacht soldiers

After the Wehrmacht faced medium and heavy Soviet tanks already in the first days of the Barbarossa plan, the German command took urgent measures to effectively prepare its troops to fight this unexpected new enemy. In the German infantry and panzergrenadier units, a new training program was quickly adopted, adequate to the current situation. Using a large number of different models for training soldiers since the early 1930s, German units in this case also built their own wooden models of Soviet tanks on a 1: 1 scale.

Often they were extremely detailed and accurately executed. The high level and good quality of mock-up work made it possible to create models of a combat vehicle corresponding to a real tank, not only in size, but also to reproduce on it various angles of inclination of armor protection sheets, for training in the use of magnetic anti-tank mines, handrails and steps for climbing onto a tank, the location of hatches and viewing devices, firing angles, not only the main armament, but also machine guns. Training models of tanks were often mounted on four-wheeled chassis so that they could simulate their movement at the real speed of the tanks. While most of these training layouts were built to mimic the average Soviet tank T-34, some other much less common types of armored vehicles were also reproduced. Currently, only one wooden KB-2 can be documented.

Capabilities of German anti-tank guns in the fight against the KV-2

The armament and tactics of the German Wehrmacht in 1939 fully corresponded to the tactics adopted by the German command of extremely mobile operations of troops during the "Blitzkrieg". Particular attention was paid to rapid breakthroughs over considerable distances, bypassing enemy nodes of resistance. Despite the available information that the enemy, in particular the French armed forces, had heavy tanks of the Char B1 type, the German command believed that their use in battle would be compensated by the tactical advantages gained through the close interaction of the ground forces with the Luftwaffe units.

At the same time, special hopes were placed on the Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers, which were supposed to provide direct support to the advancing troops. In accordance with these provisions, the anti-tank units of the Wehrmacht were armed mainly with two types of anti-tank guns: a 3.7 cm PAK 35/36 gun in 37 mm caliber and a 5 cm PAK 38 gun in 50 mm caliber.

The 50 mm RAK 38 L/60 anti-tank gun entered service with the Wehrmacht at the end of 1940 to replace the 37 mm anti-tank gun.

On June 22, 1941, with the start of Operation Barbarossa, the situation on the front line changed significantly for German soldiers. Firstly, the number of Soviet tanks that took part in the hostilities turned out to be significantly larger than expected, and secondly, the new T-34 and KB tanks were well armored. In order to effectively fight against these unexpected enemies, the crews of anti-tank 37 mm and 50 mm guns, due to their weak armor penetration, had to let Soviet tanks into close range - up to 30 meters. Such tactics were possible, but extremely dangerous and led to heavy losses.

Schemes for effective fire on the KV-2 from the 88 mm L/56 tank gun. 1942 instruction sheet for German tank crews "Tigers" referring to 1942.

An even more difficult opponent was the KV-2, with its armor reaching up to 75 mm in front of the hull and 110 mm in front of the turret. 37 mm and 50 mm German armor-piercing shells bounced off it with no visible effect, even when fired from very close distances. Their use was completely ineffective, with the exception of those cases when the gunners managed to damage the tracks, or jam the KV-2 turret. The Soviet concept of a "mobile firing bunker" proved to be quite effective, although in a slightly different aspect than it was originally planned. The only German weapon capable of dealing with the KB-2 at long ranges was the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun, which in this case was used to fire at ground targets. The excellent characteristics of this weapon often saved the situation when it was used as an emergency measure in critical combat situations that arose on the front line.

The beginning of the development of 88 mm anti-aircraft guns dates back to 1928. By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, a more advanced modification of this weapon, the Model 36, was in service, which replaced the older Model 18

Given the negative combat experience with the use of 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns in the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht immediately made efforts to develop new, more powerful weapons, which eventually culminated in the creation of the 7.5 cm PAK 40 (75 mm anti-tank gun), 8.8 cm PAK 43/41 (88 mm anti-tank gun) and 12.8 cm PAK K.44 (128 mm anti-tank gun). Although these guns were adopted too late to fight against the KV-2, they later fought quite successfully against a number of other Soviet tanks, the successors of the KV.

The source of information:

• "Military vehicles" No. 63, KV-2.

Introduction.

The history of the Great Patriotic War is still one of the most important pages in the history of our Fatherland. Despite the huge number of different studies, there are still a lot of "blank spots" in the history of the war. There are many reasons for this. For example, many documents on the initial period of the war (especially on the summer of 1941) were not preserved - they were either destroyed or buried in the ground when units fell into the environment. Not all documents stored in the archives have been processed and studied, and many of them are still classified as "secret". Although work on declassification has been actively carried out over the past years, a large array of materials on the history of the war remains inaccessible to a wide range of researchers. Enemy documents, both captured and stored in foreign archives, have also been little studied. In addition, depending on the personal point of view of the author, the same fact can be interpreted in different ways. There is a problem of "cliches", ready-made stamps that are uncritically used by authors and wander from work to work. In modern research there is a fairly clear division into "high genre" - generalizing research that claims to fully cover the most important battles and operations of the war, and "everyday war" - coverage of private events, the history of individual parts or participants in the war, which is close to the direction " history of everyday life. If for the first genre, documents of the High Command, fronts, armies, summarizing statistical data, are primarily important, then for the second genre, memoirs, various illustrative material, letters, and a few diary entries are used more. A special role is played by the work of search teams. Their excavations at the battlefields are both the moral duty of the modern generation to the dead, and material for new research. It seems to me that only a combination of all types of research can give a truly truthful picture of both individual episodes and the entire course of the war. I became convinced of this when I tried to research the history of the "Raseiniai HF" that interested me. A few years ago, on the Internet, I found a mention of the KV tank, which single-handedly delayed the advance of the German division for a whole day. It happened in Lithuania, near the town of Raseiniai. The infamous author Viktor Suvorov mentioned this event in his book "Day M". Knowing that in his publications on the history of the Great Patriotic War, he freely treats facts and documents, interpreting them according to his own point of view, I decided to check whether such an episode actually happened. As a result of comparing various sources - Soviet and German documents, historical research, photographs of that time, eyewitness accounts - the work that I want to present to you has turned out. Purpose of the work: to study the battle of the "Raseiniai KV" by combining various research methods: trips to the battlefield, conversations with local residents - eyewitnesses of the event, studying documents, both domestic and foreign, analyzing the memories of German participants in the battle, as well as studying photographic materials of that time and their comparison with the modern terrain. Tasks: 1) establish the type of tank; 2) find a photograph of the “Raseiniai KV”; 3) establish the details of the battle; 4) find out to which part this car belonged.

Chapter 1. Prelude: 2nd Panzer Division.

Having taken up the study of the “Raseiniai KV”, I found out that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in Lithuania, these combat vehicles were available only in one unit - in the 2nd Panzer Division. Lithuanian historian Arvydas Zardinkas wrote about this in his book “1941. Forgotten victories of the Red Army. By the way, contrary to the stamp that has been established in our country lately, Lithuanian researchers continue to study the actions of Soviet troops on the territory of Lithuania at the beginning of the war and do not underestimate the heroism of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army.

§ 1. History and composition of the 2nd Panzer Division.

The 2nd Panzer Division was formed on the basis of the 7th Cavalry Division and the 21st Heavy Tank Brigade in June 1940. Its first commander was Semyon Krivoshein, later - lieutenant general of tank troops, Hero of the Soviet Union. On December 9, 1940, he was replaced by Yegor Solyankin. The division included: 3rd Tank Regiment; 4th Tank Regiment; 2nd motorized rifle regiment; 2nd howitzer regiment; 2nd motor transport battalion; 2nd separate anti-aircraft artillery division; 2nd separate reconnaissance battalion; 2nd separate repair and restoration battalion; 2nd separate communications battalion; 2nd pontoon bridge battalion; 2nd medical and sanitary battalion; 2nd separate company of regulation. (1, p. 14) The division headquarters and most of its units were based in the city of Ukmerge, and the 3rd and 4th tank regiments were located in the towns of Rukla and Gaizhyunai (after the war, the 7th Guards Airborne Division was located in their place). Before the war, the 2nd Panzer Division was part of the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO).

§ 2. Division commander.

Egor Nikolaevich Solyankin, major general of tank troops. Born April 21, 1901 in Moscow. His biography is typical for the commanders of the Red Army of the pre-war period. His parents died early, his relatives took him to a village in the Gzhatsk district of the Smolensk province. He worked as a shepherd in the village, then as a blacksmith in Moscow. In 1920 he entered the service of the Red Army. By that time, he had already mastered the profession of a blacksmith, which later helped him in handling equipment. Since 1932 - in the tank troops. According to the recollections of his colleagues, he knew and loved tanks well, drove all types of combat vehicles perfectly, and could fix the breakdowns himself. As a commander, he strictly asked his subordinates, demanded impeccable service and excellent knowledge of his weapons, often brought up by personal example. At the same time, he showed great concern for his subordinates, helped in solving household issues and food problems. In 1939, Solyankin commanded the 18th tank brigade, which, along with other units of the Red Army, entered Estonia, Tallinn, under an agreement with the government of this country. In the summer of 1940, parliamentary elections were held in the Baltic countries, including Estonia. At the same time, pro-Soviet-minded politicians came to power. Thousands of rallies were held in the capitals of these states under slogans about the entry of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the USSR. But there were many opponents of this decision, especially among the military. The difficult situation was also in Tallinn. Parts of the Estonian infantry division located in the city opposed entry into the USSR, shots were fired in the city. Solyankin received an order to disarm the Estonians, but without using force. Without thinking twice, he got into the tank, crossed the square and drove up the steps into the glazed vestibule of the headquarters of the Estonian troops. Coming out of the tank in front of the taken aback Estonian officers, he introduced himself and said: “Sorry, I wanted to come and could not - they are shooting at you. I had to go to the tank." As a result, the shooting stopped, and the disarmament of the Estonian units went without loss. On December 9, 1940, Yegor Solyankin was appointed commander of the 2nd Panzer Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps. He was characterized by the command as "a decisive, energetic commander who persistently carries out the work begun to the end." Major General Solyankin died during a breakout from encirclement on June 25, 1941 in a forest near Raseiniai. He left behind a daughter, Raisa, and a son, Alexander, who are still alive. They told a lot of interesting things about their father and the fate of the division. Biography of E.N. Solyankin was compiled on the basis of an extract from his personal file, the characteristics of the high command and an extract from the service. All these documents are stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in Podolsk (3) . The memoirs of A.G. and R.G. Solyankin, who for many years collected information about the fate of their father, communicated with veterans of the division, who told them a lot about their commander and about the service under him.

§ 3. Battle of the KV-1 tank against the Routh group.

On June 18, 1941, a combat alert was announced in the 3rd mechanized corps. (1) The 2nd Panzer Division was advanced into the forests south of the town of Gaidjunai. On June 22, the division received an order to advance to the area of ​​​​the city of Raseiniai to strike at the flank of the advancing German army. The division, according to the order, began to move in two columns. However, by the time it approached the city - on the afternoon of June 23, 1941 - it was already occupied by units of the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. (2) The latter led the offensive in two battle groups - Raus and Seckendorf (named after their commanders). On the evening of June 23, these groups occupied two bridges across the Dubysa River, capturing two bridgeheads on its opposite bank. In German documents, the bridgeheads were called "northern" (it was defended by the Raus group) and "southern" (the Seckendorf group acted on it. (1, pp. 21-22) On the afternoon of June 24, 1941, the advanced units of one of the columns of the 2nd Panzer Division attacked the "southern" bridgehead, occupied the bridge and moved to Raseiniai from the northeast. Another column of the 2nd Panzer Division crossed Dubysa along the ford east of this bridge and attacked the Germans from the east. Throughout the day, on the outskirts of Raseiniai, a battle raged between units of the 2nd Soviet and 6th German tank divisions. In German sources, it is known as the "Raseiniai tank battle". During the battle, one of the KV tanks, having crossed the southern bridge, moved along the forest road to the west, and cut the road leading to the northern bridgehead occupied by the Routh group. It is not known whether the crew acted on the orders of their command or whether it was their personal initiative. The first victim of the KV was a convoy of German vehicles - several trucks were burned by tank fire. As a result, the supply of the Routh group, which occupied the defense of the northern bridgehead, was disrupted. In addition, the tankers cut the wires, and Raus lost contact with the division headquarters. Subsequently, he recalled: “Hours passed, and the enemy tank, blocking the road, hardly moved, although it fired from time to time in the direction of Raseiniai. His shooting set fire to 12 trucks coming to us from Raseiniai with the most necessary supplies. (4, p. 12) The tank stood so well that it was impossible to get around it - on the one hand there was a swamp, on the other a swampy forest. First, the Germans tried to destroy it with fire from two of the latest 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns at that time. However, the HF guns were destroyed by return fire, while two gunners were killed and one was wounded. Then the Germans tried to shoot the tank with an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which they began to roll up to a direct shot distance. The commander of the battle group, E. Raus, wrote about it in his memoirs: “The crew of the tank was on the alert, and the commander had strong nerves. He watched the approach of the gun, but did not interfere with this, since the anti-aircraft gun, while it was in motion, was not dangerous. Besides, the closer she got, the more likely it was to destroy her. The critical moment in this duel came when the anti-aircraft gunners began to prepare for firing ... While the arrows in the strongest nervous tension were hastily preparing to fire, the tank turned the turret and opened fire first. Each shot hit the target. The heavily damaged anti-aircraft gun was thrown into a ditch, where it had to be abandoned. There were casualties among the anti-aircraft gunners." In the documents of the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht there is a report that on the night of June 25, 1941, 88-mm shells for anti-aircraft guns were delivered to the airfield near Raseinaya. They were intended specifically for firing at the "Raseiniai KV". (4, p. 13) Also, attempts to destroy the KV by the forces of the tanks of the Routh group failed - there were swamps to the right and left of the road, and the combat vehicles simply got stuck. In the evening, a group of sappers was formed under the command of Lieutenant Gephard, who laid charges under the tank, but this did not work either. On the morning of June 25, 1941, the Germans launched an attack with their Pz.35 (t) tanks, and while the KV crew was distracted by this, they deployed two 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The guns opened fire, and only from the 13th shot they were able to hit the KV, whose crew died. The Germans drove the inhabitants from the city, who buried the dead, while one of the officers told his soldiers: "You must fight in the same way as these Russian tankers." (5) According to German documents, the KV cut the road to the Raus group at about 1400 on June 24, and was destroyed at about 1100 on June 25. Thus, several thousand German soldiers spent almost a day fighting one tank. In 1965, work began on land reclamation and road reconstruction. At the same time, the remains of the KV crew were reburied at the Raseiniai military cemetery. The grave of the tankers has survived to this day, in the same cemetery there is a symbolic burial place of E.N. Solyankin.

Chapter 2. A trip to the places of battles.

In the process of researching one topic, many researchers try to find contacts with each other and exchange information. Therefore, an Internet acquaintance took place, and then a personal meeting with Arvydas Zardinskas, the author of an article about the “Raseiniai HF”. He introduced us to Gediminas Kulikauskas and Alexander Novichenko, Lithuanian historians who also studied the history of the Battle of Raseiniai. They helped my dad and me organize a trip to the battlefields of the 2nd Panzer Division. The purpose of our trip to Lithuania was to get acquainted with the combat area of ​​the 2nd Panzer Division, with special attention being paid to the history of the "Raseiniai KV". As source material, we had maps, both modern and pre-war, documents and photographs. The fact is that there are a large number of photographs taken by German soldiers at the beginning of the war. Many of them had cameras with which they sought to capture the successful start of the campaign against the USSR. These images are now available for purchase at various online auction sites, many of which often list the date and location of the photo. As a result, I managed to collect quite a few photographs of KV tanks knocked out in the Raseiniai area in June 1941. But which of these tanks was the very famous "Raseiniai KV" was unknown. First we went to the place where the tank was. The fact that this is exactly the place was known from the words of local residents - eyewitnesses of the battle. In 1965, during the reburial of the remains of the tankers, personal belongings of the crew members were found: pens, two officer belts, spoons, two of which were inscribed. One spoon was with the initials “Sh.N.A.”, the other with the inscription “Smirnov” on one side and “SVA” on the other. Thus, it was possible to establish the name of one fighter. But the most valuable find was a cigarette case with a Komsomol ticket, the inscription on which, unfortunately, is not readable, and a certificate from the military registration and enlistment office addressed to Pavel Yegorovich Ershov. In the museum in Raseiniai, I managed to hold these things in my hands, namely: a cigarette case, in which the documents were, and Smirnov's spoon. This made me very excited, as these are the most unique, almost legendary things that are very often mentioned when describing the history of the Raseiniai KV, but which few people have seen. I managed to be one of those who could not only see these things with my own eyes, but also hold them in my hands. During the trip, we talked with an eyewitness to the battle - Povilas Tamutis. In 1941 he was 15 years old, but he remembered the events of that time well. P. Tamutis told some interesting details of the battle, as well as what happened to the tank after the battle. According to him, the Germans first moved the tank off the road so that it would not interfere with the passage, and a few days later they took it to Raseiniai. Here he stood in front of the police building until the end of the war. People on it sat in line to deliver parcels to the prison to their relatives. They also liked to be photographed around him. After the war, the tank was scrapped. Povilas also said that the tank stopped on the road because it ran out of fuel. Thanks to the story of Povilas, it was possible to determine exactly which photographs depict the “Raseiniai KV”. moreover, we first listened to his story without showing the German photographs that we had. Already in the course of the story, it became clear what kind of HF in question - Tamutis clearly described exactly how the tank stood on the road, and where the Germans then moved it, and, most importantly, said that there was one hole in the turret "into which a fist crawled" . We had pictures of KV that fit this description, and we showed them to Tamutis. He confirmed that it was the same tank depicted on them. Then we went to the bridge over the river. Dubis, on which the 2nd division attacked the battle group Seckendorf. This bridge is interesting because there are a lot of German photographs showing destroyed Soviet vehicles and German soldiers near the vehicles. Now a new one has been built on the site of the old bridge, 50 meters upstream of the river. A support remained from the old bridge, but the shore is very heavily overgrown with shrubs and trees, so it is not visible from the bridge and the road. Before our arrival, local researchers tried twice to find this support, but, unfortunately, they did not succeed. When we arrived, we started looking for a support from the right bank, but it was not there. Then we crossed to the opposite bank and, after long wanderings in thickets of bushes and nettles taller than a man, we finally found that support. It is made of reinforced concrete, more than 2 meters high, it is all dotted with bullets and shell fragments. During the search, there were some small "victims". When we were looking for support, one of our Lithuanian comrades did not notice a well in the ground and fell into it. Fortunately, the well was not deep. We heard his screams, but we couldn't make them out, and we thought that he had found support. When we found support and went out onto the road, we learned that he fell into the well and cut his leg. He was taken to the nearest hospital, but, fortunately, the wound was not very serious: he had a few stitches and after a while he was able to walk normally. Thus, the expedition passed with minimal losses, but showed that field research requires compliance with safety regulations.

Chapter 3. Working with archival documents.

While working at the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, I came across the fact that the funds of the 2nd Panzer Division and the 3rd Mechanized Corps were missing. It was not possible to find any materials in the fund of the 11th Army. The case is connected with the fact that on June 25, 1941, the 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded. For a day and a half, she fought with four German divisions, and, without receiving help, partly died, partly broke through to her own. At the same time, its commander E. Solyankin and a number of other staff members died. Some of the documents were destroyed, and some were buried in a safe at the site of the last battle of the division. A. Solyankin was told about this by veterans - participants in those events, there is even a scheme. But so far the safe has not been found. Several documents on the actions of the 2nd Panzer Division were found in the fund of the GABTU (Main Armored Directorate) - these are reports of headquarters commanders who left the encirclement. However, this information is extremely scarce and far from complete. Some information about the actions of the Solyankin division is in the documents of the enemy - these are, first of all, the combat logs of the 41st Panzer Corps, as well as the 6th Panzer Division and its constituent units. Film copies of these documents were obtained from NARA (U.S. National Archives & Records Administration) in the USA. I was helped to translate documents by senior comrades from Russia and Lithuania, for which I thank them very much. But the question of establishing a list of names for the crew of the Raseiniai KV still remains open. Indeed, in addition to Smirnov V.A., Ershov P.E. and a warrior with the initials Sh.N.A. we don't know anyone. Judging by the certificate found in the cigarette case and spoons with inscriptions, these things belonged to conscripts, and there are no lists of names of privates and sergeants of the 2nd Panzer Division. But I was lucky with the lists of commanders. In the documents of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District, we managed to find several files in which there were lists of command personnel of units and subunits of the 2nd Panzer Division, including its tank regiments. These lists were dated June 16-18, 1941. (6) According to these lists, you can try to establish the commander of the vehicle. During the transfer of the remains of the crew members, in addition to the things mentioned above, 2 command belts were found. Most likely, there were 2 commanders of the Red Army in the car. From this we can conclude that this is the car of either the platoon commander or the company commander, because the platoon commander (junior lieutenant or lieutenant) was assigned a tank technician (junior military technician or military technician of the 2nd rank) according to the state, and the company commander (lieutenant / senior lieutenant) deputy company commander (junior lieutenant / lieutenant). Having lists, you can look at the service record cards (CPC) for commanders. Code of Criminal Procedure - a document that records the biography and service of the commander (information about the family, the assignment of military ranks and awards, etc.). It also indicates the fate of the serviceman (died, missing or survived). Based on the situation, the crew of the "Raseiniai KV" is considered missing, so we need the Code of Criminal Procedure for the commanders of the 4th tank regiment who are missing. There were 6 such people during the check: Zinoviev V.A., Vashekidze S.G., Rantsev V.P., Dubakov I.A., Makeev A.A., Krylatkov A.E. Thus, the circle of possible commanders of the "Raseiniai KV" is outlined. The question arose - to which division belonged the legendary "Raseiniai KV". The answer to it was helped by the fact that the photo of this tank was already known. The fact is that the KV-1 tanks that were available in the Solyankin division were of two models - the release of 1940 and the release of 1941. Between themselves, they differed in a number of details, in particular the brand of the gun. Judging by the photo, the Raseiniai KV was made in 1941. The 2nd Panzer Division received seven of these vehicles in March 1941, and all of them went to the 4th Panzer Regiment, by which time it was less equipped than the 3rd.

Conclusion.

As a result of my research, working with available documents and studying photographs, I was able to establish that the "Raseiniai KV" is a KV-1 from the 4th Tank Regiment of the 2nd Tank Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 11th Army of PribOVO ( during the war - the North-Western Front). A real photograph of this vehicle was also discovered and the fate of the tank after the battle was established. This was told by local residents who saw that battle. In the future, I want to try to establish the names of the crew. This can be done if the documents of the field cash desk of the State Bank of the USSR, which was attached to the division, have been preserved. It contained lists of all military personnel, because the field cash desk issued salaries to soldiers and commanders. There is information that the documents of the divisional field cash desk are in the main archive of the Central Bank of Russia in the village of Nudol, Moscow Region. Having the names of 6 possible commanders and 2 ordinary crew members, if you have documents, you can compare the names and find the crew of the "Raseiniai KV". If this succeeds, I want to come up with an initiative to reward the heroes, because their feat is worth it. In my opinion, this feat is on a par with the feats of Captain Gastello and Alexander Matrosov.

Bibliography.

1. 1941. Forgotten victories of the Red Army. - M .: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009
2. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), fund 38, inventory 11353, file 907, sheet 331.
3. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), personal files fund, personal file of Major General E.N. Solyankin.
4. Erhard Raus Tank battles on the Eastern Front. - M.: AST, 2006
5. U.S. National Archives & Records Administration (NARA), T78, R573, f271-290, 335-336, 750-760.
6. TsAMO, f. 140, op. 12981, d. 38, ll. 164-180

Appendix.

Major General Egor Nikolaevich Solyankin Tank at the bridge on the "southern" bridgehead. PAK-35/36 gun destroyed in the Raseinaya area.
"Raseiniai KV" at the battlefield. On the right wing, the earth is visible. A few hours later the tank was already moved off the road. He is. The hole in the lower part of the gun mantlet is clearly visible.
The grave of the tank crew at the Raseiniai military cemetery. Symbolic burial of E.N. Solyankin. Battle place. August 2012
Local map. The positions of the German troops are marked in blue, the direction of the offensive of the 2nd TD is in red, the route of the “Raseiniai KV” and the place of battle are marked in dark red. The author is at the battlefield. Cigarette case of one of the crew members of the Raseiniai KV, in which a Komsomol ticket and a certificate from P.E. Ershov.
Spoon V.A. Smirnova. Spoon V.A. Smirnova. The author with a cigarette case and a spoon.
The author with Povilas Tamutis, an eyewitness to the battle. The passage of German units across the same bridge, summer 1941. Support of the same bridge, August 2012.
The author is on a support, August 2012. Order No. 1 for the 2nd TD on her nomination. The front side of the Code of Criminal Procedure on V.A. Zinoviev - the commander of the 2nd platoon of the 2nd company of the 4th tank regiment, the last entry - "missing."