In historical science, there are debatable problems on which different, often contradictory, points of view are expressed. Below is one of the controversial points of view that exist in historical science.

"The rapid restoration of the national economy after the Great Patriotic War was ensured by the advantages of the socialist system."

Using historical knowledge, give two arguments that can confirm this assessment, and two arguments that can refute it. When presenting arguments, be sure to use historical facts.

Write your answer in the following form.

Arguments to support:

Arguments in rebuttal:

Show answer

Answer

The correct answer must contain arguments:

1) in confirmation, for example:

- socialist industrialization, carried out on the eve of the war, contributed to the rapid recovery of the economy;

- the planned development of the economy made it possible to clearly coordinate restoration measures;

- a single ideology and skillful propaganda activities of the party and economic leadership ensured the mobilization of forces for the restoration of the economy, contributed to the rise of labor enthusiasm;

2) in refutation, for example:

- technology and reparations received from Germany became a significant contribution;

- in the restoration of the national economy, the labor of prisoners, repatriated persons and prisoners of war was widely used;

- Heavy industry, focused on the production of military products, developed as a priority.

Other arguments may be given

The victory gave rise to the people's hopes for a better life, the weakening of the pressure of the totalitarian state on the individual, the elimination of its most odious costs. The potential for change in the political regime, economy, and culture was opened up.

The "democratic impulse" of the war, however, was opposed by the full force of the System created by Stalin. Its positions not only were not weakened during the war years, but seemed to be even stronger in the post-war period. Even the very victory in the war was identified in the mass consciousness with the victory of the totalitarian regime.

Under these conditions, the struggle between democratic and totalitarian tendencies became the leitmotif of social development.

State of the economy of the USSR after the end of the war. The war turned out to be huge human and material losses for the USSR. It claimed almost 27 million human lives. 1,710 cities and urban-type settlements were destroyed, 70,000 villages and villages were destroyed, 31,850 plants and factories, 1,135 mines, and 65,000 km of railway lines were blown up and put out of action. The sown areas decreased by 36.8 million hectares. The country has lost about one third of its national wealth.

The country began to restore the economy even during the war years, when in 1943 a special party and government decree “On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation” was adopted. By the end of the war, the colossal efforts of the Soviet people in these areas managed to restore industrial production to a third of the level of 1940. The liberated areas in 1944 produced more than half of the national grain procurements, a quarter of livestock and poultry, and about a third of dairy products.

However, as the central task of restoration, the country faced it only after the end of the war.

Industry development. The restoration of industry took place in very difficult conditions. In the first post-war years, the work of the Soviet people was not much different from the military emergency. The constant shortage of food (the card system was canceled only in 1947), the most difficult working and living conditions, the high level of morbidity and mortality explained to the population that the long-awaited peace had just come and life was about to get better. However, this did not happen.

However, some wartime restrictions were lifted: the 8-hour working day and annual leave were reintroduced, and forced overtime was abolished. The restoration took place in the context of a sharp increase in migration processes caused by the demobilization of the army (its number decreased from 11.4 million people in 1945 to 2.9 million in 1948), the repatriation of Soviet citizens from Europe, the return of refugees and evacuees from eastern regions of the country. Another difficulty in the development of industry was its conversion, which was completed mainly by 1947. Considerable funds were also spent on supporting the allied Eastern European countries.

Huge losses in the war turned into a shortage of labor, which, in turn, led to an increase in the turnover of personnel who were looking for more favorable working conditions.

To compensate for these costs, as before, it was necessary to increase the transfer of funds from the countryside to the city and the development of the labor activity of workers.

For the first time in many years after the war, there was a trend towards a wider use of scientific and technical developments in production. However, it manifested itself mainly only at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC), where, in the conditions of the beginning of the Cold War, the process of developing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, new missile systems, and new types of tank and aircraft equipment was going on.

Along with the priority development of the military-industrial complex, preference was also given to machine building, metallurgy, the fuel and energy industries, the development of which accounted for 88% of capital investments in industry. The light and food industries, as before, were financed on a residual basis (12%) and, naturally, did not satisfy even the minimum needs of the population.

In total, during the years of the 4th five-year plan (1946-1950), 6,200 large enterprises were restored and rebuilt. In 1950, according to official data, industrial production exceeded pre-war figures by 73% (and in the new union republics - Estonia and Moldova - 2-3 times). True, this also included reparations and production of joint Soviet-East German enterprises.

Agriculture. The country's agriculture came out of the war even more weakened, the gross output of which in 1945 did not exceed 60% of the pre-war level. The situation in it worsened even more in connection with the drought of 1946, which caused a severe famine.

However, the unequal trade between town and country continued after this. Through state purchases, collective farms compensated only a fifth of the costs of milk production, a tenth of grain, and a twentieth of meat. The peasants, working on the collective farm, received practically nothing. Saved only subsidiary farming. However, the state also dealt a significant blow to it. For the period 1946-1949. 10.6 million hectares were cut in favor of the collective farms. land from peasant household plots. Taxes on income from sales in the market have been significantly increased. Market trade itself was allowed only to those peasants whose collective farms had fulfilled state deliveries. Each peasant farm was obliged to hand over to the state meat, milk, eggs, and wool as a tax for a land plot. In 1948, collective farmers were “recommended” to sell small livestock to the state (which was allowed to be kept by the collective farm charter), which caused a mass slaughter of pigs, sheep, and goats throughout the country (up to 2 million heads).

Pre-war norms were preserved that limited the freedom of movement of collective farmers: they were actually deprived of the opportunity to have passports, they were not covered by temporary disability pay, they were deprived of pensions. The monetary reform of 1947 also hit hardest on the peasantry, who kept their savings at home.

states, the transformation of the occupied territories into a colonial and raw material appendage of the Reich, the physical extermination of tens of millions of people. The entire territory up to the Urals was subject to Germanization.

Initially, the war was scheduled to start on May 15, 1941, but the overthrow of the pro-German government in Yugoslavia and the failure of the Italian troops in the war with Greece forced Germany to withdraw part of the troops from the Soviet border and transfer them to the Balkans. And only after the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece at the end of April, the date of the attack on the USSR was finally set - June 22. The moment for the attack on the USSR was not chosen by chance: the rearmament of the Red Army that had begun had not yet been completed; industry has not completely reorganized itself on a war footing; the new military command cadres were still too inexperienced.

Selected German troops were drawn to the borders of the Soviet Union, having gained rich combat experience in conducting a lightning war, and were armed with first-class equipment for those times. For the implementation of the "Plan Barbarossa" was allocated 153 divisions, including 19 armored and 14 motorized. The European allies of Germany (Finland, Romania, Hungary, Italy) fielded 37 divisions against the USSR. In total, thus, 190 fully mobilized divisions of ground forces with a total number of 5.5 million people, 4300 tanks, 5000 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars were concentrated near the Soviet border.

Having subjugated the economy of the captured and allied countries, Germany significantly increased its military and economic potential, which in 1940 allowed it to receive 348 million tons of coal and 43.6 million tons of steel. In the USSR this year 166 million tons of coal were mined and 18.3 million tons of steel were smelted. Accordingly, the output of other products, including military ones, was much less.

The German command received a huge amount of weapons, military equipment, stocks of military equipment from the occupied countries. All this created a significant superiority in manpower and means and strengthened the confidence of the Nazi leadership in the successful implementation of the "Plan Barbarossa".

Today in the lesson we will talk about methods for restoring the economy of the USSR after the war, about the development of science and problems in agriculture and the social sphere, and also learn what reparation, deportation and the Soviet economic miracle are

In addition, the leadership of the Soviet Union, led by Stalin, understood that the victorious people, who survived the terrible war, should live better, so this was another task of restoring the economy.

The Soviet economy was restored by 1950-1951, although some scholars argue that this happened earlier, in 1947, when ration cards(Fig. 2) and the supply of the population began to occur at a quite decent level.

Rice. 2. Card for bread (1941) ()

This was facilitated by the heroic work of the civilian population. After the war, overtime was abolished and the 8-hour working day, vacations, bulletins were returned, however, all administrative and criminal penalties for absenteeism, lateness, and marriage persisted until 1953. In addition, it was adopted fourth five year plan- a high-quality and balanced plan, according to which it was convenient to restore the economy (Fig. 3).

Rice. 3. Propaganda poster (1948) ()

The head of the State Planning Commission during this period was N.A. Voznesensky (Fig. 4). It is known that the planned system of economy is not bad suited for a developing economy.

Rice. 4. N. A. Voznesensky ()

Between 1945 and 1947 the demobilization of the military and the return of prisoners taken to Germany took place. All these people became the labor force, with the help of which Soviet industry was also restored. At the same time, the labor of Gulag prisoners was also used, which in the post-war period were not so much Soviet citizens as prisoners of war Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Japanese, etc. (Fig. 5).

Rice. 5. The work of prisoners of the Gulag ()

In addition, under the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences (Fig. 6), the Soviet Union had the right to reparations, i.e., for payments from fascist Germany.

Rice. 6. Participants of the Yalta Conference in 1945 ()

In Potsdam, our allies (England and America) offered the Soviet Union to use the material base of their zone of occupation (East Germany), so machine tools, factories and other material assets were exported in large volumes. The opinions of historians on this matter differ: some believe that quite a lot was exported, and this greatly helped in the restoration, while others argue that reparation payments did not provide serious assistance.

During this period there was development of science. A breakthrough was made in some areas, for example, the famous atomic breakthrough - building the atomic bomb- under the direction of L.P. Beria and I.V. Kurchatov (Fig. 7) from the scientific point of view.

Rice. 7. I.V. Kurchatov ()

In general, those industries that were somehow connected with the military industry, for example, aircraft building, the production of missiles, launchers, cars, etc., developed quite well after the war.

So, we can say that by 1950 the industry of the USSR as a whole was restored. The standard of living also rose. A reflection of this in the social sphere was the elimination of the rationing system and unique for our entire history of the twentieth century. price drop situation. Every spring 1947-1950. announced lower prices. The psychological effect of this measure was enormous (Fig. 8).

Rice. 8. Comparative table of prices in 1947 and 1953. ()

In fact, prices remained slightly higher than in 1940, and wages slightly lower, but the planned annual price cuts are remembered by older people to this day.

Giant problems were in our agriculture. Its restoration in the post-war period is a rather complicated process. This was due both to the fact that more livestock were killed or eaten, and to the fact that the men did not want to return to the village (Fig. 9).

Rice. 9. Village during the Nazi occupation ()

It was the Soviet village that suffered the main damage to the working population, in which almost only women and children remained. Exactly village became in the 20-30s. source of funds for industrialization, but in the post-war period it could not be this source. The Soviet government tried to raise the standard of living in the countryside, and primarily by enlarging collective farms and improving the quality of processing. But 1946-1948. - this is a period of natural disasters (drought, flood) and famine. Therefore, in such conditions, the village lived even worse. In the countryside, administrative and criminal penalties were maintained until 1951, when the food situation in the country was more or less resolved and the need for mass punishment was sharply reduced.

Beginning in 1947, attempts began to improve agriculture with the help of science and scientific progress. So, for example, windbreaks were created around the fields, which were supposed to protect crops from winds and cold; forced forest and grass sowing was carried out in order to strengthen the soil, etc.

Rice. 10. Collectivization ()

Since 1946 there has been a massive collectivization(Fig. 10) in the newly annexed areas: Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic states. Despite the fact that collectivization in these regions was slower and softer, forcible resettlement was used against opponents of this process or the Soviet government - deportation.

So, thanks to the heroic work and enthusiasm of the Soviet people, the skillful policy of the authorities, the plan and the development of science, by the beginning of the 1950s. the Soviet economy was restored and, according to some estimates, even outpaced the performance of pre-war industry (Fig. 11).

Rice. 11. Restoration of the USSR by the forces of the able-bodied population ()

Thus, one can speak of Soviet economic miracle, which was achieved at a great cost and required improvements. Because they remained unresolved even until the mid-50s. problems in agriculture and the social sphere: millions of Soviet citizens continued to live in barracks and dugouts.

Homework

Tell us about the development of science in the USSR in 1945-1953.

Tell us about the problems in agriculture and the social sphere in the USSR in the postwar period.

Prepare a report on the restoration of the Soviet economy in 1945-1953.

Bibliography

1. Story. Russia in the 20th - early 19th centuries. Grade 9: textbook. for generalities. inst. / A.A. Danilov. - M.: Education, 2011. - 224 p.: ill.
2. History of Russia: 9th grade: textbook. for students general images. inst. / V.S. Izmozik, O.N. Zhuravleva, S.N. Mine. - M.: Ventana-Graf, 2012. - 352 p.: ill.
3. Russian history. XX - beginning of the XIX century. Grade 9: textbook. for generalities. inst. / O.V. Volobuev, V.V. Zhuravlev, A.P. Nenarokov, A.T. Stepanischev. - M.: Bustard, 2010. - 318, p.: ill.

1. ru-history.com().
2. Protown.ru ().
3. Biofile.ru ().

The victory over fascism went to the USSR at a high price. A military hurricane raged over the main regions of the most developed part of the Soviet Union for several years. Most of the industrial centers in the European part of the country were hit. All the main granaries - Ukraine, the North Caucasus, a significant part of the Volga region - were also in the flames of war. So much was destroyed that restoration could take many years, or even decades.

The war turned out to be huge human and material losses for the USSR. It claimed almost 27 million human lives. 1,710 cities and urban-type settlements were destroyed, 70,000 villages and villages were destroyed, 31,850 plants and factories, 1,135 mines, and 65,000 km of railway lines were blown up and put out of action. The sown areas decreased by 36.8 million hectares. The country has lost about one third of its national wealth.

In the context of the transition from war to peace, questions arose about the ways of further development of the country's economy, about its structure and management system. It was not only about the conversion of military production, but also about the expediency of maintaining the existing model of the economy. In many ways, it was formed in the emergency situation of the thirties. The war further strengthened this "extraordinary" nature of the economy and left an imprint on its structure and system of organization. The war years revealed the strong features of the existing economic model, and in particular, very high mobilization capabilities, the ability to quickly establish mass production of high-quality weapons and provide the army and military-industrial complex with the necessary resources by overstraining other sectors of the economy. But the war also emphasized with all its force the weaknesses of the Soviet economy: the high share of manual labor, the low productivity and quality of non-military products. What was tolerable in peacetime, before the war, now required a radical solution.

It was about whether it was necessary to return to the pre-war model of the economy with its hypertrophied military industries, the strictest centralization, unlimited planning in determining the activities of each enterprise, the complete absence of any elements of market exchange, and strict control over the work of the administration.

The post-war period demanded a reorganization of the type of work of state bodies to solve two contradictory tasks: the conversion of the huge military-industrial complex that took shape during the war, in order to modernize the economy as quickly as possible; the creation of two fundamentally new weapons systems that guarantee the security of the country - nuclear weapons and invulnerable means of their delivery (ballistic missiles). The work of a large number of departments began to be combined into intersectoral targeted programs. It was a qualitatively new type of state administration, although it was not so much the structure of bodies that changed, but rather the functions. These changes are less noticeable than structural ones, but the state is a system, and the process in it is no less important than the structure.

The conversion of the military industry was carried out quickly, raising the technical level of civilian industries (and thus allowing then to move on to the creation of new military industries). The People's Commissariat of Ammunition was rebuilt into the People's Commissariat of Agricultural Engineering. The People's Commissariat for mortar weapons in the People's Commissariat for Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation, the People's Commissariat for the Tank Industry in the People's Commissariat for Transport Engineering, etc. (in 1946 the people's commissariats began to be called ministries).

As a result of the mass evacuation of industry to the east and the destruction of 32,000 industrial enterprises during the occupation and hostilities in the European part, the country's economic geography has changed dramatically. Immediately after the war, a corresponding reorganization of the management system began - along with the sectoral principle, they began to introduce the territorial principle into it. The point was to bring the management bodies closer to the enterprises, for the sake of which the ministries were disaggregated: during the war there were 25 of them, and in 1947 there were 34. For example, the People's Commissariat of the coal industry of the western regions and the People's Commissariat of the coal industry of the eastern regions began to manage coal mining. Similarly, the People's Commissariat of the oil industry was divided.

On this wave, among economic managers, economists began to appear striving to reorganize the system of economic management, to soften those aspects of it that held back the initiative and independence of enterprises, and in particular, to weaken the fetters of over-centralization.

Analyzing the current economic system, individual scientists and industrialists proposed to carry out transformations in the spirit of the NEP: with the prevailing dominance of the public sector, officially allow the private sector, covering primarily the service sector, small-scale production. The mixed economy naturally used market relations.

An explanation for such sentiments can be sought in the situation that developed during the war. The economy of the country during the war, the way of life of the population, the organization of the work of local authorities acquired peculiar features. With the transfer of the work of the main branches of industry to meet the needs of the front, the output of civilian products was sharply reduced, providing for the life of the population, supplying it with the most necessary goods and services, local authorities began to deal mainly with organizing small-scale production, involving handicraftsmen and artisans in the production of necessary goods. As a result, handicraft industry developed, private trade revived, and not only in food, but in manufactured goods. Only a small part of the population was covered by centralized supply.

The war taught many leaders of all levels to a certain independence and initiative. After the war, local authorities made attempts to expand the production of goods for the population not only at small handicraft workshops, but also at large factories directly subordinated to the central ministries. The Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, together with the leadership of the Leningrad Region, organized a fair in the city in 1947, at which enterprises not only in Russia, but also in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other republics, sold materials they did not need. The fair opened the possibility of establishing independent economic ties between industrial enterprises bypassing the center. To a certain extent, it contributed to the expansion of the scope of market relations (several years later, the organizers of this fair paid with their lives for their initiative).

Hopes for transformations in the field of economic management turned out to be unrealizable. From the end of the 1940s, a course was taken to strengthen the former administrative-command methods of leadership, to further develop the existing model of the economy.

To understand the reasons for such a decision, one must keep in mind the dual purpose of Russian industry. Its high mobilization capabilities during the war years were largely due to the fact that the economy from the very beginning was focused on working in wartime conditions. All the factories that were created in the prewar years had both a civilian profile and a military one. Thus, the question of the model of the economy must necessarily touch upon this key aspect as well. It was necessary to decide whether the economy would be truly civilian or, as before, remained a two-faced Janus: peaceful in words and military in essence.

Stalin's position became decisive - all attempts at change in this area ran into his imperial ambitions. As a result, the Soviet economy returned to the militaristic model with all its inherent shortcomings.

Also during this period, the question arose: what is the Soviet system of economy (it was called socialism, but this is a purely conventional concept that does not answer the question). Until the end of the war, life set such clear and urgent tasks that there was no great need for theory. Now it was necessary to understand the meaning of the plan, goods, money and the market in the economy of the USSR.

Feeling that the question was complex and that there was no ready answer in Marxism, Stalin delayed the publication of a textbook on the political economy of socialism as long as he could. In 1952, he published an important work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, where he carefully, without entering into polemics with Marxism, gave an understanding of the Soviet economy as a non-market economy of a civilization different from the West ("capitalism"). No other interpretation was possible.

The country began to restore the economy in the year of the war, when in 1943. A special party and government resolution "On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation" was adopted. By the end of the war, the colossal efforts of the Soviet people in these areas managed to restore industrial production to a third of the level of 1940. The liberated areas in 1944 produced more than half of the national grain procurements, a quarter of livestock and poultry, and about a third of dairy products.

However, as the central task of restoration, the country faced it only after the end of the war.

At the end of May 1945, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer part of the defense enterprises to the production of goods for the population. Somewhat later, a law was passed on the demobilization of thirteen ages of army personnel. These resolutions marked the beginning of the transition of the Soviet Union to peaceful construction. In September 1945, the GKO was abolished. All functions of governing the country were concentrated in the hands of the Council of People's Commissars (in March 1946 it was transformed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR).

Measures were taken to restore normal work in enterprises and institutions. Mandatory overtime work was canceled, the 8-hour working day and annual paid holidays were restored. The budget for the third and fourth quarters of 1945 and for 1946 was considered. Appropriations for military needs were reduced and spending on the development of civilian sectors of the economy increased. The restructuring of the national economy and social life in relation to peacetime conditions was completed mainly in 1946. In March 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1946-1950. The main objective of the five-year plan was to restore the areas of the country that had been occupied, to reach the pre-war level of development of industry and agriculture, and then to surpass them. The plan provided for the priority development of heavy and defense industries. Significant financial resources, material and labor resources were directed here. It was planned to develop new coal regions, expand the metallurgical base in the east of the country. One of the conditions for the fulfillment of planned targets was the maximum use of scientific and technological progress.

The year 1946 was the most difficult in the post-war development of industry. To switch enterprises to the production of civilian products, the production technology was changed, new equipment was created, and retraining of personnel was carried out. In accordance with the five-year plan, restoration work began in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The coal industry of Donbass was revived. Zaporizhstal was restored, Dneproges was put into operation. At the same time, construction of new and reconstruction of existing plants and factories was carried out. Over 6,200 industrial enterprises were restored and rebuilt during the five years. 1 Particular attention was paid to the development of metallurgy, mechanical engineering, fuel and energy and military-industrial complexes. The foundations of nuclear energy and the radio-electronic industry were laid. New industry giants emerged in the Urals, in Siberia, in the republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia (Ust-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc plant, Kutaisi automobile plant). The country's first long-distance gas pipeline Saratov - Moscow was put into operation. The Rybinsk and Sukhumi hydroelectric power stations began to operate.

Enterprises were equipped with new technology. The mechanization of labor-intensive processes in ferrous metallurgy and the coal industry has increased. The electrification of production continued. The electric power of labor in industry by the end of the five-year plan was one and a half times higher than the level of 1940.

A large amount of industrial work was carried out in the republics and regions included in the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. In the western regions of Ukraine, in the Baltic republics, new industries were created, in particular, gas and automobile, metalworking and electrical engineering. The peat industry and electric power industry have been developed in Western Belarus.

Work on the restoration of industry was basically completed in 1948. But at individual metallurgical enterprises, they continued even in the early 1950s. The mass production heroism of the Soviet people, expressed in numerous labor initiatives (the introduction of high-speed methods of work, the movement to save metal and high quality products, the movement of multi-machine operators, etc.), contributed to the successful fulfillment of planned targets. By the end of the five-year plan, the level of industrial production exceeded the pre-war level by 73%. However, the priority development of heavy industry, the redistribution in its favor of funds from the light and food industries led to a further deformation of the industrial structure towards an increase in the production of group A products.

The restoration of industry and transport, new industrial construction led to an increase in the size of the working class.

After the war, the country was in ruins, and the question of choosing the path of economic development became acute. The alternative could be market reforms, but the existing political system was not ready for this step. The directive economy still retained the mobilization character that was inherent in it during the years of the first five-year plans and during the war years. Millions of people were sent in an organized manner to the restoration of the Dneproges, the metallurgical plants of Krivoy Rog, the mines of Donbass, as well as the construction of new factories, hydroelectric power stations, etc.

The development of the USSR economy rested on its excessive centralization. All economic issues, large and small, were decided only in the center, and local economic bodies were strictly limited in resolving any cases. The main material and financial resources needed to fulfill the planned targets were distributed through a large number of bureaucratic instances. Departmental disunity, mismanagement and confusion led to constant downtime in production, storming, huge material costs, absurd transportation from one end of the vast country.

The Soviet Union received reparations from Germany in the amount of 4.3 billion dollars. Industrial equipment, including even entire factory complexes, was exported to the Soviet Union as reparations from Germany and other defeated countries. However, the Soviet economy was never able to properly dispose of this wealth due to general mismanagement, and valuable equipment, machine tools, etc. gradually turned into scrap metal. 1.5 million German and 0.5 million Japanese prisoners of war worked in the USSR. In addition, the GULAI system during this period contained approximately 8-9 million prisoners, whose work was practically unpaid.

The division of the world into two hostile camps had negative consequences for the country's economy. From 1945 to 1950, foreign trade turnover with Western countries decreased by 35%, which had a noticeable effect on the Soviet economy, which was deprived of new equipment and advanced technologies. That is why in the mid-1950s. The Soviet Union faced the need for profound socio-economic and political changes. Since the path of progressive political changes was blocked, narrowed down to possible (and even not very serious) amendments to liberalization, the most constructive ideas that appeared in the first post-war years were not about politics, but about the economy. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered various proposals of economists in this regard. Among them is the manuscript “Post-war domestic economy”, owned by S.D. Alexander. The gist of his proposals was as follows:

the transformation of state enterprises into joint-stock or share partnerships, in which the workers and employees themselves act as shareholders, and the authorized elected council of shareholders manages;

decentralization of the supply of enterprises with raw materials and materials through the creation of district and regional industrial supplies instead of supply units under the people's commissariats and central administrations;

abolishing the system of state procurement of agricultural products, granting collective and state farms the right to freely sell on the market;

reform of the monetary system, taking into account the gold parity;

liquidation of state trade and transfer of its functions to trade cooperatives and share partnerships.

These ideas can be considered as the foundations of a new economic model built on the principles of the market and the partial denationalization of the economy - very bold and progressive for that time. True, the ideas of S.D. Alexander had to share the fate of other radical projects, they were classified as "harmful" and decommissioned into the "archive".

The Center, despite the well-known hesitations, in fundamental issues relating to the foundations of building economic and political models of development, remained firmly committed to the previous course. Therefore, the center was receptive only to those ideas that did not affect the foundations of the supporting structure, i.e. did not encroach on the exclusive role of the state in matters of management, financial support, control and did not contradict the main postulates of ideology.

The first attempt to reform the command-administrative system is closely connected with the end in March 1953 of the Stalinist period in the history of the USSR, when the country's administration was concentrated in the hands of three politicians: Chairman of the Council of Ministers G.M. Malenkov, Minister of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev. A struggle broke out between them for sole power, during which each of them counted on the support of the party-state nomenklatura. This new layer of Soviet society (secretaries of the Central Committee of the republican communist parties, regional committees, regional committees, etc.) was ready to support one of these leaders of the country, provided that he was given greater independence in solving local issues and, most importantly, guarantees of personal security, an end to political “purges” and repression.

Subject to these conditions, the nomenklatura was ready to agree to reforms within certain limits, beyond which it could not and did not want to go. In the course of the reforms, it was necessary to reorganize or abolish the Gulag system, stimulate the development of the agrarian sector of the economy, carry out transformations in the social sphere, reduce the tension of constant “mobilization” in solving economic problems and in search of internal and external enemies.

As a result of a difficult struggle on the political "Olympus", N.S., supported by the nomenclature, came to power. Khrushchev, who quickly pushed his rivals aside. In 1953, L. Beria was arrested and shot on the absurd charge of "cooperating with imperialist intelligence services" and "conspiring to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie." In January 1955, G. Malenkov submitted a forced resignation. In 1957, the “anti-party group” consisting of G. Malenkov, L. Kaganovich, V. Molotov and others was expelled from the top leadership. Khrushchev, being the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1958 also became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Political changes in the USSR needed to be reinforced by changes in the economy. Speaking in August 1953 at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, G.M. Malenkov clearly formulated the main directions of economic policy: a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods, large investments in the light industry. Such a radical turn, it would seem, should forever change the fundamental guidelines for the development of the Soviet economy, which had been established in previous decades.

But this, as the history of the country's development has shown, did not happen. After the war, various administrative reforms were carried out several times, but they did not introduce fundamental changes into the essence of the planning and administrative system. In the mid-1950s, attempts were made to abandon the use of mobilization measures in solving economic problems. A few years later, it became clear that this task was unsolvable for the Soviet economy, since the economic incentives for development were incompatible with the command system. It was still necessary to organize masses of people to carry out various projects. Examples include calls to young people to participate in the development of virgin lands, in the construction of grandiose "buildings of communism" in Siberia and the Far East.

An attempt to restructure administration along territorial lines (1957) can be cited as an example of a not very thoughtful reform. In the course of this reform, many branch union ministries were abolished, and territorial councils of the national economy (sovnarkhozes) appeared instead. Only the ministries in charge of military production, the Ministry of Defense, Foreign and Internal Affairs, and some others were not affected by this restructuring. Thus, an attempt was made to decentralize management.

In total, 105 economic administrative regions were created in the country, including 70 in the RSFSR, 11 in Ukraine, 9 in Kazakhstan, 4 in Uzbekistan, and in the other republics - one economic council each. The functions of the State Planning Committee of the USSR remained only the general planning and coordination of territorial and sectoral plans, the distribution of the most important funds among the Union republics.

The first results of the management reform were quite successful. So, already in 1958, i.e. a year after it began, the increase in national income amounted to 12.4% (compared with 7% in 1957). The scale of production specialization and intersectoral cooperation has increased, and the process of creating and introducing new technology into production has accelerated. But, according to experts, the effect obtained is not only the result of perestroika itself. The point is also that for some period the enterprises turned out to be “ownerless” (when the ministries were no longer actually functioning, and the economic councils had not yet been formed), and it was during this period that they began to work noticeably more productively, without feeling any leadership “from above”. But as soon as a new management system was established, the previous negative phenomena in the economy began to intensify. Moreover, new features have appeared: parochialism, stricter administration, constantly growing “own”, local bureaucracy.

And although outwardly the new, “sovnarkhozovskaya” management system differed significantly from the former, “ministerial” one, its essence remained the same. The former principle of distribution of raw materials and products was preserved, the same dictate of the supplier in relation to the consumer. Economic levers simply could not become decisive in the conditions of the absolute dominance of the command-administrative system.

All reorganizations, in the end, did not lead to noticeable success. Moreover, if in 1951-1955. industrial production increased by 85%, agricultural production - by 20.5%, and in 1956-1960 by 64.3 and 30%, respectively (moreover, the growth of agricultural production was mainly due to the development of new lands), then in 1961-1965 these figures began to decline and amounted to 51 and 11% Our Fatherland. The experience of political history. T.2 - M., 1991, p.427.

So, centrifugal forces noticeably weakened the economic potential of the country, many economic councils were unable to solve major production problems. Already in 1959, the consolidation of economic councils began: the weaker ones began to join the more powerful ones (by analogy with the consolidation of collective farms). The centripetal tendency turned out to be stronger. Quite soon, the former hierarchical structure in the country's economy was restored.

Scientists, economists and practitioners tried to develop new approaches to the country's economic development, especially in the field of long-term planning and forecasting, and the definition of strategic macroeconomic goals. But these developments were not designed for quick returns, so they were not given enough attention. The country's leadership needed real results at the present time, and therefore all forces were directed to endless adjustments to current plans. For example, a detailed plan for the fifth five-year plan (1951-1955) was never drawn up, and the Directives of the 19th Party Congress became the starting document that guided the work of the entire economy for five years. These were just the contours of a five-year plan, but there was no concrete plan. The same situation developed with the sixth five-year plan (1956-1960).

Traditionally, so-called grassroots planning has been weak; planning at the enterprise level. Grassroots planning targets were often adjusted, so the plan turned into a purely nominal document, directly related only to the process of calculating wages and bonus payments, which depended on the percentage of fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan.

Since, as noted above, the plans were constantly being adjusted, the plans that were implemented (or more precisely, were not implemented) were not at all the plans that were adopted at the beginning of the planning period (year, five-year plan). Gosplan "bargained" with ministries, ministries - with enterprises about what plan they could carry out with the available resources. But the supply of resources under such a plan was still disrupted, and “bidding” began again in terms of the figures of the plan, in terms of the amount of supplies, etc.

All this confirms the conclusion that the Soviet economy depended to a greater extent not on competent economic developments, but on political decisions that constantly change in opposite directions and most often lead to a dead end. Fruitless attempts were made in the country to improve the structure of the state apparatus, to endow ministers, heads of central departments, directors of enterprises with new rights or, conversely, to limit their powers, to separate existing planning bodies and create new ones, etc. There were many such “reforms” in the 1950s and 1960s, but none of them brought real improvement to the operation of the command system.

Basically, when determining the priorities of post-war economic development, when developing the fourth five-year plan - the recovery plan - the country's leadership actually returned to the pre-war model of economic development and pre-war methods of conducting economic policy. This means that the development of industry, primarily heavy industry, had to be carried out not only to the detriment of the interests of the agrarian economy and the sphere of consumption (i.e., as a result of the appropriate distribution of budgetary funds), but also largely at their expense, because. the pre-war policy of “transferring” funds from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector continued (hence, for example, the unprecedented increase in taxes on the peasantry in the post-war period)

; test missiles-Korolev).

1947 - monetary reform.

In 1952 the work

The resumption of repressive politics.

After the war, society had very strong expectations of the liberalization of the political regime. However, a new round of repression begins. The leadership has chosen the proven path of terror.

- in 1945-1946. repatriated people were repressed(returned from captivity). Many of them went straight from German captivity to Soviet camps.

-reprisals against military leaders(Arrest of Air Marshal Novikov; compromising evidence was collected on Zhukov, but Stalin transferred him from the post of Deputy Minister of Defense to the post of commander of the Odessa Military District).

1946 - Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad”(the resolution stated that many ideologically harmful works appeared on the pages of these magazines; the main blow was dealt to Zoshchenko and Akhmatova; they were expelled from the Writers' Union and were not published for a long time; the Leningrad magazine was closed, the entire leadership of Zvezda was changed) ;

-1949 - "Leningrad case" - an accusation was brought against the party leaders of Leningrad; they were accused of intending to separate the RSFSR from the USSR, to make Leningrad the capital and turn it into the center of the struggle against Stalin 8 state and party workers were repressed Kuznetsov, Rodionov and Voznesensky.

- Following the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and Ingush resettled during the war years, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Moldovans were subjected to forcible deportation (resettlement) in the post-war years.

-1949 campaign against "rootless cosmopolitanism"("Cosmopolitanism" - a worldview that puts universal human values ​​above the interests of a single nation; this word was given the meaning of "not a patriot"; people, mostly Jews, were accused of "cosmopolitanism", i.e. admiration for the West, they were fired from their jobs ... .). The goal is to erase from the consciousness of the people the interest in the West that has arisen.

-1953 - "doctors' case" - a large group of doctors was arrested; they were accused of killing Zhdanov, attempting to assassinate other senior leaders, and liaising with foreign intelligence services; this case was closed only after the death of Stalin.

Thus, the flywheel of repression received a new acceleration. The punitive campaign that had begun did not stop until Stalin's death.

Military bloc of the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland.

War in Korea (USSR provided assistance to North Korea).

Begins "arms race" - the struggle for military superiority.

industrial production

-reform only increased the industrial and managerial confusion.

-there was an increase in the number of local officials

In 1965 (under Brezhnev), with the beginning of the 1965 reform under the leadership of A.N. Kosygin, the economic councils were liquidated and the sectoral ministries were restored.

XXI Congress of the CPSU proclaimed the victory of socialism in the USSR.

SCIENCE IN 1953-1964

H-bomb test (1953)

First artificial earth satellite (1957)

The beginning of space flights (Gagarin-1961; Titov-second cosmonaut)

Space flight of the first female cosmonaut 1963 (Tereshkova)

The first nuclear power plant in Obninsk (1954).

Nuclear icebreaker "Lenin" (1957)

Rocketry (Korolev).

Monument to Gagarin in Moscow

EDUCATIONAL REFORM 1958

Introduction of compulsory eight-year education (instead of seven years). An increase in the period of study in secondary school to 11 years, graduates of which were issued a certificate of acquired profession (miscalculation: reduction in hours in a general education subject).

Obtaining higher education only in the presence of work experience.

Thus, the problem of the influx of labor into production was removed.

However, for plant managers, this created new problems with staff turnover and discipline among young workers.

KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY.

XX Congress of the CPSU approved the new foreign policy doctrine of the USSR. Has been nominated the principle of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries.

Three directions were prioritized in foreign policy:

LECTURE 79. USSR in 1945-1953

Economy of the USSR after the war. Economic recovery.

The war caused great damage. 1700 cities, 70 thousand villages and villages were destroyed. USSR lost

about 30% of the national wealth. The standard of living has fallen catastrophically. The economy was experiencing a severe labor shortage. In 1946, the difficult economic situation was exacerbated by crop failure and famine.

The fourth five-year plan (1946-1950) set the task of restoring and surpassing the pre-war level of production. At the same time, the primary goal was formulated unambiguously - the restoration and development of heavy industry. Heavy industry reached its pre-war level in 1948. The Dneproges, the Zaporizhia Metallurgical Plant, the Stalingrad and Kharkov Tractor Plants were restored. New industrial enterprises were built. It was a success achieved due to the colossal exertion of forces, the labor heroism of the people.

Reparation deliveries (reparation - partial compensation for material damage caused by military operations) of equipment from Germany were of some importance. As in the 30s. the labor of Gulag prisoners was used. At the same time, colossal funds were spent on the creation of new types of weapons ( 1949 - test of the atomic bomb - Kurchatov; 1953 - test of the hydrogen bomb - Sakharov; test missiles-Korolev).

The policy of prioritizing the development of heavy industry, primarily industries associated with the military-industrial complex, ruled out the possibility of a significant increase in the standard of living.

Agriculture of pre-war indicators by the beginning of the 1950s. The transfer of funds to industry assumed enormous proportions. Compulsory state deliveries increased, taxes grew, personal plots were reduced.

1947 - abolition of the rationing system for food products.

1947 - monetary reform. At constant prices, money was exchanged for new ones at the rate of 10:1. The amounts kept in the savings banks were exchanged at a preferential rate: up to 3 thousand - 1:1; 3-10 thousand-3:2; over 10 thousand-2:1. It was assumed that speculators who had profited during the war years would suffer from the reform. In practice, peasants and workers, who traditionally kept money not in savings banks, but in “stockings”, suffered. During the reform, about a third of cash was not presented for exchange.

In 1952 the work Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR". In it, he tried to theoretically substantiate the principles of the economic policy pursued in the country. It was about the priority development of heavy industry, etc.

Reasons for the rapid recovery of the country's economy after the war:

- labor enthusiasm of the population;

-attracting funds from the population through government loans

-use of equipment and technologies received from Germany as reparations