Hello, dear readers of the blog site. Since the 60s of the last century, the military style has come into fashion, the popularity of which has not decreased for half a century.

Khaki clothes, camouflage heydays of things from bags to cars, cute little things in the form of bullets.

But is everything as harmless as it seems. Militarization - what is it in the life of modern society, what are its causes - we will understand.

The word comes from the Latin "militaris", which means "military".

Mankind is aggressive in itself, and this is proved by a series of endless wars that raged until the invention of nuclear weapons, which became a tool to deter this aggression (guaranteeing the complete destruction of everyone and everything).

In itself, militarism is the setting of the economy and ideology on a war footing.

Having used all available resources for military needs, it was possible to achieve significant superiority over the enemy and guarantee yourself either victory over him, or his inaction, when he is deprived of "acquired by overwork" (colonies, territories, resources, influence).

There are several definitions of the concept of "militarism". For example, Brockhaus and Efron in their explanatory dictionary indicate that:

it is the adaptation of most state functions to the goal of gaining military superiority.

Ozhegov in his dictionary, following the example of most Soviet sociologists and politicians, defines militarism:

as a policy of increasing the military might of the imperialist states.

It is carried out to capture foreign territories and resources. You know examples of such countries.

The much-loved Wikipedia tells us that:

militarism is the ideology of the state and the psychology of the masses, the purpose of which is wars of conquest. When it is introduced, the economy is subordinated to the interests of an aggressive foreign policy.

But this is not the whole truth. If one country builds up its military power, then others cannot sit and wait for this power to fall upon them. They begin to pursue a reciprocal policy, which in the end leads to an arms race.

For example, there is a country with 10 aircraft carriers and 20,000 aircraft plus a military budget of $700 billion. But at the same time speaking about herself as a guarantor of peace and democracy.

Other countries against which this power can be directed are simply obliged to strengthen their defenses. But this country, already armed to the teeth, starts screaming about the militarization of its potential opponents and about how bad it is.

Dripping on the brains of their citizens, she tries to convince them that military budgets need to be distributed to pensioners and the suffering. For all that, this country has the highest percentage of the homeless, disadvantaged and prisoners of the total population. What a touching concern for the unprotected layers of other countries. Don't find?

Militarization - what is it

The history of the World is an endless series of wars.

It is worth remembering Ancient Rome and Sparta - states built on a military principle. But before the invention of gunpowder, with the simplicity of military affairs, there was no militarism. It arose with the advent of new military equipment: muskets, artillery required the presence of standing armies.

To understand what militarization is and the history of its occurrence, let us turn to the period of government Napoleon III in France. It was his regime that contemporaries dubbed - " militarisme". The word is translated from French means "military".

Unlike his famous ancestor, who decided to conquer Russia in 1812, he did not gain much fame, but drew the country into multiple military conflicts in Europe, Asia and America. To fight, the country increased the number of soldiers, the volume of produced and purchased weapons and raw materials for their creation.

The largest and bloodiest world wars took place in 20th century when the states of all continents were involved in armed conflicts. As a result, in the second half of the 20th century, countries were divided into two warring camps involved in the arms race: NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

There was no mention of victory. But in order not to lose, new weapons were required: nuclear warheads, aircraft, armored vehicles.

Their production requires money, labor, and most importantly, inventors.

The development of military power is possible only when the economy, science, social, public and political spheres work for it.

Militarization is restructuring and adaptation of all branches of life to the following goals:

1. The increase in the size of the army.
2. Creation of new models of weapons and military equipment.
3. Ammunition increase.
4. The introduction of the ideology of the need for aggressive and defensive wars.

Depending on the era and the country in which militarism developed further, it had individual characteristics. But militarization of the country has a number of common features:

When solving internal and external conflicts, they resort to the help of military formations, relying on violence.

The society cultivates the idea of ​​the need to wage wars in order to defend or capture new territories.

National contradictions are fomented among the population, and. The “chosenness of God” of one people is emphasized.

Significant influence on the government of the country and the public life of the military elite.

As an example, let's take again the same country with a military budget that is many times greater than the countries following it in the arms race combined. If anyone has forgotten, then "the most peaceful" in the world (according to them). The points:

1. This country has 1,000 military bases around the world and has participated in hundreds of military conflicts over the past fifty years.
2. All wars are waged in the name of protecting the interests of this overseas country (why its interests extend to the whole world is left out of the equation).
3. As their penultimate president said, they are "an exceptional (chosen) nation." Everything they do smells like violets.
4. The Pentagon (oops, let it slip) and two dozen other law enforcement agencies are lobbying for an increase in the military budget and, in fact, are manipulating the government and the legislature.

And remember the main thing - all this is forbidden to be repeated (even in small doses) to other countries. Why? Think for yourself.

The impact of militarization on the economy

The development of militarization in the country without a redirection of the economy is impossible. This means a constant increase in budgetary funds spent on the military-industrial complex.

New arms factories are being built in the country or old ones are being rebuilt. The result is decrease in appropriations on the development of culture, art, social support of the population. Alas and ah.

To the positives economic militarization includes the development of a number of scientific branches related to the production of objects necessary for the functioning of the army:

1. Electronics.
2. Nuclear physics.
3. Information technology, etc.

Such an economic leap exists in a militaristic economy in the short term for no more than 50 years. If further produced weapons are not exported, the productivity of the economy decreases, because. inside the country, the production of a large number of weapons does not pay off.

Militarization - what is it good or bad? No one can give an exact answer to this question.

Human society has not learned without military intervention, which means that the country must have the strength to protect itself.

Therefore, a complete rejection of militarism is impossible, especially for countries that have, and therefore are of interest to large corporations in the world.

If you want peace, prepare for war.

Good luck to you! See you soon on the blog pages site

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From the first days of the establishment of the fascist dictatorship, the Nazis began to transfer the entire economy of the country to the path of militarization. This was supposed to help the German economy get out of the abyss of the crisis - to load dormant industrial enterprises with military orders, use the masses of the unemployed and thereby again ensure high profits for the monopolies. At the same time, by militarizing the economy, the Nazis sought to get ahead of their opponents in deploying a military-economic base and prepare for a new war for the redivision of the world.

The rapid militarization of the country's economy in 1933-1939 would have been impossible without the creation in Germany in 1924-1929 with the help of American and British concerns of a powerful military-industrial potential. Only on the basis of American capital, 80 new factories were built in the country over the years and the equipment of hundreds of already existing enterprises was modernized. As a result, Germany, by the beginning of the world economic crisis, took second place in the capitalist world in terms of total industrial output, in steel and iron smelting, in the production of machine tools, automobiles, etc.

Another factor that paved the way for the rapid transfer of the economy of fascist Germany to a war footing was the technical preparation of industry for war, which was consistently carried out in Weimar Germany in circumvention of the Treaty of Versailles. Later, in 1944, Gustav Krupp boasted: “The great merit of the entire German war economy is that it did not remain inactive during these difficult years, although its activities were, for obvious reasons, hidden from the public. As a result of many years of secret activity, theoretical and material prerequisites were created so that at the right time, without losing time in gaining experience, again go to work for the needs of the German armed forces ... Only this unpublished activity of German entrepreneurs made it possible after 1933 years to proceed directly to the solution of a new task - the direct restoration of military power.

With the advent of the Nazis to power, all veils were thrown off and the militarization of the economy took on proportions that had never been seen before in Germany. From 1933 to 1938, military production increased almost tenfold. For six years (1933-1938) budget expenditures on armaments and the army increased tenfold. In the 1938/1939 budget year, they accounted for 58% of all expenditures. In addition, more than 30% of the budget was made up of the so-called expenses for the maintenance of the state apparatus and other expenses, which, in the form of appropriations for propaganda, espionage, etc., also for the most part went to prepare for an aggressive war.

During the six pre-war years (1933-1938), the fascist government's expenditures for military purposes amounted to a huge amount - over 92 billion marks. This figure does not include private investments by German and foreign monopolies in the war economy of Nazi Germany. Most of these funds (54.5 billion marks) were used by the Nazis to carry out a gigantic program for the construction of military industry enterprises. In just four years, from 1933 to 1936, more than 300 military plants were put into operation in Germany, including 55-60 aviation, 45 automobile and tank, 70 chemical, 15 military shipbuilding. If in 1931 only 13 aircraft were produced in the country, in 1933 - 368, then in 1939 - 8295. On the eve of the Second World War, the production of weapons and military equipment increased by 12.5 times compared to 1933.

It should be noted that the main factor that ensured the rapid growth of military production in the early years of the fascist dictatorship was not the construction of new enterprises, but the use of colossal production capacities that remained unused during the economic crisis of 1929-1933.

Already in the first period after the establishment of the fascist dictatorship, all the largest monopolies began to receive continuously increasing military orders from the government. So, for example, in March 1934, the Flick concern received an order for the manufacture of 3 thousand bombs, 10 thousand rifles, 200 barrels for anti-tank guns, 300 mortars, 60 thousand grenades, etc. This order was followed by new, even more large .

The Nazis used a significant part of military spending (over 10 billion marks) to expand the raw material base, which was of paramount importance due to the absence or shortage in Germany of the most important types of strategic raw materials - iron ore, aluminum, copper, etc. The creation of the raw material base was carried out by the fascist government by prohibiting the consumption of scarce raw materials in industries that worked to meet the needs of the civilian population; all-round expansion of imports of strategic raw materials from abroad; organizing the production of strategic raw materials within the country.

The import of raw materials and semi-finished products to Germany increased from 26 mln. T in 1932 to 46 million. T in 1937 . The import of copper ore increased from 430 thous. T in 1929 to 656 thousand. T in 1938, lead ore - from 114 thousand tons. T up to 141 thousand tons, rubber - from 49 thousand. T up to 108 thousand T. The import of iron ore in 1938 exceeded 21 million tons. T. This allowed Nazi Germany to increase steel production in 1938 to 23.3 million tons. T and come out on top in Europe. During the six pre-war years, bauxite imports to Germany increased fivefold. In 1939, aluminum smelting at German plants reached 30% of world production and the country moved to the first place in the world in aluminum smelting. Thus, a powerful base was created for the rapid development of aviation. Coal mining rose in 1933-1938 from 126 million tons. T up to 195 million T, electricity - from 18.6 billion. kWh up to 45.5 billion kWh .

IN AND. Lenin pointed out that “the capitalist economy “for the war” (i.e., the economy connected directly or indirectly with military supplies) is a systematic, legalized embezzlement» . The billions of marks appropriated by the fascist government for military purposes, in large part, settled in the form of all kinds of state subsidies, payments for military supplies, etc., in the safes of military monopolies. The financial oligarchy of fascist Germany entrusted the organization of transferring the people's funds into the hands of the monopolies to their experienced servant Hjalmar Schacht. In August 1934, Schacht, who had already taken the post of director of the Reichsbank, was appointed by Hitler as Minister of Economics, and then on May 21, 1935, Commissioner General of the War Economy, who was instructed to direct all economic resources to military needs.

In bourgeois historical literature, the version depicting Shakht as a kind of conjurer who raised funds almost out of thin air to finance the Nazi armaments program is widely circulated. In fact, the financing of armaments was carried out at the expense of the monstrous robbery of the workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie.

The most important source of financing military preparations were taxes and all kinds of fees. According to Mine himself, on the eve of the war, their amount increased annually by 10 billion marks. The main taxes in fascist Germany were indirect taxes, which, as noted by V.I. Lenin, are "the most unfair taxes, because it is much harder for the poor to pay them than for the rich." At the same time, the Nazi government significantly reduced the turnover tax, and in July 1933 issued a special law that allowed companies involved in the production of military strategic materials to be fully or partially exempted from taxes. Until 1939, there was no income tax in Nazi Germany.

Another important source of funding for the military preparations of fascist Germany was the use of the unpaid labor of millions of unemployed, as well as young men driven by the Nazis into work camps and labor conscription camps. Only in the first years of the fascist dictatorship, 4 million unemployed people were employed in the construction of strategic highways, frontier fortifications, etc.

An important source of military appropriations was the direct robbery by the Nazis of the working masses. The Nazis seized all the savings of the workers, which were in the cash desks of trade unions and organizations adjoining them. Only in the German Workers' Bank they appropriated 5 billion marks. Of the 300 million marks annually received before the war to the fund of the "labor front" through compulsory collections from workers, the Nazis confiscated 120-150 million marks and transferred them to military monopolies. According to official, that is, clearly understated, data, 1.49 billion marks were brought to the fascist government in 1933-1937 by collections from the population for the so-called "winter aid" fund. By reducing the amounts allocated for social insurance, the Nazis allocated 2.8 billion marks for military purposes in 1933-1937 alone. Another 3.3 billion marks were withdrawn from the social security funds for the construction of strategic highways.

A major source of financing for the war economy was speculation organized by Mine with the issuance of government interest-free bills - the so-called mepho-bills. In total, they were issued by the beginning of the war for 12 billion marks. In essence, mepho-bills were a kind of state loan with the obligation of the fascist government to repay the debt in five years. Of course, the Nazis did not expect to pay off their debts in the usual way in the future. They pinned all their hopes on the predatory war they were preparing, which would at the same time solve all their financial difficulties.

In 1935, the Fascist government began issuing long-term government loans. The billions of savings of the working people and the petty bourgeoisie, which were in the savings banks, turned into bonds of the Hitler government.

An important source of funding for military preparations in fascist Germany was the seizure of the property of the working people and the petty-bourgeois masses of Jewish nationality. Only in November 1938, in the form of the so-called "indemnity" from the Jewish population of Germany, the Nazi government seized 1 billion marks in gold. Soviet economist I.M. Faingar estimates the value of the Jewish property appropriated by the German military concerns at 5 billion marks.

Finally, immediately on the eve of the Second World War, an important source of financing for the German war economy was the robbery by the Nazis of the enslaved peoples of Austria and Czechoslovakia, as well as the economically dependent countries of South-Eastern Europe. On the eve of the war, the Nazis sought to purchase as many goods as possible from these countries, at the same time delaying payments in every possible way. As a result, already by 1937, Germany owed Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and a number of other countries, according to Schacht, 500 million marks, and by the beginning of the war - several billion marks.

The militarization of the economy and the unparalleled robbery of the working people associated with it, the transformation by the Nazis of all of Germany into a huge market of forced labor ensured that the monopolies received colossal profits. On the example of fascist Germany, the words of V.I. Lenin that the monopolies "out of the horrendous suffering of the masses, out of the blood of the proletariat, extort the pure gold of their billions of dollars in income."

The growth of the net profit of the IG Farbenindustri concern in 1932-1938 (in marks)

The profits of the military concerns depended directly and directly on the size of the military orders given to them by the fascist government.

Military orders of the government and profits of the Krupp concern in 1932-1938 (in stamps)

years	Orders for the army	Orders for the Navy	The total amount of military orders	Profit
1932-1933	7 201 000	2 124 000	9 325 000	6 507 078
1933-1934	26 859 000	26 025 000	52 884 000	12 256 430
1934-1935	33 456 000	28 364 000	61 820 000	60 361 350
1935-1936	32 289 000	47 657 000	79 946 000	90 523 720
1937-1938	85 168 000	32 737 000	117 905 000	112 190 050
1938-1939	99 965 000	45 352 000	145 317 000	121 803 791

If in the year the Nazis came to power, the Krupp concern did not have a net profit, then for the period 1934-1939, on the yeast of military orders, it amounted to about 380 million marks. The net profit of the Vereinigte Stalwerke concern increased 2.13 times from 1933 to 1937, the Mannesmann concern from 1933 to 1940 - more than 5 times.

The largest banks did not lag behind the military concerns. Thus, even according to underestimated official figures, the profit of the Dresden Bank increased from 1.6 million marks in 1933 to 9 million marks in 1940.

During the prewar years, dividends increased significantly. If in 1932 in Germany as a whole they averaged 2.83%, then in 1941 - already 6.62%. In 1934, the Fascist government even passed a special law against "excessive profits", according to which dividends should not exceed 6%, and the excess amount was to be placed in state loans. It is clear that in taking this step the Nazis did not even think of limiting the profits of the monopolies. In fact, the law was deeply demagogic and propagandistic.

First, the law contained a very significant clause: if by the time the law was adopted dividends exceeded the established 6%, they could continue to remain at this level.

Second, and most importantly, dividends do not accurately represent the profits of monopolies. “Compared to the profits of enterprises,” admitted the fascist magazine Das Reich, “dividends now play a completely insignificant role”

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Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine

Kharkov Trade and Economic Institute

Kiev National University of Trade and Economics

Department of "Economic Theory and Economics of the Enterprise"

Abstract on the topic:

"Militarization as a negative global phenomenon"

Prepared by: Koliberda P.V., FK-14

Lecturer: Gavrish O.N.

Kharkov, 2015

• Introduction
• Armed conflicts
• Non-state conflicts
• One-sided violence
• Arms control

Introduction

National security is the most important condition for the successful development of any country, and ensuring defense capability is one of the main functions of the state. At the same time, the subordination of the country's economy to the goals of building up armed forces and armaments - its militarization - is far from indisputable from the point of view of long-term social and economic consequences.

The relevance of the militarization and demilitarization of the economy is now popular, because because of the events in the wax of Ukraine, this issue has become especially acute.

The purpose of the abstract work is to clarify the problems and prospects of the demilitarization of the economy as a global phenomenon inherent in many civilized countries.

militarization non-state conflict armament

Main problems and tendencies of militarization

First we need to understand the term "militarization". According to the interpretation of the term by many economic and non-economic dictionaries, and based on my understanding of this process, it can be argued that the militarization of the economy is a process of increasing the military sector in the overall structure of the national economy of an individual state to the detriment of other industries. As for countries without their own military industry, the militarization of the economy there is achieved by increasing the arms trade.

Accordingly, the process of demilitarization is the reverse process of militarization, the rejection of militarization.

Militarization, like every process, has its own goals and objectives, advantages and disadvantages. In peacetime and with the rapid development of the world economy and interstate relations, militarization threatens friendly and partnership relations between states. Therefore, the positive qualities of militarization are considered inappropriate in our time. We will first of all consider the problems and trends in the development of militarization.

The militarization of the economy hinders the satisfaction of important needs of the population, including the production of food, the construction of housing or the development of medical services. These civilian industries that produce consumer goods and services are simply left with relatively less national capital of all kinds: industrial, human, and natural.

Also, high military spending, financed from the state budget, reduces the ability of the state to solve many problems in other areas of activity, such as supporting research, education, culture, environmental protection, or protecting the poorest segments of the population.

It is also not a secret that the swelling of the military sector in countries with a market economy system reduces the overall level of efficiency of the country's economy. This is explained by the fact that the conditions of secrecy and guaranteed state orders prevent the development of market competition between enterprises that produce mainly military products, so that these enterprises are not interested in increasing the efficiency of their production.

Trends in world states and the situation in the world

The public spending crisis in the World North has not yet had a large overall impact on the major armaments companies and military service companies. Sales of arms and military services (hereinafter referred to as VVU) by large military-industrial companies for the period from 2002-2010 increased to the amount of 441.1 billion dollars, i.е. increased by 60%. But this is only 1% compared to 2009. The most likely reason for the slowdown in global armaments is that the impact of the global financial downturn is being delayed by the structure of the military industry. As an example, the reduction in the number of US troops in Iraq and the expected decrease in demand from the US armed forces there.

It is possible that economic and spending uncertainty in both the US and Western Europe will influence the direction in which the arms program develops and is implemented. Thus, it is not known whether arms sales will remain the same or increase at the same pace as in the past.

The US National Defense Budgetary Authority Act will send mixed messages about the US military industry. On the one hand, it supports many of the largest, most expensive US weapons programs, such as the F-35 combat aircraft (combined attack-fighter). Allowing continued funding for such costly programs suggests that US arms sales are likely to remain largely unchanged from current levels.

The financial crisis has also affected discussions about cooperation in the military industry of Western Europe, although these discussions have not yet resulted in the establishment of large-scale cooperation of this kind. Western European countries discussed and began to implement joint strategies for the development and production of unmanned aerial vehicle systems, and in June 2011 the European Commission initiated the process of developing and creating unmanned aerial systems.

Some key sectors of military services - such as maintenance, recovery and repair, systems support, logistics and foreign military training - have proven to be more resilient to the impact of global financial instability. Their long-term growth may be due to a number of changes since the end of the Cold War, including the restructuring of military needs and the decline in domestic capacity to create increasingly complex systems. It appears that increased pressure on public spending, which has increased the likelihood of cuts in military spending, will increase demand for services provided by third parties. In addition to the increased focus on providing military services, companies are relying on other business strategies to maintain their bottom line. A notable development has been a surge in takeovers of cybersecurity firms as major military-industrial companies look to insulate themselves from potential cuts in military spending and move into adjacent markets.

Many countries outside the World North are trying to develop a self-sustaining national military industry. India's efforts to modernize, upgrade and maintain the military equipment of its armed forces and expand its military capabilities have turned it into the largest importer of major weapons.

Next, we have to get acquainted with the production of weapons and military services in a more complete form.

Arms manufacturing and military services

Military services are specifically military services - such as research and analysis, technical services, operational support, and armed security - that were once taken over by the military but then turned over to private companies. The private military services industry has grown substantially over the past two decades.

The increase in the volume of military services began as a result of the restructuring of the military industries of the United States of America. = and Western Europe after the end of the Cold War. The concentration and specialization of military production during the period of consolidation in the 1990s included the infiltration of military services as part of a long-term trend towards the privatization (or outsourcing) of public services. The rationale for outsourcing services (in both the private and public sectors) was cited as cost savings, improved quality, access to new knowledge, experience and skills, and risk management, as well as greater flexibility and just-in-time deliveries. .

The growth of the military services industry has been most evident in the US. In 2010, the US Department of Defense's annual spending on purchasing services (including military services) accounted for half of the $400 billion spent on procurement. What's more, the current trend of US military-industrial companies becoming more focused on providing military services is likely to continue. On the one hand, this shift is part of strategies to maintain sales in anticipation of cuts in weapons programs. On the other hand, companies are moving into the service sector in order to:

· Take advantage of the government's general cost-saving measures.

Protect yourself from being kicked out of projects that are expected to rotate prime contractors in order to maintain the financial health of the military industry (known as Kroot's "refinement" imperative)

· Capitalize on the general desire of the government to reduce the number of new programs and increase the life of existing platforms. For example, even before the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, the US military was planning to transition air systems to a commercial maintenance, recovery, and repair model. This lifecycle maintenance approach aims to reduce the cost of purchasing aircraft, as well as the maintenance of aircraft already in service.

For clarity and more comfortable understanding, there are four main categories of military services:

Research and analysis

· Technical services (information technology, systems support and maintenance, restoration and repair)

· Operational support

· Armed guards.

We will focus on two of them in detail.

Service, recovery and repair: services, rendered military aviation

The after-sales service and upgrade sector for in-service weapon systems has generally experienced growth. This growth is affecting the structure of the service sector as assemblers of large systems and manufacturers of subsystems and components rethink how they perform maintenance, refurbishment and repair, and reorganize their business to increase them. With the general trend towards the privatization of public services, the industry has seen the maintenance of military equipment as a relatively stable market in the unstable economic environment of recent years. Because military maintenance contracts are awarded to governments that have long-term budgetary obligations, the maintenance of military equipment is generally less susceptible to fluctuations in the global political economy.

The growth of the global market for maintenance, restoration and repair in the first decade of the XXI century. It was particularly prominent in the military aircraft services sector, which reached $59.8 billion in 2010 sales, down 2% from $61.1 billion in 2009. Sales of services for the maintenance, repair and restoration of military aircraft in 2010 in North America (primarily in the US) amounted to 31.1 billion dollars, which is almost 2 times more than in Europe. The general increase in sales of services for the maintenance, restoration and repair of military aircraft since the early 2000s points to one way of diversifying military-industrial companies in order to counter the expected cuts in the military budget for the purchase of equipment.

Countries that do not have the industrial capacity to manufacture military aircraft are instead creating sectors for the maintenance, restoration and repair of military aircraft. For example, the aerospace division of the Singapore-based ST Engineer provides maintenance services not only to the Singapore Air Force, but also to Brazil, Indonesia and the United States.

Table 1. Regional and national shares of total arms sales of the 100 largest military-industrial companies and companies providing military services,

Number of companies	Region/country	arms sales (billion dollars)	Share in total sales, %
	NorthernAmerica
	WesternEurope
	Great Britain
	Trans-European
	Germany
	Norway
	Switzerland
	Finland
	EasternEurope
	OthercountryOECD
	South Korea
	Othercountry,notincomingvOECD
	Singapore
	Brazil
100	Total	411,1	395,7	100

International arms trade

The volume of international trade in major types of conventional weapons from 2002 to 2007-2011. increased by 24%. In 2007-2011 the top five suppliers - the US, Russia, Germany, France and the UK - accounted for three-quarters of exports. Among other suppliers in the period in 2007-2011. showed significant increases in shipments from China and Spain. While China's exports are likely to continue to rise, Spain's backlog of shipbuilding orders, which account for the bulk of its exports, suggests the country will not be able to maintain its export volume.

The first year of the "Arab Spring" sparked a debate about the policy of major export defeats to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Russian officials saw no reason to withhold supplies to any state in the region unless it was subject to a UN arms embargo. In contrast, the US and several major European suppliers to the region have revoked or suspended some of their export licenses to the region and, in some cases, have revised their arms export policies. However, strategic and economic considerations continued to play a central role in all states' decisions regarding arms exports to the region. Thus, the impact of the Arab Spring on arms export policy is likely to be limited.

The states of Asia and Oceania received almost half of all imports of major types of conventional weapons in 2007-2011. Moreover, all five of the largest recipients of weapons were located in Asia and Oceania: India, South Korea, Pakistan, China and Singapore. Large importers take advantage of the competition in the arms market, seeking attractive deals in terms of funding for offset agreements and technology transfers. India, which in 2007-2011. accounted for 10% of all imports, is likely to remain the largest recipient of major conventional weapons in the coming years.

From 2002-2006 to 2007-2011 the volume of arms supplies to Southeast Asia increased 3 times. Naval equipment and naval aviation aircraft accounted for a significant share of deliveries and outstanding orders to Burnei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. Piracy, illegal fishing and terrorism are determinants of the types and amounts of weapons these states need. However, the defense white papers, the types of weapons acquired in 2007-2011, and in particular the low-key maritime confrontation in disputed waters suggest that territorial disputes in the South China Sea play the most important role in supply decisions. States in the region are also taking steps to ensure technology transfer and diversify their sources of supply. Suppliers are increasingly eager to meet the demands of Southeast Asian states for widespread technology transfer through arms deals or partnerships to develop new weapons systems.

The recent acquisitions, orders and procurement plans of Armenia and Azerbaijan potentially raise the risk of renewed conflict over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has significantly increased the volume of arms imports against the backdrop of aggressive rhetoric about the use of force in the settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In recent years, there is only limited information about the Armenian import of tools in the public domain, but during 2010 and 2011. Armenia announced plans to purchase more advanced weapons systems in connection with the sharp increase in Azerbaijan's purchases. Each of the two states was quick to draw attention to the other side's procurement and military spending, and characterized its adversary's actions as the state's intention to continue the arms race. Although the OSCE's voluntary arms embargo remains in place, OSCE member states interpret its statute in different ways, and arms continue to be supplied to both sides. Russia is the largest supplier for both sides, although Azerbaijan has recently struck landmark production license agreements and deals with Israel, South Africa and Turkey as it seeks to use foreign technology to develop its own military industry.

The number of states reporting their arms imports and exports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms increased to 85 in 2011; the lowest ever indicator (72 States) was recorded in 2010. The number of reports from the Americas increased markedly, but only one message came from Africa, which was also the lowest figure since the existence of the UN Register. More states have published national reports on arms exports; among them was Poland, which in 2011 published its first report. A number of states also publish data on the monetary value of their arms exports.

Models of organized violence

Previously, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UPDC) provided information on patterns of "major armed conflicts", defined as conflicts in which the use of armed force by two parties (at least one of which is the government of a state) on the battlefield at least 1,000 people died during the calendar year. Now the subject of analysis has been changed and expanded to include three types of organized violence “armed conflicts”, “non-state conflicts” and unilateral violence.” Inclusion in the data set of cases of use of force by both state and non-state actors directed against other states by non-state groups or the civilian population, allows you to look at the issue of organized violence more broadly.

Of the three types of organized violence, the definition of an armed conflict is closest to that of a major armed conflict. The difference is that instead of a threshold of 1,000 battlefield deaths in one calendar year, the minimum is set at 25 deaths during the same period. In non-state conflicts, unlike armed conflict, where at least one of the parties must be a state, only non-state armed groups take part, which may be formally or informally organized. The third category, unilateral violence, is a targeted attack on civilians by a state or an organized group.

From 2001 to 2010, there were 69 armed conflicts, 221 non-state conflicts and 127 actors involved in unilateral violence. In total, more than 400 cases of violence were recorded, each of which led to the death of at least 25 people a year. The scale of organized violence at the end of the decade has decreased compared to its beginning, although its reduction cannot be called significant. In addition, while large fluctuations in the number of conflicts were recorded during the 1990s, a different picture was observed in the first decade of the 21st century. The downward trend may be an encouraging indicator of how the situation will develop in the future. Within the general trend, each of the three types of violence has its own internal dynamics, but also depends on the dynamics of the other two types. The full picture is of course more complex, however clear indications that thier types of violence cancel each other out, i.e. reduction in one type leads to an increase in the other two, not fixed.

Rice. 2.1 Number of armed, non-state conflicts, and cases of unilateral violence in the period 2001-2010

Armed conflicts

As already noted, an armed conflict is defined as a struggle between the armed forces of two parties, one of which is the government of a state, for establishing control over the government and / or territory, during which at least 25 people died on the battlefield during the calendar year . An armed conflict in which at least 1,000 people die on the battlefield during a calendar year is defined as "War"; other armed conflicts are classified as "minor armed conflicts". This definition includes conflicts of low intensity that are active for one year or several years, such as the territorial conflict between the religious political movement "Bungu dia Congo" and the Government of the Congo (2007-2008) and conflicts of high intensity that are active for over a long period of time, such as the conflict over control of state power in Afghanistan, in which successive governments have been fighting against a number of insurgent groups since 1978.

In 2001-2010 There were 69 active armed conflicts, 30 of which were active in 2010. In general, the average annual number of conflicts has slightly decreased over the specified period, but this reduction is not uniform - the largest number of conflicts was recorded in 2008. It is noteworthy that the number of wars has significantly decreased. So, if in 2001 there were 10 wars (28% of the total), then in 2010 there were only four wars (13% of the total). The longest wars were fought between the government and the Taliban, as well as the Iraqi government and many insurgent groups: both of these conflicts reached the level of war within seven years out of 10 (the conflict in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2005-2010, in Iraq - in 2004-2010).

UPDC distinguishes three types of armed conflicts: interstate, intrastate and internationalized intrastate. Intrastate conflicts are by far the most common, their share in the period under review did not fall below 70%, and in most cases exceeded 80% of all conflicts. Interstate conflicts are the least common. In 2001-2010 only three conflicts of this type have been recorded: between India and Pakistan (2001-2003), Iraq and the United States with allies (2003), as well as Djibouti and Eritrea (2008). However, despite the fact that interstate conflicts do not happen often, they should not be neglected. Compared to insurgent groups, governments have the ability to mobilize vast resources, whereby conflicts between states can quickly escalate and result in loss of life.

Internationalized intrastate conflicts are becoming more and more common. Since 2001, they can be divided into two large groups:

· conflicts related to the "global war on terrorism" declared by the United States (wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda);

cases of intervention of the government of any state in the internal conflicts of neighboring countries (the conflict between India and the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, during which the government received the support of neighboring Myanmar; the conflict between the government of Angola and the National Union for the Complete Independence of Angola, UNITA, in during which Nambian troops sided with the government).

Table 2.1 Armed conflicts by intensity, type and region 2001-2010

Non-state conflicts

A non-state conflict is defined as the use of military force between two organized groups (neither of which is the government of any state) in which the death toll on the battlefield was at least 25 in a calendar year.

According to the level of organization of the groups involved, non-state conflicts are divided into three subtypes:

· conflicts between formally organized entities such as insurgent groups;

· conflicts between informally organized supporters and adherents of political parties and candidates;

· Conflicts between unofficially organized groups formed along ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal lines.

Thus, non-state conflicts include a wide range of forms of violence, which tend to have a serious impact on the lives of ordinary people, but are often of less importance for international relations than armed conflicts.

From 2001 to 2010, there were a total of 221 non-state conflicts in the world, of which 26 were active in 2010. This decade saw a decrease in the number of active non-state conflicts, but, as in the case of armed conflicts, this decrease was not uniform.

Table 2.2 Armed non-state conflicts by subcategories and regions, 2001-2010

And here are some more interesting statistics on armed non-state conflicts in 2001-2010.

Rice. 2.2 Average number of casualties in non-state conflicts, 2001-2010

Rice. 2.3 Sub-categories of non-state conflicts by region, 2001-2010

One-sided violence

Unilateral violence is defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or a formally organized group against unorganized civilians, resulting in the death of at least 25 people. The category of unilateral violence includes situations ranging from daily small-scale attacks to large-scale attacks such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Tab. 2.2 Unilateral violence by participant and region, 2001-2010

A total of 127 unilateral actors were registered between 2001 and 2010, of which 18 were active in 2010. The total number of actors whose acts of violence were directed against civilians dropped significantly over the decade, from 30 in 2001 to 18 in 2010, the peak of their growth (46) occurred in 2002.

How the comparison between all three categories of organized violence can be seen in the next test site.

Rice. 2.4 Losses by category of organized violence, 2001-2010

Arms control

Despite the fact that all states are concerned about the question of whether their military capabilities are capable of becoming an effective counter to threats (real or perceived as such), they are also eager to discuss the limitations imposed on the development of each other's military capabilities. Barring some progress that could be seen in South America and Southeast Europe, most arms control developments in 2011 were not very promising as states were unwilling to change their positions to facilitate agreements both globally and globally. at the regional level.

Three key factors make it difficult to improve conventional arms control.

Firstly, the huge and ever-increasing injection of the US into its potential makes it impossible to find balanced solutions. Moreover, the US military strategy itself, with its growing emphasis on flexible "projected forces", poses a threat to regional arms control.

Secondly, given a number of developments related to technological development, it is not yet entirely clear what military capabilities will provide military power now and in the future. For example, questions about the potential impact of cyber weapons and missile defense systems have made it difficult to define the scope of arms control as nations now try to better understand the implications of whatever restrictions they may adopt.

Thirdly, the absence of agreed rules on the use of force - and it can be used, as often declared, ostensibly for constructive purposes, and not only as defensive measures in response to aggression - does not at all encourage countries to give up their military capabilities, even by virtue of humanitarian arguments for a policy of restraint.

For some weapons, such as anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, states have found it difficult to balance their own military security goals with humanitarian interests. The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Convention and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) are examples of agreements based on the principle that even if a given weapon provides some military advantage, it should still be limited or prohibited because of the humanitarian consequences of its uses outweigh any military benefit.

The Vientiane Action Plan, adopted in 2010 as a guide to the implementation of the CCM, is an example of what is referred to as "practical disarmament". It aims to facilitate the transition to a peaceful life in post-conflict areas by ensuring that weapons are adequately guarded, or by collecting and destroying weapons that are considered redundant or pose an unacceptable threat to civilian populations and block economic recovery in post-conflict areas.

A number of conventional arms control processes have sought to ensure control over the military activities of states by making the export of certain military products illegal without first assessing the risk associated with the transfer of weapons to the relevant government authorities of the exporting countries. Efforts to improve the technical effectiveness of export control systems continued in 2011 through global and regional organizations, as well as informal regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, the general approach to assessing acceptable risk remains rather vague and differs from the main guidelines agreed in the 1990s.

Export controls do not involve denying shipments, and even when a particular transaction is denied, the decision does not serve as a signal of condemnation for the country or organization that was denied. Unlike export controls, arms embargoes - broad restrictions placed on the supply or receipt of certain types of weapons by a designated party in a contract - are restrictive measures that express disapproval or are intended to change the behavior of an entity. The UN Security Council imposed another new arms embargo on Libya in 2011, which is mandatory for all countries, but failed to agree on an arms embargo on Syria. At the same time, the Arab League (LAS) and the European Union imposed an arms embargo on Syria.

The most well-developed conventional arms control regime is in Europe, where it functions as a self-limiting measure aimed at promoting strategic stability and establishing a balance of military power in the region. In addition to having an important impact on the size and composition of the armed forces in the post-Cold War period, the arms control regime has provided a framework from which European countries can discuss the military-technical dimensions of security in Europe. The decisions taken in 2011 signaled that the main actors - in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as in Russia - no longer believe that the consequences of key contemporary developments in the military-technical sphere can be discussed at the regional level. However, they still did not agree on the question of whether these discussions should be moved to a bilateral basis, and how this should be done.

So, in the conventional arms control system, there are measures aimed at limiting the operational capabilities of the armed forces or at making the activities of the armed forces transparent in order to enhance stability and predictability. While these measures do not impose restrictions on the size and structure of the armed forces, they can act as important confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The greatest activity in this area in 2011 was observed in Europe, where states agreed to an updated version of the Vienna Document on ISDB, and in South America, where states approved a series of confidence- and security-building measures aimed at furthering the broader goal of creating a common common security systems in the region.

Bibliography

1. SIPRI Yearbook 2012 // Armaments, disarmament and international security. - 2012

2. Karyakin, V.V. Problems of National Strategy No. 2 (17) // Militarization of International Politics. - 2013 - 204 - 208 Art.

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The militarization of the economies of the imperialist states is inextricably linked with the strengthening of state-monopoly tendencies.

In its developed form, the militarization of the economy is typical only for the era of the general crisis of capitalism with its world wars. It becomes possible because the state

The private apparatus is used by the monopolies to redistribute the national income (direct and indirect taxes, government loans, control over the distribution of strategic raw materials and materials, etc.) in order to create a grand military economy. The reason for such a truly "total" militarization, of which Germany in 1933-1939 can serve as an example, is and the United States after the Second World War lies in the strengthening of the basic contradictions of modern monopoly capitalism. The largest corporations are persistently trying to solve the sales problem at the expense of state military demand. They are deeply interested in the arms race, which provides them with billions of dollars of super-profits.

The enormous expenditures of the imperialist states on military needs for a certain time lessen the acuteness of the problem of sales.

But the militarization of the economy cannot be explained solely by economic reasons. It is inextricably linked with the general course of the domestic and foreign policy of the imperialist states. It is known that as a result of the global economic crisis of 1929-1933. many monopolies both in the USA and in Germany turned out to be equally interested in military orders. However, at that time, Hitlerite Germany took the path of forced militarization of the economy, subordinating its domestic and foreign policy to the preparation of a war for world domination. After the Second World War, the main instigator of the militarization of the economy was the United States of America.

Is it necessary to say that the social system, which uses the production of weapons of mass destruction as a means of "stimulating" the economy, from the point of view of morality, pronounces a death sentence on itself!

But it's not just about morality. This policy is not only criminal, but ultimately futile, because it does not resolve the fundamental contradictions of modern capitalism.

An increase in state military orders sometimes represents a lever for raising the general level of production, including civilian production; it can temporarily to promote a certain increase in the wages of workers, especially those employed in the military industry. This takes place, as a rule, when military production is expanded through the use of idle capacities and capital. The unemployed who get jobs in the war industry increase the demand for goods. To meet this demand, it becomes necessary to increase production in other industries. The demand of the capitalists is also growing, especially if, counting on the growing military orders, they begin to expand old and build new enterprises, for which

Rykh building materials, machines, equipment are required.

It was on this basis that unloaded production facilities in the United States were used during the Second World War. From 1940 to 1943, the volume of industrial output here grew by 90%, the number of workers in the manufacturing industry increased by 70%. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 also stimulated the growth of US industrial production. But the US example also shows the contradictions and limits of the militarization of the economy. Even during the Second World War in the United States, the period of simultaneous growth of military and non-military production was short-lived. Then began the decline in output for non-military purposes. Long before the end of the war, a situation arose in which civilian production had exhausted its possibilities for growth and had to be reduced. Since 1944, there has already been a general decline in industrial production, since the growth in the production of military materials no longer blocked the curtailment of production for non-military needs. The same thing happened during the Korean War.

The short-term stimulating effect of militarization on the overall growth of production is also explained by the methods of its financing. In the initial period, the state increases the military budget not only through taxes, but also through the issuance of government bonds, which are readily acquired by the bourgeoisie, which has free cash. But then the budget is more and more provided by an increase in taxes on workers and employees. The growth of demand from the state under such conditions is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in the effective demand of the population, and this leads to a narrowing of the market for civilian industries.

How insignificant the incentives created by the arms race in the conditions of the post-war militarized economy of the United States can be seen from the fact that in 1943-1957. US industrial production increased by only 13%. But even this small increase is by no means explained by the influence of militarization alone. No less important was the need for massive renovation and expansion of fixed capital in industry and other sectors of the economy.

While in the United States the total volume of production increased as a result of the war and militarization, in the countries whose territory was involved in the orbit of hostilities, the economic consequences of the war and the post-war militarization of the economy were different. Huge military spending not only did not accelerate, but slowed down the post-war recovery of the economy

France and England. Although as a percentage of national income, military spending in these countries is less than in the United States, but on their weakened economy, they fall a much heavier burden. Military spending eats up resources that could be used to modernize and expand industry. Thus, militarization weakened the competitive ability of England and France in the world market.

Marx wrote about war that “in the direct economic sense, this is the same as if a nation threw a part of his capital" 2 . But at the time when Marx wrote about this, even during the war years, such a quantity of material values ​​was not thrown into the bottomless sea of ​​military expenditures, which is now squandered in most capitalist countries in times of peace. Indeed, after the Second World War, in the imperialist states with the most militarized economies, the military budget annually absorbs an average of 10-15% of the national income.

The militarization of the economy is accompanied by a reduction in production for peaceful purposes, undermines the basis of expanded reproduction, and inevitably leads in the final analysis to a decrease in the total volume of production. At the same time, the rapid progress of military technology and the associated rapid “obsolescence” of modern weapons force us to constantly reproduce weapons on a mass scale, which after a few years becomes unusable and turns into mountains of rubbish and scrap iron.

No matter how rich an imperialist country is, militarization creates the prospect of gradual depletion of the national economy. She inevitably slows down growth civilian industries and the economy as a whole. To be convinced of this, it suffices to compare the rates of growth in production after the Second World War in England and France, whose economies were bent under the unreasonable burden of militarization, and in West Germany, where expenditures on armaments were incomparably lower for a number of years. In West Germany, industrial production grew much faster. This country made the most efficient use of the shortage of fixed capital that had arisen in most capitalist countries. Beginning in 1950, it expanded on a large scale the export of machinery, machine tools and equipment, which the British and French armaments factories could not produce.

The militarization of the economy causes an unprecedented increase in the tax burden. The state buys arms and pays

In addition to taxes, a certain proportion of the funds that the government spends on the army, it collects with the help of state loans. Loan bonds are purchased mainly by capitalists. Interest on loans paid annually by the treasury is an important source of their income. But in order to pay interest to the capitalists and repay loans, the government must levy additional taxes. Thus the money with which the bourgeoisie supplies the government by acquiring government bonds is returned to it from the pockets of the working people not only in full, but also with a large percentage.

The inevitable companion of the militarized economy and its most important tool is depreciation of money or inflation. The state cannot fully cover the cost of the army and armaments only through taxes and loans. The deficit of the state budget is partly covered by the issuance of paper money in excess of the amount required by circulation. In addition, government bonds are used as means of payment, as collateral for loans granted by banks to capitalists, and this leads to an increase in the amount of money in circulation. Hence inflation is a common consequence of wars and the militarization of the economy. In 1957, the purchasing power of the American dollar was two times lower than the pre-war level, the British pound sterling was three times lower, the French franc and the Italian lira were several dozen times lower. Under conditions of inflation, price increases outstrip wage growth, which means that the profits of the capitalists increase at the expense of a decrease in the share of workers in the national income. Inflation is a means of redistributing national income in favor of monopolies and robbing the working people.

Thus, military spending, in whatever form it may be financed, ultimately bears its full weight on the broad masses of the people. But they serve to enrich the big capitalists.

The militarization of the economy leads to the fact that the expenses of the capitalist state for social and cultural needs (schools, higher educational institutions, hospitals, etc.) are reduced to a minimum. It gives rise to the degradation of culture, rampant chauvinism, the growth of the influence of the military and the bureaucracy, trampling on all the achievements of bourgeois democracy won as a result of the stubborn struggle of the working masses. A dangerous consequence of a militarized economy is the threat of war.

Protection from external enemies is one of the main ones. For these purposes, a military budget is being created, which allows maintaining the army, modernizing it, conducting it. But the threat to peaceful existence comes when the militarization of the economy begins. The result is an increase in the size of the army, military equipment. The threat is that any provocation - and the state can use its military potential. What is militarization? This will be discussed in this article.

What is the militarization of the economy

Militarization is the process of increasing the military sector in the country's total output. As a rule, this happens to the detriment of other areas. This is a kind of "military" economy. Let's take an example from history.

The militarization of Europe at the turn of the century

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries, militarization was observed. Of course, the German Kaiser was not the only one who armed his country, almost all countries of Europe, including Russia, did this.

The Franco-Prussian War and, as a result, huge indemnities and the annexation of two industrial regions (Alsace and Lorraine) to Germany made it possible to concentrate huge fortunes in the hands of German bankers. The industrial magnates faced two problems:

1. Lack of markets for their products, because Germany joined the colonial division later than others.
2. Lack of an agricultural sector due to lack of agricultural land.

These reasons influenced the mood of the German financial magnates. They wanted:

1. Sell ​​your products.
2. Own agricultural land.
3. Strengthen your position within the state.

The only way out is the militarization of the economy. This solved all the problems at once:

1. The state acquires industrial products, which consist mainly of ammunition, weapons, guns, ships.
2. A combat-ready army is being created that is capable of changing the colonial division of the world, capturing markets, agricultural lands in the east.

All this ended with the First World War. The second attempt to militarize the German economy when Hitler came to power led to World War II. The third attempt to build up armaments of the USSR and the USA almost led to a nuclear war that would have destroyed our planet.

Threats of modernity

The militarization of the economy is not a thing of the past. Today we observe that many countries are actively arming themselves. These are mainly the USA, China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Arab Southeast Asia. The DPRK has a huge army of a million people.

Russia - a threat to the world?

No matter how it sounds, but it is our country that overtakes all the major countries of the world in militarization of the economy. The share of the military budget is 5.4% of our country's GDP. For example, China spends about 2%, the US - just over 3%, India - just over 2%. Huge funds go to Saudi Arabia - 13.7% of GDP. The leader is the DPRK - more than 15%.

Despite the fact that Russia has such a seemingly huge share of the military budget of GDP, it is not worth falling into hysteria and shouting that our country poses a threat to the world. Everything needs to be analyzed carefully.

The fact is that in terms of money the military budget of our country is not so huge. It is approximately 66 billion dollars. For example, the military is almost 10 times larger - about 600 billion dollars. China - more than 200 billion. Thus, in monetary terms, we are not among the leaders. There are several reasons for the high share of the military budget:

1. Weak economy.
2. Huge territories.
3. The absence of a decade of development of the army.

The last point, according to President VV Putin, is the key one. Our country after the collapse of the USSR and until the early 2000s. gg. almost lost the army. The military campaign in Chechnya is indicative in this respect. The lack of modern weapons, professional military, the latest aircraft and helicopters, let's add here the unprofessionalism of the generals, the lack of military exercises - all led to huge losses in the Chechen Republic.

That is why Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that today's militarization of the economy is catching up on lost time for modernization.

conclusions

So, let's sum up. The militarization of the economy is a significant increase in the share of the military budget as a percentage of GDP. This is important to understand. An increase in the military budget, provided that the economy as a whole is growing, does not yet speak of militarization. Conversely, if the military budget decreases in real terms, but its percentage of GDP grows, then such an economy can be called a militarized one.

It is a mistake to believe that militarization is synonymous with aggressiveness. The build-up of military potential, on the contrary, may be the result of hostility on the part of other states. For example, the growth of the army in South Korea is associated with aggressive threats coming from the DPRK. Militarization in Russia is not at all connected with the desire to unleash a war in the future, but with a ten-year absence of modernization of our army.