Introduction

Chapter I. Essence and concepts of diplomatic conflict in the system of international relations

1.1 Definition of conflict and diplomatic conflict

1.2 State border and the right to challenge it by another country

Chapter II. Russo-Japanese conflict over the Kuril Islands

2.1 History of the conflict: causes and stages of development

2.2 The development of the conflict at the present time: the positions of the parties and the search for a solution

Conclusion

List of sources used

Introduction

Political conflicts have always played an important and, undoubtedly, ambiguous role in the global diplomatic community. Particularly noteworthy are disputes over the ownership of territories, especially as long-term as the diplomatic conflict between the Russian Federation and Japan over the ownership of the South Kuril Islands. This is what determines relevance this work.

The course work is written in a simple and understandable language for the general public. It has not only theoretical, but also practical value: the material can be used as a reference note when preparing for an exam in history or the basics of the theory of international relations on the topic of issues of Russian-Japanese relations.

So, we have set purpose:

Analyze the existing problem of belonging to the Kuril Islands and suggest possible solutions to this problem.

The goal determined and specific tasks works:

ñ Collect theoretical material on this topic by analyzing and systematizing information;

ñ Form the positions of each side in the diplomatic conflict;

ñ Draw conclusions.

In order to facilitate the perception of incoming information, we divided all the work into three stages.

diplomatic conflict Kuril Island

The first stage consisted in the definition of key theoretical concepts (such as conflict, state border, the right to own territory). He formed the conceptual foundation of this work.

At the second stage, we considered the history of Russian-Japanese relations in the issue of the Kuril Islands; the Russo-Japanese conflict itself, its causes, prerequisites, development. We devoted special attention to the present time: we analyzed the state and development of the conflict at the current stage.

At the final stage, conclusions were drawn.

Chapter I. Essence and concepts of diplomatic conflict in the system of international relations

1.1 Definition of conflict and diplomatic conflict

Humanity has been familiar with conflict since its inception. Disputes and wars broke out throughout the historical development of society between tribes, cities, countries, blocs of states. They were generated by religious, cultural, ideological, ethnic, territorial and other contradictions. As the German military theorist and historian K. von Clausewitz noted, the history of the world is the history of wars. And although such a definition of history suffers from a certain absolutization, there is no doubt that the role and place of conflicts in human history are more than significant. The end of the Cold War in 1989 once again gave rise to rosy predictions about the advent of an era of conflict-free existence on the planet. It seemed that with the disappearance of the confrontation between the two superpowers - the USSR and the USA - regional conflicts and the threat of a third world war would sink into oblivion. However, the hopes for a calmer and more comfortable world were once again not destined to come true.

So, from the foregoing, it follows that conflict is the most acute way to resolve contradictions in interests, goals, views, arising in the process of social interaction, consisting in the opposition of the participants in this interaction, and usually accompanied by negative emotions, going beyond the rules and norms. Conflicts are the subject of study of the science of conflictology. Consequently, states that have opposing points of view on the subject of the dispute participate in an international conflict.

When countries try to resolve a conflict diplomatically - that is, without the use of military action - their actions are aimed primarily at finding a compromise at the negotiating table, which can be very difficult. There is an explanation for this: often the leaders of states simply do not want to make concessions to each other - they are satisfied with some semblance of armed neutrality; also, one cannot take into account the causes of the conflict, its history and, in fact, the subject of the dispute. National characteristics and needs play an important role in the development of the conflict - in the aggregate, this can significantly slow down the search for a compromise between the participating countries.

1.2 State border and the right to challenge it by another country

Let's define the state border:

State border - a line and a vertical surface passing along this line, defining the limits of the state territory (land, water, subsoil and airspace) of the country, that is, the spatial limit of the state sovereignty.

The following statement indirectly follows from the definition - the state protects its sovereignty, and, consequently, its air and land resources. Historically, one of the most motivating reasons for military action is precisely the division of territories and resources.

1.3 Right to own territories

The question of the legal nature of the state territory presupposes the answer that there is a state territory from a legal point of view, more precisely, that there is a state territory from an international legal point of view.

The state territory is a part of the Earth's surface, lawfully belonging to a certain state, within which it exercises its supremacy. In other words, state sovereignty underlies the legal nature of the state territory. Under international law, a territory is linked to its population. The state territory and its population are necessary attributes of the state.

Territorial supremacy means the complete and exclusive power of the state in its territory. This means that the public authority of another power cannot act on the territory of a particular state.

Trends in the development of modern international law indicate that the state is free in the right to use its territorial supremacy to the extent that the rights and legitimate interests of other states are not affected.

The concept of state jurisdiction is narrower in scope than the concept of territorial supremacy. Under the jurisdiction of the state is understood the right of its judicial and administrative bodies to consider and resolve any cases within its borders, in contrast to the territorial supremacy, which means the fullness of state power in a certain territory.

Chapter II. Russo-Japanese conflict over the Kuril Islands

2.1 History of the conflict: causes and stages of development

The main problem on the way to reaching an agreement is Japan's territorial claims to the southern Kuril Islands (Iturup Island, Kunashir Island and the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula and the island of Hokkaido (Japan), which separate the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. They consist of two parallel ridges of islands - Big Kuril and Malaya Kuril 4 . The first information about the Kuril Islands was reported by the Russian explorer Vladimir Atlasov.

In the 70s. In the 18th century, permanent Russian settlements existed in the Kuriles under the command of the Irkutsk tradesman Vasily Zvezdochetov. On the map of 1809, the Kuriles and Kamchatka were attributed to the Irkutsk province. In the 18th century, the peaceful colonization of Sakhalin, the Kuriles and the northeast of Hokkaido by Russians was largely completed.

In parallel with the development of the Kuriles by Russia, the Japanese were advancing to the Northern Kuriles. Reflecting the Japanese onslaught, in 1795 Russia built a fortified military camp on Urup Island.

By 1804, dual power had actually developed in the Kuriles: the influence of Russia was more strongly felt in the Northern Kuriles, and Japan's influence in the Southern Kuriles. But formally, all the Kuriles still belonged to Russia.

February 1855 was signed the first Russian-Japanese treaty - the Treatise on Trade and Borders. He proclaimed relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, opened three Japanese ports for Russian ships and established a border in the South Kuriles between the islands of Urup and Iturup.

In 1875, Russia signed a Russian-Japanese treaty, according to which it ceded 18 Kuril Islands to Japan. Japan, in turn, recognized the island of Sakhalin as wholly owned by Russia.

From 1875 to 1945 the Kuril Islands were under the control of Japan.

On February 1945, an agreement was signed between the leaders of the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain - Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, according to which, after the end of the war against Japan, the Kuril Islands should be transferred to the Soviet Union.

On September 1945, Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, by which its sovereignty was limited to the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido, as well as to the smaller islands of the Japanese archipelago. The islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai went to the Soviet Union.

On February 1946, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Kuril Islands Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai were included in the USSR.

On September 1951, at an international conference in San Francisco, a peace treaty was concluded between Japan and 48 countries participating in the anti-fascist coalition, according to which Japan renounced all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. The Soviet delegation did not sign this treaty, referring to the fact that it regards it as a separate agreement between the US and Japanese governments.

From the point of view of treaty law, the question of the ownership of the South Kuriles remained uncertain. The Kuriles ceased to be Japanese, but did not become Soviet. Using this circumstance, Japan in 1955 presented the USSR with claims to all the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin. As a result of two years of negotiations between the USSR and Japan, the positions of the parties drew closer: Japan limited its claims to the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup.

On October 1956, the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan on the termination of the state of war between the two states and the restoration of diplomatic and consular relations was signed in Moscow. In it, in particular, the Soviet government agreed to the transfer of Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan.

After the conclusion of the Japanese-American security treaty in 1960, the USSR annulled the obligations assumed by the declaration of 1956. During the Cold War, Moscow did not recognize the existence of a territorial problem between the two countries. The presence of this problem was first recorded in the Joint Statement of 1991, signed following the visit of the President of the USSR to Tokyo.

In 1993, in Tokyo, the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan signed the Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations, which recorded the agreement of the parties to continue negotiations with the aim of concluding a peace treaty as soon as possible by resolving the issue of ownership of the islands mentioned above 5 .

2.2 The development of the conflict at the present time: the positions of the parties and the search for a solution

In recent years, in order to create at the talks an atmosphere conducive to the search for mutually acceptable solutions, the parties have been paying great attention to establishing practical Russian-Japanese interaction and cooperation in the region of the islands. One of the results of this work was the beginning of the implementation in September 1999 of an agreement on the most facilitated procedure for visiting the islands by their former residents from among Japanese citizens and members of their families. Cooperation in the fisheries sector is carried out on the basis of the current Russian-Japanese Fishing Agreement near the southern Kuriles dated February 21, 1998.

The Japanese side puts forward claims to the southern Kuril Islands, motivating them with references to the Russian-Japanese Treaty on Trade and Borders of 1855, according to which these islands were recognized as Japanese, and also to the fact that these territories are not part of the Kuril Islands, from which Japan refused the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Japan made the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries dependent on the resolution of the territorial dispute.

The position of the Russian side on the issue of border delimitation is that the southern Kuril Islands passed to our country as a result of the Second World War on a legal basis in accordance with the agreements of the allied powers (Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945, Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 d.) and Russian sovereignty over them, which has the appropriate international legal design, is not subject to doubt.

Reaffirming its commitment to the previously reached agreements on holding negotiations on a peace treaty, including the issue of border delimitation, the Russian side emphasizes that the solution to this problem should be mutually acceptable, not damage the sovereignty and national interests of Russia, and receive the support of the public and the parliaments of both countries.

Despite all the measures taken, a recent visit by D.A. Medvedev on November 1, 2010, the disputed territory caused an uproar in the Japanese media; Thus, the Japanese government turned to the Russian president with a request to cancel the event in order to avoid aggravating relations between the countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation refused the request. In particular, the message of the diplomatic department noted that "the President of Russia independently determines the routes of travel through the territory of his country," and advice on this matter "from the outside" is inappropriate and unacceptable 7 .

Conclusion

The problem remains a problem. Russia and Japan have been living without any peace treaty since the Second World War - this is unacceptable from a diplomatic point of view. Moreover, normal trade and economic relations and political interaction are possible if the issue of the Kuril Islands is fully resolved. The final point, perhaps, will help to put a vote among the population of the disputed Kuril Islands, because first of all, you need to listen to the opinion of the people.

The only key to mutual understanding between the two countries is the creation of a climate of trust, trust and again trust, as well as broad mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of politics, economics and culture. To reduce the distrust accumulated over the centuries to zero and start moving towards trust with a plus is the key to the success of a peaceful neighborhood and tranquility in the border sea areas of Russia and Japan. Will current politicians be able to realize this opportunity? Will show time.

List of sources used

1. Azrilyan A. Legal Dictionary. - M.: Institute of New Economics, 2009 - 1152 p.

2. Antsupov A.Ya., Shipilov A.I. Meaning, subject and tasks of conflictology. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2008 - 496 p.

Biryukov P.N. International law. - M.: Jurist, 2008 - 688 p.

Zuev M.N. Russian history. - M.: Yurayt, 2011 - 656 p.

Klyuchnikov Yu.V., Sabanin A. International politics of modern times in contracts, notes and declarations. Part 2. - M.: Reprint edition, 1925 - 415 p.

Turovsky R.F. political regionalism. - M.: GUVSHE, 2006 - 792 p.

The issue of ownership of the Kuril Islands is as ancient as the Russian-Japanese relations themselves, however, despite its age, it still remains relevant. "First Unofficial" figured out how the Kuril issue developed throughout its history.

The problem of ownership of the Kuril Islands is no less than 230 years old. During this time, the disputed territories were part of both states claiming them, and for some time were jointly owned. At the moment, the situation is as follows: the entire Kuril ridge is part of Russia, but the Japanese side does not agree with this state of affairs.

The Kuril Islands are valuable primarily for the minerals that are hidden in their bowels. There are deposits of rare earth metals, which are practically indispensable in the chemical, nuclear, steel and oil industries, mechanical engineering and radio electronics, as well as in the production of explosives. For example, in the Kuril Islands there is a rich deposit of rhenium - an extremely refractory metal and resistant to chemical reagents. Rhenium is used in the manufacture of high-octane commercial gasoline, self-cleaning electrical contacts, and jet engines. Being part of the alloy, rhenium enhances the strength of the part, so its use is necessary in the manufacture of everything that should be heavy-duty: space satellites, rockets, aircraft. The total resources of gold in the Kuril Islands are estimated at 1867 tons, silver - 9284 tons, titanium - 39.7 million tons, iron - 273 million tons.

In the waters surrounding the Kuril Islands, there are a large number of commercial fish, crabs, mollusks and squids, which form the basis of the Japanese diet.

For Russia, the geopolitical significance of the South Kuril Islands is especially important as control points for the situation in the Pacific Ocean. The ice-free straits between the islands of the southern ridge are very valuable to our fleet.

A long time ago

In 1707, together with the announcement of the annexation of Kamchatka to Russia, Peter the Great issued a decree on surveying the surrounding areas - the Kuril Islands and Japan. On August 1, 1711, Danila Antsiferov and Ivan Kozyrevsky, with a detachment of 50 Cossacks and one Japanese guide, who had once suffered a shipwreck, left Bolsheretsk and headed for the Kuril Islands. They explored the island of Shumshu and Paramushir. In 1713 and 1721 two more expeditions took place. In total, five islands of the Kuril chain were surveyed. Then, after the death of Peter, members of the Bering expedition made a topographic survey of the Kuril Islands and the northern coast of Japan, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and Kamchatka.

For some time, the Russians and the Japanese managed to ignore each other's presence on the islands: Russian and Japanese merchants "entered" the future disputed territory from different ends and established trade contacts with the local population - the Ainu.

On May 4, 1786, Tokunai (a representative of the Japanese principality of Matsumae), having arrived in the Kuriles, met with the Russian expedition and asked who they were and where they came from. One of the Russians, whose surname in Japanese sources is rendered as "Ijuyo" (which most likely corresponds to the Russian surname "Ezhov" written in katakana), replied that he and 60 other people arrived on Urup Island to fish and hunt. Tokunai then asked if the Russians were aware that the Japanese government banned foreigners from entering the country. Ijuyo answered him: “We know. However, this is not Japan. There are no Japanese government bodies on Iturup or Urup.”

In 1798, a Japanese expedition set up pillars with the inscription "the possession of great Japan" on Iturup, overturning the Russian border pillars already standing there. In 1800, a government official Kondo arrived at Iturup and established a kind of Japanese prefecture there. Since the Russians preferred to make Urup their campsite, the strait between the two islands became a kind of dividing line between the two states. But in 1807, the Russians also left Urup, and since then the Japanese garrison, consisting of 30 Japanese soldiers, has constantly been on the island.

For some time, the Kuril issue lost its relevance: the Russian Empire was busy with events in Europe. Negotiations resumed only in 1855 with the conclusion of the first official diplomatic agreement between Russia and Japan - the Shimoda Treaty. The second article of the agreement stated that “from now on, the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Urup and Iturup. The whole island of Iturup belongs to Japan, and the island of Urup and the rest of the Kuril Islands to the north are the possession of Russia. Sakhalin remained jointly owned by the two countries.

The problem of post-war settlement

On February 11, 1945, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed an agreement under which the USSR undertook, after the surrender of Germany, to enter the war with Japan on the side of the allies already at war with her. Stalin agreed to wage war with Japan only on condition that all Russian losses in the Portsmouth peace be compensated. The return of the southern part of Sakhalin Island to the Soviet Union and the transfer of the Kuril Islands were stipulated.

On July 26, 1945, China, the United States, and Great Britain adopted the Potsdam Declaration outlining the terms of Japan's surrender. One of its conditions was the implementation of the Cairo Declaration of December 3, 1943, which provided for the limitation of Japanese sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku.

In its act of surrender on September 2, 1945, Japan unconditionally recognized the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration mentioned therein. It would seem that the solution to the issue has been found and there is nothing more to argue about.

However, during the preparation of the peace treaty with Japan, relations between the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition cooled, and at the insistence of the United States, the text of the San Francisco peace treaty was as general as possible and contained very little specifics. For example, Japan had to renounce all rights to the Kuril Islands, but under whose jurisdiction they should go, the contract was not spelled out.

In 1956, the USSR and Japan again found themselves at the negotiating table, which resulted in the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956, according to which the state of war ended between the two states (more than 10 years after the end of hostilities!) And good neighborly relations were established. The USSR, demonstrating its desire to improve relations with its eastern neighbor as soon as possible, offered Japan two of the disputed four islands - Shikotan and Habomai. Unfortunately, the signing of the peace agreement did not take place: one of the conditions for the transfer of the islands was the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of the Japanese state. However, the American military base is still located on about. Okinawa is not going to move yet.

The current state of affairs

Since 1956, there has been no significant progress in resolving the Kuril issue. Russia and Japan periodically hold bilateral meetings at different levels, during which they decide to "continue to negotiate." For Russia, at the moment, the concept of 1956 is working - the transfer of two islands in exchange for reciprocal concessions. Not so long ago, a representative of the Japanese government spoke about the potential possibility of the Japanese side agreeing to such a scenario, but no official statements were made. Moreover, Japan's main line on the issue of the Kuril Islands remains very rigid: the islands of the South Kuril chain are considered "illegally occupied" and must be returned to Japan as its "original territories."

Most likely, in the next few years the problem of belonging to the Kuril Islands will not be resolved. The outcome of negotiations on this issue will depend on the geopolitical situation in the Far East region. It is likely that the emergence of a new strong player will force the parties to unite and come to a common denominator as soon as possible.

In preparing this article, materials from the following monographs were used:

1. Nakamura Shintaro Japanese and Russians. From the history of contacts. M. 1983
2. Ponomarev S.I. Starting point - 1945// Collection of documents for parliamentary hearings on the issue of "Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956 and the problems of national security of the Russian Federation". Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. 2001
3. Territorial issue in the Afro-Asian world. / Ed. D.V. Streltsov. M. 2013 (Chapter 1, 1.2)

Disputes over the four South Kuril Islands, which currently belong to the Russian Federation, have been going on for quite some time. This land, as a result of agreements and wars signed at different times, changed hands several times. Currently, these islands are the cause of the unresolved territorial dispute between Russia and Japan.

Discovery of the islands

The issue of opening the Kuril Islands is controversial. According to the Japanese side, the Japanese were the first to set foot on the land of the islands in 1644. The map of that time with the designations applied to it - “Kunashiri”, “Etorofu”, etc. is carefully preserved in the National Museum of Japan. And the Russian pioneers, according to the Japanese, first came to the Kuril ridge only during the time of Tsar Peter I, in 1711, and on the Russian map of 1721 these islands are called "Japanese Islands".

But in reality, the situation is different: firstly, the Japanese received the first information about the Kuriles (from the Ainu language - “kuru” means “a person who came from nowhere”) from the local residents of the Ainu (the oldest non-Japanese population of the Kuril Islands and the Japanese Islands) during an expedition to Hokkaido in 1635. Moreover, the Japanese did not reach the Kuril lands themselves due to constant conflicts with the local population.

It should be noted that the Ainu were hostile to the Japanese, and initially they treated the Russians well, considering them their "brothers", because of the similarity in appearance and methods of communication between Russians and small peoples.

Secondly, the Kuril Islands were discovered by the Dutch expedition of Maarten Gerritsen de Vries (Vries) in 1643, the Dutch were looking for the so-called. "Golden Lands" The Dutch did not like the land, and they sold a detailed description of them, a map to the Japanese. It was on the basis of Dutch data that the Japanese compiled their maps.

Thirdly, the Japanese at that time did not own not only the Kuriles, but even Hokkaido, only in its southern part there was their stronghold. The Japanese began to conquer the island at the beginning of the 17th century, and the struggle against the Ainu went on for two centuries. That is, if the Russians were interested in expansion, then Hokkaido could become a Russian island. This was facilitated by the good attitude of the Ainu towards the Russians and their enmity towards the Japanese. There are records of this fact. The Japanese state of that time did not officially consider itself the sovereign of not only Sakhalin and the Kuril lands, but also Hokkaido (Matsumae) - this was confirmed in his circular by the head of the Japanese government, Matsudaira, during the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the border and trade in 1772.

Fourthly, Russian explorers visited the islands before the Japanese. In the Russian state, the first mention of the Kuril lands dates back to 1646, when Nekhoroshko Ivanovich Kolobov gave a report to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich about the campaigns of Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin and spoke about the bearded Ainu inhabiting the Kuriles. In addition, Dutch, Scandinavian and German medieval chronicles and maps report the first Russian settlements in the Kuriles of that time. The first reports about the Kuril lands and their inhabitants reached the Russians in the middle of the 17th century.

In 1697, during the expedition of Vladimir Atlasov to Kamchatka, new information about the islands appeared, the Russians explored the islands up to Simushir (an island of the middle group of the Great Kuril Islands).

18th century

Peter I knew about the Kuril Islands, in 1719 the tsar sent a secret expedition to Kamchatka led by Ivan Mikhailovich Evreinov and Fedor Fedorovich Luzhin. The marine surveyor Evreinov and the surveyor-cartographer Luzhin had to determine whether there was a strait between Asia and America. The expedition reached the island of Simushir in the south and brought local residents and rulers to the Russian state.

In 1738-1739, the navigator Martyn Petrovich Shpanberg (a Dane by origin) traveled along the entire Kuril ridge, mapped all the islands he encountered, including the entire Lesser Kuril ridge (these are 6 large and a number of small islands that are separated from the Greater Kuril ridge by the South - Kuril Strait). He explored the lands up to Hokkaido (Matsumaya), bringing the local Ainu rulers to the Russian state.

In the future, the Russians avoided sailing to the southern islands, mastered the northern territories. Unfortunately, at that time, abuses against the Ainu were noted not only by the Japanese, but also by the Russians.

In 1771, the Lesser Kuril Ridge was withdrawn from Russia and passed under the protectorate of Japan. The Russian authorities, in order to rectify the situation, sent the nobleman Antipin with the translator Shabalin. They were able to persuade the Ainu to restore Russian citizenship. In 1778-1779, Russian envoys brought over 1.5 thousand people from Iturup, Kunashir and even Hokkaido into citizenship. In 1779, Catherine II freed those who accepted Russian citizenship from all taxes.

In 1787, a list of the Kuril Islands up to Hokkaido-Matsumai was given in the "Extensive land description of the Russian state ...", the status of which has not yet been determined. Although the Russians did not control the lands south of Urup Island, the Japanese operated there.

In 1799, by order of the sei-taishogun Tokugawa Ienari, he headed the Tokugawa Shogunate, two outposts were built on Kunashir and Iturup, and permanent garrisons were placed there. Thus, the Japanese secured the status of these territories within Japan by military means.

Space image of the Lesser Kuril Ridge

Agreements

In 1845, the Japanese Empire unilaterally announced its power over all of Sakhalin and the Kuril ridge. This naturally caused a violent negative reaction from the Russian Emperor Nicholas I. But, the Russian Empire did not have time to take action, the events of the Crimean War prevented it. Therefore, it was decided to make concessions and not bring the matter to war.

On February 7, 1855, the first diplomatic agreement between Russia and Japan was concluded - Shimoda Treaty. It was signed by Vice Admiral E. V. Putyatin and Toshiakira Kawaji. According to the 9th article of the treatise, "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan" was established. Japan moved the islands from Iturup and to the south, Sakhalin was declared a joint, indivisible possession. Russians in Japan received consular jurisdiction, Russian ships received the right to enter the ports of Shimoda, Hakodate, Nagasaki. The Russian Empire received the most favored nation treatment in trade with Japan and received the right to open consulates in ports open to Russians. That is, in general, especially given the difficult international situation of Russia, the treaty can be assessed positively. Since 1981, the Japanese have celebrated the signing of the Shimoda Treaty as the Day of the Northern Territories.

It should be noted that in fact the Japanese received the right to the "Northern Territories" only for "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia", the most favored nation treatment in trade relations. Their further actions de facto annulled this agreement.

Initially, the provision of the Shimoda Treaty on the joint ownership of the island of Sakhalin was more beneficial for the Russian Empire, which was actively colonizing this territory. The Japanese empire did not have a good one, so at that time it did not have such an opportunity. But later, the Japanese began to intensively populate the territory of Sakhalin, and the question of its ownership began to become more and more controversial and acute. The contradictions between Russia and Japan were resolved by signing the St. Petersburg Treaty.

St. Petersburg Treaty. It was signed in the capital of the Russian Empire on April 25 (May 7), 1875. Under this agreement, the Empire of Japan transferred Sakhalin to Russia in full ownership, and in exchange received all the islands of the Kuril chain.

St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 (Japanese Foreign Ministry Archive).

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and Treaty of Portsmouth On August 23 (September 5), 1905, the Russian Empire, in accordance with the 9th article of the agreement, ceded to Japan the south of Sakhalin, south of 50 degrees north latitude. Article 12 contained an agreement on the conclusion of a convention on fishing by the Japanese along the Russian coasts of the Sea of ​​Japan, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.

After the death of the Russian Empire and the beginning of foreign intervention, the Japanese occupied Northern Sakhalin and participated in the occupation of the Far East. When the Bolshevik Party won the Civil War, Japan did not want to recognize the USSR for a long time. Only after the Soviet authorities in 1924 canceled the status of the Japanese consulate in Vladivostok and in the same year the USSR recognized Great Britain, France and China, the Japanese authorities decided to normalize relations with Moscow.

Beijing Treaty. On February 3, 1924, official negotiations between the USSR and Japan began in Beijing. Only on January 20, 1925, the Soviet-Japanese convention on the basic principles of relations between countries was signed. The Japanese undertook to withdraw their forces from the territory of Northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925. The declaration of the government of the USSR, which was attached to the convention, emphasized that the Soviet government did not share political responsibility with the former government of the Russian Empire for the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905. In addition, the agreement of the parties was enshrined in the convention that all agreements, treaties and conventions concluded between Russia and Japan before November 7, 1917, except for the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, should be revised.

In general, the USSR made great concessions: in particular, Japanese citizens, companies and associations were granted the rights to exploit natural resources throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. On July 22, 1925, a contract was signed to provide the Empire of Japan with a coal concession, and on December 14, 1925, an oil concession in Northern Sakhalin. Moscow agreed to this agreement in order to stabilize the situation in the Russian Far East in this way, since the Japanese supported the Whites outside the USSR. But in the end, the Japanese began to systematically violate the convention, create conflict situations.

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that took place in the spring of 1941 regarding the conclusion of a neutrality treaty, the Soviet side raised the question of liquidating Japan's concessions in Northern Sakhalin. The Japanese gave their written consent to this, but delayed the implementation of the agreement for 3 years. Only when the USSR began to gain the upper hand over the Third Reich did the Japanese government agree to the implementation of the agreement given earlier. So, on March 30, 1944, a protocol was signed in Moscow on the destruction of the Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin and the transfer to the Soviet Union of all Japanese concession property.

February 11, 1945 at the Yalta Conference three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain - reached an oral agreement on the entry of the USSR into the war with the Empire of Japan on the terms of the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril ridge to it after the end of World War II.

In the Potsdam Declaration dated July 26, 1945, it was said that Japanese sovereignty would be limited only to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and other smaller islands, which the victorious countries would indicate. The Kuril Islands were not mentioned.

After the defeat of Japan, on January 29, 1946, by Memorandum No. 677 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers by the American General Douglas MacArthur, the Chisima Islands (Kuril Islands), the Habomadze Islands (Habomai) and the island of Shikotan (Shikotan) were excluded from Japanese territory.

According to San Francisco Peace Treaty dated September 8, 1951, the Japanese side renounced all rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. But the Japanese argue that Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and Habomai (the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge) were not part of the Tisima Islands (Kuril Islands) and they did not refuse them.

Negotiations in Portsmouth (1905) - from left to right: from the Russian side (far side of the table) - Planson, Nabokov, Witte, Rosen, Korostovets.

Further agreements

joint declaration. On October 19, 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan adopted a Joint Declaration. The document ended the state of war between the countries and restored diplomatic relations, and also spoke of Moscow's consent to the transfer of the Habomai and Shikotan islands to the Japanese side. But they were to be handed over only after the signing of the peace treaty. However, later Japan was forced to refuse to sign a peace treaty with the USSR. The United States threatened the Japanese not to give up Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago if they gave up their claims to the other islands of the Lesser Kuril chain.

After Tokyo signed the Cooperation and Security Treaty with Washington in January 1960, extending the American military presence on the Japanese islands, Moscow declared that it refused to consider the issue of transferring the islands to the Japanese side. The statement was substantiated by the security of the USSR and China.

In 1993 was signed Tokyo Declaration about Russian-Japanese relations. It said that the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR and recognizes the 1956 agreement. Moscow expressed its readiness to start negotiations on Japan's territorial claims. In Tokyo, this was assessed as a sign of the coming victory.

In 2004, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergei Lavrov, made a statement that Moscow recognizes the 1956 Declaration and is ready to negotiate a peace treaty based on it. In 2004-2005, this position was confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But the Japanese insisted on the transfer of 4 islands, so the issue was not resolved. Moreover, the Japanese gradually increased their pressure, for example, in 2009, the head of the Japanese government at a government meeting called the Lesser Kuril Ridge "illegally occupied territories." In 2010-early 2011, the Japanese got so excited that some military experts began to talk about the possibility of a new Russo-Japanese war. Only a spring natural disaster - the consequences of a tsunami and a terrible earthquake, the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant - cooled the ardor of Japan.

As a result, the loud statements of the Japanese led to the fact that Moscow announced that the islands are the territory of the Russian Federation legally following the results of the Second World War, this is enshrined in the UN Charter. And the Russian sovereignty over the Kuriles, which has the appropriate international legal confirmation, is beyond doubt. Plans were also announced to develop the economy of the islands and strengthen the Russian military presence there.

The strategic importance of the islands

economic factor. The islands are economically underdeveloped, but they have deposits of valuable and rare earth metals - gold, silver, rhenium, titanium. The waters are rich in biological resources, the seas that wash the shores of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands are one of the most productive areas of the World Ocean. The shelves, where hydrocarbon deposits have been found, are also of great importance.

political factor. The cession of the islands will sharply lower Russia's status in the world, and there will be a legal opportunity to review other results of the Second World War. For example, they may demand to give the Kaliningrad region to Germany or part of Karelia to Finland.

military factor. The transfer of the islands of the South Kuril chain will provide the naval forces of Japan and the United States with free access to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. It will allow our potential adversaries to exercise control over strategically important strait zones, which will drastically impair the deployment of the forces of the Russian Pacific Fleet, including nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles. This will be a strong blow to the military security of the Russian Federation.

Briefly, the history of the "belonging" of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island is as follows.

1.In period 1639-1649. Russian Cossack detachments led by Moskovitinov, Kolobov, Popov explored and began to explore Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. At the same time, Russian pioneers repeatedly swim to the island of Hokkaido, where they are peacefully met by local natives of the Ainu people. The Japanese appeared on this island a century later, after which they exterminated and partially assimilated the Ainu.

2.B 1701 Cossack constable Vladimir Atlasov reported to Peter I about the "subordination" of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Russian crown, leading to the "wonderful Nipon kingdom."

3.B 1786. By order of Catherine II, a register of Russian possessions in the Pacific Ocean was produced, bringing the register to the attention of all European states as a declaration of Russia's rights to these possessions, including Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

4.B 1792. By decree of Catherine II, the entire ridge of the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as Sakhalin Island officially incorporated into the Russian Empire.

5. As a result of the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War 1854—1855 gg. under pressure England and France Russia forced was concluded with Japan on February 7, 1855. Treaty of Shimoda, through which four southern islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to Japan: Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Sakhalin remained undivided between Russia and Japan. At the same time, however, the right of Russian ships to enter Japanese ports was recognized, and "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia" was proclaimed.

6.May 7, 1875 under the Petersburg Treaty, the tsarist government as a very strange act of "good will" makes incomprehensible further territorial concessions to Japan and transfers to it 18 more small islands of the archipelago. In return, Japan finally recognized Russia's right to the whole of Sakhalin. It is for this agreement referred most of all by the Japanese today, slyly silent that the first article of this treaty reads: "... and henceforth eternal peace and friendship will be established between Russia and Japan" ( the Japanese themselves violated this treaty in the 20th century repeatedly). Many Russian statesmen of those years sharply condemned this “exchange” treaty as short-sighted and harmful to the future of Russia, comparing it with the same short-sightedness as the sale of Alaska to the United States of America in 1867 for next to nothing (7 billion 200 million dollars). ), saying that "now we are biting our own elbows."

7. After the Russo-Japanese War 1904—1905 gg. followed another stage of humiliation of Russia. By Portsmouth peace treaty concluded on September 5, 1905, Japan received the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, and also took away from Russia the right to lease the naval bases of Port Arthur and Dalniy. When Russian diplomats reminded the Japanese that all these provisions are contrary to the 1875 treaty g., those arrogantly and arrogantly answered : « War cancels all treaties. You have failed and let's proceed from the current situation ". Reader, remember this boastful declaration of the invader!

8. Next comes the time of punishment of the aggressor for his eternal greed and territorial expansion. Signed by Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference February 10, 1945 G. " Agreement on the Far East"It was envisaged:" ... 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan subject to the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, as well as the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny(these built and equipped hands of Russian workers, soldiers and sailors back in the late XIX - early XX centuries. geographically very convenient naval bases were donated to "fraternal" China. But these bases were so necessary for our fleet in the 60-80s of the rampant Cold War and intense combat service of the fleet in remote areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. I had to equip the forward base Cam Ranh in Vietnam for the fleet from scratch).

9.B July 1945 g. in accordance with Potsdam Declaration heads of the victorious countries the following verdict was passed regarding the future of Japan: "The sovereignty of Japan shall be limited to four islands: Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and such as WE SPECIFY". August 14, 1945 the Japanese government has publicly confirmed the acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and on September 2 Japan unconditionally surrendered. Article 6 of the Instrument of Surrender reads: "... the Japanese government and its successors will faithfully fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Declaration to give such orders and take such actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers shall require in order to carry out this declaration...”. January 29, 1946 Commander-in-Chief General MacArthur DEMANDED by Directive No. 677: "The Kuril Islands, including Habomai and Shikotan, are excluded from the jurisdiction of Japan." AND only after that legal effect, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 2, 1946 was issued, which read: “ All lands, bowels and waters of Sakhalin and the Kul Islands are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ". Thus, the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as about. Sakhalin, legally and were returned to Russia in accordance with international law . This could put an end to the "problem" of the Southern Kuriles and stop all further verbiage. But the story of the Kuriles continues.

10. After the end of World War II US occupied Japan and turned it into their military foothold in the Far East. In September 1951 USA, UK and a number of other states (total 49) signed San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, prepared in violation of the Potsdam agreements without the participation of the Soviet Union . Therefore, our government did not join the treaty. However, Art. 2, chapter II of this treaty, it is fixed in black and white: “ Japan renounces all legal grounds and claims ... to the Kuril Islands and that part of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. However, even after this, the story with the Kuriles does not end.

October 11.19 1956 d. the government of the Soviet Union, following the principles of friendship with neighboring states, signed with the Japanese government joint declaration, according to which the state of war between the USSR and Japan ended and peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations were restored between them. When signing the Declaration as a gesture of good will and no more promised to give Japan the two southernmost islands of Shikotan and Habomai, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the countries.

12. However The United States after 1956 imposed a number of military agreements on Japan, replaced in 1960 by a single "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security", according to which US troops remained on its territory, and thereby the Japanese islands turned into a base of aggression against the Soviet Union. In connection with this situation, the Soviet government announced to Japan that it was impossible to transfer the promised two islands to it.. And in the same statement it was emphasized that according to the declaration of October 19, 1956, "peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations" between the countries were established. Therefore, an additional peace treaty may not be required.
In this way, the problem of the Southern Kuriles does not exist . It's been decided a long time ago. AND de jure and de facto the islands belong to Russia . In this regard, it might be to remind the Japanese of their arrogant statement in 1905 g., and also indicate that Japan was defeated in World War II and therefore has no rights to any territory, even to her ancestral lands, except for those granted to her by the victors.
AND our foreign ministry just as harshly, or in a milder diplomatic form it would be necessary to declare this to the Japanese and put an end to this, FOREVER stopping all negotiations and even conversations on this non-existent and humiliating problem of the dignity and authority of Russia.
And again the "territorial question"

However, starting from 1991 , repeatedly held meetings of the President Yeltsin and members of the Russian government, diplomats with government circles in Japan, during which the Japanese side every time importunately raises the question of the "Northern Japanese Territories".
Thus, in the Tokyo Declaration 1993 signed by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan, was again acknowledged the "existence of the territorial issue", and both sides promised to "make efforts" to resolve it. The question arises - could our diplomats really know that such declarations should not be signed, because the recognition of the existence of a “territorial issue” is contrary to the national interests of Russia (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “ Treason»)??

As for the peace treaty with Japan, it is de facto and de jure in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956. not really needed. The Japanese do not want to conclude an additional official peace treaty, and there is no need. He Japan needs more, as the side that was defeated in the Second World War, rather than Russia.

A citizens of Russia should know the “problem” of the South Kuriles, sucked from the finger , her exaggeration, periodic hype in the media around her and the litigation of the Japanese - there a consequence of Japan's illegitimate claims in violation of the obligations it has assumed, to strictly comply with the international obligations recognized and signed by it. And such a constant desire of Japan to reconsider the ownership of many territories in the Asia-Pacific region pervades Japanese politics throughout the 20th century.

Why the Japanese, one might say, have seized the South Kuriles with their teeth and are trying to seize them again illegally? But because the economic and military-strategic importance of this region is extremely great for Japan, and even more so for Russia. This an area of ​​colossal seafood riches(fish, living creatures, marine animals, vegetation, etc.), deposits of minerals, and rare earth minerals, energy sources, mineral raw materials.

For example, January 29 of this year. short information slipped through the Vesti (RTR) program: a a large deposit of the rare earth metal Rhenium(75th element in the periodic table, and the only one in the world ).
Scientists allegedly calculated that it would be enough to invest only 35 thousand dollars, but the profit from the extraction of this metal will allow to bring the whole of Russia out of the crisis in 3-4 years . Apparently, the Japanese know about this and that is why they are so persistently attacking the Russian government with a demand to give them the islands.

It must be said that for 50 years of ownership of the islands, the Japanese have not built or created anything capital on them, except for light temporary buildings. Our border guards had to rebuild barracks and other buildings at the outposts. The entire economic "development" of the islands, which the Japanese are shouting to the whole world today, consisted in the predatory robbery of the riches of the islands . During the Japanese "development" from the islands rookeries of fur seals, habitats of sea otters disappeared . Part of the population of these animals our Kuril residents have already restored .

Today, the economic situation of this entire island zone, like the whole of Russia, is difficult. Of course, significant measures are needed to support this region and take care of the Kuril people. According to the calculations of a group of deputies of the State Duma, it is possible to extract on the islands, as reported in the program "Parliamentary Hour" (RTR) on January 31 of this year, only fish products up to 2000 tons per year, with a net profit of about 3 billion dollars.
In military terms, the ridge of the Northern and Southern Kuriles with Sakhalin constitutes a complete closed infrastructure of the strategic defense of the Far East and the Pacific Fleet. They enclose the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and turn it into an inland one. This is the area deployment and combat positions of our strategic submarines.

Without the South Kuriles, we will get a "hole" in this defense. Control over the Kuriles ensures free access of the fleet to the ocean, because until 1945 our Pacific Fleet, starting from 1905, was practically locked up in its bases in Primorye. The means of detection on the islands provide long-range detection of air and surface enemy, the organization of anti-submarine defense of the approaches to the passages between the islands.

In conclusion, one should note such a feature in the relationship of the Russia-Japan-US triangle. It is the United States that confirms the "legitimacy" of the ownership of the islands of Japan in spite of all international treaties they have signed .
If so, then our Foreign Ministry has every right, in response to the claims of the Japanese, to propose that they demand the return of Japan to its "southern territories" - the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands.
These archipelagos former colonies of Germany, captured by Japan in 1914. Japan's dominion over these islands was sanctioned by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. After the defeat of Japan, all these archipelagos came under US control.. So Why shouldn't Japan demand that the United States return the islands to her? Or lack of spirit?
As you can see, there is explicit double standard in Japanese foreign policy.

And one more fact that clarifies the general picture of the return of our Far Eastern territories in September 1945 and the military significance of this region. The Kuril operation of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet (August 18 - September 1, 1945) provided for the liberation of all the Kuril Islands and the capture of the island of Hokkaido.

The accession of this island to Russia would be of great operational and strategic importance, since it would ensure the complete isolation of the "fencing" of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk by our island territories: the Kuriles - Hokkaido - Sakhalin. But Stalin canceled this part of the operation, saying that with the liberation of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, we had resolved all our territorial issues in the Far East. A we don't need foreign land . In addition, the capture of Hokkaido will cost us a lot of blood, unnecessary losses of sailors and paratroopers in the very last days of the war.

Stalin here showed himself to be a real statesman, taking care of the country, its soldiers, and not an invader, who coveted foreign territories that were very accessible in that situation for the capture.

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (Russia) and the island of Hokkaido (Japan). The area is about 15.6 thousand km2.

The Kuril Islands consist of two ridges - the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril (Khabomai). A large ridge separates the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean.

The Great Kuril Ridge has a length of 1200 km and extends from the Kamchatka Peninsula (in the north) to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (in the south). It includes more than 30 islands, of which the largest are: Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup and Kunashir. The southern islands are forested, while the northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation.

The Lesser Kuril Ridge is only 120 km long and extends from the island of Hokkaido (in the south) to the northeast. Consists of six small islands.

The Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin Oblast (Russian Federation). They are divided into three districts: North Kuril, Kuril and South Kuril. The centers of these regions have the corresponding names: Severo-Kurilsk, Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk. There is also the village of Malo-Kurilsk (the center of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The relief of the islands is predominantly mountainous volcanic (there are 160 volcanoes, of which about 39 are active). The prevailing heights are 500-1000m. The exception is the island of Shikotan, which is characterized by a low-mountain relief, formed as a result of the destruction of ancient volcanoes. The highest peak of the Kuril Islands is the Alaid volcano -2339 meters, and the depth of the Kuril-Kamchatka depression reaches 10339 meters. High seismicity is the reason for the constant threat of earthquakes and tsunamis.

The population is 76.6% Russians, 12.8% Ukrainians, 2.6% Belarusians, 8% other nationalities. The permanent population of the islands lives mainly on the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the northern ones - Paramushir, Shumshu. The basis of the economy is the fishing industry, because. the main natural wealth is the biological resources of the sea. Agriculture has not received significant development due to unfavorable natural conditions.

Deposits of titanium-magnetites, sands, ore occurrences of copper, lead, zinc and the rare elements of indium, helium, thallium contained in them are discovered on the Kuril Islands, there are signs of platinum, mercury and other metals. Large reserves of sulfur ores with a rather high sulfur content have been discovered.

Transport communications are carried out by sea and air. In winter, regular navigation stops. Due to difficult meteorological conditions, flights are not regular (especially in winter).

Discovery of the Kuril Islands

In the Middle Ages, Japan had little contact with other countries of the world. As V. Shishchenko notes: “In 1639, the “policy of self-isolation” was announced. Under pain of death, the Japanese were forbidden to leave the islands. The construction of large ships was prohibited. Almost no foreign ships were allowed into the ports.” Therefore, the organized development of Sakhalin and the Kuriles by the Japanese began only at the end of the 18th century.

V. Shishchenko further writes: “For Russia, Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin is deservedly considered the discoverer of the Far East. In 1638-1639, led by Moskvitin, a detachment of twenty Tomsk and eleven Irkutsk Cossacks left Yakutsk and made the most difficult transition along the Aldan, Maya and Yudoma rivers, through the Dzhugdzhur ridge and further along the Ulya river to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The first Russian settlements (including Okhotsk) were founded here.”

The next significant step in the development of the Far East was made by the even more famous Russian pioneer Vasily Danilovich Poyarkov, who, at the head of a detachment of 132 Cossacks, was the first to go along the Amur - to its very mouth. Poyarkov, left Yakutsk in June 1643, at the end of the summer of 1644, Poyarkov's detachment reached the Lower Amur and ended up in the lands of the Amur Nivkhs. In early September, the Cossacks saw the Amur Estuary for the first time. From here, the Russian people could also see the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, which they got the idea of ​​as a large island. Therefore, many historians consider Poyarkov the "discoverer of Sakhalin", despite the fact that the expedition members did not even visit its shores.

Since then, the Amur has gained great importance, not only as a "bread river", but also as a natural communication. Indeed, until the 20th century, the Amur was the main road from Siberia to Sakhalin. In the autumn of 1655, a detachment of 600 Cossacks arrived on the Lower Amur, which at that time was considered a large military force.

The development of events steadily led to the fact that the Russian people already in the second half of the 17th century could fully gain a foothold on Sakhalin. This was prevented by a new turn of history. In 1652, a Manchu-Chinese army arrived at the mouth of the Amur.

Being at war with Poland, the Russian state could not allocate the necessary number of people and means to successfully counteract Qing China. Attempts to extract any benefits for Russia through diplomacy have not been successful. In 1689, the Nerchinsk peace was concluded between the two powers. For more than a century and a half, the Cossacks had to leave the Amur, which practically made Sakhalin inaccessible to them.

For China, the fact of the "first discovery" of Sakhalin does not exist, most likely for the simple reason that the Chinese knew about the island for a very long time, so long ago that they do not remember when they first learned about it.

Here, of course, the question arises: why did the Chinese not take advantage of such a favorable situation, did not colonize Primorye, the Amur Region, Sakhalin and other territories? V. Shishchenkov answers this question: “The fact is that until 1878, Chinese women were forbidden to cross the Great Wall of China! And in the absence of "their beautiful half", the Chinese could not firmly settle on these lands. They appeared in the Amur region only to collect yasak from the local peoples.

With the conclusion of the Nerchinsk peace, for the Russian people, the sea route remained the most convenient way to Sakhalin. After Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnev made his famous voyage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean in 1648, the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean becomes regular.

In 1711-1713 D.N. Antsiferov and I.P. Kozyrevsky make expeditions to the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, during which they receive detailed information about most of the Kuriles and about the island of Hokkaido. In 1721, surveyors I.M. Evreinov and F.F. Luzhin, by order of Peter I, surveyed the northern part of the Great Kuril ridge to the island of Simushir and compiled a detailed map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

In the XVIII century, there was a rapid development of the Kuril Islands by Russian people.

“Thus,” notes V. Shishchenko, “by the middle of the 18th century, an amazing situation had developed. Navigators from different countries literally plowed the ocean far and wide. And the Great Wall, the Japanese “policy of self-isolation” and the inhospitable Sea of ​​Okhotsk formed a truly fantastic circle around Sakhalin, which left the island beyond the reach of both European and Asian explorers.”

At this time, the first clashes between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in the Kuriles take place. In the first half of the 18th century, the Kuril Islands were actively developed by Russian people. Back in 1738-1739, during the Spanberg expedition, the Middle and Southern Kuriles were discovered and described, and even a landing was made on Hokkaido. At that time, the Russian state could not yet take control of the islands, which were so far from the capital, which contributed to the abuses of the Cossacks against the natives, which sometimes amounted to robbery and cruelty.

In 1779, by her royal command, Catherine II freed the "hairy smokers" from any fees and forbade encroachment on their territories. The Cossacks could not maintain their power in a non-coercive way, and the islands south of Urup were abandoned by them. In 1792, by order of Catherine II, the first official mission took place in order to establish trade relations with Japan. This concession was used by the Japanese to delay time and strengthen their position in the Kuriles and Sakhalin.

In 1798, a major Japanese expedition to Iturup Island took place, led by Mogami Tokunai and Kondo Juzo. The expedition had not only research goals, but also political ones - Russian crosses were demolished and pillars with the inscription: "Dainihon Erotofu" (Iturup - the possession of Japan) were installed. The following year, Takadaya Kahee opens a sea route to Iturup, and Kondo Juzo visits Kunashir.

In 1801, the Japanese reached Urup, where they set up their posts and ordered the Russians to leave their settlements.

Thus, by the end of the 18th century, the ideas of Europeans about Sakhalin remained very unclear, and the situation around the island created the most favorable conditions in favor of Japan.

Kuriles in the 19th century

In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands were studied by Russian explorers D. Ya. Antsiferov, I. P. Kozyrevsky, and I. F. Kruzenshtern.

Japan's attempts to seize the Kuriles by force provoked protests from the Russian government. N.P., who arrived in Japan in 1805 to establish trade relations. Rezanov, told the Japanese that "... to the north of Matsmai (Hokkaido) all lands and waters belong to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese should not extend their possessions further."

However, the aggressive actions of the Japanese continued. At the same time, in addition to the Kuriles, they began to lay claim to Sakhalin, making attempts to destroy signs on the southern part of the island indicating that this territory belongs to Russia.

In 1853, the representative of the Russian government, Adjutant General E.V. Putyatin negotiated a trade agreement.

Along with the task of establishing diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin's mission was to formalize the border between Russia and Japan by treaty.

Professor S.G. Pushkarev writes: “During the reign of Alexander II, Russia acquired significant areas of land in the Far East. In exchange for the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island was acquired from Japan.

After the Crimean War in 1855, Putyatin signed the Treaty of Shimoda, which established that "the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup", and Sakhalin was declared "undivided" between Russia and Japan. As a result, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup retreated to Japan. This concession was stipulated by Japan's consent to trade with Russia, which, however, developed sluggishly even after that.

N.I. Tsimbaev characterizes the state of affairs in the Far East at the end of the 19th century in the following way: “Bilateral agreements signed with China and Japan during the reign of Alexander II determined Russia’s policy in the Far East for a long time, which was cautious and balanced.”

In 1875, the tsarist government of Alexander II made another concession to Japan - the so-called Petersburg Treaty was signed, according to which all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, in exchange for the recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. (See Appendix 1)

The fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. was a gross violation of the Treaty of Shimoda, which proclaimed "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan."

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

As already mentioned, Russia had extensive possessions in the Far East. These territories were extremely remote from the center of the country and were poorly involved in the national economic turnover. “A change in the situation, as noted by A.N. Bokhanov, - was associated with the construction of the Siberian railway, the laying of which began in 1891. It was planned to be carried out through the southern regions of Siberia with access to the Pacific Ocean in Vladivostok. Its total length from Chelyabinsk in the Urals to the final destination was about 8 thousand kilometers. It was the longest railway line in the world."

By the beginning of the XX century. The main hub of international contradictions for Russia has become the Far East and the most important direction - relations with Japan. The Russian government was aware of the possibility of a military clash, but did not seek it. In 1902 and 1903 there were intensive negotiations between St. Petersburg, Tokyo, London, Berlin and Paris, which did not lead to anything.

On the night of January 27, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. The next day, 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the Varyag cruiser and the Korean gunboat in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Only on January 28 Japan declared war on Russia. The treachery of Japan caused a storm of indignation in Russia.

Russia was forced into a war that she did not want. The war lasted a year and a half and turned out to be inglorious for the country. The causes of general failures and specific military defeats were caused by various factors, but the main ones were:

• the incompleteness of the military-strategic training of the armed forces;
• significant remoteness of the theater of operations from the main centers of the army and control;
• extremely limited network of communication links.

The futility of the war was clearly manifested by the end of 1904, and after the fall of the fortress of Port Arthur in Russia on December 20, 1904, few believed in a favorable outcome of the campaign. The initial patriotic upsurge was replaced by despondency and irritation.

A.N. Bokhanov writes: “The authorities were in a state of stupor; no one could have imagined that the war, which according to all preliminary assumptions should have been short, dragged on for so long and turned out to be so unsuccessful. Emperor Nicholas II for a long time did not agree to admit the failure in the Far East, believing that these were only temporary setbacks and that Russia should mobilize its efforts to strike at Japan and restore the prestige of the army and the country. He certainly wanted peace, but an honorable peace, one that only a strong geopolitical position could provide, and it was seriously shaken by military failures.

By the end of the spring of 1905, it became obvious that a change in the military situation was possible only in the distant future, and in the short term it was necessary to immediately begin to peacefully resolve the conflict that had arisen. This was forced not only by considerations of a military-strategic nature, but, to an even greater extent, by the complications of the internal situation in Russia.

N.I. Tsimbaev states: "Japan's military victories turned it into the leading Far Eastern power, which was supported by the governments of England and the United States."

The situation for the Russian side was complicated not only by military-strategic defeats in the Far East, but also by the absence of previously worked out terms for a possible agreement with Japan.

Having received the appropriate instructions from the sovereign, S.Yu. On July 6, 1905, Witte, together with a group of experts on Far Eastern affairs, left for the United States, to the city of Portsmouth, where negotiations were planned. The head of the delegation was only instructed not to agree to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia had never paid in its history, and not to cede "not an inch of Russian land", although by that time Japan had already occupied the southern part of Sakhalin Island.

Japan initially took a tough stance in Portsmouth, demanding in an ultimatum from Russia a complete withdrawal from Korea and Manchuria, the transfer of the Russian Far Eastern fleet, the payment of indemnities and consent to the annexation of Sakhalin.

The negotiations were on the verge of collapse several times, and only thanks to the efforts of the head of the Russian delegation, a positive result was achieved: August 23, 1905. the parties entered into an agreement.

In accordance with it, Russia ceded lease rights to Japan in the territories in South Manchuria, part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, and recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. A.N. Bokhanov speaks of the negotiations as follows: “The Portsmouth agreements have become an undoubted success for Russia and its diplomacy. In many ways, they looked like an agreement of equal partners, and not like an agreement concluded after an unsuccessful war.

Thus, after the defeat of Russia, in 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded. The Japanese side demanded from Russia as an indemnity the island of Sakhalin. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the exchange agreement of 1875, and also stated that all trade agreements between Japan and Russia would be canceled as a result of the war.

This treaty annulled the Shimoda Treaty of 1855.

However, treaties between Japan and the newly created USSR existed as early as the 1920s. Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “In April 1920, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was created, a temporary revolutionary-democratic state, a “buffer” between the RSFSR and Japan. The People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the FER under the command of V.K. Blucher, then I.P. Uborevich in October 1922 liberated the region from Japanese and White Guard troops. On October 25, units of the NRA entered Vladivostok. In November 1922, the "buffer" republic was abolished, its territory (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin, from which the Japanese left in May 1925) became part of the RSFSR.

By the time the convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan was concluded on January 20, 1925, there was in fact no existing bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.

In January 1925, the USSR established diplomatic and consular relations with Japan (Peking Convention). The Japanese government evacuated its troops from Northern Sakhalin, captured during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviet government granted Japan concessions in the north of the island, in particular for the exploitation of 50% of the area of ​​oil fields.

War with Japan in 1945 and the Yalta Conference

Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “... a special period of the Great Patriotic War was the war between the USSR and militaristic Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945). On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On August 9, fulfilling its allied obligations taken at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan ... During the 24-day military campaign, the millionth Kwantung Army, which was in Manchuria, was defeated. The defeat of this army became the determining factor in the defeat of Japan.

It led to the defeat of the Japanese armed forces and to the most severe losses for them. They amounted to 677 thousand soldiers and officers, incl. 84 thousand killed and wounded, more than 590 thousand captured. Japan lost the largest military-industrial base on the Asian mainland and the most powerful army. Soviet troops expelled the Japanese from Manchuria and Korea, from South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan lost all the military bases and bridgeheads that it was preparing against the USSR. She was not in a position to wage an armed struggle.”

At the Yalta Conference, the “Declaration on a Liberated Europe” was adopted, which, among other points, indicated the transfer to the Soviet Union of the South Kuril Islands that were part of the Japanese “northern territories” (the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, Khabomai).

In the first years after the end of World War II, Japan made no territorial claims to the Soviet Union. The advancement of such demands was ruled out then, if only because the Soviet Union, along with the United States and other Allied Powers, took part in the occupation of Japan, and Japan, as a country that agreed to unconditional surrender, was obliged to comply with all decisions taken by the Allied Powers, including decisions regarding its borders. It was during that period that the new borders of Japan with the USSR were formed.

The transformation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into an integral part of the Soviet Union was secured by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 2, 1946. In 1947, according to the changes made to the Constitution of the USSR, the Kuriles were included in the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk region of the RSFSR. The most important international legal document that fixed Japan's renunciation of the rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the peace treaty signed by it in September 1951 at an international conference in San Francisco with the victorious powers.

In the text of this document, summing up the results of the Second World War, in paragraph "C" in Article 2 it was clearly written: "Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Portsmouth Treaty of September 5, 1905.

However, already during the San Francisco Conference, the desire of Japanese government circles to question the legitimacy of the borders established between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Japanese militarism was revealed. At the conference itself, this aspiration did not find open support on the part of its other participants, and above all on the part of the Soviet delegation, which is clear from the above text of the treaty.

Nevertheless, in the future, Japanese politicians and diplomats did not abandon their intention to revise the Soviet-Japanese borders and, in particular, to return four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago under Japanese control: Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai (I.A. Latyshev explains that in Habomai actually consists of five small islands adjacent to each other). The confidence of Japanese diplomats in their ability to carry out such a revision of the borders was associated with the behind-the-scenes, and then open support for the aforementioned territorial claims to our country, which the US government circles began to provide Japan with - support that clearly contradicted the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements signed by the US President F. Roosevelt in February 1945.

Such an obvious refusal of the US government circles from their obligations enshrined in the Yalta agreements, according to I.A. Latyshev, explained simply: “... in the face of the further strengthening of the Cold War, in the face of the victory of the communist revolution in China and the armed confrontation with the North Korean army on the Korean Peninsula, Washington began to consider Japan as its main military foothold in the Far East and, moreover, as its main ally in the struggle to maintain US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. And in order to tie this new ally more firmly to their political course, American politicians began to promise him political support in getting the southern Kuriles, although such support represented a US departure from the international agreements mentioned above, designed to secure the borders that had developed as a result of World War II.

The refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference to sign the text of the peace treaty, along with other allied countries participating in the conference, gave the Japanese initiators of territorial claims to the Soviet Union many advantages. This refusal was motivated by Moscow's disagreement with the US intention to use the treaty to maintain American military bases on Japanese territory. This decision of the Soviet delegation turned out to be short-sighted: it began to be used by Japanese diplomats to create the impression among the Japanese public that the absence of the Soviet Union's signature on the peace treaty freed Japan from complying with it.

In subsequent years, the leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry resorted to reasoning in their statements, the essence of which was that since the representatives of the Soviet Union did not sign the text of the peace treaty, therefore the Soviet Union has no right to refer to this document, and the world community should not give consent to the possession The Soviet Union the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, although Japan abandoned these territories in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty.

At the same time, Japanese politicians also referred to the absence in the agreement of a mention of who would henceforth own these islands.

Another direction of Japanese diplomacy boiled down to the fact that “... Japan's renunciation of the Kuril Islands recorded in the treaty does not mean its renunciation of the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago on the grounds that Japan ... does not consider these islands to be Kuril Islands. And that, when signing the treaty, the Japanese government considered the allegedly named four islands not as the Kuriles, but as lands adjacent to the coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

However, at the first glance at the Japanese pre-war maps and sailing directions, all the Kuril Islands, including the southernmost, were one administrative unit, called "Tishima".

I.A. Latyshev writes that the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the conference in San Francisco to sign, along with representatives of other allied countries, the text of a peace treaty with Japan was, as the subsequent course of events showed, a very unfortunate political miscalculation for the Soviet Union. The absence of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan began to contradict the national interests of both sides. That is why, four years after the San Francisco Conference, the governments of both countries expressed their readiness to enter into contact with each other in order to find ways to formally resolve their relations and conclude a bilateral peace treaty. This goal was pursued, as it seemed at first, by both sides at the Soviet-Japanese talks that began in London in June 1955 at the level of ambassadors of both countries.

However, as it turned out during the negotiations that had begun, the main task of the then Japanese government was to use the interest of the Soviet Union in normalizing relations with Japan in order to obtain territorial concessions from Moscow. In essence, it was an open refusal by the Japanese government of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in that part of it where the northern borders of Japan were defined.

From that moment, as I.A. Latyshev, the most ill-fated territorial dispute between the two countries, detrimental to the Soviet-Japanese good neighborliness, began, which continues to this day. It was in May-June 1955 that Japanese government circles embarked on the path of illegal territorial claims to the Soviet Union, aimed at revising the borders that had developed between both countries as a result of World War II.

What prompted the Japanese side to take this path? There were several reasons for this.

One of them is the long-standing interest of Japanese fishing companies in gaining control of the sea waters surrounding the southern Kuril Islands. It is well known that the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands are the richest in fish resources, as well as in other seafood, in the Pacific Ocean. Fishing for salmon, crabs, seaweed and other expensive seafood could provide fabulous profits for Japanese fishing and other companies, which prompted these circles to put pressure on the government in order to get these richest areas of the sea fishing for themselves.

Another motivating reason for the attempts of Japanese diplomacy to return the southern Kuriles under their control was the Japanese understanding of the exceptional strategic importance of the Kuril Islands: whoever owns the islands actually holds in his hands the keys to the gate leading from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bOkhotsk.

Third, by putting forward territorial demands on the Soviet Union, Japanese government circles hoped to revive nationalist sentiments among broad sections of the Japanese population and use nationalist slogans to rally these sections under their ideological control.

And, finally, fourthly, another important point was the desire of the ruling circles of Japan to please the United States. After all, the territorial demands of the Japanese authorities fit in perfectly with the bellicose course of the US government, which was directed at the tip against the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and other socialist countries. And it is no coincidence that US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles, as well as other influential US political figures, already during the London Soviet-Japanese negotiations, began to support Japanese territorial claims, despite the fact that these claims obviously contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers.

As for the Soviet side, the advancement of territorial demands by Japan was considered by Moscow as an encroachment on the state interests of the Soviet Union, as an illegal attempt to revise the borders that had developed between both countries as a result of the Second World War. Therefore, the Japanese demands could not but meet with a rebuff from the Soviet Union, although its leaders in those years sought to establish good-neighborly contacts and business cooperation with Japan.

The territorial dispute during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 (in 1956, these negotiations were transferred from London to Moscow), Japanese diplomats, having met with a firm rebuff to their claims to South Sakhalin and all the Kuriles, began to quickly moderate these claims. In the summer of 1956, the territorial harassment of the Japanese was reduced to the demand that Japan transfer only the southern Kuriles, namely the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai, which represented the most favorable part of the Kuril archipelago for life and economic development.

On the other hand, at the very first stages of the negotiations, the short-sightedness in the approach to Japanese claims of the then Soviet leadership, which sought at any cost to accelerate the normalization of relations with Japan, was also revealed. Having no clear idea about the southern Kuriles, and even more so about their economic and strategic value, N.S. Khrushchev, apparently, treated them like small change. This alone can explain the Soviet leader's naive judgment that negotiations with Japan could be successfully completed as soon as the Soviet side made a "small concession" to Japanese demands. In those days, N.S. It seemed to Khrushchev that, imbued with gratitude for the “gentlemanly” gesture of the Soviet leadership, the Japanese side would respond with the same “gentlemanly” compliance, namely: it would withdraw its excessive territorial claims, and the dispute would end with an “amicable agreement” to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.

Guided by this erroneous calculation of the Kremlin leader, the Soviet delegation at the talks, unexpectedly for the Japanese, expressed its readiness to cede to Japan two southern islands of the Kuril chain: Shikotan and Habomai, after the Japanese side signs a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Willingly acknowledging this concession, the Japanese side did not calm down, and for a long time continued to stubbornly seek the transfer of all four South Kuril Islands to it. But then she failed to bargain for big concessions.

Khrushchev's irresponsible "gesture of friendship" was recorded in the text of the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations", signed by the heads of governments of both countries in Moscow on October 19, 1956. In particular, in Article 9 of this document it was written that the Soviet Union and Japan “... agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan " .

The future transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a demonstration of the readiness of the Soviet Union to give up part of its territory in the name of good relations with Japan. It is no coincidence, as it was emphasized more than once later, that the article dealt with the "transfer" of these islands to Japan, and not their "return", as the Japanese side was then inclined to interpret the essence of the matter.

The word "transfer" was intended to mean the intention of the Soviet Union to cede to Japan part of its own, and not Japanese territory.

However, the inclusion in the declaration of Khrushchev’s reckless promise to give Japan an advance payment of a “gift” in the form of part of the Soviet territory was an example of the political thoughtlessness of the then Kremlin leadership, which had neither legal nor moral right to turn the country’s territory into a subject of diplomatic bargaining. The short-sightedness of this promise became obvious within the next two or three years, when the Japanese government in its foreign policy took a course towards strengthening military cooperation with the United States and increasing Japan's independent role in the Japanese-American "security treaty", the edge of which was quite definitely directed towards Soviet Union.

The hopes of the Soviet leadership that its readiness to "transfer" two islands to Japan would induce Japanese government circles to renounce further territorial claims to our country did not come true.

The very first months that passed after the signing of the joint declaration showed that the Japanese side did not intend to calm down in its demands.

Soon Japan had a new "argument" in the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, based on a distorted interpretation of the content of the named declaration and the text of its ninth article. The essence of this "argument" boiled down to the fact that the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations does not end, but, on the contrary, implies further negotiations on the "territorial issue" and that the fixation in the ninth article of the declaration of the Soviet Union's readiness to transfer the Habomai and Shikotan islands to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty still does not draw a line to the territorial dispute between the two countries, but, on the contrary, suggests the continuation of this dispute over the other two islands of the southern Kuriles: Kunashir and Iturup.

Moreover, at the end of the 1950s, the Japanese government became more active than before in using the so-called "territorial question" to inflate unkind sentiments towards Russia among the Japanese population.

All this prompted the Soviet leadership, headed by N.S. Khrushchev, to correct their assessments of Japanese foreign policy, which did not correspond to the original spirit of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Shortly after Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the anti-Soviet "security pact" in Washington on January 19, 1960, namely on January 27, 1960, the USSR government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government.

The note stated that as a result of the conclusion by Japan of a military treaty weakening the foundations of peace in the Far East, “... a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promises of the Soviet government to transfer the islands of Habomai and Sikotan to Japan”; “Agreeing to the transfer of these islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty,” the note continued, “the Soviet government met the wishes of Japan, took into account the national interests of the Japanese state and the peaceful intentions expressed at that time by the Japanese government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations.”

As was later pointed out in the cited note, in the changed situation, when the new treaty is directed against the USSR, the Soviet government cannot contribute to the transfer of the Habomai and Shikotan islands belonging to the USSR to Japan, to expand the territory used by foreign troops. By foreign troops, the note referred to the US armed forces, whose indefinite presence in the Japanese islands was secured by a new "security treaty" signed by Japan in January 1960.

In the following months of 1960, other notes and statements by the USSR Foreign Ministry and the Soviet government were published in the Soviet press, testifying to the unwillingness of the USSR leadership to continue fruitless negotiations over Japanese territorial claims. Since that time, for a long time, or rather, for more than 25 years, the position of the Soviet government regarding the territorial claims of Japan has become extremely simple and clear: “there is no territorial issue in relations between the two countries” because this issue has “already been resolved” by previous international agreements.

Japanese claims in 1960-1980

The firm and clear position of the Soviet side with regard to Japanese territorial claims led to the fact that during the 60-80s, none of the Japanese statesmen and diplomats managed to draw the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its leaders into any kind of extended discussion about Japanese territorial harassment. .

But this did not mean at all that the Japanese side resigned itself to the Soviet Union's refusal to continue discussions on Japanese claims. In those years, the efforts of Japanese government circles were aimed at launching the so-called "movement for the return of the northern territories" in the country through various administrative measures.

It is noteworthy that the words "northern territories" acquired a very loose content during the deployment of this "movement".

Some political groups, in particular government circles, meant by "northern territories" the four southern islands of the Kuril chain; others, including the socialist and communist parties of Japan, all the Kuril Islands, and still others, especially from among the adherents of ultra-right organizations, not only the Kuril Islands, but also South Sakhalin.

Beginning in 1969, the Government Cartographic Department and the Ministry of Education began to publicly "correct" maps and textbooks, in which the southern Kuril Islands began to be painted over under the color of Japanese territory, as a result of which the territory of Japan "grew" on these new maps, as the press reported. , for 5 thousand square kilometers.

At the same time, more and more efforts were used to process the public opinion of the country and draw as many Japanese as possible into the "movement for the return of the northern territories". So, for example, trips to the island of Hokkaido to the area of ​​the city of Nemuro, from where the southern Kuril Islands are clearly visible, by specialized groups of tourists from other regions of the country, have become widely practiced. The programs of the stay of these groups in the city of Nemuro necessarily included "walks" on ships along the borders of the southern islands of the Kuril chain with the aim of "sad contemplation" of the lands that once belonged to Japan. By the beginning of the 80s, a significant proportion of the participants in these “nostalgic walks” were schoolchildren, for whom such trips were counted as “study trips” provided for by school programs. On Cape Nosapu, closest to the borders of the Kuril Islands, a whole complex of buildings intended for “pilgrims” was built at the expense of the government and a number of public organizations, including a 90-meter observation tower and an “Archival Museum” with a biased exposition designed to convince uninformed visitors in the imaginary historical "validity" of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands.

A new moment in the 70s was the appeal of the Japanese organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign to the foreign public. The first example of this was the speech of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, in which the head of the Japanese government tried to draw the world community into a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 1980s, attempts by Japanese diplomats to use the UN rostrum for the same purpose were made repeatedly.

Since 1980, at the initiative of the Japanese government, the so-called "days of the northern territories" have been celebrated annually in the country. That day was February 7th. It was on this day in 1855 in the Japanese city of Shimoda that the Russian-Japanese treaty was signed, according to which the southern part of the Kuril Islands was in the hands of Japan, and the northern part remained with Russia.

The choice of this date as the "day of the northern territories" was to emphasize that the Shimoda Treaty (annulled by Japan itself in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1918-1925 during the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia) ostensibly still retains its significance.

Unfortunately, the position of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union regarding Japanese territorial claims began to lose its former firmness during M.S.'s tenure. Gorbachev. Calls appeared in public statements for a revision of the Yalta system of international relations that developed as a result of World War II and for an immediate end to the territorial dispute with Japan through a "fair compromise", which meant concessions to Japanese territorial claims. The first frank statements of this kind were made in October 1989 from the lips of the people's deputy, the rector of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute Yu. Afanasyev, who during his stay in Tokyo announced the need to break the Yalta system and transfer the four southern islands of the Kuril chain to Japan as soon as possible.

Following Y. Afanasiev, others began to speak out in favor of territorial concessions during trips to Japan: A. Sakharov, G. Popov, B. Yeltsin. Nothing more than a course towards gradual, protracted concessions to Japanese territorial demands was, in particular, the “Program for a five-stage solution of the territorial issue”, put forward by the then leader of the interregional group Yeltsin during his visit to Japan in January 1990.

As I.A. Latyshev writes: “The result of long and intense negotiations between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1991 was a “Joint Statement” signed by the leaders of the two countries. This statement reflected Gorbachev's characteristic inconsistency in his views and in protecting the national interests of the state.

On the one hand, despite the persistent harassment of the Japanese, the Soviet leader did not allow the inclusion in the text of the "Joint Declaration" of any wording openly confirming the readiness of the Soviet side to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. Nor did he agree to refuse the notes of the Soviet government sent to Japan in 1960.

However, on the other hand, rather ambiguous formulations were nevertheless included in the text of the “Joint Statement”, which allowed the Japanese to interpret them in their favor.

Gorbachev's inconsistency and unsteadiness in protecting the national interests of the USSR was also evidenced by his statement about the intention of the Soviet leadership to start reducing the ten thousandth military contingent located on the disputed islands, despite the fact that these islands are adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where four of the thirteen Japanese divisions were stationed. "self-defense forces".

Democratic time of the 90s

The August events of 1991 in Moscow, the transfer of power into the hands of B. Yeltsin and his supporters and the subsequent withdrawal of the three Baltic countries from the Soviet Union, and later the complete collapse of the Soviet state, which followed as a result of the Belovezhskaya Accords, were perceived by Japanese political strategists as evidence of a sharp weakening the ability of our country to resist the claims of Japan.

In September 1993, when the date of Yeltsin's arrival in Japan was finally agreed - October 11, 1993, the Tokyo press also began to orient the Japanese public to give up excessive hopes for a quick resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia.

The events connected with Yeltsin's further stay at the head of the Russian state, even more clearly than before, showed the failure of the hopes of both Japanese politicians and the Russian Foreign Ministry leaders for the possibility of quickly resolving the protracted dispute between the two countries through a "compromise" involving the concessions of our country to the Japanese territorial harassment.

Followed in 1994-1999. The discussions between Russian and Japanese diplomats did not, in fact, add anything new to the situation that has developed at the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute.

In other words, the territorial dispute between the two countries reached a deep dead end in 1994-1999, and neither side saw a way out of this dead end. The Japanese side, apparently, did not intend to give up its unfounded territorial claims, because none of the Japanese statesmen was able to decide on such a step, fraught with inevitable political death for any Japanese politician. And any concessions to the Japanese claims of the Russian leadership became, in the conditions of the balance of political forces that had developed in the Kremlin and beyond its walls, even less likely than in previous years.

A clear confirmation of this was the increasing conflicts in the sea waters surrounding the southern Kuriles - conflicts during which, during 1994-1955, the repeated unceremonious incursions of Japanese poachers into the territorial waters of Russia met with a harsh rebuff from Russian border guards who opened fire on violators of the borders.

About the possibilities of settling these relations says I.A. Latyshev: “Firstly, the Russian leadership should already then immediately abandon the illusion that as soon as Russia cedes the southern Kuril Islands to Japan, the Japanese side will immediately benefit our country with large investments, soft loans, and scientific and technical information. It was this misconception that prevailed in Yeltsin's entourage.

“Secondly,” writes I.A. Latyshev, our diplomats and politicians, both in Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's times, should have abandoned the false judgment that the Japanese leaders could moderate their claims to the southern Kuriles in the short term and make some kind of "reasonable compromise" in the territorial dispute with our country.

For many years, as was discussed above, the Japanese side has never shown, and was unable to show in the future, the desire to abandon its claims to all four southern Kuril Islands. The maximum that the Japanese could agree to is to receive the four islands they demand not at the same time, but in installments: first two (Khabomai and Shikotan), and then, after some time, two more (Kunashir and Iturup).

“Thirdly, for the same reason, the hopes of our politicians and diplomats that the Japanese could be persuaded to conclude a peace treaty with Russia on the basis of the “Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations” signed in 1956 were self-deception. It was a good deception and nothing more. The Japanese side sought from Russia an open and intelligible confirmation of the obligation recorded in Article 9 of the said declaration to transfer to it, upon the conclusion of a peace treaty, the islands of Shikotan and Habomai. But this did not at all mean that the Japanese side was ready to put an end to its territorial harassment of our country after such confirmation. Japanese diplomats considered the establishment of control over Shikotan and Habomai only as an intermediate stage on the way to mastering all four South Kuril Islands.

In the second half of the 1990s, the national interests of Russia demanded that Russian diplomats abandon the course of illusory hopes for the possibility of our concessions to Japanese territorial claims, and vice versa, would inspire the Japanese side with the idea of ​​the inviolability of Russia's post-war borders.

In the fall of 1996, the Russian Foreign Ministry put forward a proposal for the “joint economic development” by Russia and Japan of the very four islands of the Kuril archipelago that Japan so insistently claimed was nothing more than another concession to pressure from the Japanese side.

The allocation by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the southern Kuril Islands to a certain special zone accessible for the business activities of Japanese citizens was interpreted in Japan as an indirect recognition by the Russian side of the “justification” of Japanese claims to these islands.

I.A. Latyshev writes: “Another thing is also annoying: in the Russian proposals, which implied wide access for Japanese entrepreneurs to the southern Kuriles, there was not even an attempt to condition this access by Japan's consent to appropriate benefits and free access of Russian entrepreneurs to the territory close to the southern Kuriles areas of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. And this manifested the lack of readiness of Russian diplomacy to achieve in negotiations with the Japanese side the equality of the two countries in their business activity in each other's territories. In other words, the idea of ​​"joint economic development" of the southern Kuriles turned out to be nothing more than a unilateral step by the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the Japanese desire to master these islands.

The Japanese were allowed to surreptitiously fish in the immediate vicinity of the shores of precisely those islands that Japan claimed and claims. At the same time, the Japanese side not only did not grant similar rights to Russian fishing vessels to fish in Japanese territorial waters, but also did not undertake any obligations for its citizens and vessels to comply with the laws and regulations of fishing in Russian waters.

Thus, decades of attempts by Yeltsin and his entourage to resolve the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute on a "mutually acceptable basis" and sign a bilateral peace treaty between the two countries did not lead to any tangible results. B. Yeltsin's resignation and V.V. Putin alerted the Japanese public.

President of the country V.V. Putin is in fact the only government official authorized by the Constitution to determine the course of Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute between the two countries. His powers were limited by certain articles of the Constitution, and in particular by those that obligated the President to “ensure the integrity and inviolability of the territory” of the Russian Federation (Article 4), “to protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state” (Article 82).

In the late summer of 2002, during his short stay in the Far East, where Putin flew in to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the Russian president had only a few words to say about his country's territorial dispute with Japan. At a meeting with journalists held in Vladivostok on August 24, he said that "Japan considers the southern Kuriles its territory, while we consider them our territory."

At the same time, he expressed his disagreement with the disturbing reports of some Russian media that Moscow is ready to "return" the named islands to Japan. “These are just rumors,” he said, “spread by those who would like to get some benefit from it.”

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Moscow took place on January 9, 2003, in accordance with previously reached agreements. However, Putin's talks with Koizumi did not make any progress in the development of the territorial dispute between the two countries. I.A. Latyshev calls the policy of V.V. Putin is indecisive and evasive, and this policy gives the Japanese public a reason to expect a dispute to be resolved in favor of their country.

The main factors to be taken into account when solving the problem of the Kuril Islands:

• the presence of the richest reserves of marine biological resources in the waters adjacent to the islands;
• underdevelopment of infrastructure on the territory of the Kuril Islands, the virtual absence of its own energy base with significant reserves of renewable geothermal resources, the lack of own vehicles to ensure freight and passenger traffic;
• proximity and virtually unlimited capacity of seafood markets in neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region;
• the need to preserve the unique natural complex of the Kuril Islands, maintain local energy balance while maintaining the purity of the air and water basins, and protect the unique flora and fauna. When developing a mechanism for the transfer of islands, the opinion of the local civilian population should be taken into account. Those who stay should be guaranteed all rights (including property), and those who leave should be fully compensated. It is necessary to take into account the readiness of the local population to accept the change in the status of these territories.

The Kuril Islands are of great geopolitical and military-strategic importance for Russia and affect the national security of Russia. The loss of the Kuril Islands will damage the defense system of the Russian Primorye and weaken the defense capability of our country as a whole. With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk ceases to be our inland sea. In addition, the South Kuriles have a powerful air defense system and radar systems, fuel depots for refueling aircraft. The Kuril Islands and the water area adjacent to them is the only ecosystem of its kind that has the richest natural resources, primarily biological ones.

The coastal waters of the South Kuril Islands, the Lesser Kuril Ridge are the main habitats of valuable commercial fish and seafood species, the extraction and processing of which is the basis of the economy of the Kuril Islands.

It should be noted that at the moment Russia and Japan have signed a program for the joint economic development of the South Kuril Islands. The program was signed in Tokyo in 2000 during an official visit to Japan by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"Socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands of the Sakhalin region (1994-2005)" in order to ensure the integrated socio-economic development of this region as a special economic zone.

Japan believes that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia is impossible without determining the ownership of the four South Kuril Islands. This was stated by Foreign Minister of this country Yoriko Kawaguchi, speaking to the public of Sapporo with a speech on Russian-Japanese relations. The Japanese threat hanging over the Kuril Islands and their population still worries the Russian people today.