During the last period of the existence of serfdom, all classes of society that rose in any way above the level of the masses were exempted from compulsory military service. This exemption extended to nobles, merchants, honorary citizens and educated persons. German colonists and immigrants from other countries also enjoyed exemption from military service. In addition, benefits for serving military service were provided to residents of Bessarabia, remote areas of Siberia, foreigners, etc. In general, more than 30% of the population were either completely freed or could pay off the supply of recruits with a monetary contribution. The recruitment of the army bore a clear imprint of the estate system: the entire burden of military service fell on the lower classes of the Russian population, on the so-called tax-paying estates. Recruitment sets were made among them. The very choice of recruits from the landowner peasants actually depended on the power of the landowner. Recruitment among other peasants (state, appanage) and among the bourgeoisie was carried out on the basis of the Recruitment Charter of 1831. The latter established the “regular” order, taking into account the interests of the families from which recruits were to be taken. Until 1834, active service lasted 25 years. Then the term was reduced to 20 years, with the remaining 5 years of the lower rank being on indefinite leave. The length of service completely separated the recruits from the rest of the population and therefore actually turned all ranks of the army into a separate class.

After the liberation of the peasants in 1861, such a procedure for recruiting the armed forces could not continue to exist.

The government of Emperor Alexander II, which was rebuilding Russia on new social principles, could not leave such an unfair distribution of military service in force. At the same time, Germany's victories in the war of 1870–1871. showed quite clearly that the armed force of a modern state cannot be based on the previous, relatively small and detached from the people, purely professional armies. The armed force exhibited by states during war came closer and closer to an “armed people.”

The report to Emperor Alexander II, submitted by the Minister of War, General (later Count) Milyutin, states: “Your Imperial Majesty, having turned your attention to the extraordinary increase in the number of European armed forces

states, on the unusually rapid transition of their armies, especially the German one, from a peaceful situation to a military one and on the extensively prepared means by them for the constant replenishment of the loss of ranks in the active troops, ordered the Minister of War to present considerations on the means of developing the military forces of the empire on principles corresponding to the current state weapons of Europe."

In the Manifesto of Emperor Alexander II of January 1, 1874, which declared universal military service in Russia, the government considered it necessary to put forward a new idea of ​​nationwide state protection as the main idea of ​​compulsory military service.

“The strength of the state,” says the Manifesto, “is not in the number of troops alone, but mainly in its moral and mental qualities, which reach high development only when the cause of defending the Fatherland becomes the common cause of the people, when everyone, without distinction of ranks and status, unites for this holy cause."

The law on compulsory military service was issued in the form of the 1874 Charter on universal military service.

Paragraph one of this law read: “the defense of the Throne and the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every Russian subject...”, thus military service was declared universal, all-class and personal.

According to the principles of the new structure of armed force, the army maintained in peacetime should first of all serve as a school for preparing a reserve of military-trained people, through the conscription of whom the wartime army was deployed during mobilization. In this regard, the Charter on Military Service assigns completely different terms of service than before. Initially, this period was set at 5 years, and then reduced to 4 and 3 years. The wall that separated the army from the people was thus destroyed, and the social connection between them was established extremely close.

The conscription statute of 1874 lasted for 40 years, until the World War. True, in 1912 a law was passed amending the Charter, but these changes, which were introduced into the “Charter on Military Service of 1874” by the law of 1912, could not yet be fully reflected in real life, since two years later a world war broke out war.

That is why the study of the conditions created by Russian legislation for the use of the state’s “manpower” in war should be based primarily on a consideration of the Charter on Military Service of 1874.

Territorial distribution of the burdens of military service

According to the Charter of 1874, complete exemption from military service was granted to the entire non-Russian population of the Astrakhan province, Turgai, Ural, Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk regions, Siberia, as well as Samoyeds living in the Mezen and Pechora districts of the Arkhangelsk province. This exemption was also retained by the 1912 law.

Until 1887, the entire population of Transcaucasia, as well as the foreigners of the North Caucasus, were also completely exempt from military service. But then the non-native population of the entire Caucasus was gradually attracted to serve military service on a general basis. In addition, some of the mountain tribes of the North Caucasus were involved in military service (but according to a special, simplified provision).

The entire population of the Turkestan Territory, Primorsky and Amur regions and some remote areas of Siberia were also exempted from military service. As railways were built in Turkestan and Siberia, this seizure decreased.

Until 1901, Finland served military service on the basis of a special situation. But in 1901, out of fear for the capital of the empire, St. Petersburg, in the event of war with Germany, the government disbanded the Finnish troops and, pending the processing of the new Regulations, completely exempted the population of Finland from military service.

Finally, on the basis of special Cossack regulations, the Cossack population of the regions served military service: the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Siberian, Semirechensky, Transbaikal, Amur and Ussuri troops. But the Cossack regulations not only did not represent any relief in serving military service, but in some respects they made greater demands on the population than the general Regulations. The existence of special Cossack charters was explained by the government’s desire to give the Cossacks a law, although built on the same principles as the general Charter, but at the same time adapted to their way of life and historical traditions.

Summarizing the above, we can express in the following figures the distribution of the burdens of “military service” among the entire population of the Russian Empire in 1914:

From this we see that, in comparison with the previous recruitment regulations, our laws on military service significantly expanded the basis on which the recruitment of the armed forces was built. The exemption of part of the population from military service, although retained, is liberation loses its former class character, it is determined by reasons of a national order, and it can be likened to the exemptions from military service provided by other European states to the population of their colonies. Thus, in the above-mentioned exemptions one cannot yet see a violation of the basic principles, namely: universal obligation, universal class and personal duty on which our law on military service sought to be based.

Service life

The idea of ​​the personal duty of every citizen to defend his fatherland is the basic principle of the law on compulsory military service.

The implementation of this idea among the indigenous population of Russia received special moral significance. But in order for this idea to take root in the minds of the people, especially those with little culture, it was necessary that the law on compulsory military service strive to the fullest extent for social justice. All European states base their laws on compulsory military service on the age and physical fitness of the conscripted citizen. Such a formulation of the question is, in fact, most consistent with the idea of ​​compulsory military service. A young and healthy man is a better warrior and can more easily bear all the hardships of combat life. As the age of soldiers decreases, the number of soldiers with large families, for whom military service is incomparably more difficult than single soldiers, also decreases. Therefore, a young army is capable of showing greater energy than an army filled with elderly people, often burdened with a large family.

The last war forced the introduction of some compromises for qualified

workers whose knowledge and skills are more useful for the state to apply not at the front, but in the rear. But all these compromises do not violate the basic idea of ​​the law on compulsory military service if they are dictated solely by the benefit of the state and not by personal benefit. That is why, when we said above that laws on compulsory military service should strive to realize justice to the fullest extent, we added the word “social.” We wanted to highlight the idea that we are not talking about justice in the ordinary understanding of individual life, but about justice determined by the benefit of the entire social organism.

Such a point of view causes great complications, but even in these complicated conditions, the correct solution will be found only if the age principle is used as the basis for the distribution of the burdens imposed on the shoulders of the population by the law on compulsory military service; in other words, the distribution of these burdens should be made among the age strata of the male population of the country, maintaining the greatest uniformity in the requirements within each age class and lowering these requirements as the age of the class increases.

Let us now see to what extent this basic requirement has been fulfilled by our law.

Young people who had just turned 21 were subject to conscription. In peacetime, young people recruited for service entered the standing troops, which consisted of the army, navy and Cossack troops. After serving active service for the period established by law, ranks of the army, navy and Cossack troops were transferred to the “reserve”. By the time the law was published in 1912, the period of active service was 3 years for infantry and artillery (except cavalry), 4 years for other ground forces, and 5 years for the navy. In the reserve, ranks who served in the infantry and artillery (except for cavalry) were listed for 15 years, ranks of other ground forces - 13 years, and ranks of the navy - 5 years.

Reserve ranks were intended to be staffed in the event of the mobilization of units of the active army. In peacetime, reserve ranks could be called up for training camps, but no more than twice during the entire period, and each time for no longer than six weeks. Out of a desire to save money, the duration of training camps was actually reduced: thus, persons who had been in active service for more than three years were called up only once and for two weeks, and persons who had served for less than three years were called up twice, but each time only for three weeks.

At the end of the statutory period of stay in the reserve, those who were in it were transferred to the state militia, in which they remained until the age of 43.

Comparison with German law

From this we see that Russian law distributed the responsibilities of military service into three age strata. In order to see how much such a simplified solution to the issue did not have the flexibility to fully implement the age principle, we refer the reader to diagram No. 1 at the end of the book. In it we indicate for comparison the solution to the same issue under German legislation. While our legislation divided the burdens of military service into three layers, German legislation divided them into six. In peacetime, this difference could not directly affect the situation, because in a peaceful situation, the burden of compulsory military service was borne only by those persons who were in active service, while the rest, who were in the reserve or militia with us and in the reserve, Landwehr and Landsturm in Germany, did not took a break from their private life. But in wartime, the difference between the categories indicated in the table was significant. In our country, categories I and II went immediately with the declaration of war into the ranks of the active troops to die on the battlefields, and category III was partly used to replenish the losses of the active army, and partly to form special militia units for rear service, i.e. without the risk of injury and death. In Germany with

By declaring war, they were immediately intended for active military operations of categories II and III. Category IV (Landwehr category I) was intended for the formation of special units, which were initially supposed to be assigned secondary combat missions. Category V (Landwehr II category) formed special units intended initially for rear service, but they could later be recruited for secondary combat missions. Category VI (land assault troops over 39 years old) formed special units intended exclusively for rear service and border protection. Finally, Category I (landsturm soldiers under 20 years of age) could be called up, if necessary, in the form of early conscription to staff active troops.

In anticipation of the enormous need for “manpower” in the event of a European war, German legislation provided the War Ministry with a certain freedom in the disposal of age classes, for example, the younger ages of the Landwehr, if necessary, could be used to staff field and reserve troops, and the younger ages of the Landsturm II category - to staff the Landwehr.

From a comparison of the data in the diagram we present (No. 1), we first of all see that Germany was preparing to display greater tension in the war than Russia. Germany considered it necessary for its defense to have 28 ages at its army’s disposal, while Russia had only 22.

In the next chapter we will look at the special conditions that existed in Russia and did not allow it the same “tension of people” that was available to other Western European states. But here we need to pay attention to the difference in the attitude of Russian and German legislation to the issue of using younger ages. The conscription age, according to Russian legislation, was determined as follows: the annual conscription took place in the month of October, and young people who had reached 21 years of age by October 1 of the same year were conscripted. According to German law, young people who turned 19 in the previous year were involved. At the same time, while imposing very strict requirements on the physical readiness of a recruit, German legislation provided a deferment for entering the service for physically not fully developed young people. This led to the fact that the average conscription age increased slightly, equaling 20 and a half years. Such a system made it possible, without forcing the weaker part of the male population, to still have a draft age a year younger than ours.

But not only that. German legislation foresaw the need for early conscription in the event of war. It established a procedure according to which every German, upon reaching the age of 17, was enlisted in the Landsturm, that is, made liable for military service.

Our charter of 1874 did not at all foresee the possibility of early conscription in the event of war. The 1912 law attempted to correct this deficiency. But our young people's representatives were not aware of the tremendous effort that would be required from Russia in two years. Our military department was not fully aware of this either. And the above attempt turned out to be very timid. The 1912 law, although it provided for the possibility of early conscription, spoke very vaguely about them.

Art. 5 of the 1912 law stated: “If emergency circumstances arise in wartime, causing an urgent need to speed up the entry of recruits into the ranks of the troops, the next conscription may be, by the Highest Command, announced by the Highest Decree to the Governing Senate, carried out earlier than the deadlines in the previous article (Article 4 ) indicated..."

Meanwhile Art. 4 talks about the timing of conscription in a given year; We find an indication of the age at which young people are subject to conscription in Art. 2, to which in Art. 5 no link available.

Further comparison of the data in Chart 1 shows us that, although Germany is preparing for the conscription of a much larger number of age classes in the event of war,

than Russia, nevertheless, it creates a system that allows it to match the size of the use of its manpower with the size of the emerging needs of the war, while strictly adhering to the age principle.

This system is not only flexible; careful attention to the age principle gives it moral significance, accordingly educating the people's consciousness.

The same cannot be said about Russian law. Although it is rated for lower voltage than the German one, it lacks flexibility. It does not make it possible to implement fair consistency in the use of age classes throughout the country. To characterize in one word, our law is artisanal.

He inherited this handicraft from the Recruitment Charter of 1831. But the latter responded to a different task, namely, waging war by a professional army, while the new task required waging war by an armed people.

Distribution of the hardships of military service by age

The backwardness of Russian legislation on compulsory military service from the requirements of modern warfare is revealed even more clearly if we deepen our analysis.

We have already mentioned above that the law on compulsory military service, when putting into practice the principle of the duty of every citizen to defend his fatherland, is forced to make some deviations from absolutely equal fulfillment of this duty for everyone.

We will dwell on this issue in detail in the following chapters. Here we will touch upon another question related to what was just mentioned, namely, the question of which of the categories indicated in diagram No. 1 included persons who received exemption from active service in peacetime. At first glance it may seem that this question has only formal significance, but in fact this is not the case.

According to the Russian Charter on Military Service of 1874, persons who were not accepted into active service in peacetime were enrolled immediately upon conscription into the state militia. The latter was divided by our law into two categories:

I category - was intended not only for the formation of special militia units, but could also be used to staff active troops.

II category - intended exclusively for staffing special militia units, which were used only as rear guards or as labor.

As we will see later, the greatest development in the field of benefits in our legislation was the benefit based on marital status. Up to 48% of conscripts used it. And approximately half of this number (preferential first category) were enlisted directly into the second category militia, that is, in the event of war they were exempted by law from real combat service. The other half of those benefiting from marital status were enlisted in the 1st category militia. Although, according to the meaning of the law, militia warriors of the second category could be recruited, if necessary, to replenish the active troops, but, according to our legal provisions, records were kept only for warriors of the first category who had previously served in the troops (i.e., between the ages of 39 and 43) and only to the younger four ages of other warriors of the 1st category. The strength of this part of the 1st category militia was considered sufficient “for the probable need: 1) for additional manning for standing troops and 2) for the formation of militia units.”

Thus, our law intended to exempt not only from combat service, but also from any type of military service also warriors of the first category, with the exception of those who had previously served in active service and four younger ages.

As a result, instead of distributing the burdens of military service by age group, our

the law seemed to cut off part of the male population, destining it for military service up to the age of 43, and exempting a completely different part from combat and even from any type of military service.

The world war that broke out in 1914 disrupted all the calculations of the Russian Military Department. During the war it was necessary to hastily change the laws. But the main defects of the Charter on military service were reflected in full force. Diagram No. 2 shows the deadlines for conscription of age classes in various categories of our military personnel. From this cartogram it is clearly visible that the age principle was completely violated.

To illustrate our point, let’s use an example to see how the world war affected the people conscripted in 1897.

In 1914, people of this conscription were 38 years old.

According to what we have stated above, they can be divided into three categories in relation to the burden that falls on them with the declaration of war.

First: those who have completed active service and have been in the reserves for the last year.

Second: enlisted in 1897 in the 1st category militia.

Third: enlisted in 1897 in the militia of the second category.

The first, on the very first day of the announcement of mobilization, were drafted into the active army and marched in its ranks, the second began to be drafted only on March 25, 1916, i.e., twenty months after the start of the war; and still others began to be drafted only on October 25, 1916, that is, twenty-seven months later. In order for this third category to be involved in combat service, and not remain in militia units, even a radical change in the law was required.

This enormous difference in the state’s requirements for the above three categories was predetermined back in 1897, in most cases depending on what kind of worker the conscript was then in the family of his father (or grandfather). 17 years have passed since then. The family of the father, and even more so the grandfather, fell apart (at the same time, as we moved away from serfdom, the separation of young families occurred earlier and earlier). By 1914, the family of the conscript had become a completely independent unit. Meanwhile, the following picture was created: the head of a large family, with young children, goes to the battlefield, and a healthy bore is blissful in the rear and only after 27 months of bloody slaughter is called up, and often only to guard supplies in the distant rear.

The social injustice turned out to be enormous. It increases even more if we compare a 42-year-old former soldier with a large family, although already listed as a warrior of the 1st category, but called up five days after the announcement of mobilization and soon then joining the ranks of the active troops, with a 21-year-old single young man, according to his position in the father's family becoming warriors of the 2nd category. It could happen that this young man, released from military service, turned out to be the son of that former soldier who himself went to die for his Motherland.

In order to compensate for the violation of the economic interests of families from which the head left, the government ordered the issuance of a special cash ration. This measure was reasonable and fair. But with this money only economic justice was restored, but not social justice: life, injury - money cannot be redeemed.

From this we see that our law radically violated the principle of using “manpower” by age. Instead of dividing the male population into horizontal age strata, as we see in cartogram No. 1, in reality the male population of the Russian Empire was divided, as it were, vertically (see diagram No. 2), and this division distributed the burden of military service during the war extremely unevenly , placing all of it on the shoulders of one part of the population and almost freeing the other from it. Along with the violation of the principle of “age” use of the population, the idea of ​​universal compulsory military service was lost. In violation of the age principle, our law allowed a kind of sequence. The conscription of militia warriors of the 1st category was carried out after the exhaustion of all ages of persons who served in peacetime in

troops, and the conscription of militia warriors of the second category was carried out only after the use of almost all age classes of the first category militia.

Diagram No. 2 with the conscription dates indicated on it presents a very interesting illustration in this regard.

During the war, such a formulation of the matter could not strengthen among our masses the consciousness of the universal obligation of the duty to defend their fatherland. For the uncultured masses of the Russian people, the practical implementation of the law was much more convincing than the words about the sacred duty printed in the first article of the law. After the revolution, at soldier rallies the phrases were often heard: “we are from Tambov” or “we are from Penza”, “the enemy is still far away from us, so we have no need to fight.” These phrases formulated not so much a lack of patriotism among the lower ranks of the Russian people, but rather a lack of understanding of the idea of ​​​​the general compulsoryness of military service. Our laws on “military conscription,” as we have seen, did not educate the people’s consciousness in this direction.

German legislation, in contrast to ours, was extremely attentive to this issue, and its main educational technique was the careful implementation of the age principle in its requirements for citizens. Forced, like the Russian (albeit to a lesser extent), to take into account exemptions from active service in peacetime, it creates for these persons a special category called the Ersatz Reserve. All those physically fit for service in peacetime, as well as those released from the troops before the end of their total service period, were enrolled in this Ersatz reserve.

With the declaration of war, ranks of the Ersatz Reserve who had not reached the age of 28 were called up, along with their peers who were in the reserve, to staff the field and form reserve troops. Ersatz Reserve ranks aged 28–32 were drafted along with their peers who were in the Landwehr 1st conscription. Finally, ranks of the Ersatz Reserve at the age of 32–38 were called up, again along with their peers, Landwehrists to form Landwehr units of the 2nd conscription. Upon reaching the age of 38, the ranks of the Ersatz Reserve were enrolled on a general basis in the Landsturm.

From here we see that with the declaration of war, all the exemptions and benefits that German legislation was forced to make for peacetime lost their significance and the entire population of the German Empire was equalized in their responsibilities for the defense of the fatherland.

Cossack charters on military service

We have already mentioned above that 2.5% of the population of the Russian Empire was subject to special Cossack regulations regarding military service. We also said that the reason for singling out the Cossack population was explained by the desire not to violate the historical traditions that had developed among the Cossacks.

The main type for Cossack regulations was the Charter on the military service of the Don Army (published in 1875).

According to this charter, the armed forces of the Don Army consisted of “service personnel” of the army and “militia”.

“Service personnel” were divided into three categories:

a) “Preparatory” category, in which the Cossacks received preliminary training for military service;

b) “Combatant” category, from which the combatants fielded by the troops were recruited

c) “Spare” category, intended to replenish losses in combat units in wartime and for the formation of new military units in wartime.

The service of each Cossack began when he reached 18 years of age and lasted 20 years. During this period, he was in the “service” category, and he remained in the “preparatory” category for 3 years, in the “combat” category for 12 years, and in the “reserve” category for 5 years.

During the first year of being in the preparatory category, the Cossacks were exempt from personal taxes, both in kind and in cash, and had to prepare the equipment necessary for service. From the autumn of the second year, the Cossacks of the preparatory category began to receive primary individual military training in their villages. In the third year, in addition to this training, they were assigned camp training for one month.

Upon reaching the age of 21, the Cossacks were enrolled in the “combatant” rank, and of them, such a number as was necessary to replenish the combat units were enlisted in February of the following year for active service, in which they remained continuously for 4 years. The regiments and batteries deployed by the Cossacks were divided into three lines, of which in peacetime the 1st line was in service, and the 2nd and 3rd were “on benefits.” The above-mentioned Cossacks of the first 4 age classes served in units of the 1st line; then, upon completion of 4 years of active service, they are enlisted for 4 years - in the 3rd line unit. Preferential Cossacks who belonged to the regiments of the 2nd stage were subject to two control fees and one three-week training session annually. Those belonging to the regiments of the 3rd line were subject to collection only once, namely, in the third year of their stay in this line, also for three weeks.

Cossacks of the “reserve” category did not gather for any training in peacetime. In wartime, they were called up for service as needed, starting at a young age.

Finally, the “militia” consisted of all Cossacks capable of carrying weapons who did not belong to the “service personnel”, and the Cossacks of the militia up to the age of 48 were kept records.

We have plotted on diagram No. 3 the distribution of military service, according to Cossack regulations, by age strata. Comparing this distribution with the same created by our general statute, and the same created by German legislation, we cannot help but see a greater resemblance to the second than to the first. In the Cossack regulations, as well as in the German statutes, we see an extremely careful distribution of the burden of military service by age strata, and even the number of such age strata coincides.

The similarities between the Cossack charters and German legislation do not end there. It goes deeper.

According to Cossack regulations, young people who were physically fit for military service, but for one reason or another were exempt from active service in peacetime, were enrolled in “preferential regiments.” Thus, they were not immediately made militia warriors, as happened according to the general regulations, but fell into the 2nd line combat reserve. As a result, with the declaration of war, they lost their peacetime benefits and went along with their peers to defend the fatherland.

The similarity between the Cossack regulations and the German laws on compulsory military service is all the more striking since there can be no talk of any mutual borrowing.

We encounter here only an extremely interesting social phenomenon: the same ideas, logically and consistently implemented, led to the same consequences.

The only difference was that Germany implemented the idea of ​​compulsory military service on a more grandiose scale. She approached this realization by

empirical (a strong impetus in this regard was given by the Peace of Tilsit of 1807, the secret article of which Napoleon prohibited Prussia from maintaining more than 42,000 troops in peacetime) and through deep scientific development under the leadership of such a brilliant organizer as Field Marshal Moltke. The Cossacks followed an exclusively empirical path. The centuries-old struggle that befell them to protect Russia from the peoples of the East, which required the participation in this struggle of the entire male population capable of bearing arms, not only raised the Cossacks in the idea of ​​​​the general compulsory military service, but also developed the very forms of implementing this idea in practice.

Thus, at the disposal of Russian statesmen, along with the experience of recruiting the army, there was also the historically established experience of Cossack compulsory military service. The question inevitably arises as to why this “Cossack” experience was not used in the general regulations, since the idea of ​​universal military service extended to the entire empire.

The answer to this question must be sought in the field of general social and political conditions.

The implementation of the idea of ​​universal compulsory military service is very closely connected with the democratization of the social system. Prussian archives preserve a number of projects of interesting reforms considered before Vienna (1806). One of them, Knesebeck, who proposed the establishment of universal conscription, was rejected in 1803. A critic of this project wrote: “The state system and military institutions are closely related; throw away one ring and the whole chain falls apart. Universal conscription is possible only with the reform of the entire political system of Prussia.” These archival projects indicate the impossibility of carrying out universal conscription in the presence of obstacles rooted in the general political conditions of the then Prussia. In the same way, the outstanding military minds of the 18th century. expressed ideas in the field of tactics, those ideas that Napoleon later implemented, but the old order was powerless to accept them. So it was in Prussia - it took a cruel blow, a shock to the foundations of feudal remnants, in order to transfer the reform from the realm of wishes to reality. Only after Vienna did Scharngorst become possible as the creator of military reform. Prussia’s full entry into the path of universal military service, the path leading to an “armed people,” became possible only after the revolution of 1848.

Due to historical conditions, the Cossack population bore the stamp of deep democracy in their traditions and social skills. The rest of Russia only took the first step along this path with the liberation of the peasants. History cannot fail to note the greatness of the reforms of Emperor Alexander II. But at the same time, it is completely natural that for the employees of this great emperor, who directed the development of Russia along new paths, it was difficult to rid themselves of the influence of outdated ideas. Therefore, in military terms, the ideas of the Recruitment Charter of 1831 were closer to the drafters of the Charter of Military Service of 1874 than the experience of the compulsory service of the Cossacks. Meanwhile, the Recruitment Charter of 1831 was built on completely different principles, namely, on the idea of ​​a professional army, isolated from the rest of the population; this charter was quite logically based, so to speak, on the “vertical” division of the country’s male population: one small part of the male population had to fight until they were physically unusable, while the rest could calmly stay in the rear, believing that the defense of the Fatherland was not her business. The influence of the Recruitment Charter introduced into the 1874 Charter inconsistency in the implementation of the age principle in practice.

The influence of the ideas of the Recruit Charter of 1831 on the drafters of the Charter of 1874 finds another explanation. In 1874, the idea of ​​an “armed people” was new not only for Russia, but also for all other European states except Germany. It was completely natural on the part of the drafters of the new Charter to strive, as far as possible, to smooth out the break with the old forms that took place under the new structure of the armed force. In the natural course of things, the Charter on Military Service of 1874

over time it would improve, losing the harmful remnants borrowed from the Recruitment Charter. But the bomb explosion that killed Emperor Alexander II on March 1, 1881, put a bloody end to the further development of the reforms of the Tsar Liberator, orienting the reign of Emperor Alexander III along a different path. At best, the activities of Emperor Alexander II remained without further improvement. The law on universal military service suffered a similar fate.

Caused by the unsuccessful war with Japan, the revolution of 1905 forced the Russian government to again seek a path in the direction indicated by the great reforms of Emperor Alexander II. But when the country calmed down, the government was taking all measures to evade the initiatives announced in the Manifesto of Emperor Nicholas II of October 17, 1905. The government of Emperor Nicholas II after the revolution of 1905 no longer believed in the old political ideas and at the same time did not want accept new ones. This duality of policy gives state management a character of lack of ideas.

Hesitation and lack of ideas are also reflected in the organization of the armed forces.

Under the direct impression of the defeats on the fields of Manchuria, such enlightened people who understood modern military affairs as Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and generals Palitsyn and Roediger were promoted to positions of high leaders of the Russian armed forces. As Chairman of the Council of State Defense, the Grand Duke was entrusted with general management of the activities of the General Staff of General Palitsyn and Minister of War General Roediger. At the same time, an important organizational reform was carried out in the form of the separation of the Main Directorate of the General Staff from the War Ministry. Such a distinction was especially important for Russia of this era, as it made it possible to focus on the scientific development of the basic ideas of the structure of the Russian armed force. Such work began under the direct leadership of General Palitsyn.

Minister of War General V. A. Sukhomlinov

But already in 1908, a new luminary appeared on the horizon of the Petrograd bureaucracy - General Sukhomlinov. The Council of State Defense is abolished, and at the same time Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich is removed from the overall leadership of the structure of the armed forces. Generals Palitsyn and Roediger were removed from their posts. The General Staff is again subordinate to the Minister of War, which General Sukhomlinov becomes.

The appearance of the latter as Minister of War is not an accident. In every social organism a kind of social selection develops. The famous English aphorism “the right man on the right place” is only the result of such selection in a healthy social organism. In a sick organism, social selection is expressed in the fact that the most “convenient” people are selected. In this state of affairs, the appearance of “proper people” is, in turn, an accident. The appearance of General Palitsyn and Minister of War General Roediger as Chief of the General Staff was an “accident”, explained only by the severity of the impressions of the failures in the Japanese war and the pressure exerted by the revolution. Generals Palitsyn and Roediger had the civic courage to point out the backwardness of our military training and the need for long, hard work, based on a scientific basis; with this they destroyed the legend of our innate invincibility.

As the acute impression of defeat began to fade, and the revolution that had flared up subsided, General Sukhomlinov turned out to be more responsive to the “turn back” policy. Having graduated from the Academy of the General Staff in the 70s of the last century and decorated with the St. George Cross for the war of 1877–1878, he suggested a combination of higher education and combat experience. But with the rapid development of military affairs, a higher military education obtained without constant hard work to study the evolution of military affairs loses its value. Sukhomlinov was fully convinced that the knowledge he acquired decades ago, although often already outdated, remained unshakable truths. General Sukhomlinov's ignorance was combined with amazing frivolity. These two shortcomings allowed him to be surprisingly calm about the most complex issues of organizing military power. People who did not understand the complexity of modern military affairs were given the false impression that Sukhomlinov quickly understood the matter and was very decisive. Meanwhile, he simply became like a man who, walking near an abyss, does not see it.

We had to dwell in a little more detail on the figure of General Sukhomlinov, because this minister of war, who became omnipotent in the field of military training of the country, caused a return in this area to lack of ideas and lack of system.

The extent to which there was no understanding of the need for the opposite is demonstrated by the following fact.

The body entrusted with detailed scientific development and at the same time synthesis of decisions on all particular issues of military training of the state is an institution corresponding, in German terminology, to the “Great General Staff”. In Russia there was a Main Directorate of the General Staff, but for many reasons it was far from corresponding to the high and responsible mission that was entrusted to it. One of the main reasons for this was the constant change of chiefs of the General Staff. From the time General Sukhomlinov took over the management of the War Ministry before the start of the war, i.e., for 6 years, 4 people held this post (General Myshlaevsky, General Gerngross, General Zhilinsky, General Yanushkevich). Meanwhile, in Germany, the successive tenure of four persons in the same post (Count Moltke, Count Walderee, Count Schlieffen, Count Moltke the Younger) lasted 53 years. Any change in the chiefs of the General Staff inevitably has a destructive effect on all work to prepare for war. Therefore, there is no need to talk seriously about the possibility of uniting all the numerous and varied measures to prepare armed power in the era of Sukhomlinov. Depending on the ability, degree of preparation and even tastes of one or another person, we paid attention to one or another issue; this issue was resolved one way or another, but we did not have the scientifically based synthesis that was available in France or Germany.

The unsystematic and unprincipled nature of the management of the ministry by General Sukhomlinov was clearly revealed when drawing up such basic military regulations as the “Regulations on Field Command of Troops.” “The crown of all work on the reorganization of the army,” writes General Yu. Danilov, “should have been the revision of the “Regulations on the field control of troops in wartime.” This provision should have determined: the organization of higher military formations, their management, the organization of the rear and the service of all kinds of supplies. The current regulation was published in the nineties of the last century and under modern conditions was completely inapplicable. This was shown by the war of 1904–1905, during which a lot of fundamental changes had to be made. Despite a number of commissions working on the new project, the matter did not go well, and

Only by January 1913, when the drafting at the request of the quartermaster general’s department was removed from the commissions that were slowing it down and concentrated under the said department of the General Staff, the work was completed. The project met, however, with many objections, mainly from departments that occupied a privileged position and wanted to see their representatives more independent than was determined by the general scheme. Its consideration dragged on for more than a year, and only the upcoming events of 1914 accelerated the successful resolution of the case. What seemed insoluble under peaceful living conditions for many months was resolved in anticipation of war - in one night meeting. Only on July 16/29, 1914, i.e. just three days before the start of the war, was one of the most important provisions for wartime approved by the supreme power.”

The failure of Sukhomlinov's ministry to carry out the necessary reform in the laws on universal military service was even more evident, because such a reform required not only an in-depth scientific understanding of modern war, but also a broad point of view on all aspects of public life.

We will again present here excerpts from the book of General Yu. Danilov “Russia in the World War”.

“The basis of our entire military system was the Charter on Military Service, issued during the reign of Emperor Alexander II and, of course, significantly outdated. The urgent need for its complete revision was felt both in government circles and in the Duma. But this took time. And so, in order to move things forward more reliably and quickly, the State Duma decided to deny the government an increase in the contingent of recruits it annually approved until a new Charter was passed through the legislative institutions...”

“The complexity of the issue, internal interdepartmental tensions, of which there were always many, led to the fact that the new Charter on military service was approved in 1912. Having thus become law shortly before the war, it had almost no impact on the conditions of actual recruitment of the army and the procedure for transferring it to martial law. In addition, the new Charter was not far from its predecessor and in no way ensured that the Russian army in peacetime would transform it into an armed people with the declaration of war.”

“Theoretically, the need to build the armed force of a modern state on the given basis may have been recognized, but this position was not actually implemented.”

Alexander II is known for his numerous reforms that affected all aspects of the life of Russian society. In 1874, on behalf of this tsar, Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin changed the conscription system for the Russian army. The format of universal conscription, with some changes, existed in the Soviet Union and continues today.

Military reform

The introduction of universal military service, which was epochal for the inhabitants of Russia at that time, occurred in 1874. It took place as part of large-scale reforms in the army undertaken during the reign of Emperor Alexander II. This tsar ascended the throne at a time when Russia was shamefully losing the Crimean War, unleashed by his father Nicholas I. Alexander was forced to conclude an unfavorable peace treaty.

However, the real consequences of failure in another war with Turkey appeared only a few years later. The new king decided to understand the reasons for the fiasco. They included, among other things, an outdated and ineffective system for replenishing army personnel.

Disadvantages of the recruitment system

Before the introduction of universal conscription, there was conscription in Russia. It was introduced in 1705. An important feature of this system was that conscription extended not to citizens, but to communities, which chose young men to be sent to the army. At the same time, the service life was lifelong. Bourgeois and artisans chose their candidates by blind lot. This norm was enshrined in law in 1854.

The landowners, who owned their own serfs, themselves chose the peasants, for whom the army became their home for life. The introduction of universal conscription freed the country from another problem. It consisted in the fact that legally there was no definite one. It varied depending on the region. At the end of the 18th century, the service life was reduced to 25 years, but even such a time frame separated people from their own farming for too long a period. The family could be left without a breadwinner, and when he returned home, he was already effectively incapacitated. Thus, not only a demographic, but also an economic problem arose.

Proclamation of reform

When Alexander Nikolaevich assessed all the disadvantages of the existing order, he decided to entrust the introduction of universal conscription to the head of the Military Ministry, Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin. He worked on the new legislation for several years. The development of the reform ended in 1873. On January 1, 1874, the introduction of universal conscription finally took place. The date of this event became significant for contemporaries.

The recruiting system was abolished. Now all men who had reached 21 years of age were subject to conscription. The state made no exceptions for classes or ranks. Thus, the reform also affected the nobles. The initiator of the introduction of universal conscription, Alexander II, insisted that there should be no privileges in the new army.

Service life

The main one was now 6 years (in the navy - 7 years). The time frame for being in reserve was also changed. Now they were equal to 9 years (in the navy - 3 years). In addition, a new militia was formed. Those men who had already served in actual service and in the reserve were included in it for 40 years. Thus, the state received a clear, regulated and transparent system for replenishing troops for any occasion. Now, if a bloody conflict began, the army did not have to worry about the influx of fresh forces into its ranks.

If a family had a sole breadwinner or only son, he was freed from the obligation to go to serve. A flexible deferment system was also provided (for example, in case of low welfare, etc.). The period of service was shortened depending on what kind of education the conscript had. For example, if a man had already graduated from university, he could only stay in the army for a year and a half.

Deferments and exemptions

What other features did the introduction of universal conscription in Russia have? Among other things, deferments appeared for conscripts who had health problems. If, due to his physical condition, a man was unable to serve, he was generally exempted from the obligation to serve in the army. In addition, an exception was also made for church ministers. People who had specific professions (medical doctors, students at the Academy of Arts) were immediately enlisted in the reserves without actually being in the army.

The national question was a sensitive one. For example, representatives of the indigenous peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus did not serve at all. At the same time, such benefits were abolished in 1874 for the Lapps and some other northern nationalities. Gradually this system changed. Already in the 1880s, foreigners from the Tomsk, Tobolsk and Turgai, Semipalatinsk and Ural regions began to be called up for service.

Acquisition areas

Other innovations also appeared, which were marked by the introduction of universal conscription. The year of reform was remembered in the army by the fact that it now began to be staffed according to regional rankings. The entire Russian Empire was divided into three large sections.

The first of them was Great Russian. Why was he called that? It included territories where an absolute Russian majority lived (above 75%). The objects of ranking were counties. It was based on their demographic indicators that the authorities decided which group the residents belong to. The second section included lands where there were also Little Russians (Ukrainians) and Belarusians. The third group (foreign) is all other territories (mainly the Caucasus, Far East).

This system was necessary for manning artillery brigades and infantry regiments. Each such strategic unit was replenished by residents of only one site. This was done in order to avoid ethnic hatred in the troops.

Reform in the military personnel training system

It is important that the implementation of military reform (the introduction of universal military service) was accompanied by other innovations. In particular, Alexander II decided to completely change the officer education system. Military educational institutions lived according to the old skeletal order. In the new conditions of universal conscription, they became ineffective and costly.

Therefore, these institutions began their own serious reform. Her main guide was Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich (the Tsar’s younger brother). The main changes can be noted in several theses. Firstly, special military education was finally separated from general education. Secondly, access to it was made easier for men who did not belong to the noble class.

New military educational institutions

In 1862, new military gymnasiums appeared in Russia - secondary educational institutions that were analogues of civilian real schools. Another 14 years later, all class qualifications for admission to such institutions were finally abolished.

The Alexander Academy was founded in St. Petersburg, which specialized in training military and legal personnel. By 1880, the number of military educational institutions throughout Russia had increased markedly compared to the figures at the beginning of the reign of the Tsar-Liberator. There were 6 academies, the same number of schools, 16 gymnasiums, 16 schools for cadets, etc.

CHARTER ON MILITARY SERVICE

[Extract]

The male population, regardless of condition, is subject to military service.

4. Cash ransom from military service and replacement by a hunter are not allowed.

5. The armed forces of the state consist of standing troops and militia. This latter is convened only in emergency wartime circumstances.

10. Entry into conscription service is decided by lot, which is drawn once for life. Persons who, according to the number of the lot drawn by them, are not eligible for permanent troops, are enlisted in the militia.

11. Each year, only the age of the population is drawn by lot, namely young people who have turned 21 years old since October 1 of the year in which the selection is made.

12. Persons who meet certain educational conditions are allowed to serve military service without drawing lots, as volunteers, on the basis of the rules set out in Chapter XII of this charter.

17. The total period of service in the ground forces for those entering by lot is determined at 15 years, of which 6 years of active service and 9 years in reserve.

18. The total service life in the navy is determined at 10 years, of which 7 years of active service and 3 years in the reserve.

20. The terms of service indicated in the previous 17 and 18 articles are established specifically for peacetime: during war, those in the ground forces and navy are obliged to remain in service as long as state needs require it.

36. The state militia is made up of all the male population from the conscript age (Article 11) up to and including 43 years of age who is not included in the standing troops, but is capable of bearing arms. Persons discharged from the army and navy reserves before this age are not exempt from conscription into the militia.

Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire. T. XLIX. No. 52983.

On January 1 (13), 1874, the “Manifesto on the introduction of universal military service” was published, according to which military service was imposed on all classes of Russian society. On the same day, the “Charter on Military Service” was approved. “Defense of the throne and fatherland is the sacred duty of every Russian subject. The male population, regardless of condition, is subject to military service,” the Charter stated.

Starting from the time of Peter I, all classes in Russia were involved in military service. The nobles themselves had to undergo military service, and the tax-paying classes had to ensure that the army was staffed with a supply of recruits. When in the 18th century. The nobles were gradually freed from compulsory service; conscription turned out to be the lot of the poorest strata of society, since wealthy people could pay off by hiring a recruit for themselves.

Crimean War 1853-1856 demonstrated the weakness and backwardness of the military organization in the Russian Empire. During the reign of Emperor Alexander II, military reforms, which were dictated by external and internal factors, were carried out thanks to the activities of Minister of War D. A. Milyutin in several areas: the introduction of new regulations, reduction of army personnel, training of trained reserves and officers, rearmament of the army, reorganization quartermaster service. The main goal of these reforms was to reduce the army in peacetime and at the same time ensure the possibility of its deployment during war. However, all the innovations could not eliminate the feudal-class structure of the army, based on a system of recruitment among peasants and the monopoly of nobles on occupying officer positions. Hence, Milyutin’s most important measure was the introduction of universal conscription.

Back in 1870, a special commission was formed to develop the issue of conscription, which, just four years later, presented to the emperor the Charter of universal conscription for all classes, which was approved by the highest in January 1874. Rescript of Alexander II addressed to Milyutin dated January 11 (23) 1874 instructed the minister to carry out the law “in the same spirit in which it was drafted.”

The Charter on Military Service of 1874 determined the total period of military service in the ground forces to be 15 years, in the navy - 10 years, of which active military service was 6 years on land and 7 in the navy, in the reserve - 9 years on land and 3 years in the navy. Infantry and foot artillery were recruited on a territorial basis. From now on, recruitment was abolished, and the entire male population over 21 years of age was subject to conscription. Persons who were exempt from military service due to various benefits were enlisted in the militia in the event of a declaration of war. Having left the reserve, the soldier could only occasionally be called up for training camps, which did not interfere with his private studies or peasant labor.

The charter also provided for benefits for education and deferments for marital status. Thus, the only sons of their parents, the only breadwinners in the family with young brothers and sisters, and representatives of certain nationalities were subject to exemption from service. The clergy, doctors and teachers were completely exempted from military service.

To carry out conscription, provincial conscription presences were established in each province, which were under the jurisdiction of the Directorate for Conscription Affairs of the General Staff of the Military Ministry of the Russian Empire. The charter on military service, with amendments and additions, continued to be in force until January 1918.

Lit.: Golovin N. N. Russian laws on universal military service // Military efforts of Russia in the World War. Paris, 1939; The same [Electronic resource]. URL:http://militera.lib.ru/research/golovnin_nn/01.html ; Goryainov S. M. Statutes on military service. St. Petersburg, 1913; Livin Y., Ransky G. Charter on military service. With all changes and additions. St. Petersburg, 1913; Charter on military service of January 1, 1874 [Electronic resource] // International Military Historical Association. B. d. URL: http://www.imha.ru/index.php?newsid=1144523930 .

See also in the Presidential Library:

Improve officer training

Re-equip the army with modern weapons

Improve the military command system

Eliminate the gap between the Russian army and Western European ones

Create an army with trained reserves

The reason for the introduction of this reform was the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War.

Main provisions of the reform:

15 military districts established to improve army management

The network of military educational institutions for training officers has been expanded (academies, military gymnasiums, cadet schools)

New military regulations were introduced

Rearmament of the army and navy was carried out

Abolition of corporal punishment

And in 1874, the recruitment system was abolished, and universal (all-class) military service was introduced.

The following terms of service in the army were established: in the infantry - 6 years, in the navy - 7, 9 years in the reserve, for those who graduated from district schools - 3 years, for those who graduated from gymnasiums - 1.5 years, for those who graduated from universities - 6 months, i.e. The length of service depended from education.

Military service began at the age of 20. The following were not called up for military service: the only son in the family, the breadwinner, the clergy, the peoples of the North, Wed. Asia, part of the Caucasus and Siberia

The first Russian revolution of 1905-1907: its prerequisites and main stages. Creation of Soviets as bodies of revolutionary power.

The Highest Manifesto on the improvement of state order (October Manifesto)

A legislative act of the Supreme Power of the Russian Empire, promulgated on October 17 (30), 1905. It was developed by Sergei Witte on behalf of Emperor Nicholas II in connection with the ongoing “turmoil”. In October, a strike began in Moscow, which spread throughout the country and grew into the All-Russian October political strike. On October 12-18, over 2 million people went on strike in various industries. This general strike and, above all, the strike of railway workers, forced the emperor to make concessions.

First of all, the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 outlined the fundamental rights and freedoms of man and citizen, which were discussed in more detail in
Code of Basic State Laws. This was a significant step towards the development of the principles of constitutionalism in the country.

In addition, the Manifesto reflects the foundations of the state structure, the foundations of the formation and activities of the State Duma and
Governments, which also received their development in the Code.

The code, in turn, covered a wider range of issues. In addition to these issues, this normative legal act reflects such important issues as the issue of state power, legislative initiative and the legislative process as a whole, the position of this Code in the legislative system that existed at that time, and much more.

Basic state laws of the Russian Empire as amended on April 23, 1906: form of government, legislative procedure, rights and obligations of subjects

A few days before the opening of the first Duma, on April 23, 1906, Nicholas II approved the text of the edition of the Basic State Laws of the Russian Empire. Such haste was associated with the desire to prevent their discussion in the Duma, so that the latter would not turn into the Constituent Assembly. The Basic Laws of 1906 established the state structure of the Russian Empire, the state language, the essence of the supreme power, the order of legislation, the principles of organization and activity of central government institutions, the rights and obligations of Russian subjects, the position of the Orthodox Church, etc.

The first chapter of the basic laws revealed the essence of the “supreme autocratic power”. Until the last moment, Nicholas II resisted removing from the text the provision on the unlimited power of the monarch in Russia. In the final edition, the article on the scope of royal power was formulated as follows: “ The Supreme Autocratic power belongs to the All-Russian Emperor...” From now on, the Russian emperor had to share legislative power with the Duma and the State Council. However, the prerogatives of the monarch remained very broad: he owned “ initiative on all subjects of legislation"(only on his initiative could the Basic State Laws be revised), he approved laws, appointed and dismissed senior dignitaries, directed foreign policy, and was proclaimed “ sovereign leader of the Russian army and navy", was endowed with the exclusive right to mint coins, war was declared in his name, peace was concluded, and legal proceedings were carried out.

The ninth chapter, which established the procedure for the adoption of laws, determined that “ no new law can follow without the approval of the State Council and the State Duma and take force without the approval of the Sovereign Emperor.” Bills that were not passed by both houses were considered rejected. Bills rejected by one of the chambers could be reintroduced for its consideration only with the permission of the emperor. Bills not approved by the emperor could be considered again no earlier than the next session.

Basic state laws laid the foundations for a new political system, which later became known as the June Third monarchy.

The basic state laws of 1906 were the constitution. They were considered as such both by government officials and liberal historians of state law.

Thus, we can conclude that a dualistic monarchy has been established in Russia. A characteristic feature of this form in Russia was the incomplete separation of powers, which gave rise to a synthesis of elements of absolute and constitutional monarchy, with a clear predominance of the former.

State Duma

The system of representative institutions was introduced in Russia by a number of state acts, starting with the Manifesto of August 6, 1905 and ending with the “Basic State. laws” April 23, 1906. According to the original draft (August 6, 1905), the State Duma was intended to be a “legislative institution” elected on the basis of qualification representation from three curiae. The aggravation of the political situation soon required a revision of the project.

On December 11, 1905, after the defeat of the armed uprising in Moscow, a decree “On changing the regulations on elections to the State Duma” was issued, cat. The circle of voters is significantly expanding. Almost the entire male population of the country over the age of 25, except for soldiers, students, day laborers and some nomads, received voting rights. The right to vote was not direct and remained unequal for voters of different categories (curiae).

Deputies were elected by electoral assemblies consisting of electors from each province and a number of large cities. Electors were chosen by four separate curiae of voters: landowners, city dwellers, peasants and workers.

State Duma in the period from 1905–1907. was a representative body of power that for the first time limited the monarchy in Russia.

The reasons for the formation of the Duma were: the revolution of 1905–1907, which arose after Bloody Sunday, and general popular unrest in the country.

The procedure for the formation and establishment of the Duma was established by the Manifesto on the establishment of the State Duma. Duma of August 6, 1905

The State Duma was supposed to work together with the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers was a permanent, highest government institution headed by a chairman.

The Council of Ministers headed all departments on issues of legislation and higher government. management, i.e. he to some extent limited the activities of the State. Duma.

Basic principles of work of the State. Dumas:

1. freedom of conscience;

2. participation in elections by broad sections of the population;

3. mandatory approval by the Duma of all laws issued.

All men over 25 years of age had active voting rights to the State Duma (with the exception of military personnel, students, day laborers and nomads).

The competence of the Duma on the Establishment: development of laws, their discussion, approval of the country's budget. All bills passed by the Duma had to be approved by the Senate, and later by the Emperor. The Duma did not have the right to consider issues beyond its competence, for example, issues of state payments. debts and loans to the Ministry of the Household, as well as for state. loans.

Term of office State. Duma - 5 years.

The State Duma was bicameral: the upper house was the State Duma. council (it was headed by a chairman and vice-chairman, appointed by the emperor annually); lower house - representatives from the population.

During the period 1905–1907 3 different Dumas were convened. compositions. The First Duma lasted 72 days. It was the most liberal-minded, since its convening was a consequence of the revolutionary movement in Russia; there were no representatives from the monarchist movement.

After the dissolution of the Third Duma (when popular uprisings were suppressed by the tsarist army), significant changes were made to the laws on the State. Duma, for example:

2. the number of representatives from Poland, the Caucasus and Central Asia was limited.